Always keep a change output, so every tx stays fee-bumpable (B-62)

The max-amount checkbox sends amount_sats == the whole confirmed balance, so
change came out at 0, the change output was dropped, and the transaction had a
single output. bump_fee has nothing to shrink there: it raised RbfError every
30s until the reconciler abandoned the row six hours later. The RBF
single-change-output limitation was a documented gap, but the UI made it the
*default* withdrawal path.

The extra-input fallback would not have helped this case: a transaction moving
the entire balance already spends every UTXO the sender has. So the fix is at
build time — build_signed_transaction never produces a change output below
DUST_LIMIT_SATS, and never folds it into the fee either:

- withdrawals pass reduce_amount_to_keep_change=True and move a dust limit less.
  The fee already comes out of the withdrawn amount by design, so this is the
  same rule applied a little harder, and Withdrawal.amount_requested_sats vs
  amount_sent_sats already existed to record the difference.
- bets don't: the bet is a fixed price that can't be quietly reduced. A balance
  exactly equal to the bet is refused with balance_leaves_no_change (translated
  into all 7 languages, carrying required_extra_sats), which turns "a user's
  balance must never exactly equal the bet" from a documented assumption into an
  enforced one — and stops an unbumpable bet from holding a round open until the
  reconciler gives up on it.

bump_fee's no-change guard stays: a single-output tx broadcast before this
change can still be pending across the deploy, and it must fail loudly rather
than start shrinking a recipient's output. Its test now hand-builds that shape,
precisely because the builder no longer will.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
davideandClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-08-03 23:36:55 +02:00
1 parent 37cc5eeeb5
commit 8dd913ec59
9 files changed
+197 -51

