2026-07-27 00:32:22 +02:00
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import logging
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2026-07-21 11:29:59 +02:00
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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2026-07-21 10:26:18 +02:00
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from sqlalchemy import select
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2026-07-27 00:32:22 +02:00
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from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
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2026-07-21 10:26:18 +02:00
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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2026-08-04 14:13:00 +02:00
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from app.db.models import Round, RoundConfig
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2026-07-21 15:05:40 +02:00
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from app.rounds.config import get_round_config
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2026-07-23 10:52:07 +02:00
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from app.rounds.events import broadcaster
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Make the draw a commit-reveal at a fixed, confirmed, quorum-agreed height with a public proof (B-73, RND-14 … RND-20, RND-33 … RND-37, DAT-61 … DAT-66, API-25, API-45, AUD-24 … AUD-27, AUD-37, ELC-15, SEC-56, ADR-24, ADR-25)
2026-10-14 16:29:09 +02:00
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from app.rounds.draw import new_server_seed, server_seed_commitment
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Give every round its own pool address (B-80, RND-35, DAT-60, DAT-11, REG-14, SEC-08, BET-12, RND-22, WDR-14, SEC-43, API-23, API-36)
2026-10-14 13:52:32 +02:00
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from app.wallet.hd import derive_pool_address
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Make the draw a commit-reveal at a fixed, confirmed, quorum-agreed height with a public proof (B-73, RND-14 … RND-20, RND-33 … RND-37, DAT-61 … DAT-66, API-25, API-45, AUD-24 … AUD-27, AUD-37, ELC-15, SEC-56, ADR-24, ADR-25)
2026-10-14 16:29:09 +02:00
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from app.wallet.keystore import encrypt_round_seed
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Give every payout a bump reserve output and refuse configs that cannot pay a round (B-79, RND-21, RND-23, RND-24, RND-27, RND-38, RND-40, DAT-73, API-31, API-36, TX-11, ADR-17, ADR-29)
2026-10-16 13:55:51 +02:00
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from app.wallet.psbt_builder import (
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DUST_LIMIT_SATS,
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MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND,
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MAX_TX_INPUTS,
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estimate_vsize,
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payout_bump_reserve,
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)
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2026-07-21 10:26:18 +02:00
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2026-07-27 00:32:22 +02:00
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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2026-07-21 10:26:18 +02:00
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_ACTIVE_STATUSES = ("open", "closing", "drawing", "paying_out")
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2026-07-27 00:32:22 +02:00
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# Bounded: a conflict means someone else is opening a round right now, so a couple
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# of retries is plenty. Unbounded retries could spin if the invariant were ever
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# broken in a way we don't anticipate.
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_OPEN_ROUND_ATTEMPTS = 3
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2026-07-31 15:04:33 +02:00
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# 70% winner / 30% fees. Hardcoded by design (see CLAUDE.md) — changing the split
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# is a code change, not an admin-editable setting. Single source of truth so the
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# advertised jackpot (rounds.py) and the actual payout (scheduler.py) can't diverge.
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Make the draw a commit-reveal at a fixed, confirmed, quorum-agreed height with a public proof (B-73, RND-14 … RND-20, RND-33 … RND-37, DAT-61 … DAT-66, API-25, API-45, AUD-24 … AUD-27, AUD-37, ELC-15, SEC-56, ADR-24, ADR-25)
2026-10-14 16:29:09 +02:00
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def _new_round_secret() -> dict:
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"""B-73 (RND-34): a fresh secret for a round about to open, as the columns that hold it —
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its published commitment and its encrypted form, never the plaintext."""
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server_seed = new_server_seed()
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return {
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"server_seed_hash": server_seed_commitment(server_seed),
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"server_seed_enc": encrypt_round_seed(server_seed),
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}
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2026-07-31 15:04:33 +02:00
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def winner_share(pool_amount_sats: int) -> int:
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return pool_amount_sats * 70 // 100
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2026-07-21 10:26:18 +02:00
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async def get_active_round(session: AsyncSession) -> Round | None:
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"""The round currently in progress (in any non-closed state), if any. Rounds
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never overlap: a new round only opens once the previous one is fully closed
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2026-07-27 00:32:22 +02:00
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(payout confirmed, or no participants to pay out).
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The database enforces "at most one active round" (ix_rounds_single_active, see
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app/db/models.py), so the ordering below is belt-and-braces; if it ever does
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see two, that's a broken invariant and worth a loud log rather than silently
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picking one."""
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active = (
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await session.scalars(select(Round).where(Round.status.in_(_ACTIVE_STATUSES)).order_by(Round.id.desc()))
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).all()
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if len(active) > 1:
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logger.error(
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"invariant violated: %s rounds are active at once (ids=%s) — using the newest",
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len(active),
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[r.id for r in active],
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)
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return active[0] if active else None
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2026-07-21 10:26:18 +02:00
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2026-08-03 23:25:56 +02:00
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def round_deadline(round_: Round) -> datetime:
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"""When this round stops accepting bets. B-61: from the round's own snapshotted
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duration, not from the live config — an operator editing round_duration_seconds
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mid-round must not move a deadline clients are already counting down to, nor
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close an in-progress round on the spot."""
