Corroborate an external spend before marking a UTXO gone (B-29)
detect_external_spends marked a UTXO spent_txid='external-spend' irreversibly the moment it was missing from one listunspent reply, on one server, with no way to undo it. A rotated-to server that's broken or behind, or an empty reply, could zero a user's balance permanently. Split into three functions in deposits/service.py: find_utxos_missing_ from (read-only candidate detection, and refuses to flag anything at all when listunspent comes back entirely empty for a funded address - that reads as a broken response, not a full sweep), mark_utxos_spent_ externally (persistence only, once a candidate is already confirmed), and reinstate_reappeared_utxos (undoes the mark if the outpoint reappears as unspent later). ElectrumListener gains corroborate_utxo_spent, sharing the same majority-quorum logic corroborate_header already uses for B-28: before a candidate is marked, the other configured servers are asked whether they also see it as spent. _refresh_user now reads candidates, then corroborates each one with no DB session held open across those network calls (same shape as B-18/B-25), then persists. Suite grows from 165 to 176 tests. BUGS.md moves B-29 to Previously fixed.
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# Known bugs
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A second full-codebase audit on 2026-07-27 found **25 further issues** (4 critical, 6 high,
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7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-29 … B-49. B-25 through B-28 are fixed (see "Previously
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fixed" below) — no Critical-severity finding remains open; the other 21 are High/Medium/Low.
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7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-30 … B-49. B-25 through B-29 are fixed (see "Previously
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fixed" below) — no Critical-severity finding remains open; the other 20 are High/Medium/Low.
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The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so none of these were caught by existing
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coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the four fixes so far brought the suite from
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139 to 165).
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coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the five fixes so far brought the suite from
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139 to 176).
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The recurring pattern across the open findings is worth stating once: the code is rigorous
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about the failure modes that have actually been hit, and silent about the ones that have not.
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Outgoing transactions reconcile; deposits do not (B-29). The payout phase is now fully
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recoverable; the "drawing" phase (waiting on a block) still has no equivalent
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resume-after-restart or stall visibility (B-36).
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The payout phase is now fully recoverable; the "drawing" phase (waiting on a block) still has
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no equivalent resume-after-restart or stall visibility (B-36), and there's still no periodic
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deposit-side reconciler independent of scripthash notifications (B-30).
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For limitations that are accepted by design rather than bugs (single-shared-token admin auth,
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single-process assumptions, no user-facing history, etc.), see "Known gaps / TODO" in
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@@ -21,23 +21,6 @@ single-process assumptions, no user-facing history, etc.), see "Known gaps / TOD
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## High
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### B-29 — `detect_external_spends` is irreversible and trusts a single response
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`deposits/service.py:87` marks `spent_txid = "external-spend"` for any UTXO missing from the
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current `listunspent`. There is **no path to undo it**: `credit_confirmed_utxos` skips
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`(txid, vout)` keys that already exist, regardless of their spent status (`:19-31`).
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One incomplete `listunspent` — a rotated-to server that is broken or behind, an empty reply on
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error, or a reorg — permanently and silently zeroes a user's balance, recoverable only by
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editing the database. Crediting is idempotent and conservative; debiting is neither, and it
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acts on a single reply from a single unauthenticated server.
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**Proposed fix.** Treat a missing outpoint as *evidence*, not proof. Require the same UTXO to
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be absent across N consecutive refreshes (or confirm the spend by looking up the outpoint's
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spending tx) before marking it, and skip the whole pass when `listunspent` returns empty for
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an address the DB believes is funded. Make the mark reversible: re-crediting should clear
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`spent_txid` when the sentinel value is present and the outpoint reappears as unspent.
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### B-30 — No deposit-side reconciler: one missed subscription means deposits are never credited
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`electrum/listener.py:61-67` (`address_for_new_user`) fires `asyncio.create_task(...)` without
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@@ -301,9 +284,10 @@ already does.
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- **B-26** — a payout failure or a process restart could wedge a round in `paying_out` forever
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- **B-27** — an RBF bump reset the reconciler's own abandon clock, so a repeatedly-bumped tx was never abandoned
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- **B-28** — a hostile Electrum server (or a MITM) could single-handedly pick the round's winner
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- **B-29** — a UTXO absent from one server's `listunspent` was marked spent immediately, irreversibly, on a single unauthenticated reply
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See git history for the fix-by-fix breakdown (commits `f13f685`, `50a43ae`, `933760e`, and the
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B-28 fix). Suite grew from 139 to 165 tests over the four.
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B-28/B-29 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 176 tests over the five.
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A full-codebase audit on 2026-07-26 (commit `d4e0974`) found 24 bugs across every Python
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module under `app/`, both static frontends, and the Docker/Caddy deployment — 5 critical,
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