plm-lottery/BUGS.md

# BUGS.md — open findings

Two audits currently have open entries: 2026-08-03 (B-71, B-72, below) and the
2026-09-28 specification review (B-73 … B-98, at the end of the file).

## Audit of 2026-08-03

Third full-codebase audit, opened after the 2026-07-26 (B-01 … B-24) and
2026-07-27 (B-25 … B-49) lists were emptied. Numbering continues from the last
fixed finding, B-51.

The list opened at B-52 … B-72 and holds only what is still **open**: a finding is
removed from this file once it is fixed, and is not listed here afterwards. Per
CLAUDE.md's convention each entry gets its own commit with its own regression test,
and the `B-nn` marker goes in a comment next to the fix, so
`git log --all --grep 'B-nn'` is the record of how any closed finding was closed.

State of the tree at audit time: 264 unit tests, all passing; `tests/integration/`
still empty; withdrawal and the RBF bump path still never live-broadcast.

Verified as *not* broken while looking for these: i18n key parity (146 identical
keys across all 7 languages), HTML escaping of every user-controlled value in
`admin.js`, the Alembic chain (linear, single head, matching `models.py`),
strictly-integer satoshi arithmetic everywhere, and `.gitignore` coverage of
secrets/DB/logs (nothing sensitive is tracked in git).

Severity is about consequence, not likelihood:
**critical** = money stuck or lost, or the lottery stops;
**high** = a security control that does not hold;
**medium** = wrong behaviour with a bounded blast radius;
**low** = drift between documentation and code.

---

## Critical

### (not new) `drawing` does not resume after a restart

Already tracked as an accepted gap in CLAUDE.md's "Known gaps", not re-numbered
here. Worth restating in context: with `restart: unless-stopped` on the app
container, this is the one state that gets stuck with money in play, and it
remains the last prerequisite for running unattended.

---

## Low — documentation and consistency drift

### B-71 — `.env` points `MASTER_KEY_PATH` at a second copy of the master key

CLAUDE.md's deployment section prescribes pointing `MASTER_KEY_PATH` at the
host-side `./data/keys/master.xprv.enc` so the venv scripts and the container read
one file. `.env` instead sets `./master.xprv.enc`, and both files now exist in the
working tree (both gitignored). They were verified during this audit to decrypt to
the *same* xprv, so nothing has diverged yet — but `scripts/decrypt_master_key.py`
reads a different file from the one the container uses, and a future
`generate_master_key.py --overwrite` would split them silently, with an ops
recovery path that then reports the wrong key.

The same duplication exists for the database (`./plm_lottery.db` next to
`data/db/plm_lottery.db`), which is less dangerous but equally confusing.

Fix: set `MASTER_KEY_PATH=./data/keys/master.xprv.enc` in `.env`, delete the stray
root copy once confirmed redundant, and state the same for `DATABASE_URL`.

### B-72 — `docs/setup.md` still frames setup as "locally or via Docker"

`docs/setup.md:1-10` lists Python as a prerequisite "for the local/venv workflow"
and describes the master-key step as local *or* Docker, while B-44 made Docker the
only supported way to run the server (`docs/running-the-server.md` and README were
updated, this file was not). The venv genuinely is needed for tests, migrations and
the key scripts — the wording just needs to say that instead of implying a second
way to run the server.

---

# Audit of 2026-09-28 — specification review (B-73 … B-98)

Fourth audit, run against the new specification in `docs/` rather than the code
alone: four independent reviews (coin/chain mechanics, money state machine,
DevOps, spec cross-validation), with the critical claims re-verified in code.
The target behaviour of every entry below is now written into `docs/` as
requirements marked `*Stato:* da implementare (B-nn)`; the Italian overview, the
design decisions and the implementation order are in
[docs/piano-correzioni.md](docs/piano-correzioni.md). The code has **not** been
changed yet. Same convention as above: one commit per entry, with its own
regression test, spec + code + test together.

