Credit deposits at deposit_confirmations and verify the round's coins with the quorum before paying (B-82, DEP-03, DEP-04, DEP-09, DEP-12, DEP-14, ELC-17, ELC-27, RND-21, RND-22, RND-25, RND-39, DAT-10, DAT-11, DAT-24, DAT-62, DAT-67, DAT-68, AUD-12, AUD-44, AUD-45, API-30, API-31, API-36, ADR-06, ADR-52)

A user could bet and then double-spend the 1-conference deposit that funded the bet with a
private chain: the bet left the chain but its participant stayed `confirmed`, and the payout
failed "insufficient pool UTXOs" for ever with everyone else's money stuck. Coinbase outputs
were also credited at 1 confirmation (maturity is 120).

Deposits
- `round_config.deposit_confirmations` (default 6, 1-100, editable from /admin) is the
  threshold for a deposit; an output of a platform transaction (any txid of a
  pending_transactions row, RBF versions included) keeps 1; a coinbase output needs 120,
  recognised from the raw transaction, which must hash to the txid (`is_coinbase`, cached).
  `read_deposit_policy` / `classify_new_deposits` run between the read and the write, so no
  session is open across the lookup.
- The quorum must also place the coin deep enough on our own tip (ELC-17).
- Confirmed outputs short of their threshold are pending deposits (memory only, replaced at
  every refresh): shown in `pending_balance_sats` / `has_pending` (also for DEP-13's withdrawal
  message), never spendable. No scripthash notification announces a maturing deposit, so each
  new block refreshes only the users that have one, one task per user (DEP-09 now says so).

Payout
- `_trigger_payout` verifies the round's confirmed participants' bet outputs with the other
  servers (`verify_pool_outpoints`: strict majority of >= 2 answers per outpoint, a
  mempool-only coin or a tie gives no verdict) and builds from exactly those outpoints
  (RND-22), never from whatever else sits at the address. No quorum: `payout_failed`, `pool
  verification unavailable`, nothing changes. Bets that are gone become `reorged_out`, one
  `participant_reorged_out` row each, `pool_amount_sats` rewritten (only downward) in the same
  transaction, and the 70/30 split is computed on what is left.
- Winner's own bet gone: nothing is built; `rounds.payout_blocked_at` (Alembic f2c64a8d1e93,
  with `deposit_confirmations`, plain add_column) is set, `payout_blocked` and the pause with
  `paused_reason = 'payout_blocked'` are written in one transaction; `POST /admin/resume` clears
  the mark and the next attempt verifies again. /admin/rounds returns it.
- Rounds opened before B-80 (pool = the shared reserve address) keep the old active-server
  `listunspent` choice, since that address holds no single round's bets.

Ambiguities resolved: the winner's row stays `confirmed` while held (AUD-45 says every
participant whose bet is gone becomes `reorged_out`, but OPS-30/DAT-68 need the verification to
repeat after the resume, which only a `confirmed` row allows); `/`'s deposit hint no longer says
"1 confirmation" (7 languages, same keys); guides updated.

Tests changed because the spec changed: listener tests that credited height-100 coins at tip 0
now set a tip past every threshold; the payout fixtures seed confirmed participants (the new
source of the inputs) instead of an active-server `listunspent`, FakeNetwork answers the
verification, and test_round_pool_address asserts the quorum is asked about the round's
address. New: thresholds at exactly 6/5, configured value, coinbase at 119/120 and a mismatching
or missing raw tx, platform outputs at 1, dust, quorum height, waiting-deposit display and
disappearance, block-triggered refresh, resume, verification verdicts, gone bets excluded with
the split recomputed, winner gone held and paused, held payouts untouched until the resume,
re-verification after it, no quorum, a payout with 1 and with 400 participants against
reserve+fee+dust, admin config bounds and migration. Mutation-checked: threshold 1, ignored
coinbase, no height bound, no verification and no winner hold each fail tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/audit-log.md

@@ -187,8 +187,8 @@ flowchart LR
   riga. `user_id` no, `round_id` no. Stessa transazione della modifica.
   *Codice:* `app/api/routes/admin.py:update_config` ·
   *Test:* `tests/unit/test_admin.py`
-  *Stato:* da implementare (B-82, B-95), per gli ultimi due campi ·
-  *Oggi:* i campi sono i primi otto.
+  *Stato:* da implementare (B-95), per `max_round_pool_sats` ·
+  *Oggi:* i campi sono i primi nove.
 
