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palladum-lightning/tools/lightning-hsmtool.c

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#include "config.h"
#include <ccan/array_size/array_size.h>
#include <ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256/hkdf_sha256.h>
#include <ccan/err/err.h>
#include <ccan/noerr/noerr.h>
#include <ccan/read_write_all/read_write_all.h>
#include <ccan/rune/rune.h>
#include <ccan/tal/grab_file/grab_file.h>
#include <ccan/tal/path/path.h>
#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
#include <common/bech32.h>
#include <common/bech32_util.h>
#include <common/codex32.h>
#include <common/derive_basepoints.h>
#include <common/descriptor_checksum.h>
#include <common/errcode.h>
#include <common/hsm_secret.h>
#include <common/key_derive.h>
#include <common/memleak.h>
#include <common/utils.h>
#include <common/utxo.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <wally_bip32.h>
#include <wally_bip39.h>
#define ERROR_USAGE 2
#define ERROR_LIBSODIUM 3
#define ERROR_LIBWALLY 4
#define ERROR_KEYDERIV 5
#define ERROR_LANG_NOT_SUPPORTED 6
#define ERROR_TERM 7
/* We don't implement leak detection, since we don't persist. */
void *notleak_(void *ptr, bool plus_children)
{
return ptr;
}
static void show_usage(const char *progname)
{
printf("%s <method> [arguments]\n", progname);
printf("methods:\n");
printf(" - decrypt <path/to/hsm_secret> [LEGACY - binary format only]\n");
printf(" - encrypt <path/to/hsm_secret> [LEGACY - binary format only]\n");
printf(" - dumpcommitments <node id> <channel dbid> <depth> "
"<path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
printf(" - guesstoremote <P2WPKH address> <node id> <tries> "
"<path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
printf(" - generatehsm <path/to/new/hsm_secret>\n");
printf(" - derivetoremote <node id> <channel dbid> [<cmt pt>] "
"<path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
printf(" - checkhsm <path/to/new/hsm_secret>\n");
printf(" - dumponchaindescriptors [--show-secrets] <path/to/hsm_secret> [network]\n");
printf(" - makerune <path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
printf(" - getsecret <path/to/hsm_secret> [<id>]\n");
printf(" - getemergencyrecover <path/to/emergency.recover>\n");
printf(" - getnodeid <path/to/hsm_secret>\n");
exit(0);
}
static bool ensure_hsm_secret_exists(int fd, const char *path)
{
const char *config_dir = path_dirname(NULL, path);
if (fsync(fd) != 0) {
close(fd);
return false;
}
if (close(fd) != 0)
return false;
fd = open(config_dir, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return false;
if (fsync(fd) != 0) {
close(fd);
return false;
}
close(fd);
tal_free(config_dir);
return true;
}
/* Load hsm_secret using the unified interface */
static struct hsm_secret *load_hsm_secret(const tal_t *ctx, const char *hsm_secret_path)
{
u8 *contents = grab_file_raw(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
const char *passphrase = NULL;
struct hsm_secret *hsms;
enum hsm_secret_error error;
if (!contents)
err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Reading hsm_secret");
/* Get passphrase if needed */
if (hsm_secret_needs_passphrase(contents, tal_bytelen(contents))) {
printf("Enter hsm_secret password:\n");
fflush(stdout);
passphrase = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &error);
if (!passphrase)
errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read password: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(error));
}
hsms = extract_hsm_secret(ctx, contents, tal_bytelen(contents), passphrase, &error);
if (!hsms) {
err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "%s", hsm_secret_error_str(error));
}
return hsms;
}
/* Legacy function - only works with binary encrypted format */
static void decrypt_hsm(const char *hsm_secret_path)
{
int fd;