Design decisions taken with the owner on 2026-09-28 (they change existing
decisions, see `docs/limiti-noti.md`):

- **Draw by commit-reveal.** The winner must not be computable by anyone who
  controls block production, since PLM's hashrate (~22 TH/s) is rentable.
- **Never release funds on doubt.** A money-moving row is rolled back only on proof
  (an explicit rejection, or its inputs confirmed-spent elsewhere), never on a
  timeout or on one server's silence.
- **One pool address per round**, so a round's money, history and payout are
  isolated from every other round's.
- **Deposits need 6 confirmations** (configurable), everything else keeps 1: the
  deposit is the only input a user can double-spend.
- **Contain reorgs instead of pretending they don't happen:** detect them, pause
  on deep ones, and pay out only what is verifiably on chain.

## Critical

### B-73 — The draw can be steered by whoever produces or relays blocks

The seed is the block hash alone, so a miner holding tickets can withhold blocks
until one makes them win, and the active Electrum server can pick which real block
is used (it only has to skip announcing one; corroboration checks that the block
exists, not that it is the first after closing). The participant order uses the
server-only `broadcast_at` with no tie-break, so the draw is not reproducible.

Fix (commit-reveal): at round open generate a 32-byte `server_seed`, store it
**encrypted** (`server_seed_enc`, Fernet with the master-xprv key, so a DB copy or
backup alone never reveals it; the plaintext column is written only at reveal), and
publish only `server_seed_hash = sha256(server_seed)`. On entering `drawing`, fix
the participant list ordered by confirmed bet txid (ascending), publish
`participants_hash = sha256` of the `txid:vout:address` lines, and fix
`draw_height = tip_at_close + 1` (persisted, never moved). Wait until the chain has
`draw_confirmations` (round_config, default 3, snapshotted at open) blocks from
`draw_height`, fetch the header *at `draw_height`* from every server, require the
quorum to agree (on disagreement wait and re-ask for the same height). Seed =
`sha256(server_seed || block_hash || participants_hash)` as an integer, index = seed
mod n. Reveal `server_seed` once the winner is persisted, and expose the full proof
at `GET /rounds/{id}/proof`.

### B-74 — Headers are accepted without a minimum-difficulty check, and a jump skips the linkage check

`header_meets_its_own_target` never compares `bits` against the chain's powLimit, so
a header with `bits=0x207fffff` passes with no work. A multi-block jump is not
linked to the current tip. A fake header at a huge height locks `tip_height` (it
never regresses) and freezes every draw. Conversely an ordinary 1-block reorg kills
the session on every server until the next block.

Fix: reject `bits` easier than powLimit; on any advance of more than one block fetch
the intermediate headers (`blockchain.block.headers`) and validate the chain; on a
linkage mismatch walk back up to 10 headers to find the fork point and follow the
reorg instead of ending the session (reorg handling: B-85).

### B-79 — A payout normally has no change output, so it cannot be fee-bumped

The pool normally holds exactly the round's bet outputs, the payout spends them all
for exactly `pool_amount_sats`, so there is no change and `bump_fee` can never help.
A payout stuck in a mempool is also never abandoned (the server still knows it): the
round stays in `paying_out` and no new round opens.

Fix: every payout carries a **bump reserve** output of
`max(DUST_LIMIT_SATS, estimated_vsize × 10 sat/vB)`, taken from the commission share
and paid to the pool reserve address (`m/84'/746'/0'/1/0`, the old pool address);
RBF shrinks that output. `rounds_can_open` refuses a configuration in which a
round of 1 or of `MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND` participants could not cover winner
fee + reserve + dust commission, and `PUT /admin/config` refuses a bet amount or
fee rate that would fail the same check (spec: RND-40).

### B-81 — `drawing` wedges on any exception, not only on restart

The participant snapshot and `tip_at_close` live only in memory; `_tick` skips
`drawing`. Any exception during the wait (`database is locked` writing an audit row,
a malformed header) leaves the round in `drawing` forever.

