Require a real Electrum quorum and allow certificate pinning (B-84, ELC-01, ELC-03, ELC-14, ELC-19, ARC-20, OPS-12)

An empty ELECTRUM_FALLBACK_SERVERS (the .env.example default) silently made every
corroboration pass, and with fallbacks the majority was taken over whoever
answered, so one reachable fallback decided alone. TLS certificates were never
checked.

- _corroborate_majority passes only with at least 2 answers (MIN_QUORUM_RESPONSES)
  and a strict majority of the answers; no other server configured, or fewer than
  2 answering, fails. ALLOW_NO_QUORUM=true keeps the old reduced rule.
- config.validate_quorum_servers, called from the lifespan after parse_endpoints,
  refuses to start with fewer than 2 fallback servers unless ALLOW_NO_QUORUM=true
  (which logs a warning at every start).
- Optional pinning: `host:port[:mode]:pin=<sha256>` per fallback and
  ELECTRUM_CERT_PIN for the primary; ElectrumClient compares the SHA-256 of the
  DER certificate after the TLS handshake and a mismatch fails like an unreachable
  server. A pin on a plaintext entry is a startup error.
- .env.example now ships the four bootstrap servers and documents both new
  variables; docs/setup.md, spec, storico and BUGS.md updated.
- Tests changed because the spec changed: the two "no other servers configured ->
  True" corroboration tests now assert that outcome only under allow_no_quorum.

Note: a dev .env with fewer than 2 fallback servers will now refuse to start.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 committed 2026-10-14 14:04:35 +02:00
1 parent fd6a91e93d
commit 13cb66cc06
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@@ -69,10 +69,9 @@ dovranno allora rispettare quel proprietario.
`app/config.py:validate_runtime_secrets`,
`app/electrum/client.py:parse_endpoints`, `app/wallet/hd.py:_load_account_key` ·
*Test:* `tests/unit/test_config.py`, `tests/unit/test_electrum_client.py`
*Stato:* da implementare (B-89, B-84) · *Oggi:* della master key si
controlla solo che il file esista e che `XPRV_ENCRYPTION_KEY` non sia vuota;
una chiave sbagliata emerge alla prima derivazione, e il server parte anche
senza server di riserva.
*Stato:* da implementare (B-89) · *Oggi:* della master key si controlla
solo che il file esista e che `XPRV_ENCRYPTION_KEY` non sia vuota; una
chiave sbagliata emerge alla prima derivazione.
- **[OPS-03]** Il database SQLite lavora in modalità **WAL**: accanto a
`plm_lottery.db` esistono `plm_lottery.db-wal` e `plm_lottery.db-shm`, e le
@@ -469,12 +468,6 @@ con `docker compose logs app` ([architettura.md](architettura.md) ARC-09).
*Codice:* `app/electrum/listener.py:ElectrumListener._corroborate_majority`,
`app/main.py:lifespan` ·
*Test:* `tests/unit/test_electrum_listener.py`
*Stato:* da implementare (B-84) · *Oggi:* con `ELECTRUM_FALLBACK_SERVERS`
vuoto (il valore di `.env.example`) il server parte e la corroborazione
passa sempre: un solo server decide tutto. Con server di riserva la
maggioranza è su chi risponde, quindi basta una sola riserva raggiungibile;
se nessuna risponde, la corroborazione fallisce
(`draw_header_corroboration_failed` a ogni blocco).
### Round bloccato in `drawing`