Meet BIP125's relay minimum on every RBF bump, and cap the fee rate (B-32)
bump_fee computed fee_delta as new_fee - old_fee, falling back to a flat 1-satoshi bump whenever that came out zero or negative - which happened whenever old_fee (the actual fee paid, from real prevout amounts) already exceeded the naive target, e.g. because dust change had been folded into the original fee (psbt_builder.py's DUST_LIMIT_SATS handling). A 1-satoshi total increase is nowhere near BIP125 rule 4's minimum (the replacement must pay at least the incremental relay fee rate times its own vsize more than what it replaces), so the node rejected it every time - and since bump_fee raised before touching `pending`, the next tick retried with identical parameters every 30 seconds, forever. Separately, the fee rate climbed by 1 sat/vB every bump with no ceiling. fee_delta is now max(target_fee - old_fee, vsize * the incremental relay rate) - always at least the relay-mandated minimum regardless of what the naive arithmetic produces. pending.fee_rate_sat_vb is set to the actual resulting rate rather than the naive target, so a later bump's arithmetic starts from what's really being paid instead of drifting from it. Once a transaction reaches MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB (a new constant, 10,000 sat/vB, shared with RoundConfig.fee_rate_sat_vb's existing admin-facing bound so the two can't drift apart - the same reason MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH is shared elsewhere) bump_fee refuses to bump further; the reconciler abandons it if it never confirms (B-27) instead of this retrying forever. Suite grows from 185 to 187 tests. BUGS.md moves B-32 to Previously fixed.
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@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
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# Known bugs
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A second full-codebase audit on 2026-07-27 found **25 further issues** (4 critical, 6 high,
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7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-32 … B-49. B-25 through B-31 are fixed (see "Previously
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fixed" below) — no Critical-severity finding remains open; the other 18 are High/Medium/Low.
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7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-33 … B-49. B-25 through B-32 are fixed (see "Previously
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fixed" below) — no Critical-severity finding remains open; the other 17 are High/Medium/Low.
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The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so none of these were caught by existing
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coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the seven fixes so far brought the suite
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from 139 to 185).
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coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the eight fixes so far brought the suite
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from 139 to 187).
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The recurring pattern across the open findings is worth stating once: the code is rigorous
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about the failure modes that have actually been hit, and silent about the ones that have not.
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@@ -20,28 +20,6 @@ single-process assumptions, no user-facing history, etc.), see "Known gaps / TOD
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## High
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### B-32 — `bump_fee` can loop forever on rebroadcasts the node always rejects
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`tx/broadcast.py:87-88` forces `fee_delta = 1` when `fee_delta <= 0`. A **one-satoshi** total
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fee increase violates BIP125 rule 4 (a replacement must pay at least the incremental relay fee
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times its own size), so the node rejects it. `bump_fee` raises before updating `pending`, so
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`fee_rate_sat_vb` never advances and the next tick **retries with identical parameters, every
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30 seconds, forever**.
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This triggers whenever the real fee exceeds the estimate — i.e. whenever dust change was
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absorbed into the fee, which is an explicitly supported path
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(`wallet/psbt_builder.py:105-107`).
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Related, same function: `new_fee_rate = pending.fee_rate_sat_vb + 1` on every bump, with **no
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ceiling**. A transaction stuck for a day reaches ~96 sat/vB, eating the user's change, and it
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ignores the `le=10_000` bound the admin panel enforces on the config field.
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**Proposed fix.** Compute the delta from the actual replacement vsize
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(`fee_delta = max(new_fee - old_fee, ceil(vsize * incremental_relay_rate))`) so the bump is
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always relay-valid. Cap `new_fee_rate` at the configured maximum and raise `RbfError` once
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reached, so the transaction falls through to the reconciler (which, since B-27, correctly
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abandons it) rather than being retried indefinitely.
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### B-33 — No brute-force protection on a custodial wallet
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`POST /auth/login` (`auth/routes.py:83`) has no rate limiting, no lockout, no delay and no
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@@ -248,9 +226,10 @@ already does.
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- **B-29** — a UTXO absent from one server's `listunspent` was marked spent immediately, irreversibly, on a single unauthenticated reply
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- **B-30** — a lost scripthash subscription meant a user's deposits were never credited, with no periodic safety net
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- **B-31** — resubscribing on reconnect ran serially before anything else started, freezing the chain tip (and so an in-flight draw) for the whole sweep
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- **B-32** — an RBF bump's fee delta could fall below BIP125's relay-mandated minimum, so the node rejected it and the same tick retried identically forever; also had no ceiling on how high the fee rate could climb
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See git history for the fix-by-fix breakdown (commits `f13f685`, `50a43ae`, `933760e`, and the
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B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 185 tests over the seven.
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B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 187 tests over the eight.
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A full-codebase audit on 2026-07-26 (commit `d4e0974`) found 24 bugs across every Python
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module under `app/`, both static frontends, and the Docker/Caddy deployment — 5 critical,
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