diff --git a/common/Makefile b/common/Makefile
index b5a1591e9..28751e7bf 100644
--- a/common/Makefile
+++ b/common/Makefile
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ COMMON_SRC_NOGEN :=				\
 	common/onion_decode.c			\
 	common/onion_encode.c			\
 	common/onionreply.c			\
+	common/onion_message.c			\
 	common/onion_message_parse.c		\
 	common/peer_billboard.c			\
 	common/peer_failed.c			\
diff --git a/common/onion_message.c b/common/onion_message.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..98e5b87d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/common/onion_message.c
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+#include "config.h"
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <bitcoin/pubkey.h>
+#include <ccan/array_size/array_size.h>
+#include <ccan/cast/cast.h>
+#include <common/blindedpath.h>
+#include <common/onion_message.h>
+#include <common/sphinx.h>
+#include <sodium.h>
+#include <wire/onion_wire.h>
+
+struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv **new_encdata_tlvs(const tal_t *ctx,
+						 const struct pubkey *ids,
+						 const struct short_channel_id **scids)
+{
+	struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv **etlvs;
+
+	etlvs = tal_arr(ctx, struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv *, tal_count(ids));
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(etlvs); i++) {
+		etlvs[i] = tlv_encrypted_data_tlv_new(etlvs);
+		if (i+1 < tal_count(scids) && scids[i+1]) {
+			etlvs[i]->short_channel_id = tal_dup(etlvs[i],
+							     struct short_channel_id,
+							     scids[i+1]);
+		} else if (i + 1 < tal_count(ids)) {
+			etlvs[i]->next_node_id = tal_dup(etlvs[i],
+							 struct pubkey,
+							 &ids[i+1]);
+		}
+	}
+	return etlvs;
+}
+
+/* We can extract nodeid from ids[], but usually we can get it from the
+ * previous next_node_id. */
+static const struct pubkey *
+get_nodeid(const struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv **tlvs,
+	   const struct pubkey *ids,
+	   size_t i)
+{
+	if (i == 0)
+		return &ids[0];
+
+	if (tlvs[i-1]->next_node_id == NULL) {
+		/* If you didn't set next_node_id you have to set
+		 * short_channel_id! */
+		assert(tlvs[i-1]->short_channel_id);
+		assert(i < tal_count(ids));
+		return &ids[i];
+	}
+
+	return tlvs[i-1]->next_node_id;
+}
+
+/* Stage 1: tlv_encrypted_data_tlv[] -> struct blinded_path.
+ * Optional array of node_ids, consulted iff tlv uses scid in one entry. */
+struct blinded_path *blinded_path_from_encdata_tlvs(const tal_t *ctx,
+						    const struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv **tlvs,
+						    const struct pubkey *ids)
+{
+	struct privkey first_blinding, blinding_iter;
+	struct blinded_path *path;
+	size_t nhops = tal_count(ids);
+	const struct pubkey *nodeid;
+
+	path = tal(ctx, struct blinded_path);
+
+	assert(nhops > 0);
+	assert(tal_count(ids) > 0);
+
+	randombytes_buf(&first_blinding, sizeof(first_blinding));
+	if (!pubkey_from_privkey(&first_blinding, &path->blinding))
+		abort();
+	sciddir_or_pubkey_from_pubkey(&path->first_node_id, &ids[0]);
+
+	path->path = tal_arr(ctx, struct onionmsg_hop *, nhops);
+
+	blinding_iter = first_blinding;
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < nhops; i++) {
+		nodeid = get_nodeid(tlvs, ids, i);
+
+		path->path[i] = tal(path->path, struct onionmsg_hop);
+		path->path[i]->encrypted_recipient_data
+			= encrypt_tlv_encrypted_data(path->path[i],
+						     &blinding_iter,
+						     nodeid,
+						     tlvs[i],
+						     &blinding_iter,
+						     &path->path[i]->blinded_node_id);
+	}
+
+	return path;
+}
+
+/* Stage 2: turn struct blinded_path into array of tlv_onionmsg_tlv.
