Cap SSE subscribers per client IP instead of only globally (B-38)
GET /rounds/stream capped concurrent subscribers with one global counter (MAX_SUBSCRIBERS=500): anyone opening 500 connections degraded every other user to polling. The comment called it a defensive cap; it was actually the vector, since nothing stopped a single source from exhausting it alone. RoundEventBroadcaster now also tracks subscribers per client IP, capped much lower (MAX_SUBSCRIBERS_PER_IP=5). Past that cap, opening one more stream evicts that same IP's own oldest connection (woken via a new EVICTED sentinel so the SSE generator closes it promptly) rather than refusing the new one or letting one abusive IP crowd out unrelated clients under the old global-only cap. The global cap stays as a backstop against overall resource exhaustion regardless of source. Extracted client_ip() (X-Forwarded-For, since Caddy reverse-proxies every request) out of auth/routes.py into app/api/client_ip.py so the login/registration throttles (B-33) and this new per-IP cap share one definition instead of two that could drift apart. Not implemented: enforcing the connection cap at the Caddy layer itself, which the proposed fix also suggested - the standard Caddy image this project uses has no such directive without a third-party module, and building a custom image felt like a bigger, separate change than this fix warranted. Suite grows from 201 to 211 tests. BUGS.md moves B-38 to Previously fixed.
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# Known bugs
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A second full-codebase audit on 2026-07-27 found **25 further issues** (4 critical, 6 high,
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7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-33 … B-49. B-25 through B-37 are fixed (see "Previously
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fixed" below) — no Critical-severity finding remains open; the other 12 are High/Medium/Low.
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7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-39 … B-49. B-25 through B-38 are fixed (see "Previously
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fixed" below) — no Critical-severity finding remains open; the other 11 are Medium/Low.
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The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so none of these were caught by existing
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coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the thirteen fixes so far brought the suite
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from 139 to 201).
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coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the fourteen fixes so far brought the suite
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from 139 to 211).
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The recurring pattern across the open findings is worth stating once: the code is rigorous
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about the failure modes that have actually been hit, and silent about the ones that have not.
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@@ -18,18 +18,6 @@ admin auth, single-process assumptions, no user-facing history, etc.) are docume
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## Medium
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### B-38 — The 500-subscriber SSE cap is a zero-cost DoS of the realtime feature
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`GET /rounds/stream` requires no authentication and each connection takes a slot on a
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**global** counter (`rounds/events.py:33-38`). Anyone opening 500 connections degrades every
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real user to polling. The comment describes it as a defensive cap; it is in fact the vector,
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not the defence.
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**Proposed fix.** Cap per client IP (and, once available, per authenticated user) rather than
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globally, and evict the oldest idle subscriber instead of refusing new ones. The reverse proxy
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is the right place for the connection-count limit — Caddy can enforce it before the request
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reaches the app.
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### B-39 — SQLite with no WAL, no `busy_timeout`, and five concurrent writer tasks
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`db/base.py:6` calls `create_async_engine(settings.database_url)` with no `connect_args`, and
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@@ -156,9 +144,10 @@ already does.
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- **B-35** — API timestamps round-tripped as naive datetimes, so the frontend parsed them as local time instead of UTC
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- **B-36** — a stalled draw wait had no timeout, no log, and no audit trail, so a frozen round showed nothing in `/admin`
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- **B-37** — a withdrawal covered by unconfirmed change answered "insufficient balance" instead of distinguishing it from actually having no funds
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- **B-38** — the SSE subscriber cap was global, so one client opening enough connections degraded every other user to polling
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See git history for the fix-by-fix breakdown (commits `f13f685`, `50a43ae`, `933760e`, and the
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B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33/B-34/B-35/B-36/B-37 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 201 tests over the thirteen.
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B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33/B-34/B-35/B-36/B-37/B-38 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 211 tests over the fourteen.
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A full-codebase audit on 2026-07-26 (commit `d4e0974`) found 24 bugs across every Python
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module under `app/`, both static frontends, and the Docker/Caddy deployment — 5 critical,
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