struct hsm_secret *hsms;
const char *dir, *backup;
/* Check if it's a format we can decrypt */
u8 *contents = grab_file_raw(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
if (!contents)
err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Reading hsm_secret");
enum hsm_secret_type type = detect_hsm_secret_type(contents, tal_bytelen(contents));
if (type != HSM_SECRET_ENCRYPTED) {
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "decrypt command only works on legacy encrypted binary format (73 bytes).\n"
"Current file is: %s\n"
"For mnemonic formats, use the generatehsm command to create a new hsm_secret instead.",
format_type_name(type));
}
/* Load the hsm_secret */
hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
dir = path_dirname(NULL, hsm_secret_path);
backup = path_join(dir, dir, "hsm_secret.backup");
/* Create a backup file, "just in case". */
rename(hsm_secret_path, backup);
fd = open(hsm_secret_path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0400);
if (fd < 0)
err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not open new hsm_secret");
if (!write_all(fd, hsms->secret_data, tal_bytelen(hsms->secret_data))) {
unlink_noerr(hsm_secret_path);
close(fd);
rename("hsm_secret.backup", hsm_secret_path);
err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE,
"Failure writing plaintext seed to hsm_secret.");
}
/* Be as paranoïd as in hsmd with the file state on disk. */
if (!ensure_hsm_secret_exists(fd, hsm_secret_path)) {
unlink_noerr(hsm_secret_path);
rename(backup, hsm_secret_path);
errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE,
"Could not ensure hsm_secret existence.");
}
unlink_noerr(backup);
tal_free(dir);
printf("Successfully decrypted hsm_secret, be careful now :-).\n");
}
/* Legacy function - only works with binary plain format */
static void encrypt_hsm(const char *hsm_secret_path)
{
int fd;
struct hsm_secret *hsms;
u8 encrypted_hsm_secret[ENCRYPTED_HSM_SECRET_LEN];
const char *passwd, *passwd_confirmation;
const char *dir, *backup;
enum hsm_secret_error pass_err;
/* Check if it's a format we can encrypt */
u8 *contents = grab_file_raw(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
if (!contents)
err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Reading hsm_secret");
enum hsm_secret_type type = detect_hsm_secret_type(contents, tal_bytelen(contents));
if (type != HSM_SECRET_PLAIN) {
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "encrypt command only works on legacy plain binary format (32 bytes).\n"
"Current file is: %s\n"
"For mnemonic formats, the passphrase is already integrated into the format.",
format_type_name(type));
}
/* Load the hsm_secret */
hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
printf("Enter hsm_secret password:\n");
fflush(stdout);
passwd = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &pass_err);
if (!passwd)
errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read password: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(pass_err));
printf("Confirm hsm_secret password:\n");
fflush(stdout);
passwd_confirmation = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &pass_err);
if (!passwd_confirmation)
errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read password: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(pass_err));
if (!streq(passwd, passwd_confirmation))
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Passwords confirmation mismatch.");
dir = path_dirname(NULL, hsm_secret_path);
backup = path_join(dir, dir, "hsm_secret.backup");
/* Create encryption key and encrypt */
struct secret *encryption_key = get_encryption_key(tmpctx, passwd);
if (!encryption_key)
errx(ERROR_LIBSODIUM, "Could not derive encryption key");
struct secret legacy_secret;
memcpy(legacy_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
if (!encrypt_legacy_hsm_secret(encryption_key, &legacy_secret, encrypted_hsm_secret))
