Disable Swagger/ReDoc/OpenAPI JSON by default (B-42)

They enumerate the entire API surface, admin endpoints included, to
anyone who requests them. Gate them behind a new ENABLE_API_DOCS
setting (off by default) and update README/docs and BUGS.md/CLAUDE.md
open-bug counts accordingly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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davideandClaude Sonnet 5 committed 2026-07-27 15:34:49 +02:00
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# Known bugs
A second full-codebase audit on 2026-07-27 found **25 further issues** (4 critical, 6 high,
7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-42 … B-49. B-25 through B-41 are fixed (see "Previously
fixed" below) — no Critical- or Medium-severity finding remains open; the other 8 are Low/hygiene.
The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so none of these were caught by existing
coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the seventeen fixes so far brought the suite
from 139 to 222).
7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-43 … B-49. B-25 through B-42 are fixed (see "Previously
fixed" below) — no Critical-, High- or Medium-severity finding remains open; the remaining 7 are
Low/hygiene. The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so none of these were caught
by existing coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the eighteen fixes so far brought
the suite from 139 to 224).
The recurring pattern across the open findings is worth stating once: the code is rigorous
about the failure modes that have actually been hit, and silent about the ones that have not.
@@ -18,13 +18,6 @@ admin auth, single-process assumptions, no user-facing history, etc.) are docume
## Low / hygiene
### B-42 — `/docs` exposed in production
FastAPI mounts Swagger by default, so the entire API surface — `/admin` included — is publicly
enumerable. The README advertises it.
**Fix:** `docs_url=None, redoc_url=None, openapi_url=None` in production (env-gated), or place
them behind `require_admin`.
### B-43 — No HTTP security headers
The [Caddyfile](Caddyfile) sets no CSP, no `X-Frame-Options`/`frame-ancestors`, and no HSTS
@@ -89,6 +82,7 @@ already does.
- **B-29** — a UTXO absent from one server's `listunspent` was marked spent immediately, irreversibly, on a single unauthenticated reply
- **B-30** — a lost scripthash subscription meant a user's deposits were never credited, with no periodic safety net
- **B-31** — resubscribing on reconnect ran serially before anything else started, freezing the chain tip (and so an in-flight draw) for the whole sweep
- **B-42** — Swagger/ReDoc/the raw OpenAPI JSON enumerated the entire API surface, admin endpoints included, to anyone who requested them; now off by default and gated behind `ENABLE_API_DOCS`
- **B-32** — an RBF bump could retry forever below BIP125's relay-mandated minimum fee delta, with no ceiling on the fee rate either
- **B-33** — `POST /auth/login` had no rate limiting, so a password could be brute-forced against an enumerable username list
- **B-34** — password change/reset didn't invalidate already-issued JWTs, so a stolen token survived a change meant to lock it out
@@ -101,7 +95,7 @@ already does.
- **B-41** — confirmation/reconciliation depended on a verbose `blockchain.transaction.get` reply many Electrum servers reject, and abandonment relied on fragile substring-matching of an error message
See git history for the fix-by-fix breakdown (commits `f13f685`, `50a43ae`, `933760e`, and the
B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33/B-34/B-35/B-36/B-37/B-38/B-39/B-40/B-41 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 222 tests over the seventeen.
B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33/B-34/B-35/B-36/B-37/B-38/B-39/B-40/B-41/B-42 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 224 tests over the eighteen.
A full-codebase audit on 2026-07-26 (commit `d4e0974`) found 24 bugs across every Python
module under `app/`, both static frontends, and the Docker/Caddy deployment — 5 critical,