Bound admin list endpoint limits, add status filter to pending-transactions (B-45)

/admin/rounds and /admin/audit-log accepted any limit, including -1 (which
SQLite treats as "no limit"), and /admin/pending-transactions had no limit
at all -- it grows without end. Add Query(default=..., ge=1, le=500) to all
three, plus an optional status filter on pending-transactions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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davideandClaude Sonnet 5 committed 2026-07-27 16:10:53 +02:00
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@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
# Known bugs
A second full-codebase audit on 2026-07-27 found **25 further issues** (4 critical, 6 high,
7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-45 … B-49. B-25 through B-44 are fixed (see "Previously
fixed" below) — no Critical-, High- or Medium-severity finding remains open; the remaining 5 are
7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-46 … B-49. B-25 through B-45 are fixed (see "Previously
fixed" below) — no Critical-, High- or Medium-severity finding remains open; the remaining 4 are
Low/hygiene. The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so none of these were caught
by existing coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the twenty fixes so far brought
the suite from 139 to 232).
by existing coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the twenty-one fixes so far brought
the suite from 139 to 245).
The recurring pattern across the open findings is worth stating once: the code is rigorous
about the failure modes that have actually been hit, and silent about the ones that have not.
@@ -18,14 +18,6 @@ admin auth, single-process assumptions, no user-facing history, etc.) are docume
## Low / hygiene
### B-45 — Unvalidated and unpaginated admin list endpoints
`limit: int = 50` on `/admin/rounds` and `/admin/audit-log` has no bounds (`-1` means
"everything" on SQLite), and `/admin/pending-transactions` has no limit at all — it grows
without end.
**Fix:** `Query(default=50, ge=1, le=500)` on both, and the same treatment plus a status filter
on the pending-transaction list.
### B-46 — `secrets.compare_digest` on a `str` raises on non-ASCII input
`api/routes/admin.py:27` raises `TypeError` — a 500 instead of a 403 — when the header contains
@@ -68,6 +60,7 @@ already does.
- **B-42** — Swagger/ReDoc/the raw OpenAPI JSON enumerated the entire API surface, admin endpoints included, to anyone who requested them; now off by default and gated behind `ENABLE_API_DOCS`
- **B-43** — the Caddyfile sent no CSP, no `X-Frame-Options`/`frame-ancestors`, and no HSTS, on a page whose JWT lives in `localStorage`
- **B-44** — README's Quick start documented a bare `uvicorn --reload` workflow, and `docs/running-the-server.md` still had a matching "Locale / venv" section, both contradicting CLAUDE.md's Docker-only policy
- **B-45** — `/admin/rounds`/`/admin/audit-log`'s `limit` had no bounds (`-1` means "everything" on SQLite), and `/admin/pending-transactions` had no limit or status filter at all
- **B-32** — an RBF bump could retry forever below BIP125's relay-mandated minimum fee delta, with no ceiling on the fee rate either
- **B-33** — `POST /auth/login` had no rate limiting, so a password could be brute-forced against an enumerable username list
- **B-34** — password change/reset didn't invalidate already-issued JWTs, so a stolen token survived a change meant to lock it out
@@ -80,7 +73,7 @@ already does.
- **B-41** — confirmation/reconciliation depended on a verbose `blockchain.transaction.get` reply many Electrum servers reject, and abandonment relied on fragile substring-matching of an error message
See git history for the fix-by-fix breakdown (commits `f13f685`, `50a43ae`, `933760e`, and the
B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33/B-34/B-35/B-36/B-37/B-38/B-39/B-40/B-41/B-42/B-43/B-44 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 232 tests over the twenty.
B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33/B-34/B-35/B-36/B-37/B-38/B-39/B-40/B-41/B-42/B-43/B-44/B-45 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 245 tests over the twenty-one.
A full-codebase audit on 2026-07-26 (commit `d4e0974`) found 24 bugs across every Python
module under `app/`, both static frontends, and the Docker/Caddy deployment — 5 critical,