errx(ERROR_LIBSODIUM, "Could not encrypt the hsm_secret seed.");
/* Create a backup file, "just in case". */
rename(hsm_secret_path, backup);
fd = open(hsm_secret_path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0400);
if (fd < 0)
err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not open new hsm_secret");
/* Write the encrypted hsm_secret. */
if (!write_all(fd, encrypted_hsm_secret,
ENCRYPTED_HSM_SECRET_LEN)) {
unlink_noerr(hsm_secret_path);
close(fd);
rename(backup, hsm_secret_path);
err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Failure writing cipher to hsm_secret.");
}
/* Be as paranoïd as in hsmd with the file state on disk. */
if (!ensure_hsm_secret_exists(fd, hsm_secret_path)) {
unlink_noerr(hsm_secret_path);
rename(backup, hsm_secret_path);
errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not ensure hsm_secret existence.");
}
unlink_noerr(backup);
tal_free(dir);
printf("Successfully encrypted hsm_secret. You'll now have to pass the "
"--encrypted-hsm startup option.\n");
}
/* Taken from hsmd. */
static void get_channel_seed(struct secret *channel_seed, const struct node_id *peer_id,
u64 dbid, struct secret *hsm_secret)
{
struct secret channel_base;
u8 input[sizeof(peer_id->k) + sizeof(dbid)];
const char *info = "per-peer seed";
hkdf_sha256(&channel_base, sizeof(struct secret), NULL, 0,
hsm_secret, sizeof(*hsm_secret),
"peer seed", strlen("peer seed"));
memcpy(input, peer_id->k, sizeof(peer_id->k));
BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(peer_id->k) == PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN);
memcpy(input + PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN, &dbid, sizeof(dbid));
hkdf_sha256(channel_seed, sizeof(*channel_seed),
input, sizeof(input),
&channel_base, sizeof(channel_base),
info, strlen(info));
}
static void print_secret(const char *hsm_secret_path, const char *id, bool must_be_oldstyle)
{
struct secret hsm_secret;
char *bip93;
const char *err;
struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
switch (hsms->type) {
case HSM_SECRET_ENCRYPTED:
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Encrypted hsm_secret");
case HSM_SECRET_MNEMONIC_NO_PASS:
if (must_be_oldstyle)
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Cannot use getcodexsecret with modern nodes: use getsecret");
printf("%s\n", hsms->mnemonic);
return;
case HSM_SECRET_MNEMONIC_WITH_PASS:
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "hsm_secret with passphrase");
case HSM_SECRET_PLAIN:
if (id == NULL)
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Must set 'id' for a codex32 secret");
/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
err = codex32_secret_encode(tmpctx, "cl", id, 0, hsm_secret.data, 32, &bip93);
if (err)
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "%s", err);
printf("%s\n", bip93);
return;
case HSM_SECRET_INVALID:
break;
}
/* Never happens. */
abort();
}
static void print_emergencyrecover(const char *emer_rec_path)
{
u8 *scb = grab_file_raw(tmpctx, emer_rec_path);
char *output, *hrp = "clnemerg";
if (!scb) {
err(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Reading emergency.recover");
}
u5 *data = tal_arr(tmpctx, u5, 0);
bech32_push_bits(&data, scb, tal_bytelen(scb) * 8);
output = tal_arr(tmpctx, char, strlen(hrp) + tal_count(data) + 8);
bech32_encode(output, hrp, data, tal_count(data), (size_t)-1,
BECH32_ENCODING_BECH32);
printf("%s\n", output);
}
static void dump_commitments_infos(struct node_id *node_id, u64 channel_id,
u64 depth, char *hsm_secret_path)
{
struct sha256 shaseed;
struct secret hsm_secret, channel_seed, per_commitment_secret;
struct pubkey per_commitment_point;
struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
get_channel_seed(&channel_seed, node_id, channel_id, &hsm_secret);
derive_shaseed(&channel_seed, &shaseed);
