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docs: document fuzzing infrastructure and its security guarantees

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Sync AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md with the fuzzing workflow, add a README section
pointing to tests/PalladiumWallet.Fuzz, and record in SECURITY.md the two
guarantees the fuzz suite enforces: a bounded PBKDF2 iteration count on read
and a typed InvalidDataException for any malformed encrypted container.
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Davide Grilli
2026-07-07 22:06:38 +02:00
parent cdede17683
commit 6f4ae679e5
4 changed files with 16 additions and 1 deletions
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SECURITY.md
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@@ -55,8 +55,9 @@ It cannot (given correct Merkle verification):
## Encryption at rest
- Algorithm: AES-256-GCM
- Key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 600 000 iterations, 16-byte random salt (fresh salt and nonce on every save; the iteration count is stored in the file container, so future increases remain backward-compatible)
- Key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, 600 000 iterations, 16-byte random salt (fresh salt and nonce on every save; the iteration count is stored in the file container, so future increases remain backward-compatible — bounded at 10 000 000 on read, since the count is attacker-controlled in a tampered file and an absurd value would hang the wallet at open)
- Authentication: GCM tag (16 bytes) — any tampering is detected before decryption
- A malformed container (broken JSON, missing fields, bad base64, wrong nonce/tag size) always fails with a typed `InvalidDataException`, never a raw parser exception — the decrypt path is fuzz-tested (`tests/PalladiumWallet.Fuzz`)
- The user can explicitly opt out of encryption (UI shows a warning); the `WalletStore.Save` API accepts `null` password only when the caller has confirmed user intent
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