Never let a draw be seeded by a block that predates the close (B-63)
ElectrumListener._run_once assigned self.client before subscribe_headers() returned, so there was a window — one round-trip wide, at process start — where the connection looked alive while tip_height was still its initial 0. "client is not None" is what every consumer reads as "the chain is reachable", RoundScheduler._tick included, and a round closing inside that window recorded tip_at_close = 0. The very first header we then learned about — the current tip, a block mined *before* the round closed, whose hash was already public while bets were still open — satisfied tip_height > tip_at_close and became the draw's entropy. The draw's whole guarantee is that its seed did not exist yet when betting stopped. Two changes, defending different things: - The client is published only once the first header has been applied, so "client is not None" now means "reachable *and* we know where the chain is". During the window consumers see no connection, which is honest: a bet gets the same 503 it already gets while disconnected, and the background tasks skip a cycle as they already do. - _wait_for_next_block treats a baseline of 0 as *unknown*, not as height zero: it adopts the first height it learns as the baseline, waits for a block strictly after it, and records draw_baseline_tip_unknown so the extra block of waiting is explainable from /admin. Unreachable via the listener now, but it is the local statement of what the draw requires, and nothing else in that function would notice if the invariant stopped holding. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ Source of truth: the `PalladiumWallet` repo — [ChainProfiles.cs](../PalladiumW
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| `PendingTransactionReconciler` | `tx/reconcile.py` | at startup, then 120s | resolves `building`/`pending` rows against the chain |
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| `DepositReconciler` | `deposits/reconcile.py` | 300s (sleeps first) | re-`refresh_user`s every address, catching a silently-lost subscription (B-30) |
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Chain access goes through `listener.client`, passed as `lambda: listener.client` so a reconnect swaps the client under its consumers; a task finding it `None` skips that cycle instead of failing. `DepositReconciler` takes the whole listener instead, reusing `refresh_user` so the periodic and notification-driven paths can't diverge.
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Chain access goes through `listener.client`, passed as `lambda: listener.client` so a reconnect swaps the client under its consumers; a task finding it `None` skips that cycle instead of failing. **A non-null `client` means the tip is already known**: `_run_once` publishes it only after the first header has been applied (B-63), so `client is not None` can be read as "the chain is reachable *and* we know where it is" — `tip_height` is never the initial 0 behind a live client, which is what the draw depends on (see DRAW below). `DepositReconciler` takes the whole listener instead, reusing `refresh_user` so the periodic and notification-driven paths can't diverge.
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## Electrum connection
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@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ Diagrams: [platform-overview.mmd](flowchart/platform-overview.mmd), [round-lifec
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**DRAW** — configurable timer (default 600s):
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- *Bet cutoff is the round's own deadline* (`round_deadline` = `opened_at + Round.duration_seconds`, the value snapshotted at open time — B-61), **not** the DB status: `place_bet` calls `rounds/service.round_accepts_bets`, which rejects once the deadline passes even while `status` is still `"open"` (the 5s scheduler tick can lag behind it). Once a round leaves `open`, no new bets either, and no new round opens until this one is fully `closed`. The deadline is checked twice — on arrival and again after the transaction is built — and the participant row is then committed behind a **compare-and-set on the round row** (`UPDATE rounds ... WHERE status = 'open'`, B-53): the scheduler flips `open` → `closing` in a transaction of its own and only counts in-flight bets afterwards, so without the CAS a bet could commit in between, be excluded from the draw (only `confirmed` participants are drawn) and still have its sats land in the pool with no refund path. Its mirror image on the scheduler side is `_close_and_draw` re-counting in-flight bets in the same session it snapshots the participants from.
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- *"Yellow light":* closing **waits for every already-broadcast bet to confirm** before drawing, so a bet in flight at the boundary isn't lost (`building` counts as in-flight; what bounds the wait is the reconciler eventually abandoning a bet that never confirms).
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- *Algorithm* (deliberately simple, meant to be replaced): first block confirmed after closing — corroborated by the other servers first, and on failure the draw waits for a *further* block and writes a `draw_header_corroboration_failed` audit entry rather than stalling silently — hash as seed, `index = seed mod participant_count` over participants ordered by **broadcast timestamp** (also the tie-break when two bets land in the same block). Equal probability for everyone, regardless of amount.
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- *Algorithm* (deliberately simple, meant to be replaced): first block confirmed after closing — corroborated by the other servers first, and on failure the draw waits for a *further* block and writes a `draw_header_corroboration_failed` audit entry rather than stalling silently — hash as seed, `index = seed mod participant_count` over participants ordered by **broadcast timestamp** (also the tie-break when two bets land in the same block). Equal probability for everyone, regardless of amount. The baseline the draw compares against (`tip_at_close`) must be a height we actually knew at closing time: a `0` there means *unknown*, not "the chain is at zero", so `_wait_for_next_block` adopts the first height it then learns as the baseline and waits for a block strictly after it (`draw_baseline_tip_unknown`, B-63) — seeding from a block that already existed while bets were open would make the winner predictable to whoever was watching the chain.
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- *Payout* is signed with the pool key; its **fee comes out of the winner's 70%**, leaving the 30% fee share intact. Same timeout → RBF → rebroadcast pattern.
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- *UI, two independent layers.* A generic phase box ("Pagamento al vincitore in corso…") shows to **every** viewer for the whole closing/drawing/paying_out span — pure cosmetic text driven by `status`. **Additively**, a personalized "Hai vinto!/Non hai vinto" box appears only where `user_played` is true (computed via `get_optional_user`, since the endpoint is reachable logged-out) — nobody else has anything to reveal.
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- *Reveal timing.* Delayed by at least `draw_animation_seconds`, anchored to the server's `closes_at` so a reload can't reset the countdown, and decoupled from the real (~block-time) wait for `winner_user_id`. Once revealed it's persisted in `localStorage.plm_persisted_result`, surviving the move to `closed` — at which point `get_active_round` stops returning the round and `winner_user_id` disappears from `GET /rounds/current`. `GET /users/me/last-round-result` is the durable DB-backed backstop for a device that missed the live window entirely. Full logic: `refreshRound`/`checkLastRoundResult` in `app/static/app.js`.
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