 - **[AUD-11]** `lottery_paused` — la lotteria è stata messa in pausa, da
   chiunque. Payload `{"reason"}`, più `"note"` quando l'operatore l'ha
@@ -216,10 +216,10 @@ flowchart LR
   `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._trigger_payout`,
   `app/tx/reconcile.py:reconcile_once` ·
   *Test:* `tests/unit/test_pause_reason.py`, `tests/unit/test_electrum_listener.py`
-  *Stato:* da implementare (B-82, B-90) · *Oggi:* scritto da
-  `POST /admin/pause` (`operator`), dal riconciliatore (`resurrected_tx`) e dal
-  listener (`reorg`); `payout_blocked` e l'avvio con `START_PAUSED` non lo
-  scrivono ancora.
+  *Stato:* da implementare (B-90) · *Oggi:* scritto da
+  `POST /admin/pause` (`operator`), dal riconciliatore (`resurrected_tx`), dal
+  listener (`reorg`) e dallo scheduler (`payout_blocked`); l'avvio con
+  `START_PAUSED` non lo scrive ancora.
 
 - **[AUD-12]** `lottery_resumed` — `POST /admin/resume`. Payload
   `{"reason"}`: il `paused_reason` che la ripresa ha tolto (`null` se la
@@ -229,9 +229,7 @@ flowchart LR
   `paused = false`, `paused_reason = NULL` e dell'azzeramento di
   `payout_blocked_at`.
   *Codice:* `app/api/routes/admin.py:resume_lottery` ·
-  *Test:* `tests/unit/test_pause_reason.py`
-  *Stato:* da implementare (B-82), per l'azzeramento di `payout_blocked_at` ·
-  *Oggi:* `rounds.payout_blocked_at` non esiste ancora.
+  *Test:* `tests/unit/test_pause_reason.py`, `tests/unit/test_admin.py::test_resume_releases_a_payout_held_because_the_winners_bet_left_the_chain`
 
 - **[AUD-13]** `admin_privkey_accessed` — `GET /admin/users/{id}/privkey` ha
   esportato la chiave privata (WIF) di un utente. Payload `{"user_id"}`.
@@ -491,7 +489,7 @@ flowchart LR
   scrive invece `payout_blocked` ([AUD-44]). L'elenco dei motivi è di
   [RND-25](ciclo-di-vita-del-round.md#4--pagamento); la verifica senza
   quorum di [RND-39](ciclo-di-vita-del-round.md#4--pagamento) termina anche
-  lei con `payout_failed`, motivo `pool verification unavailable` (B-82). Cosa fare per ogni motivo è descritto in
+  lei con `payout_failed`, motivo `pool verification unavailable`. Cosa fare per ogni motivo è descritto in
   [operativita.md](operativita.md).
   *Codice:* `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._trigger_payout`,
   `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._log_payout_failure` ·
@@ -515,10 +513,8 @@ flowchart LR
   riscritto dopo l'esclusione. `user_id` sì (il partecipante), `round_id` sì.
   Stessa transazione del passaggio a `reorged_out` e della riscrittura di
   `pool_amount_sats`. Nessuna logica rilegge la riga.
-  *Codice:* `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._trigger_payout` ·
-  *Test:* —
-  *Stato:* da implementare (B-82) · *Oggi:* nessun partecipante viene mai
-  escluso; il pagamento fallisce con `insufficient pool UTXOs`.
+  *Codice:* `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._trigger_payout`, `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._verify_round_pool` ·
+  *Test:* `tests/unit/test_pool_verification.py::test_a_reorged_out_bet_is_excluded_and_the_split_is_computed_on_what_is_there`, `tests/unit/test_pool_verification.py::test_several_bets_gone_at_once_each_get_a_row_in_one_transaction`
 
 - **[AUD-44]** `payout_blocked` — la verifica prima del pagamento ha trovato
   assente la scommessa **del vincitore**: il pagamento non si costruisce, il
@@ -532,10 +528,8 @@ flowchart LR
   verifica si ripete: se la scommessa è ancora assente si scrive una nuova
   riga. Non è un `payout_failed` e non fa da orologio dei tentativi.
   Procedura in [operativita.md](operativita.md) (OPS-30).
-  *Codice:* `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._trigger_payout` ·
-  *Test:* —
-  *Stato:* da implementare (B-82) · *Oggi:* il pagamento fallisce con
-  `insufficient pool UTXOs` a ogni tentativo, senza pausa.
+  *Codice:* `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._trigger_payout`, `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._verify_round_pool` ·
+  *Test:* `tests/unit/test_pool_verification.py::test_the_winners_own_bet_gone_holds_the_payout_and_pauses_the_lottery`, `tests/unit/test_pool_verification.py::test_after_the_resume_the_verification_repeats`
 
 ### Riconciliazione