B1: plm_engine takes the modules without a database (ADR-59)

HD derivation (pure part), PSBT builder, Electrum client/merkle/quorum/scripthash, network
profile, addresses and header checks move to plm_engine; the old stack imports them from
there. A test forbids framework imports in the package.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 committed 2026-11-16 15:31:47 +01:00
1 parent c9784efa07
commit 3ee60a23da
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@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
import os
from embit import script
from embit.bip32 import HDKey
from embit.ec import PrivateKey
from app.config import settings
from plm_engine import hd as engine
from app.wallet.keystore import decrypt_xprv, encrypt_xprv, write_secret_file
from app.wallet.plm_network import ACCOUNT_PATH, PLM_MAINNET
from plm_engine.network import ACCOUNT_PATH, PLM_MAINNET
_account_key: HDKey | None = None
@@ -31,55 +30,30 @@ def _load_account_key() -> HDKey:
def derive_user_key(derivation_index: int) -> HDKey:
return _load_account_key().derive(f"0/{derivation_index}")
return engine.user_key(_load_account_key(), derivation_index)
def derive_user_address(derivation_index: int) -> str:
pub = derive_user_key(derivation_index).to_public()
return script.p2wpkh(pub).address(network=PLM_MAINNET)
return engine.user_address(_load_account_key(), derivation_index)
def derive_user_wif(derivation_index: int) -> str:
"""Exports a user's raw private key (WIF) for manual server-side intervention
(e.g. sweeping funds back to a user, or out, if something gets stuck). This is
a custodial system — the server already holds the master key this is derived
from — but callers must still treat the result as a live secret: log access,
never persist it, never return it over an unauthenticated channel."""
key = derive_user_key(derivation_index)
return PrivateKey(key.secret, compressed=True, network=PLM_MAINNET).wif(network=PLM_MAINNET)
"""Exports a user's raw private key (WIF) for manual server-side intervention (e.g. sweeping funds back to a
user, or out, if something gets stuck). Callers must treat the result as a live secret: log access, never
persist it, never return it over an unauthenticated channel."""
return engine.user_wif(_load_account_key(), derivation_index)
def derive_pool_key(round_id: int | None = None) -> HDKey:
"""A pool key. With a `round_id`, that round's own key on branch 2 of the account
(`m/84'/746'/0'/2/<round_id>`, B-80, RND-35): its bets are paid to it and its
payout is signed with it, so one round's money and history never mix with another's.
Without one, the **reserve** key at branch 1, index 0 — the single pool address every
round used before B-80, still the pool of the rounds opened back then and the
destination of the payout's bump reserve. Branch 0 is users. Not a spec requirement
of the coin, an implementation choice to keep every key under the one encrypted
master key rather than in separate secrets."""
if round_id is None:
return _load_account_key().derive("1/0")
if round_id < 1:
raise ValueError(f"invalid round id {round_id}")
return _load_account_key().derive(f"2/{round_id}")
"""A pool key: a round's own (B-80, RND-35) or, without a `round_id`, the reserve key. See `plm_engine.hd`."""
return engine.pool_key(_load_account_key(), round_id)
def derive_pool_address(round_id: int | None = None) -> str:
"""The pool address of a round (B-80), or the reserve address without a `round_id`."""
pub = derive_pool_key(round_id).to_public()
return script.p2wpkh(pub).address(network=PLM_MAINNET)
return engine.pool_address(_load_account_key(), round_id)
def derive_round_pool_key(round_id: int, pool_address: str) -> HDKey:
"""The key that controls `pool_address`, the address stored on round `round_id`.
A round opened before B-80 stores the reserve address and is signed with the reserve
key; every other round with its own. Checking the derived address against the stored
one means a key can never be used for money it does not control, and a mismatch (a
different master key, a corrupted row) fails loudly instead of building a transaction
that spends someone else's coins."""
for key in (derive_pool_key(round_id), derive_pool_key()):
if script.p2wpkh(key.to_public()).address(network=PLM_MAINNET) == pool_address:
return key
raise ValueError(f"round {round_id}: no pool key controls the stored address {pool_address!r}")
"""The key that controls `pool_address`, the address stored on round `round_id` (see `plm_engine.hd`)."""
return engine.round_pool_key(_load_account_key(), round_id, pool_address)