Make the draw a commit-reveal at a fixed, confirmed, quorum-agreed height with a public proof (B-73, RND-14 … RND-20, RND-33 … RND-37, DAT-61 … DAT-66, API-25, API-45, AUD-24 … AUD-27, AUD-37, ELC-15, SEC-56, ADR-24, ADR-25)

The seed was the hash of the first block seen after the close, so a miner holding tickets
could withhold blocks until one made them win, the active Electrum server could pick which
real block was used by not announcing another (a failed corroboration even moved the draw to
the next block), and the participant order was the server-only `broadcast_at` with no
tie-break, so nobody could recompute the result.

- Open: every round gets a 32-byte `server_seed`, stored only Fernet-encrypted with the
  master-xprv key (`server_seed_enc`), with its published `server_seed_hash`;
  `draw_confirmations` is copied from round_config. The plaintext column is written only by
  the reveal.
- Entering `drawing` (one transaction, `draw_committed` audit row): participants ordered by
  bet txid, each `draw_position`, `participants_hash` (sha256 of `txid:vout:address\n`
  lines; new `bet_vout`), `draw_height = tip_at_close + 1`. A tip of 0 keeps the round
  `closing` (`draw_baseline_tip_unknown`, once per round). All persisted, so a resumed draw
  reads rather than recomputes (the `_tick` branch itself is B-81).
- `_complete_draw` / `_wait_for_draw_block` replace `_wait_for_next_block`: wait for
  `draw_confirmations` blocks from `draw_height`, then `ElectrumListener.agreed_block_hash`
  asks every server, the active one included, for the header at that exact height (valid
  work, >= 2 other answers, strict majority of all); no agreement means the same height is
  asked again and `draw_header_corroboration_failed` is written once per distinct reported
  hash. `draw_stalled` now counts from the last tip advance, or from when the quorum started
  to fail. Seed = sha256(server_seed || block_hash || participants_hash), index = seed mod n.
- The winner, the seed and the reveal (`server_seed`, `winner_drawn` payload) are written in
  one transaction; a round closing with no participants reveals too. A round opened before
  this change (no commitment) is given a secret as it enters `drawing`.
- `GET /rounds/{id}/proof` (public, 404 `round_not_found`, translated in all 7 languages) and
  the new fields on `GET /rounds/current`; `draw_confirmations` in `/admin/config` and the
  /admin form; `server_seed_hash`/`draw_height` in `/admin/rounds`, never the secret.
- Alembic d3e8b15a7c42 (plain add_column / create_index, expression indexes untouched).
- Docs: the B-73 `*Stato:*`/`*Oggi:*` lines are gone, guides and CLAUDE.md describe the new
  draw. Ambiguities resolved in api.md: the proof's participants also carry `amount_sats`
  (RND-37 lists it); `seed` is decimal in the proof and hex in the audit row, as specified.

Tests changed because the spec changed: ElectrumListener.corroborate_header (asked only the
other servers about the block the active one announced) is replaced by agreed_block_hash and
its quorum tests ported; draw_winner takes the secret and the list fingerprint; the four
_wait_for_next_block scheduler tests are replaced by _wait_for_draw_block ones (fixed height,
confirmations, same-height retry, stall clock). New: test_draw_proof.py recomputes the winner
independently from the public proof, checks the plaintext secret is nowhere in the database,
the API or the log before the reveal, and that a second pass over a `drawing` round yields
the same winner. Mutation-checked: ordering by broadcast_at, an early reveal and asking the
tip instead of the draw height each fail tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 committed 2026-10-14 16:29:09 +02:00
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@@ -47,9 +47,9 @@ implementato il [piano delle correzioni](piano-correzioni.md).
- **[LIM-01]** **Lo stato `drawing` non riprende dopo un errore o un
riavvio.** Lo scheduler gestisce `open`, `closing` e `paying_out` a ogni giro
e salta `drawing`; l'attesa del blocco (`_wait_for_next_block`) vive solo
dentro la chiamata a `_close_and_draw` che l'ha avviata, con `tip_at_close` e
la lista dei partecipanti in memoria. Non serve un riavvio: **qualunque
e salta `drawing`; l'attesa del blocco (`_wait_for_draw_block`) vive solo
dentro la chiamata a `_close_and_draw` che l'ha avviata (altezza, elenco e
segreto sono ormai salvati nel database, ma nulla li rilegge). Non serve un riavvio: **qualunque
eccezione** durante l'attesa (un `database is locked` scrivendo una riga di
audit, un header malformato) la interrompe, e nessuno la riprende. Il terzo
audit (2026-08-03) lo ha ribadito come problema **critico**, la revisione
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ implementato il [piano delle correzioni](piano-correzioni.md).
Con l'altezza fissa e il seme impegnato di [ADR-24](adr/ADR-24-l-estrazione-commit-reveal-fra-server.md)/[ADR-25](adr/ADR-25-blocco-estrazione-fissato-altezza-successivo-chiusura.md), un'estrazione
ripresa dà sempre lo stesso vincitore.
*Codice:* `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._tick` · `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._close_and_draw` · `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._wait_for_next_block`
*Codice:* `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._tick` · `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._close_and_draw` · `app/rounds/scheduler.py:RoundScheduler._wait_for_draw_block`
- **[LIM-02]** **L'RBF gestisce una sola forma di transazione**: un'unica uscita
di resto verso il mittente, abbastanza grande da assorbire l'aumento. Non c'è
@@ -314,8 +314,8 @@ implementato il [piano delle correzioni](piano-correzioni.md).
- *Distorsione del modulo:* un seme da 256 bit modulo al più 400 partecipanti
introduce una distorsione inferiore a 400/2²⁵⁶, accettata anche dopo il
piano.
- *Stato:* da chiudere con B-73.
- *Per chiuderlo:* il commit-reveal di [ADR-24](adr/ADR-24-l-estrazione-commit-reveal-fra-server.md) con l'altezza fissa e le
- *Stato:* chiuso da B-73.
- *Come è chiuso:* il commit-reveal di [ADR-24](adr/ADR-24-l-estrazione-commit-reveal-fra-server.md) con l'altezza fissa e le
conferme di [ADR-25](adr/ADR-25-blocco-estrazione-fissato-altezza-successivo-chiusura.md): seme che dipende da un segreto impegnato
all'apertura, partecipanti ordinati per txid e fissati da un'impronta,
prova pubblica. Resta accettata la collusione fra operatore e minatore