Make X-Forwarded-For trustworthy instead of attacker-controlled (B-54)

client_ip() read the first element of X-Forwarded-For, which is correct only if
the proxy replaces the header. Caddy appends the peer address to whatever the
client sent, so element 0 was whatever the caller claimed: rotating a fake value
per request minted a fresh identity every time and walked straight through the
login and registration throttles (B-33) and the SSE per-IP subscriber cap
(B-38). Only the per-username login bucket, which doesn't key on the IP, still
bit.

Both halves of the audit's fix, since they hold independently:

- the Caddyfile overwrites the header with `header_up X-Forwarded-For
  {remote_host}`, so what reaches the app is the actual peer and nothing else.
  This is the one that makes the app's assumption true at the source.
- client_ip() reads the *last* hop rather than the first — the element written
  by the hop closest to us, i.e. by our own proxy. Exactly one trusted proxy
  sits in front of the app (`app` is only `expose`d on the compose network,
  never published to the host), so that element is the real peer.

An empty or comma-only header now falls back to request.client.host instead of
returning "", which was its own shared-bucket evasion.

Regression tests both sides: two requests spoofing different prefixes must key
to the same IP, and the Caddyfile must keep the header_up directive (checked by
`caddy validate`).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
davideandClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-08-03 22:14:03 +02:00
1 parent 8f3cdcb2f8
commit 907e32e9e0
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@@ -29,5 +29,15 @@
Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'"
}
reverse_proxy app:8123
# B-54: Caddy *appends* the real peer address to whatever X-Forwarded-For the
# client sent, so without this the header arrives as "<whatever the client
# claimed>, <real ip>" and every IP-keyed control in the app (the login and
# registration throttles of B-33, the SSE per-IP subscriber cap of B-38) is
# defeated by simply rotating a fake value per request. Overwriting the header
# with the actual peer makes the app's assumption true at the source; it also
# reads the last hop rather than the first (app/api/client_ip.py), so the two
# defences hold independently.
reverse_proxy app:8123 {
header_up X-Forwarded-For {remote_host}
}
}