Widen raw_tx_hex and payload_json from String to Text (B-47)

Both held arbitrary-length data (a raw signed transaction hex, an audit
payload) in a bare String, which SQLAlchemy compiles to VARCHAR with no
length. SQLite and PostgreSQL accept that; other backends like MySQL
require a length on VARCHAR and would reject it. Add a migration
(verified upgrade/downgrade/upgrade round-trip, and confirmed with
`alembic check` that it leaves no further diff against the models).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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davideandClaude Sonnet 5 committed 2026-07-27 16:24:05 +02:00
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# Known bugs
A second full-codebase audit on 2026-07-27 found **25 further issues** (4 critical, 6 high,
7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-47 … B-49. B-25 through B-46 are fixed (see "Previously
fixed" below) — no Critical-, High- or Medium-severity finding remains open; the remaining 3 are
7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-48 … B-49. B-25 through B-47 are fixed (see "Previously
fixed" below) — no Critical-, High- or Medium-severity finding remains open; the remaining 2 are
Low/hygiene. The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so none of these were caught
by existing coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the twenty-two fixes so far brought
the suite from 139 to 246).
by existing coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the twenty-three fixes so far
brought the suite from 139 to 248).
The recurring pattern across the open findings is worth stating once: the code is rigorous
about the failure modes that have actually been hit, and silent about the ones that have not.
@@ -18,12 +18,6 @@ admin auth, single-process assumptions, no user-facing history, etc.) are docume
## Low / hygiene
### B-47 — Unbounded `String` columns for large text
`raw_tx_hex` (`db/models.py:146`) and `payload_json` (`:178`) should be `Text`. It works on
SQLite and PostgreSQL and breaks elsewhere.
**Fix:** switch both to `Text` in a migration.
### B-48 — No cap on input count in `select_utxos`
A user with hundreds of small UTXOs builds a huge transaction whose fee — deducted from the bet
@@ -56,6 +50,7 @@ already does.
- **B-44** — README's Quick start documented a bare `uvicorn --reload` workflow, and `docs/running-the-server.md` still had a matching "Locale / venv" section, both contradicting CLAUDE.md's Docker-only policy
- **B-45** — `/admin/rounds`/`/admin/audit-log`'s `limit` had no bounds (`-1` means "everything" on SQLite), and `/admin/pending-transactions` had no limit or status filter at all
- **B-46** — `secrets.compare_digest` on a `str` raises `TypeError` on non-ASCII input, turning an invalid admin token with non-ASCII characters into a 500 instead of a 403
- **B-47** — `raw_tx_hex` and `payload_json` were unbounded `String` columns (`VARCHAR` with no length) — fine on SQLite/PostgreSQL, rejected by backends like MySQL that require a length
- **B-32** — an RBF bump could retry forever below BIP125's relay-mandated minimum fee delta, with no ceiling on the fee rate either
- **B-33** — `POST /auth/login` had no rate limiting, so a password could be brute-forced against an enumerable username list
- **B-34** — password change/reset didn't invalidate already-issued JWTs, so a stolen token survived a change meant to lock it out
@@ -68,7 +63,7 @@ already does.
- **B-41** — confirmation/reconciliation depended on a verbose `blockchain.transaction.get` reply many Electrum servers reject, and abandonment relied on fragile substring-matching of an error message
See git history for the fix-by-fix breakdown (commits `f13f685`, `50a43ae`, `933760e`, and the
B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33/B-34/B-35/B-36/B-37/B-38/B-39/B-40/B-41/B-42/B-43/B-44/B-45/B-46 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 246 tests over the twenty-two.
B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33/B-34/B-35/B-36/B-37/B-38/B-39/B-40/B-41/B-42/B-43/B-44/B-45/B-46/B-47 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 248 tests over the twenty-three.
A full-codebase audit on 2026-07-26 (commit `d4e0974`) found 24 bugs across every Python
module under `app/`, both static frontends, and the Docker/Caddy deployment — 5 critical,