Fix: persist `draw_height`, `participants_hash` and each participant's
`draw_position` when entering `drawing`; `_tick` re-enters the wait for a round in
`drawing`, idempotently. Together with B-73's fixed height and committed seed, a
resumed draw always yields the same winner.

### B-82 — A deposit reorged out after a bet leaves the round unpayable

Deposits are credited at 1 confirmation. A user can bet, then (if they lost)
double-spend the deposit the bet spent with a private chain: the bet disappears but
its participant stays `confirmed` and counted, and the payout fails "insufficient
pool UTXOs" forever with every other player's money stuck. Immature coinbase outputs
are also credited at 1 confirmation (maturity is 120).

Fix: deposits credited at `deposit_confirmations` (round_config, default 6),
coinbase outputs at 120. Before building a payout the round address's UTXOs are
verified with the quorum; participants whose bet outpoint is gone are marked
`reorged_out` and the 70/30 split is computed on what is actually there. If the
winner's own bet is gone the payout is held (`payout_blocked`) and the lottery pauses.

## High

### B-83 — Confirmations and reinstatement trust the active server alone

`poll_once` marks a tx confirmed on one server's `height > 0`, and
`reinstate_reappeared_utxos` restores a UTXO on its word, so a hostile active server
can report a never-relayed payout as confirmed (winner unpaid) or a phantom bet.
Broadcasts go to the active server only.

Fix: a confirmation is accepted once the quorum returns a valid merkle proof
(`blockchain.transaction.get_merkle`) against a header we hold; reinstatement needs
the same quorum as a credit (B-59); broadcasts fan out (B-76).

### B-85 — Reorgs are neither followed nor surfaced

Nothing detects a reorg; a 1-block reorg is treated as a hostile server (B-74).

Fix: the listener keeps the last 10 headers; a fork is followed to its fork point, a
`chain_reorg_detected` audit row records depth and heights, and a depth ≥ 2 pauses
the lottery (`paused_reason = 'reorg'`) until the operator resumes it.

### B-86 — A connected but stalled server is never replaced

`ping` keeps succeeding while the server stops following the chain; nothing compares
tip progress with the other servers, and a restart goes back to the primary.

Fix: if the tip has not advanced for 360s and any other server reports a higher tip,
rotate. `GET /health/ready` and `/admin` expose connection state, endpoint and
last-header age (B-92).

### B-87 — The RBF bump can leave a dust change output

`bump_fee` only requires change > fee delta. A 294-sat change (full-balance
withdrawal) becomes ~153 sat after the minimum bump and every replacement is refused
by relay, every 30s.

Fix: when a bump would leave change below `DUST_LIMIT_SATS`, the change output is
dropped and its value goes to the fee (the replacement is then final); `RbfError`
and every refused bump write a `rbf_bump_failed` audit row.

### B-89 — Key problems surface only at first use

Startup checks only that the key file exists and `XPRV_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is non-empty;
a wrong key or a different xprv is found at the first registration or payout, and a
different xprv silently moves the pool address. The scripts accept any xprv and write
files `0644`.

Fix: at startup decrypt the key and check the pool reserve address and a sample of
stored user addresses; refuse to serve on mismatch. The scripts refuse an xprv whose
derived addresses differ from the DB's and write `0600`.

### B-90 — Restoring a backup is unsafe

A restored DB reopens rounds that were already drawn and paid, and reassigns the
derivation indexes of users registered after the backup to new users — who then
receive the old users' funds.

Fix: `START_PAUSED=true` starts with the lottery paused; at startup the next 20
indexes past the highest assigned are checked for on-chain history and, if any has
some, registration is refused until the operator reconciles (`restore_gap_detected`);
per-round addresses (B-80) and B-82's pre-payout check make a replayed round
unpayable instead of payable twice.

### B-91 — Host and supply-chain hardening

The container runs as root, `.env` and key files are world-readable, dependencies are
unpinned `>=` and base images float, secrets sit in env vars visible to
`docker inspect`.

