4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 54dbffb552 Credit deposits at deposit_confirmations and verify the round's coins with the quorum before paying (B-82, DEP-03, DEP-04, DEP-09, DEP-12, DEP-14, ELC-17, ELC-27, RND-21, RND-22, RND-25, RND-39, DAT-10, DAT-11, DAT-24, DAT-62, DAT-67, DAT-68, AUD-12, AUD-44, AUD-45, API-30, API-31, API-36, ADR-06, ADR-52)
A user could bet and then double-spend the 1-conference deposit that funded the bet with a
private chain: the bet left the chain but its participant stayed `confirmed`, and the payout
failed "insufficient pool UTXOs" for ever with everyone else's money stuck. Coinbase outputs
were also credited at 1 confirmation (maturity is 120).

Deposits
- `round_config.deposit_confirmations` (default 6, 1-100, editable from /admin) is the
  threshold for a deposit; an output of a platform transaction (any txid of a
  pending_transactions row, RBF versions included) keeps 1; a coinbase output needs 120,
  recognised from the raw transaction, which must hash to the txid (`is_coinbase`, cached).
  `read_deposit_policy` / `classify_new_deposits` run between the read and the write, so no
  session is open across the lookup.
- The quorum must also place the coin deep enough on our own tip (ELC-17).
- Confirmed outputs short of their threshold are pending deposits (memory only, replaced at
  every refresh): shown in `pending_balance_sats` / `has_pending` (also for DEP-13's withdrawal
  message), never spendable. No scripthash notification announces a maturing deposit, so each
  new block refreshes only the users that have one, one task per user (DEP-09 now says so).

Payout
- `_trigger_payout` verifies the round's confirmed participants' bet outputs with the other
  servers (`verify_pool_outpoints`: strict majority of >= 2 answers per outpoint, a
  mempool-only coin or a tie gives no verdict) and builds from exactly those outpoints
  (RND-22), never from whatever else sits at the address. No quorum: `payout_failed`, `pool
  verification unavailable`, nothing changes. Bets that are gone become `reorged_out`, one
  `participant_reorged_out` row each, `pool_amount_sats` rewritten (only downward) in the same
  transaction, and the 70/30 split is computed on what is left.
- Winner's own bet gone: nothing is built; `rounds.payout_blocked_at` (Alembic f2c64a8d1e93,
  with `deposit_confirmations`, plain add_column) is set, `payout_blocked` and the pause with
  `paused_reason = 'payout_blocked'` are written in one transaction; `POST /admin/resume` clears
  the mark and the next attempt verifies again. /admin/rounds returns it.
- Rounds opened before B-80 (pool = the shared reserve address) keep the old active-server
  `listunspent` choice, since that address holds no single round's bets.

Ambiguities resolved: the winner's row stays `confirmed` while held (AUD-45 says every
participant whose bet is gone becomes `reorged_out`, but OPS-30/DAT-68 need the verification to
repeat after the resume, which only a `confirmed` row allows); `/`'s deposit hint no longer says
"1 confirmation" (7 languages, same keys); guides updated.

Tests changed because the spec changed: listener tests that credited height-100 coins at tip 0
now set a tip past every threshold; the payout fixtures seed confirmed participants (the new
source of the inputs) instead of an active-server `listunspent`, FakeNetwork answers the
verification, and test_round_pool_address asserts the quorum is asked about the round's
address. New: thresholds at exactly 6/5, configured value, coinbase at 119/120 and a mismatching
or missing raw tx, platform outputs at 1, dust, quorum height, waiting-deposit display and
disappearance, block-triggered refresh, resume, verification verdicts, gone bets excluded with
the split recomputed, winner gone held and paused, held payouts untouched until the resume,
re-verification after it, no quorum, a payout with 1 and with 400 participants against
reserve+fee+dust, admin config bounds and migration. Mutation-checked: threshold 1, ignored
coinbase, no height bound, no verification and no winner hold each fail tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 14:25:41 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 50b68d2957 Follow and record chain reorganisations, pausing on deep ones (B-85, ELC-09, ELC-22, ELC-23, ELC-24, AUD-38, DAT-69)
A reorganisation was neither recorded nor acted upon, and a competing header at the tip's
own height was ignored for as long as the tip stood, leaving the listener on an orphan.

- A header at the height we hold with a different hash is followed through the same
  fork-point search as any other reorg (ELC-09) instead of being ignored; it still has to
  bring valid work and a connected chain.
- ElectrumListener._record_reorg writes `chain_reorg_detected` (depth, fork height, old and
  new tip height and hash) before the window moves, so a failed write ends the session and
  the next server's announcement of the same fork is recorded then. Depth 1 is a
  transaction of its own; depth >= 2 also pauses the lottery with paused_reason 'reorg'
  and writes `lottery_paused` in the same transaction (begin_immediate first).
- Docs: ELC-09/22/23/24, AUD-03/11/38, DAT-30/69, OPS-30, RND-04, ADR-26/52 lose their
  B-85 "da implementare" lines.

Tests changed because the spec changed: test_apply_header_ignores_a_competing_header_at_
the_current_tip_height encoded the B-64 behaviour that ELC-09 now reverses; it is replaced
by test_a_competing_header_at_the_tip_height_is_a_reorg_to_follow and the depth tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 15:56:21 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 ca50ef62f3 Require real proof of work in headers and link every advance to the tip (B-74, ELC-11, ELC-12, ELC-22, ELC-23)
A header only had to meet the target it declared for itself, so a fabricated one with
`bits = 0x207fffff` passed half the time, a jump of several blocks was accepted without
being linked to the tip (a fake header at a huge height locked `tip_height` and froze every
draw), and an ordinary one-block reorganisation closed the session on every server.

- draw.py: MAINNET_POW_LIMIT (00000000ffff...ffff); header_meets_its_own_target also
  refuses a claimed target easier than POW_LIMIT.
- ElectrumListener._apply_header is async and takes the active client. A single block must
  chain by prev_hash; a jump downloads the headers in between (blockchain.block.headers,
  at most 2016 per request, ElectrumClient.get_block_headers) and each must carry valid
  work and chain, otherwise HeaderValidationError ends the session.
- The listener keeps the last 10 headers (`_window`), built from the process's first header
  and its 9 predecessors (which must chain into it). A header that does not join the tip is
  walked back to its fork point inside the window and the server's branch is followed
  instead of ending the session; a fork older than the window, or a branch that does not
  end at the announced header, still ends it. The audit row and the pause for deep reorgs
  are B-85; a competing header at the tip's own height is still ignored until then.
- _header_at also serves older heights from the window.

Tests changed because the spec changed: the mainnet powLimit cannot be mined in a test, so
tests/unit/conftest.py swaps in a regtest limit at import time (the new tests put the real
one back); the _apply_header tests are async; the two _run_once tests serve the first
header's 9 predecessors; test_apply_header_skips_linkage_check_across_a_height_gap is
replaced by the jump tests, since that behaviour is exactly what the finding removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 15:45:34 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 b424f670c5 Restructure docs: docs-first, SSOT, one ADR per decision
- Add docs/README.md as the index of all documentation.
- Split the 52 DEC entries of decisioni-e-limiti.md into docs/adr/ADR-NN
  files (same numbers), add ADR-53 (audit log), TEMPLATE.md and an ADR index
  with a feature -> ADR table.
- Rename decisioni-e-limiti.md to limiti-noti.md (LIM only) and rewrite all
  DEC-nn references as links to the ADRs.
- Document the docs-first / SSOT / ADR rules in processo-di-modifica.md and
  map the docs in CLAUDE.md and README.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 12:05:57 +02:00