Restructure bump_fee into three phases, drop float fee math (B-40)

bump_fee issued one get_transaction per input (up to 15s each) and
then a broadcast, all with the caller's DB session held open - exactly
the pattern already fixed elsewhere for the same reason (B-18's
_trigger_payout, B-31's refresh_user). Also, _prevout_amount computed
a prevout's satoshi value via round(value_coins * 100_000_000) on a
float the server reported, in a codebase that is otherwise strictly
integer-satoshi.

bump_fee now takes a session_factory and a pending_id instead of a
live session and row, with three phases: read what's needed (the
signing key, current fee rate, raw tx) and close the session before
any network call; do the chain reads, signing and broadcast with no
session open; reopen a session only to persist the outcome.
_prevout_amount now asks for the raw (non-verbose) transaction and
reads embit's parsed TransactionOutput.value directly - already an
exact integer, no float conversion involved at all.

A pending_transaction that's no longer "pending" by the time bump_fee
actually runs (it confirmed in the meantime, a normal race) is now a
quiet no-op returning None, rather than being folded into RbfBumper's
error-logging path.

Suite grows from 214 to 217 tests. BUGS.md moves B-40 to Previously
fixed, and trims its own now-stale claim that bump_fee still depended
on verbose=True (B-41) - it no longer does.
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davide committed 2026-07-27 15:14:58 +02:00
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@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
# Known bugs
A second full-codebase audit on 2026-07-27 found **25 further issues** (4 critical, 6 high,
7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-40 … B-49. B-25 through B-39 are fixed (see "Previously
fixed" below) — no Critical-severity finding remains open; the other 10 are Medium/Low.
7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-41 … B-49. B-25 through B-40 are fixed (see "Previously
fixed" below) — no Critical-severity finding remains open; the other 9 are Medium/Low.
The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so none of these were caught by existing
coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the fifteen fixes so far brought the suite
from 139 to 214).
coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the sixteen fixes so far brought the suite
from 139 to 217).
The recurring pattern across the open findings is worth stating once: the code is rigorous
about the failure modes that have actually been hit, and silent about the ones that have not.
@@ -18,28 +18,15 @@ admin auth, single-process assumptions, no user-facing history, etc.) are docume
## Medium
### B-40 — `bump_fee` holds a DB session open across N network calls
### B-41 — Confirmation/reconciliation logic depends on `verbose=True`, which is not universally supported
`tx/broadcast.py:80` issues one `get_transaction` **per input** (up to 15s each) and then a
`broadcast`, all with the session open. This is precisely the pattern B-18 removed from
`_trigger_payout` via its three-phase structure; it survives here.
Side note in the same function: `_prevout_amount` does `round(value_coins * 100_000_000)` on a
float from the server — acceptable at these magnitudes, but it is floating-point money
arithmetic in a codebase that is otherwise strictly integer-satoshi.
**Proposed fix.** Restructure into the same three phases: read what is needed and close the
session, do the chain work, then reopen to persist. For the float: prefer the raw (non-verbose)
transaction and parse the output value as an integer with `embit`, which is what
`reconcile.py:_release_inputs` already does for inputs.
### B-41 — All confirmation logic depends on `verbose=True`, which is not universally supported
`poll_once`, `reconcile._tx_exists_on_chain` and `bump_fee` all call
`blockchain.transaction.get(txid, True)`. Several Electrum server implementations and versions
reject the verbose flag ("verbose transactions are currently unsupported"). Falling back onto
such a server means **no confirmations, no reconciliation, no bumps** — and the code would read
that as a transport error and stay silent.
`poll_once` and `reconcile._tx_exists_on_chain` call `blockchain.transaction.get(txid, True)`.
Several Electrum server implementations and versions reject the verbose flag ("verbose
transactions are currently unsupported"). Falling back onto such a server means **no
confirmations, no reconciliation** — and the code would read that as a transport error and stay
silent. (`bump_fee`'s own `verbose=True` call was removed as part of the B-40 fix — it now reads
the raw transaction and parses the output value with `embit` instead, so bumps are unaffected by
this finding.)
Related: `reconcile.py:83` decides whether to **abandon a transaction** by substring-matching
the error text (`"missing"`, `"not found"`, `"no such"`, `"unknown"`). It works against
@@ -133,9 +120,10 @@ already does.
- **B-37** — a withdrawal covered by unconfirmed change answered "insufficient balance" instead of distinguishing it from actually having no funds
- **B-38** — the SSE subscriber cap was global, so one client opening enough connections degraded every other user to polling
- **B-39** — SQLite ran without WAL or a `busy_timeout`, so a writer could block every reader and a second writer failed immediately instead of waiting
- **B-40** — `bump_fee` held a DB session open across N slow network calls, and computed a prevout's value from a server-reported float instead of an exact integer
See git history for the fix-by-fix breakdown (commits `f13f685`, `50a43ae`, `933760e`, and the
B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33/B-34/B-35/B-36/B-37/B-38/B-39 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 214 tests over the fifteen.
B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33/B-34/B-35/B-36/B-37/B-38/B-39/B-40 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 217 tests over the sixteen.
A full-codebase audit on 2026-07-26 (commit `d4e0974`) found 24 bugs across every Python
module under `app/`, both static frontends, and the Docker/Caddy deployment — 5 critical,