+ * You normally then add fields to the final tlv_onionmsg_tlv. */
+struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv **onionmsg_tlvs_from_blinded_path(const tal_t *ctx,
+							  const struct blinded_path *bpath)
+{
+	size_t nhops = tal_count(bpath->path);
+	struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv **otlvs = tal_arr(ctx, struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv *, nhops);
+
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < nhops; i++) {
+		otlvs[i] = tlv_onionmsg_tlv_new(otlvs);
+		otlvs[i]->encrypted_recipient_data
+			= tal_dup_talarr(otlvs[i], u8,
+					 bpath->path[i]->encrypted_recipient_data);
+	}
+
+	return otlvs;
+}
+
+/* Stage 3: linearize each struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv into sphinx_hops (taking ids from bpath) */
+struct sphinx_hop **onionmsg_tlvs_to_hops(const tal_t *ctx,
+					  const struct blinded_path *bpath,
+					  const struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv **tlvs)
+{
+	size_t nhops = tal_count(tlvs);
+	struct sphinx_hop **hops = tal_arr(ctx, struct sphinx_hop *, nhops);
+
+	assert(tal_count(bpath->path) == nhops);
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < nhops; i++) {
+		u8 *payload;
+		hops[i] = tal(hops, struct sphinx_hop);
+		hops[i]->pubkey = bpath->path[i]->blinded_node_id;
+		/* We use a temporary here since ->raw_payload is const */
+		payload = tal_arr(hops[i], u8, 0);
+		towire_tlv_onionmsg_tlv(&payload, tlvs[i]);
+		hops[i]->raw_payload = payload;
+	}
+
+	return hops;
+}
+
+struct blinded_path *incoming_message_blinded_path(const tal_t *ctx,
+						   const struct pubkey *ids,
+						   const struct short_channel_id **scids,
+						   const struct secret *path_secret)
+{
+	struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv **etlvs;
+	size_t nhops = tal_count(ids);
+
+	assert(nhops > 0);
+	etlvs = new_encdata_tlvs(tmpctx, ids, scids);
+
+	/* Put path_secret into final hop (us) */
+	etlvs[nhops-1]->path_id = tal_dup_arr(etlvs[nhops-1], u8,
+					      path_secret->data,
+					      ARRAY_SIZE(path_secret->data), 0);
+
+	return blinded_path_from_encdata_tlvs(ctx,
+					      cast_const2(const struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv **, etlvs),
+					      ids);
+}
+
+static void extend_blinded_path(struct blinded_path *bpath,
+				const struct onionmsg_hop *hop)
+{
+	struct onionmsg_hop *newhop = tal(bpath->path, struct onionmsg_hop);
+        newhop->blinded_node_id = hop->blinded_node_id;
+	newhop->encrypted_recipient_data = tal_dup_talarr(newhop, u8, hop->encrypted_recipient_data);
+	tal_arr_expand(&bpath->path, newhop);
+}
+
+struct onion_message *outgoing_onion_message(const tal_t *ctx,
+					     const struct pubkey *ids,
+					     const struct short_channel_id **scids,
+					     const struct blinded_path *their_path,
+					     struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv *final_tlv STEALS)
+{
+	struct onion_message *omsg;
+	struct blinded_path *our_path;
+	const struct blinded_path *combined_path;
+	struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv **etlvs = new_encdata_tlvs(tmpctx, ids, scids);
+	struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv **otlvs;
+
+	assert(tal_count(ids) > 0);
+
+	if (their_path) {
+		struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv *pre_final;
+
+		/* Path must lead to blinded path! */
+		if (their_path->first_node_id.is_pubkey)
+			assert(pubkey_eq(&ids[tal_count(ids)-1], &their_path->first_node_id.pubkey));
+
+		/* If we don't actually have any path, it's all them. */
+		if (tal_count(ids) == 1) {
+			combined_path = their_path;
+			goto wrap;
+		}
+
+		/* We need to tell last hop to hand blinded_path blinding for next hop */
+		pre_final = etlvs[tal_count(ids)-2];
+		pre_final->next_blinding_override = tal_dup(pre_final,
+							    struct pubkey,
+							    &their_path->blinding);
+	}
+
+	our_path = blinded_path_from_encdata_tlvs(tmpctx,
+						  cast_const2(const struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv **, etlvs),
+						  ids);
+
+	/* Extend with their blinded path if there is one */
+	if (their_path) {
+		/* Remove final one, since it's actually the first one in blinded path. */
+		tal_resize(&our_path->path, tal_count(our_path->path)-1);
+		for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(their_path->path); i++)
+			extend_blinded_path(our_path, their_path->path[i]);
+	}
+
+	combined_path = our_path;
+
+wrap:
+	/* Now wrap in onionmsg_tlvs */
+	otlvs = onionmsg_tlvs_from_blinded_path(tmpctx, combined_path);
+
+	/* Transfer encrypted blob into final tlv, and use it to replace last tlv */
+	final_tlv->encrypted_recipient_data = tal_steal(final_tlv, otlvs[tal_count(otlvs)-1]->encrypted_recipient_data);
+	tal_free(otlvs[tal_count(otlvs)-1]);
+	otlvs[tal_count(otlvs)-1] = tal_steal(otlvs, final_tlv);
+
+	/* Now populate the onion message to return */
+	omsg = tal(ctx, struct onion_message);
+	omsg->first_blinding = combined_path->blinding;
+	omsg->hops = onionmsg_tlvs_to_hops(omsg, combined_path,
+					   cast_const2(const struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv **, otlvs));
+	return omsg;
+}
diff --git a/common/onion_message.h b/common/onion_message.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..efa05c4cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/common/onion_message.h
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+#ifndef LIGHTNING_COMMON_ONION_MESSAGE_H
+#define LIGHTNING_COMMON_ONION_MESSAGE_H
+#include "config.h"
+#include <ccan/tal/tal.h>
+#include <common/sciddir_or_pubkey.h>
+#include <common/utils.h>
+
+struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv;
+struct secret;
+
+/* Onion messages are kind of complicated, so read carefully!