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return round_.opened_at.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=round_.duration_seconds)
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def round_accepts_bets(round_: Round) -> bool:
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2026-07-22 14:07:09 +02:00
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"""The authoritative "yellow light" check: once a round's timer has expired,
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no new bet may be accepted, even though its DB status is still "open" (the
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scheduler only flips it to "closing" on its next tick, up to
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_TICK_INTERVAL_SECONDS later — see rounds/scheduler.py). Bets already placed
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before the deadline are unaffected: the round still waits for them to confirm
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before actually closing."""
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if round_.status != "open":
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return False
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2026-08-03 23:25:56 +02:00
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return datetime.now(timezone.utc) < round_deadline(round_)
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2026-07-22 14:07:09 +02:00
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Give every payout a bump reserve output and refuse configs that cannot pay a round (B-79, RND-21, RND-23, RND-24, RND-27, RND-38, RND-40, DAT-73, API-31, API-36, TX-11, ADR-17, ADR-29)
2026-10-16 13:55:51 +02:00
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def payout_config_problem(bet_amount_sats: int, fee_rate_sat_vb: int) -> str | None:
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"""Why a round could not be paid out under this bet amount and fee rate, or None (B-79,
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RND-40). Checked for the two extremes — 1 participant (the smallest platform share) and
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MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND (the largest bump reserve, which grows with the inputs):
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the winner's 70% must cover the network fee of the payout and still be at least dust, and
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the platform's 30% must cover the bump reserve and still leave the fee address at least
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dust. The smallest bet that can reach the pool is the amount minus the fee of the biggest
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transaction a user may build (MAX_TX_INPUTS inputs, 2 outputs), so that is what every
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participant is assumed to have contributed."""
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net_bet = bet_amount_sats - estimate_vsize(MAX_TX_INPUTS, 2) * fee_rate_sat_vb
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for participants in (1, MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND):
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pool = participants * net_bet
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share = winner_share(pool)
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if share - estimate_vsize(participants, 3) * fee_rate_sat_vb < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
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return "winner_share_below_network_fee"
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if pool - share - payout_bump_reserve(participants) < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
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return "commission_below_dust_limit"
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return None
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2026-08-04 14:13:00 +02:00
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Give every payout a bump reserve output and refuse configs that cannot pay a round (B-79, RND-21, RND-23, RND-24, RND-27, RND-38, RND-40, DAT-73, API-31, API-36, TX-11, ADR-17, ADR-29)
2026-10-16 13:55:51 +02:00
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def rounds_can_open(config: RoundConfig) -> bool:
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"""Whether the instance is configured well enough to run a round at all (B-66, B-79).
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Two prerequisites, both because a round without them is unpayable: a fee_address — the
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payout pays the platform's share to it, so build_payout_transaction cannot even be built,
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and it has no column default (rounds/config.py) because an operator must set their own —
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and a bet amount and fee rate under which a round of 1 or of
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MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND participants can cover the payout's fee, the bump reserve and
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dust outputs (payout_config_problem, RND-40). PUT /admin/config refuses the same
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combinations, so this only trips on a configuration that predates the check.
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2026-08-04 14:13:00 +02:00
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Anything else that would make a round unpayable belongs here too, next to it,
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rather than being discovered at payout time. Deliberately not about *pausing*,
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which is a decision an operator took (RoundConfig.paused) rather than a
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prerequisite they haven't met yet."""
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Give every payout a bump reserve output and refuse configs that cannot pay a round (B-79, RND-21, RND-23, RND-24, RND-27, RND-38, RND-40, DAT-73, API-31, API-36, TX-11, ADR-17, ADR-29)
2026-10-16 13:55:51 +02:00
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if not config.fee_address.strip():
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return False
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return payout_config_problem(config.bet_amount_sats, config.fee_rate_sat_vb) is None
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2026-08-04 14:13:00 +02:00
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2026-07-21 11:29:59 +02:00
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async def open_new_round_if_needed(session: AsyncSession) -> Round | None:
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"""Returns the active round if one exists (whatever its status). Otherwise
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opens a fresh one, unless the last closed round's cooldown (ROUND_COOLDOWN_SECONDS)
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2026-08-04 14:13:00 +02:00
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hasn't elapsed yet, the lottery is paused for maintenance, or the instance isn't
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configured well enough to pay a winner — in any of those cases returns None.
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Callers that need to attach a bet must additionally check the returned round's
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status == "open" — a round in closing/drawing/paying_out isn't accepting new bets,
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but a new round can't open until it's done.
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2026-07-22 10:36:36 +02:00
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Pausing never touches a round already in progress: it only suppresses opening
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the *next* one, so the current round still closes, draws, and pays out the
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winner normally (see admin.py's /admin/pause and /admin/resume)."""