printf("shaseed: %s\n", fmt_sha256(tmpctx, &shaseed));
for (u64 i = 0; i < depth; i++) {
if (!per_commit_secret(&shaseed, &per_commitment_secret, i))
errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive secret #%"PRIu64, i);
printf("commit secret #%"PRIu64": %s\n",
i, tal_hexstr(tmpctx, per_commitment_secret.data,
sizeof(per_commitment_secret.data)));
if (!per_commit_point(&shaseed, &per_commitment_point, i))
errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive point #%"PRIu64, i);
printf("commit point #%"PRIu64": %s\n",
i, fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, &per_commitment_point));
}
}
static void guess_to_remote(const char *address, struct node_id *node_id,
u64 tries, char *hsm_secret_path)
{
struct secret hsm_secret, channel_seed, basepoint_secret;
struct pubkey basepoint;
struct ripemd160 pubkeyhash;
u8 goal_pubkeyhash[20];
char hrp[strlen(address) - 6];
int witver;
size_t witlen;
/* Get the hrp to accept addresses from any network. */
if (bech32_decode(hrp, goal_pubkeyhash, &witlen, address, 90) != BECH32_ENCODING_BECH32)
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Could not get address' network");
if (segwit_addr_decode(&witver, goal_pubkeyhash, &witlen, hrp, address) != 1)
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Wrong bech32 address");
struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
for (u64 dbid = 1; dbid < tries ; dbid++) {
get_channel_seed(&channel_seed, node_id, dbid, &hsm_secret);
if (!derive_payment_basepoint(&channel_seed,
&basepoint, &basepoint_secret))
errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive basepoints for dbid %"PRIu64
" and channel seed %s.", dbid,
fmt_secret(tmpctx, &channel_seed));
pubkey_to_hash160(&basepoint, &pubkeyhash);
if (memcmp(pubkeyhash.u.u8, goal_pubkeyhash, 20) == 0) {
printf("bech32 : %s\n", address);
printf("pubkey hash : %s\n",
tal_hexstr(tmpctx, pubkeyhash.u.u8, 20));
printf("pubkey : %s \n",
fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, &basepoint));
printf("privkey : %s \n",
fmt_secret(tmpctx, &basepoint_secret));
return;
}
}
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Could not find any basepoint matching the provided witness programm.\n"
"Are you sure that the channel used `option_static_remotekey` ?");
}
static void generate_hsm(const char *hsm_secret_path)
{
const char *mnemonic, *passphrase;
enum hsm_secret_error error;
/* Get mnemonic from user using consistent interface */
mnemonic = read_stdin_mnemonic(tmpctx, &error);
if (!mnemonic)
errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read mnemonic: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(error));
/* Get optional passphrase */
printf("Warning: remember that different passphrases yield different "
"bitcoin wallets.\n");
printf("If left empty, no password is used (echo is disabled).\n");
printf("Enter your passphrase: \n");
fflush(stdout);
passphrase = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &error);
if (!passphrase)
errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read passphrase: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(error));
if (streq(passphrase, "")) {
passphrase = NULL;
}
/* Write to file using your new mnemonic format */
int fd = open(hsm_secret_path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0400);
if (fd < 0) {
err(ERROR_USAGE, "Unable to create hsm_secret file");
}
/* Hash the derived seed for validation */
struct sha256 seed_hash;
if (!derive_seed_hash(mnemonic, passphrase, &seed_hash))
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Error deriving seed from mnemonic");
/* Write seed hash (32 bytes) + mnemonic */
if (!write_all(fd, &seed_hash, sizeof(seed_hash)))
err(ERROR_USAGE, "Error writing seed hash to hsm_secret file");
/* Write the mnemonic */
if (!write_all(fd, mnemonic, strlen(mnemonic)))
