Cap participants per round and give the payout its own input limit (B-52)

The payout has to spend one pool UTXO per bet, so reusing MAX_TX_INPUTS (50)
for it made any round past ~50 players unpayable: select_utxos raised
too_many_inputs, the round stayed "paying_out" retrying every 60s forever, and
since no new round may open while one is active, the whole lottery stopped with
the pool stuck. The cap was being enforced on the payout side, i.e. discovered
once the money was already committed and there was no way back.

Two halves:

- select_utxos takes the cap as a parameter. Bets and withdrawals keep
  MAX_TX_INPUTS = 50, which protects a user from a fee that eats into the amount
  they are moving; the payout uses MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS = 500, where that
  argument doesn't apply — 400 inputs at 1 sat/vB cost ~0.00027 PLM out of the
  winner's 70% share. What actually bounds it is relay policy: 500 inputs is
  ~34 kvB against the 100 kvB standardness limit, and signing that many measures
  ~0.4s, once per round, inside a background task.

- place_bet refuses the 401st bet with a new round_full error (translated into
  all 7 languages), so "a round can always be paid out" is an invariant checked
  before any money moves. MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND sits below the input cap to
  leave the payout headroom for pool change from earlier rounds, and counts every
  participant row rather than only confirmed ones, since a failed bet frees a slot.

A round already wedged past the old cap now pays out on the next retry tick.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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davideandClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-08-03 16:21:33 +02:00
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Severity is about consequence, not likelihood:
## Critical
### B-52 — a round with more than ~50 participants deadlocks the platform permanently
### B-52 — a round with more than ~50 participants deadlocks the platform permanently — **FIXED**
`app/wallet/psbt_builder.py:42` (`MAX_TX_INPUTS = 50`),
`app/rounds/scheduler.py:349-373`.
@@ -45,10 +45,30 @@ CLAUDE.md presents B-48's input cap purely as a fragmented *user* address proble
The pool case is structural rather than an edge case: participant count alone
causes it, with the default bet amount and no unusual deposit pattern.
Fix directions: consolidate the pool between rounds (a sweep tx from pool to pool),
or let a payout span more than one transaction, or — as an interim guard — cap
participants per round and reject bets past the cap with a translatable error.
Whatever the choice, it needs a regression test at n = MAX_TX_INPUTS + 1.
**Fixed** by moving the limit from where it was *discovered* to where it can still be
*enforced*:
- `select_utxos` takes the cap as a parameter. Bets and withdrawals keep
`MAX_TX_INPUTS = 50` (a user-protection limit: the fee comes out of the amount
they are moving); the payout uses the new `MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS = 500`, since the
pool's UTXO count is just the number of bets and the fee comes out of a 70% share
of the whole pool. 500 inputs is ~34 kvB, about a third of the 100 kvB relay
standardness budget; signing that many costs ~0.4 s of event loop, once per round,
in a background task.
- `place_bet` refuses the bet past `MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND = 400` with a new
`round_full` error (400, translated into all 7 languages), counting every
participant row rather than only the confirmed ones. The cap sits below the input
cap so the payout keeps headroom for pool change accumulated by earlier rounds.
The invariant is now "a round can always be paid out", enforced before any of the
401st player's money moves. A round already wedged with 51–499 participants pays out
by itself on the next `_retry_payout_if_due` tick.
Not addressed, and deliberately so: periodic pool consolidation, which is what would
be needed to go beyond this order of magnitude (see the audit discussion — it needs a
new PendingTransaction kind, must not run mid-round, and would force the payout math
to tolerate a pool short of its exact target). Raising these two constants covers
anything up to ~1400 participants first.
### B-53 — a bet can pay into the pool and still be left out of the draw