Validate admin config and registration input, and log config changes
fee_address was the dangerous one (B-05). PUT /admin/config assigned whatever it
was given, and a well-formed address from another chain (bc1...) parses fine as a
witness program — so every round's 30% commission would be signed and broadcast
to a script nobody holds the key for. A malformed one instead wedged the payout
with an unhandled EmbitError. It now has to pass is_valid_plm_address, the same
check user withdrawals already had. Numeric fields got bounds too:
fee_rate_sat_vb=0 produces transactions no node relays, which stalls bets,
payouts and withdrawals alike, and round_duration_seconds=0 expires a round the
instant it opens.
Config changes are audit-logged (B-10). /pause and /resume were logged but a
config edit wasn't, so the most sensitive setting in the system could be changed
without leaving any trace — contradicting CLAUDE.md, which says audit_log records
what changed. The entry carries a before/after diff per field, computed before
assignment, and no-op updates write nothing. `paused` was removed from
_CONFIG_FIELDS so the maintenance switch has exactly one audited path; it stays
in the response model.
Admin token comparison is constant-time (B-14), with the empty-token check kept
*ahead* of it: compare_digest("", "") returns True, so the obvious ordering would
have opened the panel on any instance without an ADMIN_TOKEN.
Registration input (B-12). It accepted an empty username and a one-character
password while /users/me/change-password demanded 8 — an odd place to be lenient
on a custodial system holding real funds. MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH moved to
auth/security.py so both share it, and the username is constrained to 3-32 chars
of [A-Za-z0-9_.-]. The IntegrityError handler also distinguishes a username
collision (answers username_taken) from a derivation-index one (retries): a
concurrent duplicate username used to be retried five times and then reported as
derivation_index_conflict, which told the user the wrong thing.
verify_password (B-13) catches VerificationError and InvalidHashError, not just
VerifyMismatchError, so an unparseable stored hash reads as "wrong password"
instead of a 500 — logged as an error, since that one is a data problem.
guida-admin.md gains a table of the audit events worth watching, including
payout_failed, which needs manual intervention.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
daf66fd6bc
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8 files changed
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-30
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+57
-13
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import json
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import secrets
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Header, HTTPException, status
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator
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from sqlalchemy import select
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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@@ -12,16 +12,26 @@ from app.config import settings
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from app.db.models import AuditLog, PendingTransaction, Round, User
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from app.db.session import get_session
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from app.rounds.config import get_round_config
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from app.wallet.address import is_valid_plm_address
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from app.wallet.hd import derive_user_wif
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/admin", tags=["admin"])
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async def require_admin(x_admin_token: str = Header(default="")) -> None:
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if not settings.admin_token or x_admin_token != settings.admin_token:
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# An unset ADMIN_TOKEN denies everything — checked first, since compare_digest
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# on two empty strings returns True and would otherwise open the panel to
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# anyone on an instance that never configured a token.
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if not settings.admin_token:
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raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, "invalid admin token")
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if not secrets.compare_digest(x_admin_token, settings.admin_token):
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raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, "invalid admin token")
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# `paused` is deliberately NOT here: it has its own audit-logged endpoints
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# (/admin/pause, /admin/resume), and accepting it on PUT /config as well gave the
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# operator an unlogged way to stop the lottery (B-10). It stays in the response
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# model, so the dashboard still reads its current value from here.
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_CONFIG_FIELDS = (
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"fee_address",
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"bet_amount_sats",
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@@ -30,7 +40,6 @@ _CONFIG_FIELDS = (
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"fee_rate_sat_vb",
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"rbf_timeout_seconds",
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"draw_animation_seconds",
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"paused",
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)
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@@ -46,18 +55,41 @@ class RoundConfigResponse(BaseModel):
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class RoundConfigUpdate(BaseModel):
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"""Bounds are enforced here rather than trusting the operator: a value like
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fee_rate_sat_vb=0 produces transactions no node will relay (stalling every bet,
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payout and withdrawal), and round_duration_seconds=0 expires a round the instant
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it opens. `paused` is not accepted — see _CONFIG_FIELDS."""
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# An unvalidated fee_address was the worst of the lot: a malformed one wedged the
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# payout with an unhandled EmbitError, and a well-formed *foreign* one (bc1...)
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# parses fine as a witness program, so every round's 30 % commission would be
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# broadcast to a script nobody holds the key for (B-05).