+ *
+ * An onion message is an array of struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv:
+ * encrypted struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv:
+ *	encrypted_recipient_data
+ *
+ * The final entry can also have unencrypted fields:
+ * 	struct blinded_path *reply_path;
+ *	u8 *invoice_request;
+ *	u8 *invoice;
+ *	u8 *invoice_error;
+ *
+ * The struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv contains the interesting things:
+ *
+ * Intermediate nodes:
+ *	short_channel_id/next_node_id (always)
+ *	next_blinding_override (optional)
+ *	payment_relay/payment_constraints (required, for payments only)
+ *	allowed_features (optional)
+ *
+ * Final nodes:
+ *      path_id (so it can tell blinded path was correctly used).
+ */
+
+/* Low level routines: */
+
+/**
+ * Stage 0: populate tlv_encrypted_data_tlv[] array.
+ * @ctx: tal context
+ * @ids: array of pubkeys defining path destinations
+ * @scids: optional array of scids: if non-NULL, use this instead of pubkey for
+ *         next hop values.
+ *
+ * This simply populates the short_channel_id/next_node_id fields; you will want to
+ * add others.
+ */
+struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv **new_encdata_tlvs(const tal_t *ctx,
+						 const struct pubkey *ids,
+						 const struct short_channel_id **scids);
+
+/**
+ * Stage 1: tlv_encrypted_data_tlv[] -> struct blinded_path.
+ * @ctx: tal context
+ * @tlvs: tlvs to be encrypted
+ * @ids: array of pubkeys.
+ *
+ * ids[0] needs to be first node id, but rest don't have to be there unless
+ * a tlv uses short_channel_id instead of next_node_id.
+ *
+ * You can turn the first_node_id into an scidd after if you want to.
+ */
+struct blinded_path *blinded_path_from_encdata_tlvs(const tal_t *ctx,
+						    const struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv **tlvs,
+						    const struct pubkey *ids);
+
+/**
+ * Stage 2: turn struct blinded_path into array of tlv_onionmsg_tlv.
+ * @ctx: tal context
+ * @bpath: path containing the encrypted blobs.
+ *
+ * You normally then add payload fields to the final tlv_onionmsg_tlv.
+ */
+struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv **onionmsg_tlvs_from_blinded_path(const tal_t *ctx,
+							  const struct blinded_path *bpath);
+
+/**
+ * Stage 3: linearize each struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv into onionmsg_hops
+ * @ctx: tal context
+ * @bpath: the path (for the pubkeys)
+ * @tlvs: the tlvs for each hop.
+ *
+ * This is the format the sphinx wants to encode the actual onion message.
+ */
+struct sphinx_hop **onionmsg_tlvs_to_hops(const tal_t *ctx,
+					  const struct blinded_path *bpath,
+					  const struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv **tlvs);
+
+
+/* Stage 4: turn into sphinx_hop * into linear onionmsg (e.g. via injectonionmessage,
+ * or directly using common/sphinx.c) */
+
+/* Higher level helpers. */
+
+/**
+ * incoming_message_blinded_path - create incoming blinded path for messages.
+ * @ctx: context to tallocate off
+ * @ids: array of node ids.
+ * @scids: optional, if these are set, use these for directions instead of node ids.
+ * @path_secret: put this into final entry, so we can verify.
+ */
+struct blinded_path *incoming_message_blinded_path(const tal_t *ctx,
+						   const struct pubkey *ids,
+						   const struct short_channel_id **scids,
+						   const struct secret *path_secret);
+
+
+/* A ready-to-be-encrypted-and-sent onion message. */
+struct onion_message {
+	struct pubkey first_blinding;
+	struct sphinx_hop **hops;
+};
+
+/**
+ * outgoing_message_tlvs - create encrypted blobs to send msg
+ * @ctx: context to tallocate off
+ * @ids: array of node ids (first is our peer, must be at least one).
+ * @scids: optional, if these are set, use these for directions instead of node ids.
+ * @their_path: blinded path they told us to use for reply (or NULL)
+ * @final_tlv: extra fields to put in final tlv (consumed)
+ *
+ * If @their_path is set, the final @ids entry must be @their_path->first_node_id.
+ * We cannot check this if their_path->first_node_id is not a pubkey, of course.
+ */
+struct onion_message *outgoing_onion_message(const tal_t *ctx,
+					     const struct pubkey *ids,
+					     const struct short_channel_id **scids,
+					     const struct blinded_path *their_path,
+					     struct tlv_onionmsg_tlv *final_tlv STEALS);
+
+#endif /* LIGHTNING_COMMON_ONION_MESSAGE_H */