Throttle login and registration with exponential backoff (B-33)

POST /auth/login had no rate limiting, no lockout, no delay — a patient
distributed attack could brute-force a password against an enumerable
username list on a custodial wallet, where a guessed password means
withdrawing someone's funds.

Add per-username and per-IP throttling with exponential backoff
(app/auth/rate_limit.py), keyed on app.state like UserLocks rather than
a module global so each app instance gets isolated throttle state.
Unknown-user and wrong-password already shared one response path, so no
enumeration oracle there. Registration is throttled per-IP too, which
also bounds how many accounts one IP can spin up (B-31).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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davideandClaude Sonnet 5 committed 2026-07-27 11:51:26 +02:00
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# Known bugs
A second full-codebase audit on 2026-07-27 found **25 further issues** (4 critical, 6 high,
7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-33 … B-49. B-25 through B-32 are fixed (see "Previously
fixed" below) — no Critical-severity finding remains open; the other 17 are High/Medium/Low.
7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-33 … B-49. B-25 through B-33 are fixed (see "Previously
fixed" below) — no Critical-severity finding remains open; the other 16 are High/Medium/Low.
The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so none of these were caught by existing
coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the eight fixes so far brought the suite
from 139 to 187).
coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the nine fixes so far brought the suite
from 139 to 192).
The recurring pattern across the open findings is worth stating once: the code is rigorous
about the failure modes that have actually been hit, and silent about the ones that have not.
@@ -20,22 +20,6 @@ single-process assumptions, no user-facing history, etc.), see "Known gaps / TOD
## High
### B-33 — No brute-force protection on a custodial wallet
`POST /auth/login` (`auth/routes.py:83`) has no rate limiting, no lockout, no delay and no
CAPTCHA, and the password minimum is 8 characters. Argon2 slows a single attempt but not a
patient distributed attack against an enumerable username list — and `409 username_taken` on
registration is a perfect enumeration oracle.
"No rate limiting" is listed as a generic known gap; on a system where guessing a password
means **withdrawing someone's funds**, it deserves to be tracked separately and treated as a
blocker.
**Proposed fix.** Per-username *and* per-IP throttling with exponential backoff on failed
logins (`slowapi`, or a small DB-backed counter — but note the in-process caveat if workers
are ever scaled). Return an identical response for unknown-user and wrong-password. Rate-limit
registration too, which also bounds B-31's attacker-controlled user count.
### B-34 — Password change and admin reset do not invalidate existing sessions
Neither `/users/me/change-password` nor `/admin/users/{id}/reset-password` invalidates
@@ -227,9 +211,10 @@ already does.
- **B-30** — a lost scripthash subscription meant a user's deposits were never credited, with no periodic safety net
- **B-31** — resubscribing on reconnect ran serially before anything else started, freezing the chain tip (and so an in-flight draw) for the whole sweep
- **B-32** — an RBF bump's fee delta could fall below BIP125's relay-mandated minimum, so the node rejected it and the same tick retried identically forever; also had no ceiling on how high the fee rate could climb
- **B-33** — `POST /auth/login` had no rate limiting on a custodial wallet, so a patient distributed attack could brute-force a password against an enumerable username list; fixed with per-username *and* per-IP exponential backoff (`app/auth/rate_limit.py`), registration throttled per-IP too (also bounds B-31's attacker-controlled user count)
See git history for the fix-by-fix breakdown (commits `f13f685`, `50a43ae`, `933760e`, and the
B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 187 tests over the eight.
B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 192 tests over the nine.
A full-codebase audit on 2026-07-26 (commit `d4e0974`) found 24 bugs across every Python
module under `app/`, both static frontends, and the Docker/Caddy deployment — 5 critical,