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fee_address: str | None = None
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bet_amount_sats: int | None = None
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round_duration_seconds: int | None = None
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round_cooldown_seconds: int | None = None
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fee_rate_sat_vb: int | None = None
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rbf_timeout_seconds: int | None = None
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draw_animation_seconds: int | None = None
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paused: bool | None = None
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bet_amount_sats: int | None = Field(default=None, gt=0, le=100_000 * 100_000_000)
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round_duration_seconds: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=30, le=7 * 24 * 3600)
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round_cooldown_seconds: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=24 * 3600)
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fee_rate_sat_vb: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=1, le=10_000)
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rbf_timeout_seconds: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=60, le=7 * 24 * 3600)
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draw_animation_seconds: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=600)
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@field_validator("fee_address")
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@classmethod
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def _validate_fee_address(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
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if value is None:
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return None
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value = value.strip()
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if not is_valid_plm_address(value):
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raise ValueError(
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"fee_address must be a valid PLM bech32 address (plm1...) — an address from "
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"another chain would send every round's commission somewhere unspendable"
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)
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return value
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def _config_response(config) -> RoundConfigResponse:
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return RoundConfigResponse(**{field: getattr(config, field) for field in _CONFIG_FIELDS})
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fields = {field: getattr(config, field) for field in _CONFIG_FIELDS}
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fields["paused"] = config.paused
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return RoundConfigResponse(**fields)
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@router.get("/config", response_model=RoundConfigResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
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@@ -72,10 +104,22 @@ async def update_config(
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body: RoundConfigUpdate, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)
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) -> RoundConfigResponse:
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config = await get_round_config(session)
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# Diff computed before assignment so the audit entry records both sides. Without
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# it, the most sensitive setting in the system (fee_address — where 30 % of every
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# pool goes) could be changed without leaving any trace at all (B-10).
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changes: dict[str, dict] = {}
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for field in _CONFIG_FIELDS:
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value = getattr(body, field)
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if value is not None:
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setattr(config, field, value)
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if value is None:
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continue
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previous = getattr(config, field)
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if previous == value:
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continue
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changes[field] = {"from": previous, "to": value}
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setattr(config, field, value)
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if changes:
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await write_audit_log(session, "config_updated", changes)
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await session.commit()
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return _config_response(config)
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@@ -5,15 +5,13 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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from app.api.errors import http_error
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from app.auth.dependencies import get_current_user
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from app.auth.security import hash_password, verify_password
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from app.auth.security import MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, hash_password, verify_password
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from app.db.models import Round, RoundParticipant, User
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from app.db.session import get_session
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from app.wallet.balance import compute_pending_balance
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/users", tags=["users"])
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_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 8
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class MeResponse(BaseModel):
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id: int
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@@ -60,12 +58,12 @@ async def change_password(
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raise http_error(
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status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, "current_password_incorrect", "current password is incorrect"
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)
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if len(body.new_password) < _MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH:
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if len(body.new_password) < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH:
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raise http_error(
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status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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"password_too_short",
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f"new password must be at least {_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters",
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minimum=_MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH,
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f"new password must be at least {MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters",
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minimum=MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH,
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)
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user.password_hash = hash_password(body.new_password)
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+18
-5
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Request, status
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
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from sqlalchemy import func, select
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from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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from app.api.errors import http_error
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from app.auth.security import create_access_token, hash_password, verify_password
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from app.auth.security import MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, create_access_token, hash_password, verify_password
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from app.db.models import User
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from app.db.session import get_session
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from app.wallet.hd import derive_user_address
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@@ -16,8 +16,13 @@ _MAX_REGISTER_RETRIES = 5
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class RegisterRequest(BaseModel):
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username: str
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password: str
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"""Registration used to accept an empty username and a one-character password,
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while /users/me/change-password demanded 8 characters — an odd place to be
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lenient on a custodial system holding real funds (B-12). MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH is
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shared with that endpoint so the two can't drift apart again."""
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username: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=32, pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$")
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password: str = Field(min_length=MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH, max_length=256)
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class TokenResponse(BaseModel):
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@@ -48,8 +53,16 @@ async def register(
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session.add(user)
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try:
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await session.commit()
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except IntegrityError:
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except IntegrityError as exc:
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await session.rollback()
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# Only a derivation-index collision is worth retrying. A username
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# collision (someone registered the same name between the check above and
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# this commit) is permanent, and retrying it five times only to report
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# "derivation_index_conflict" told the user the wrong thing entirely (B-12).
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if "username" in str(exc.orig).lower():
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raise http_error(
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status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, "username_taken", "username already taken"
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) from exc
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continue
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await session.refresh(user)
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request.app.state.electrum_listener.address_for_new_user(user.id, user.address)
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+21
-2
@@ -1,11 +1,19 @@
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from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
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import logging
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import jwt
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from argon2 import PasswordHasher
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from argon2.exceptions import VerifyMismatchError
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from argon2.exceptions import InvalidHashError, VerificationError
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from app.config import settings
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# Shared by registration (app/auth/routes.py) and the self-service password change
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# (app/api/routes/users.py) so the two can't enforce different minimums.
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MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 8
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_hasher = PasswordHasher()
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@@ -14,9 +22,20 @@ def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
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def verify_password(password: str, password_hash: str) -> bool:
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"""Any failure to verify reads as "wrong password", never as a server error.
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Catching only VerifyMismatchError left the other two cases as unhandled 500s
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(B-13): VerificationError covers argon2's other verification failures, and
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InvalidHashError fires when the stored hash can't be parsed at all — which is a
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data problem worth logging, but from the caller's side it still just means this
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password does not open this account.
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"""
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try:
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return _hasher.verify(password_hash, password)
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except VerifyMismatchError:
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except InvalidHashError:
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logger.error("stored password hash is unparseable — password verification cannot succeed")
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return False
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except VerificationError:
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return False
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