A1: Django skeleton with web and worker processes (ADR-54, ADR-55, WEB-01, WEB-07, ARC-70..74)
Django 5.2 project (config/, apps/accounts with a custom User and case-insensitive usernames, apps/lottery with the run_worker command, apps/web with a placeholder home and /health/live, apps/ops), SQLite in WAL with IMMEDIATE transactions, secrets and hosts from the environment. The compose stack is now web + worker + caddy and serves https://localhost; the old FastAPI service is out of the stack until roadmap D1. The three old infrastructure tests follow the new Dockerfile and compose. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -6,21 +6,12 @@
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# instead, via its internal CA. Browsers will still warn on first visit
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# unless that CA is explicitly trusted — expected for local/dev use.
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{$SITE_ADDRESS:localhost} {
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# gzip buffers output, which would delay delivery on the SSE stream
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# (/rounds/stream, app/api/routes/rounds.py) — it needs each event flushed
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# to the client immediately, not batched. Everything else still compresses.
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@not_sse {
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not path /rounds/stream
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}
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encode @not_sse gzip
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encode gzip
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# B-43: Caddy adds none of these on its own. The JWT lives in
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# localStorage, so any XSS exfiltrates it — CSP is the main mitigation.
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# script-src/style-src need 'unsafe-inline' because both SPAs
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# (app/static/index.html, admin.html) use inline onclick handlers and
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# style="" attributes throughout; removing those is a separate,
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# larger refactor, not a header change. fonts.googleapis.com/gstatic.com
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# are the one external asset (the Google Fonts @import in style.css/admin.css).
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# B-43: Caddy adds none of these on its own. The session cookie is HttpOnly, but a CSP is
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# still the main mitigation against injected script. 'unsafe-inline' stays for now because
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# Django Admin uses inline scripts and styles; the pages of the new site (roadmap A5-A8)
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# are written without them so the policy can be tightened for them later.
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header {
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Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
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X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
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@@ -35,9 +26,8 @@
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# registration throttles of B-33, the SSE per-IP subscriber cap of B-38) is
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# defeated by simply rotating a fake value per request. Overwriting the header
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# with the actual peer makes the app's assumption true at the source; it also
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# reads the last hop rather than the first (app/api/client_ip.py), so the two
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# defences hold independently.
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reverse_proxy app:8123 {
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# reads the last hop rather than the first, so the two defences hold independently.
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reverse_proxy web:8000 {
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header_up X-Forwarded-For {remote_host}
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}
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}
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