No files matched your search

+7
View File
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
'error.round_full': 'This round has reached its maximum of {max_participants} players — wait for the next one, it opens shortly.',
'error.already_betting': 'You already have an active bet in the current round.',
'error.insufficient_balance': 'Insufficient balance.',
'error.balance_leaves_no_change': 'Your balance is too close to the bet amount: {required_extra_plm} PLM more are needed so the transaction keeps a change output and can be fee-bumped if the network is slow.',
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': 'You have {pending_plm} PLM pending confirmation — it is not spendable yet.',
'error.amount_below_network_fee': 'The amount is too small to cover the network fee.',
'error.invalid_address': 'Not a valid PLM address (it must start with plm1q…).',
@@ -303,6 +304,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
'error.round_full': 'Questo round ha raggiunto il massimo di {max_participants} giocatori — aspetta il prossimo, si apre tra poco.',
'error.already_betting': 'Hai già una bet attiva nel round corrente.',
'error.insufficient_balance': 'Saldo insufficiente.',
'error.balance_leaves_no_change': 'Il tuo saldo è troppo vicino all\'importo della giocata: servono {required_extra_plm} PLM in più perché la transazione mantenga un resto e possa essere rilanciata con fee più alta se la rete è lenta.',
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': 'Hai {pending_plm} PLM in attesa di conferma — non ancora disponibili per la spesa.',
'error.amount_below_network_fee': "L'importo è troppo basso per coprire la fee di rete.",
'error.invalid_address': 'Indirizzo PLM non valido (deve iniziare con plm1q…).',
@@ -464,6 +466,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
'error.round_full': 'Esta ronda ha alcanzado su máximo de {max_participants} jugadores: espera la siguiente, se abre en breve.',
'error.already_betting': 'Ya tienes una apuesta activa en la ronda actual.',
'error.insufficient_balance': 'Saldo insuficiente.',
'error.balance_leaves_no_change': 'Tu saldo está demasiado cerca del importe de la apuesta: hacen falta {required_extra_plm} PLM más para que la transacción conserve un cambio y pueda relanzarse con más comisión si la red va lenta.',
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': 'Tienes {pending_plm} PLM pendientes de confirmación — todavía no se pueden gastar.',
'error.amount_below_network_fee': 'El importe es demasiado pequeño para cubrir la comisión de red.',
'error.invalid_address': 'Dirección PLM no válida (debe empezar por plm1q…).',
@@ -625,6 +628,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
'error.round_full': 'Ce tour a atteint son maximum de {max_participants} joueurs — attendez le prochain, il ouvre dans un instant.',
'error.already_betting': 'Vous avez déjà une mise active dans le round en cours.',
'error.insufficient_balance': 'Solde insuffisant.',
'error.balance_leaves_no_change': 'Votre solde est trop proche du montant de la mise : il faut {required_extra_plm} PLM de plus pour que la transaction garde une monnaie de rendu et puisse être relancée avec des frais plus élevés si le réseau est lent.',
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': 'Vous avez {pending_plm} PLM en attente de confirmation — pas encore disponibles.',
'error.amount_below_network_fee': 'Le montant est trop faible pour couvrir les frais de réseau.',
'error.invalid_address': 'Adresse PLM invalide (elle doit commencer par plm1q…).',
@@ -786,6 +790,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
'error.round_full': 'Diese Runde hat ihr Maximum von {max_participants} Spielern erreicht — warten Sie auf die nächste, sie beginnt in Kürze.',
'error.already_betting': 'Du hast bereits eine aktive Wette in der laufenden Runde.',
'error.insufficient_balance': 'Nicht genügend Guthaben.',
'error.balance_leaves_no_change': 'Ihr Guthaben liegt zu nah am Einsatzbetrag: Es werden {required_extra_plm} PLM mehr benötigt, damit die Transaktion einen Wechselgeld-Ausgang behält und bei langsamem Netz mit höherer Gebühr neu gesendet werden kann.',
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': 'Sie haben {pending_plm} PLM, die noch auf Bestätigung warten — noch nicht verfügbar.',
'error.amount_below_network_fee': 'Der Betrag ist zu klein, um die Netzwerkgebühr zu decken.',
'error.invalid_address': 'Keine gültige PLM-Adresse (sie muss mit plm1q… beginnen).',
@@ -947,6 +952,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
'error.round_full': 'В этом раунде достигнут максимум участников ({max_participants}) — дождитесь следующего, он начнётся совсем скоро.',
'error.already_betting': 'У вас уже есть активная ставка в текущем раунде.',
'error.insufficient_balance': 'Недостаточно средств.',
'error.balance_leaves_no_change': 'Ваш баланс слишком близок к сумме ставки: нужно ещё {required_extra_plm} PLM, чтобы в транзакции остался выход сдачи и её можно было переотправить с более высокой комиссией, если сеть работает медленно.',
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': 'У вас есть {pending_plm} PLM, ожидающих подтверждения — они пока недоступны для расходования.',
'error.amount_below_network_fee': 'Сумма слишком мала, чтобы покрыть комиссию сети.',
'error.invalid_address': 'Некорректный адрес PLM (он должен начинаться с plm1q…).',
@@ -1108,6 +1114,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
'error.round_full': '本轮已达到 {max_participants} 名玩家的上限 —— 请等待下一轮,很快就会开始。',
'error.already_betting': '你在当前回合已有一笔有效下注。',
'error.insufficient_balance': '余额不足。',
'error.balance_leaves_no_change': '您的余额与投注金额过于接近:还需要 {required_extra_plm} PLM,交易才能保留找零输出,并在网络拥堵时提高手续费重新广播。',
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': '您有 {pending_plm} PLM 待确认 —— 尚不可用于支出。',
'error.amount_below_network_fee': '金额太小,不足以支付网络手续费。',
'error.invalid_address': 'PLM 地址无效(必须以 plm1q… 开头)。',
+34 -7
View File
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ def build_signed_transaction(
amount_sats: int,
change_address: str,
fee_rate_sat_vb: int,
reduce_amount_to_keep_change: bool = False,
) -> BuiltTransaction:
"""Build, sign and finalize a single-recipient P2WPKH transaction with change
back to change_address.
@@ -155,21 +156,47 @@ def build_signed_transaction(
spec everywhere a single-recipient tx is used (bet, withdrawal): "fee deducted
from the amount being moved", not paid on top by the sender.
A change amount below DUST_LIMIT_SATS is dropped and left to the fee — paying it
back to ourselves would produce an unrelayable transaction. The fee estimate
already assumes two outputs, so dropping one never underpays.
B-62: the transaction always keeps a change output of at least DUST_LIMIT_SATS.
Change used to be folded into the fee whenever it came out below the dust limit,
which for an amount equal to the whole input total (the UI's "withdraw
everything" checkbox, or a bet from a balance exactly equal to the bet amount)
produced a single-output transaction — and `tx/broadcast.py:bump_fee` has nothing
to shrink there, so it raised RbfError every 30s until the reconciler abandoned
the row hours later. Adding inputs instead is no answer for this case in
particular: the transaction already spends every UTXO the sender has.
What happens when the change would be too small depends on who's asking, hence
`reduce_amount_to_keep_change`:
- withdrawals pass True — the amount moved is reduced just enough to leave a
dust-limit change output. The fee already comes out of the withdrawn amount by
design, so this is the same rule applied a little harder, and the caller
records what was actually sent (`Withdrawal.amount_sent_sats`).
- bets pass False (the default) and get an InsufficientFundsError instead: the
bet is a fixed price that cannot be quietly reduced, and "a user's balance must
never exactly equal the bet" is a documented invariant of the PLAY phase. The
player needs a little more than the bet amount, which is what the error says.
"""
selected, total_in = select_utxos(utxos, amount_sats)
fee = estimate_vsize(len(selected), 2) * fee_rate_sat_vb
change = total_in - amount_sats
if change < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
if not reduce_amount_to_keep_change:
raise InsufficientFundsError(
f"the amount leaves no change output: {DUST_LIMIT_SATS - change} more sats are "
"needed for the transaction to stay fee-bumpable",
code="balance_leaves_no_change",
required_extra_sats=DUST_LIMIT_SATS - change,
)
amount_sats -= DUST_LIMIT_SATS - change
change = DUST_LIMIT_SATS
recipient_amount = amount_sats - fee
if recipient_amount <= 0:
raise InsufficientFundsError(
"amount too small to cover the network fee", code="amount_below_network_fee"
)
change = total_in - amount_sats
if change < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
fee += change # dust change is unspendable and unrelayable — miners get it
change = 0
if recipient_amount < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
raise InsufficientFundsError(
"amount too small to be sent (dust)", code="amount_below_dust_limit"
+7
View File
@@ -87,6 +87,13 @@ async def request_withdrawal(
amount_sats=amount_sats,
change_address=user.address,
fee_rate_sat_vb=config.fee_rate_sat_vb,
# B-62: "withdraw everything" asks for the whole confirmed balance, which
# would leave no change output and therefore nothing bump_fee could
# shrink — the one tx shape RBF cannot rescue, and the UI's default
# withdrawal path at that. Move a dust limit less instead of producing an
# unbumpable transaction; amount_sent_sats below records what actually
# went out, which is already how a fee-deducted withdrawal is reported.
reduce_amount_to_keep_change=True,
)
except InsufficientFundsError as exc:
raise WithdrawalError(exc.code, str(exc), **exc.params) from exc