err(ERROR_USAGE, "Error writing mnemonic to hsm_secret file");
if (fsync(fd) != 0)
err(ERROR_USAGE, "Error fsyncing hsm_secret file");
if (close(fd) != 0)
err(ERROR_USAGE, "Error closing hsm_secret file");
printf("New hsm_secret file created at %s\n", hsm_secret_path);
printf("Format: %s\n", passphrase ? "mnemonic with passphrase" : "mnemonic without passphrase");
if (passphrase) {
printf("Remember your passphrase - it's required to use this hsm_secret!\n");
}
/* passphrase and mnemonic will be automatically cleaned up by tmpctx */
}
static void derive_to_remote(const struct unilateral_close_info *info, const char *hsm_secret_path)
{
struct secret hsm_secret, channel_seed, basepoint_secret;
struct pubkey basepoint;
struct privkey privkey;
secp256k1_ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY
| SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN);
struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
/* Copy first 32 bytes of secret_data to the local secret struct */
memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, sizeof(hsm_secret.data));
get_channel_seed(&channel_seed, &info->peer_id, info->channel_id, &hsm_secret);
if (!derive_payment_basepoint(&channel_seed, &basepoint, &basepoint_secret))
errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive basepoints for dbid %"PRIu64
" and channel seed %s.", info->channel_id,
fmt_secret(tmpctx, &channel_seed));
if (!info->commitment_point)
privkey.secret = basepoint_secret;
else if (!derive_simple_privkey(&basepoint_secret, &basepoint, info->commitment_point, &privkey))
errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "Could not derive simple privkey for dbid %"PRIu64
", channel seed %s, and commitment point %s.", info->channel_id,
fmt_secret(tmpctx, &channel_seed),
fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, info->commitment_point));
printf("privkey : %s\n", fmt_secret(tmpctx, &privkey.secret));
}
static void dumponchaindescriptors(const char *hsm_secret_path,
const u32 version, bool show_secrets)
{
struct secret hsm_secret;
u8 bip32_seed[BIP32_ENTROPY_LEN_256];
u32 salt = 0;
struct ext_key master_extkey;
char *enc_xkey, *descriptor;
struct descriptor_checksum checksum;
struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
/* The root seed is derived from hsm_secret using hkdf.. */
do {
hkdf_sha256(bip32_seed, sizeof(bip32_seed),
&salt, sizeof(salt),
&hsm_secret, sizeof(hsm_secret),
"bip32 seed", strlen("bip32 seed"));
salt++;
/* ..Which is used to derive m/ */
} while (bip32_key_from_seed(bip32_seed, sizeof(bip32_seed),
version, 0, &master_extkey) != WALLY_OK);
if (show_secrets) {
if (bip32_key_to_base58(&master_extkey, BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PRIVATE,
&enc_xkey) != WALLY_OK)
errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't encode xpriv");
} else {
if (bip32_key_to_base58(&master_extkey, BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PUBLIC,
&enc_xkey) != WALLY_OK)
errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't encode xpub");
}
/* Now we format the descriptor strings (we only ever create P2TR, P2WPKH, and
* P2SH-P2WPKH outputs). */
descriptor = tal_fmt(NULL, "wpkh(%s/0/0/*)", enc_xkey);
if (!descriptor_checksum(descriptor, strlen(descriptor), &checksum))
errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't derive descriptor checksum for wpkh");
printf("%s#%s\n", descriptor, checksum.csum);
tal_free(descriptor);
descriptor = tal_fmt(NULL, "sh(wpkh(%s/0/0/*))", enc_xkey);
if (!descriptor_checksum(descriptor, strlen(descriptor), &checksum))
errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't derive descriptor checksum for sh(wpkh)");
printf("%s#%s\n", descriptor, checksum.csum);
tal_free(descriptor);
descriptor = tal_fmt(NULL, "tr(%s/0/0/*)", enc_xkey);
if (!descriptor_checksum(descriptor, strlen(descriptor), &checksum))
errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Can't derive descriptor checksum for tr");
printf("%s#%s\n", descriptor, checksum.csum);
tal_free(descriptor);
wally_free_string(enc_xkey);
}
/* Check HSM secret by comparing with backup mnemonic */
static void check_hsm(const char *hsm_secret_path)
{
struct secret file_secret, derived_secret;
u8 bip32_seed[BIP39_SEED_LEN_512];
size_t bip32_seed_len;
const char *mnemonic_passphrase, *mnemonic;
enum hsm_secret_error err;
/* Load the hsm_secret (handles decryption automatically if needed) */
struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
memcpy(file_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
/* Ask user for their backup mnemonic passphrase */
printf("Warning: remember that different passphrases yield different "
"bitcoin wallets.\n");
printf("If left empty, no password is used (echo is disabled).\n");
printf("Enter your mnemonic passphrase: \n");
fflush(stdout);
mnemonic_passphrase = read_stdin_pass(tmpctx, &err);
if (!mnemonic_passphrase)
errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read passphrase: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(err));
if (streq(mnemonic_passphrase, "")) {
mnemonic_passphrase = NULL;
}
/* Ask user for their backup mnemonic using consistent interface */
mnemonic = read_stdin_mnemonic(tmpctx, &err);
if (!mnemonic)
errx(EXITCODE_ERROR_HSM_FILE, "Could not read mnemonic: %s", hsm_secret_error_str(err));
/* Derive seed from user's backup mnemonic + passphrase */
if (bip39_mnemonic_to_seed(mnemonic, mnemonic_passphrase, bip32_seed, sizeof(bip32_seed), &bip32_seed_len) != WALLY_OK)
errx(ERROR_LIBWALLY, "Unable to derive BIP32 seed from BIP39 mnemonic");
/* Copy first 32 bytes to our secret for comparison */
memcpy(derived_secret.data, bip32_seed, sizeof(derived_secret.data));
/* Compare the seeds */
if (memcmp(derived_secret.data, file_secret.data, sizeof(file_secret.data)) != 0)
errx(ERROR_KEYDERIV, "resulting hsm_secret did not match");
printf("OK\n");
}
static void make_rune(const char *hsm_secret_path)
{
struct secret hsm_secret, derived_secret, rune_secret;
struct rune *master_rune, *rune;
struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
/* HSM derives a root secret for `makesecret` */
hkdf_sha256(&derived_secret, sizeof(struct secret), NULL, 0,
&hsm_secret, sizeof(hsm_secret),
"derived secrets", strlen("derived secrets"));
/* Commando derives secret using makesecret "commando" */
hkdf_sha256(&rune_secret, sizeof(struct secret), NULL, 0,
&derived_secret, sizeof(derived_secret),
"commando", strlen("commando"));
master_rune = rune_new(tmpctx,
rune_secret.data,
ARRAY_SIZE(rune_secret.data),
NULL);
rune = rune_derive_start(tmpctx, master_rune, "0");
printf("%s\n", rune_to_base64(tmpctx, rune));
}
static void print_node_id(const char *hsm_secret_path)
{
u32 salt = 0;
struct secret hsm_secret;
struct privkey node_privkey;
struct pubkey node_id;
struct hsm_secret *hsms = load_hsm_secret(tmpctx, hsm_secret_path);
/* Extract first 32 bytes for legacy compatibility */
memcpy(hsm_secret.data, hsms->secret_data, 32);
/*~ So, there is apparently a 1 in 2^127 chance that a random value is
* not a valid private key, so this never actually loops. */
do {
/*~ ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256 implements RFC5869 "Hardened Key
* Derivation Functions". That means that if a derived key
* leaks somehow, the other keys are not compromised. */
hkdf_sha256(&node_privkey, sizeof(node_privkey),
&salt, sizeof(salt),
&hsm_secret,
sizeof(hsm_secret),
"nodeid", 6);
salt++;
} while (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_ctx, &node_id.pubkey,
node_privkey.secret.data));
printf("%s\n", fmt_pubkey(tmpctx, &node_id));
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
const char *method;
setup_locale();
err_set_progname(argv[0]);