Fix: non-root `USER`, `0600`/`0700` permissions, a hash-pinned lock file,
digest-pinned base images, the Fernet key mounted as a file rather than an env var.

## Medium

### B-92 — No health, readiness or real audit browsing

`/health` always answers ok; nothing exposes Electrum state; the audit endpoint
returns only the latest 500 rows unfiltered; registration writes no audit row; the
access log records Caddy's IP; app logs go only to the file.

Fix: `GET /health/ready` (Electrum connected, tip age < 360s, scheduler heartbeat <
30s) used as the container healthcheck; Electrum status in `/admin`; audit filters by
event type, round, user and time, with pagination; `user_registered` audit row with
index and address; uvicorn proxy headers from Caddy only; logs also to stdout.

### B-93 — Deploys and rollbacks

A deploy with an open SSE stream never shuts down gracefully (uvicorn waits, Docker
kills after 10s); an older image cannot start on a newer DB; images are untagged;
`SITE_ADDRESS` passed per command reverts to `localhost` on the next plain
`docker compose up`.

Fix: close SSE streams on shutdown, `stop_grace_period: 30s`, await task
cancellation; tag images per release; `SITE_ADDRESS` in `.env` with `${SITE_ADDRESS:?}`;
documented pre-deploy backup and downgrade procedure.

### B-94 — Account and endpoint abuse limits

`change-password` has no rate limit, no audit and no maximum length; login fields
have no length bounds; `POST /bug-reports` is anonymous and unlimited;
`GET /admin/users` has no pagination; admin, SSE and framework errors are bare
strings; static JS/CSS have no `Cache-Control`.

Fix: throttle and audit (`password_changed`) the password change, cap every
credential field at 256, rate-limit bug reports per IP, paginate the user list,
structured errors everywhere, `Cache-Control: no-cache` on static files.

### B-95 — Round parameters read live instead of snapshotted

Only duration and cooldown are snapshotted at open; bet amount, `fee_address` and the
new `draw_confirmations` are read live, so an edit mid-round changes the round in
progress (e.g. redirects its commission).

Fix: snapshot `bet_amount_sats`, `fee_address` and `draw_confirmations` on the round
at open. Optional per-round cap `max_round_pool_sats` (round_config, 0 = disabled):
once reached, further bets get `round_full`.

### B-96 — Smaller state inconsistencies

A reduced full-balance withdrawal is not re-checked against the minimum; an abandoned
payout leaves `winner_amount_sats`/`fee_amount_sats` set; a promoted payout writes no
`payout_sent` and a promoted bet no `bet_placed`; the reconciler pings SSE for every
row it checks; concurrent refreshes of one user can collide on the unique outpoint
and end the Electrum session; `listener.client` is read outside the per-user lock;
a bet covered only by pending change gets `insufficient_balance` instead of
`balance_pending_confirmation`. A round waiting in `closing` on a bet that never
leaves the mempool gives no signal at all.

Fix: each as described, one regression test per item; for the `closing` wait, a
`closing_stalled` audit row every 1800s past the deadline and `closing_waiting_since`
on `GET /rounds/current` (spec: TX-29).

### B-98 — Coin selection stops at the first covering UTXO, refusing a payable bet

Found while writing the spec on 2026-09-28 (medium). `select_utxos` returns as soon
as the selected total covers the target. When that happens exactly (a 10 PLM coin
for a 10 PLM bet), the change is 0: the bet is refused with
`balance_leaves_no_change` and a withdrawal is reduced by `DUST_LIMIT_SATS`, even
though a second coin would have left a proper change output.

Fix: select until the total covers `target + DUST_LIMIT_SATS` (still largest-first,
still capped at `max_inputs`); only when every allowed coin together cannot reach it
fall back to today's behaviour (refuse the bet, reduce the withdrawal). Spec:
`docs/scommesse-e-prelievi.md` BET-24.