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2026-07-21 10:26:18 +02:00
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active = await get_active_round(session)
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if active is not None:
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return active
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2026-07-21 11:29:59 +02:00
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2026-07-22 10:36:36 +02:00
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config = await get_round_config(session)
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if config.paused:
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return None
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2026-08-04 14:13:00 +02:00
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if not rounds_can_open(config):
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# B-66: a fresh instance starts with no fee_address, and a round opened
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# without one takes bets, confirms them, and only then discovers that the
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# payout cannot be built — leaving the round wedged in "paying_out",
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# retrying every 60s, with money already in the pool. Every round would
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# need its own manual recovery. Refusing to open costs nothing by
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# comparison: no money has moved yet, and it is the operator's own missing
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# setup, surfaced through GET /rounds/current's lottery_configured and the
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# admin panel rather than discovered a round too late.
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return None
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2026-07-22 10:36:36 +02:00
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2026-07-21 11:29:59 +02:00
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last_closed = await session.scalar(select(Round).where(Round.status == "closed").order_by(Round.id.desc()))
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if last_closed is not None and last_closed.closed_at is not None:
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closed_at = last_closed.closed_at.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
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2026-08-03 23:25:56 +02:00
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# B-61: the cooldown the closing round announced is the one honoured, so
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# editing the config never retroactively shortens or extends a gap already
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# under way. The new value applies from the next round on.
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if datetime.now(timezone.utc) < closed_at + timedelta(seconds=last_closed.cooldown_seconds):
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2026-07-21 11:29:59 +02:00
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return None
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2026-07-27 00:32:22 +02:00
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for attempt in range(_OPEN_ROUND_ATTEMPTS):
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2026-08-03 23:25:56 +02:00
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# B-61: the timing this round will run by, fixed at open time.
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round_ = Round(
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status="open",
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duration_seconds=config.round_duration_seconds,
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cooldown_seconds=config.round_cooldown_seconds,
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Make the draw a commit-reveal at a fixed, confirmed, quorum-agreed height with a public proof (B-73, RND-14 … RND-20, RND-33 … RND-37, DAT-61 … DAT-66, API-25, API-45, AUD-24 … AUD-27, AUD-37, ELC-15, SEC-56, ADR-24, ADR-25)
2026-10-14 16:29:09 +02:00
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draw_confirmations=config.draw_confirmations, # B-73 (DAT-61)
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Snapshot the bet cost, fee address and pool cap onto the round at open, and cap the pool (B-95, RND-05, RND-06, RND-23, BET-20, BET-21, DAT-26, DAT-27, DAT-61, DAT-62, API-21, API-30, API-31, ADR-10, LIM-16)
2026-10-16 15:12:00 +02:00
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# B-95 (DAT-61, RND-05): everything else that governs the round, fixed now — a later
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# edit from /admin applies to the next round, never to this one.
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bet_amount_sats=config.bet_amount_sats,
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fee_address=config.fee_address.strip(),
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max_round_pool_sats=config.max_round_pool_sats,
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Make the draw a commit-reveal at a fixed, confirmed, quorum-agreed height with a public proof (B-73, RND-14 … RND-20, RND-33 … RND-37, DAT-61 … DAT-66, API-25, API-45, AUD-24 … AUD-27, AUD-37, ELC-15, SEC-56, ADR-24, ADR-25)
2026-10-14 16:29:09 +02:00
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# B-73 (RND-34, DAT-64): the commitment, then the secret itself encrypted — the
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# plaintext column stays NULL until the reveal.
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**_new_round_secret(),
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2026-08-03 23:25:56 +02:00
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)
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2026-07-27 00:32:22 +02:00
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session.add(round_)
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try:
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await session.flush()
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except IntegrityError:
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# Another caller (the scheduler tick, or a concurrent place_bet) got
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# there first — ix_rounds_single_active turns what used to be two live
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# rounds into a clean failure here. Roll our insert back and use theirs.
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# Safe to roll back: this runs before its callers have written anything
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# else in this session.
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await session.rollback()
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existing = await get_active_round(session)
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if existing is not None:
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logger.info("lost the race to open a round; using round %s", existing.id)
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return existing
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# Nothing active *and* the insert conflicted: the winner's transaction
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# hadn't committed yet when we looked. Try again rather than failing the
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# caller — a bet shouldn't 500 because of a scheduler tick's timing.
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logger.info("round-open conflict with nothing active yet (attempt %s), retrying", attempt + 1)
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continue
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# Published pre-commit (the caller commits right after) — acceptable: this
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# only tells subscribers "go refetch", and by the time an SSE client's
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# refetch request actually lands, this in-process commit (microseconds
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# away) has essentially always already happened.
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Give every round its own pool address (B-80, RND-35, DAT-60, DAT-11, REG-14, SEC-08, BET-12, RND-22, WDR-14, SEC-43, API-23, API-36)
2026-10-14 13:52:32 +02:00
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# B-80 (RND-35, DAT-60): the round's own pool address, now that its id exists —
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# still inside the caller's transaction, so no committed round ever lacks one.
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round_.pool_address = derive_pool_address(round_.id)
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2026-07-27 00:32:22 +02:00
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broadcaster.publish()
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return round_
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logger.error("could not open a round after %s attempts", _OPEN_ROUND_ATTEMPTS)
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return await get_active_round(session)
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