Validate Electrum headers and corroborate the draw's block (B-28)
A single hostile Electrum server, or a MITM on the one active connection, could fabricate the block header the draw's entropy comes from and so pick the winner of every round: headers were accepted with no proof-of-work check and no link to the previous tip. app/rounds/draw.py adds header_meets_its_own_target (rejects a header whose hash doesn't satisfy the difficulty target it claims) and header_prev_hash. electrum/listener.py's _apply_header now rejects a header failing either check by raising HeaderValidationError, which ends the session the same way a dropped connection would so the listener rotates to the next configured server. ElectrumListener gains corroborate_header: before the draw uses a block, it's independently checked against the other configured servers and needs a majority to agree. rounds/scheduler.py's _wait_for_next_block now calls this and, on failure, logs why and waits for a further block instead of ever using an uncorroborated header. Certificate/hostname verification stays disabled, so this doesn't cover an attacker able to MITM every configured server at once - BUGS.md notes that as not covered. Suite grows from 151 to 165 tests. BUGS.md moves B-28 to Previously fixed.
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# Known bugs
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A second full-codebase audit on 2026-07-27 found **25 further issues** (4 critical, 6 high,
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7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-25 … B-49. B-25, B-26 and B-27 are fixed (see "Previously
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fixed" below); the other 22 are open. The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so
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none of these were caught by existing coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the
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three fixes so far brought the suite from 139 to 151).
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7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-29 … B-49. B-25 through B-28 are fixed (see "Previously
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fixed" below) — no Critical-severity finding remains open; the other 21 are High/Medium/Low.
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The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so none of these were caught by existing
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coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the four fixes so far brought the suite from
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139 to 165).
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The recurring pattern across the open findings is worth stating once: the code is rigorous
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about the failure modes that have actually been hit, and silent about the ones that have not.
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@@ -18,31 +19,6 @@ single-process assumptions, no user-facing history, etc.), see "Known gaps / TOD
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---
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## Critical
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### B-28 — A hostile Electrum server (or a MITM) can choose the winner
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`electrum/listener.py:167-186` accepts any header whose `height >= tip_height`: no
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proof-of-work check, no linkage to the previous block hash. That header is the **sole source
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of entropy for the draw** (`scheduler.py:129`).
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In parallel, `electrum/client.py:104-106` sets `check_hostname = False` and
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`verify_mode = CERT_NONE`. The comment justifies this with "the protocol's trust model is
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server consensus" — but there is no consensus here: one server at a time, rotated over a list
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of arbitrary third parties. So a hostile server, or anyone able to MITM a connection that
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validates no certificate, can fabricate a header and thereby decide who wins every round.
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**Proposed fix, in order of value.** (1) Validate headers before accepting them: check the
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PoW against the claimed target and that `prev_block` matches the current tip; reject anything
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that fails. (2) Do not trust one server for the draw — fetch the header for
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`draw_block_height` from *several* endpoints in the rotation and require agreement before
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using it as the seed. (3) Pin certificates (or verify hostnames) for the configured servers
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rather than disabling verification wholesale. Longer term this is the argument for replacing
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the v1 draw algorithm — CLAUDE.md already calls it a replaceable component — with a scheme
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that does not depend on a single unauthenticated data source.
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---
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## High
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### B-29 — `detect_external_spends` is irreversible and trusts a single response
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@@ -321,17 +297,13 @@ already does.
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## Previously fixed
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B-25 (the payout had no two-phase write, unlike bets and withdrawals — a crash or rejected
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broadcast could leave money on-chain with no DB record, or leave the round wedged with no way
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to retry safely), B-26 (a transient failure or a process restart at payout time wedged the
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round in `paying_out` forever, with most failure paths logging nothing) and B-27 (every RBF
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bump reset the reconciler's own abandon clock, so a repeatedly-bumped-but-never-mined
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transaction was never abandoned) are fixed as of 2026-07-27. Together B-25 and B-26 make
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`paying_out` fully recoverable — a payout retry is now safe (persisted before broadcast,
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guarded against double-spend) and automatic (the scheduler retries a stuck round on its own,
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throttled, with every failure audit-logged with a reason, including across a process restart).
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See git history (commits `f13f685`, `50a43ae`, `933760e`) for the fix-by-fix breakdown; the
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regression suite grew from 139 to 151 tests over the three.
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- **B-25** — the payout had no two-phase write, unlike bets and withdrawals
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- **B-26** — a payout failure or a process restart could wedge a round in `paying_out` forever
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- **B-27** — an RBF bump reset the reconciler's own abandon clock, so a repeatedly-bumped tx was never abandoned
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- **B-28** — a hostile Electrum server (or a MITM) could single-handedly pick the round's winner
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See git history for the fix-by-fix breakdown (commits `f13f685`, `50a43ae`, `933760e`, and the
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B-28 fix). Suite grew from 139 to 165 tests over the four.
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A full-codebase audit on 2026-07-26 (commit `d4e0974`) found 24 bugs across every Python
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module under `app/`, both static frontends, and the Docker/Caddy deployment — 5 critical,
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