secp256k1_ctx = secp256k1_context_create(SECP256K1_CONTEXT_VERIFY
| SECP256K1_CONTEXT_SIGN);
method = argc > 1 ? argv[1] : NULL;
if (!method)
show_usage(argv[0]);
if (streq(method, "decrypt")) {
if (argc < 3)
show_usage(argv[0]);
decrypt_hsm(argv[2]);
} else if (streq(method, "encrypt")) {
if (argc < 3)
show_usage(argv[0]);
encrypt_hsm(argv[2]);
} else if (streq(method, "dumpcommitments")) {
/* node_id channel_id depth hsm_secret */
if (argc < 6)
show_usage(argv[0]);
struct node_id node_id;
if (!node_id_from_hexstr(argv[2], strlen(argv[2]), &node_id))
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Bad node id");
dump_commitments_infos(&node_id, atol(argv[3]), atol(argv[4]),
argv[5]);
} else if (streq(method, "guesstoremote")) {
/* address node_id depth hsm_secret */
if (argc < 6)
show_usage(argv[0]);
struct node_id node_id;
if (!node_id_from_hexstr(argv[3], strlen(argv[3]), &node_id))
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Bad node id");
guess_to_remote(argv[2], &node_id, atol(argv[4]),
argv[5]);
} else if (streq(method, "derivetoremote")) {
/* node_id channel_id [commitment_point] hsm_secret */
if (argc < 5 || argc > 6)
show_usage(argv[0]);
struct unilateral_close_info info = { };
struct pubkey commitment_point;
if (!node_id_from_hexstr(argv[2], strlen(argv[2]), &info.peer_id))
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Bad node id");
info.channel_id = atoll(argv[3]);
if (argc == 6) {
if (!pubkey_from_hexstr(argv[4], strlen(argv[4]), &commitment_point))
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Bad commitment point");
info.commitment_point = &commitment_point;
}
derive_to_remote(&info, argv[argc - 1]);
} else if (streq(method, "generatehsm")) {
if (argc != 3)
show_usage(argv[0]);
char *hsm_secret_path = argv[2];
/* if hsm_secret already exists we abort the process
* we do not want to lose someone else's funds */
struct stat st;
if (stat(hsm_secret_path, &st) == 0)
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "hsm_secret file at %s already exists", hsm_secret_path);
generate_hsm(hsm_secret_path);
} else if (streq(method, "dumponchaindescriptors")) {
char *fname = NULL;
char *net = NULL;
bool show_secrets = false;
bool only_arguments = false;
u32 version;
if (argc < 3)
show_usage(argv[0]);
for (int i = 2; i < argc; ++i) {
char *next = argv[i];
if (only_arguments || next[0] != '-') {
// this is an argument
if (!fname) {
fname = next;
continue;
}
if (!net) {
net = next;
continue;
}
errx(ERROR_USAGE,
"Argument '%s' was not expected.", next);
}
if (streq(next, "--")) {
only_arguments = true;
continue;
}
// we are processing an option here
if (streq(next, "--show-secrets")) {
show_secrets = true;
continue;
}
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Option '%s' is not recognized.",
next);
}
if (net && (streq(net, "testnet") || streq(net, "testnet4") || streq(net, "signet")))
version = BIP32_VER_TEST_PRIVATE;
else if (net && !streq(net, "bitcoin"))
errx(ERROR_USAGE, "Network '%s' not supported."
" Supported networks: bitcoin (default),"
" testnet and signet", net);
else
version = BIP32_VER_MAIN_PRIVATE;
dumponchaindescriptors(fname, version, show_secrets);
} else if (streq(method, "checkhsm")) {
if (argc < 3)
show_usage(argv[0]);
check_hsm(argv[2]);
} else if (streq(method, "makerune")) {
if (argc < 3)
show_usage(argv[0]);
make_rune(argv[2]);
} else if(streq(method, "getsecret")) {
if (argc < 3 || argc > 4)
show_usage(argv[0]);
print_secret(argv[2], argv[3], false);
} else if(streq(method, "getcodexsecret")) {
if (argc != 4)
show_usage(argv[0]);
print_secret(argv[2], argv[3], true);
} else if(streq(method, "getemergencyrecover")) {
if (argc < 3)
show_usage(argv[0]);
print_emergencyrecover(argv[2]);
} else if (streq(method, "getnodeid")) {
if (argc < 3)
show_usage(argv[0]);
print_node_id(argv[2]);
} else {
show_usage(argv[0]);
}
return 0;
}