Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 2b6ddb019b Never roll back an ambiguous broadcast as if it had been refused (B-76, TX-04, TX-05, TX-20, TX-21, BET-16, BET-17, BET-23, WDR-11, WDR-12, WDR-16, API-13)
place_bet and request_withdrawal released everything on any exception from the
broadcast, including the 15s timeout and a connection dropped after the write. The
tx may have propagated: a bet's sats landed in the pool with no participant, a
withdrawal left while its row said failed and its coins were spendable again.

- client: ElectrumRpcError (subclass of ElectrumError) is raised only for a reply
  carrying a JSON-RPC `error`; timeouts, drops and write errors stay plain
  ElectrumError.
- tx/outcome.py:broadcast_with_verdict sorts a broadcast into accepted / refused /
  uncertain. A refusal is verified first: ElectrumListener.transaction_known asks
  blockchain.transaction.get of the active server and every other one (10s each) —
  any server returning the tx means accepted; the active server plus
  MIN_QUORUM_RESPONSES others all denying it means refused (ALLOW_NO_QUORUM keeps
  the reduced rule); too few answers is uncertain. "already known" wording is only a
  shortcut that skips the check. With no network to ask, a refusal is uncertain.
- place_bet / request_withdrawal / _trigger_payout use it: only a verified refusal
  releases; uncertain leaves the rows building for the reconciler, publishes SSE and
  POST /bets and POST /withdrawals answer 202 with status building; "already known"
  promotes a payout (payout_sent) like any accepted broadcast.
- An accepted transaction is fanned out to every other server
  (ElectrumListener.fan_out_transaction, best effort, off the caller's path). The RBF
  replacement in bump_fee is left for B-77, which rewrites that function.

Tests changed because the spec changed: the existing "refused broadcast" tests raised
a bare RuntimeError (now an uncertain outcome) and are made explicit refusals
(rpc_error) with a network that denies the tx; direct route calls pass a Response;
FakePayoutListener gains the network surface.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 14:22:20 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 13cb66cc06 Require a real Electrum quorum and allow certificate pinning (B-84, ELC-01, ELC-03, ELC-14, ELC-19, ARC-20, OPS-12)
An empty ELECTRUM_FALLBACK_SERVERS (the .env.example default) silently made every
corroboration pass, and with fallbacks the majority was taken over whoever
answered, so one reachable fallback decided alone. TLS certificates were never
checked.

- _corroborate_majority passes only with at least 2 answers (MIN_QUORUM_RESPONSES)
  and a strict majority of the answers; no other server configured, or fewer than
  2 answering, fails. ALLOW_NO_QUORUM=true keeps the old reduced rule.
- config.validate_quorum_servers, called from the lifespan after parse_endpoints,
  refuses to start with fewer than 2 fallback servers unless ALLOW_NO_QUORUM=true
  (which logs a warning at every start).
- Optional pinning: `host:port[:mode]:pin=<sha256>` per fallback and
  ELECTRUM_CERT_PIN for the primary; ElectrumClient compares the SHA-256 of the
  DER certificate after the TLS handshake and a mismatch fails like an unreachable
  server. A pin on a plaintext entry is a startup error.
- .env.example now ships the four bootstrap servers and documents both new
  variables; docs/setup.md, spec, storico and BUGS.md updated.
- Tests changed because the spec changed: the two "no other servers configured ->
  True" corroboration tests now assert that outcome only under allow_no_quorum.

Note: a dev .env with fewer than 2 fallback servers will now refuse to start.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 14:04:35 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 daec4749c2 Survive oversized Electrum replies and ignore dust deposits (B-75, ELC-20, DEP-01, DAT-10)
A reply line over asyncio's default 64 KiB StreamReader limit raised out of
_read_loop and closed the only connection; the pool address's get_history passes
that after ~800 transactions, and dust sent to any public address does it on
purpose.

- ElectrumClient opens the stream with a 16 MiB limit and frames lines itself:
  an oversized line is discarded up to its newline, a non-JSON line is dropped,
  and the request whose id is readable in the first/last 256 bytes fails at once;
  the connection stays up either way.
- Coins below DUST_LIMIT_SATS are never offered as credit candidates, never
  credited, and select_utxos never selects them.
- Spec (ELC-20, DEP-01, DAT-10, ARC), storico, BUGS.md and test counts updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 12:14:12 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 b424f670c5 Restructure docs: docs-first, SSOT, one ADR per decision
- Add docs/README.md as the index of all documentation.
- Split the 52 DEC entries of decisioni-e-limiti.md into docs/adr/ADR-NN
  files (same numbers), add ADR-53 (audit log), TEMPLATE.md and an ADR index
  with a feature -> ADR table.
- Rename decisioni-e-limiti.md to limiti-noti.md (LIM only) and rewrite all
  DEC-nn references as links to the ADRs.
- Document the docs-first / SSOT / ADR rules in processo-di-modifica.md and
  map the docs in CLAUDE.md and README.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 12:05:57 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5 88221b0dbd Document the 2026-09-28 specification review and its fixes (B-73..B-97)
Fourth full audit, run against the docs/ specification instead of the code
alone, found logical flaws rooted in PLM's small hashrate (~22 TH/s): a
minable draw, no distinction between "never broadcast" and "unknown if
broadcast", an Electrum client that degrades as the pool address's history
grows, and 1-confirmation deposits on a chain where a reorg is rentable.

The spec now describes the target behaviour for every finding, marked
*Stato:* da implementare (B-nn) with an *Oggi:* line for what the code does
now; docs/piano-correzioni.md records the design decisions and the
implementation order. No code changed — this is spec-only, per B-nn
convention when a bug reveals the spec itself was incomplete.

Also documents, as an accepted-but-open risk (LIM-24), that the optional
jackpot cap (max_round_pool_sats) isn't tied to the cost of a 51% attack —
deferred, not decided.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 15:51:13 +02:00
davideandClaude Opus 5.5 61efbb0e37 Replace flowchart/ with a traceable specification in docs/
The two Mermaid diagrams under flowchart/ described the intended flow but
had drifted from the code and carried no link back to it. docs/ now holds
the specification instead: 15 Italian documents (flows, architecture, data
model, API, security, audit log, operations, decisions and limits, bug
history) with 472 numbered requirements, each pointing at the function
that implements it and the test that covers it. docs/processo-di-modifica.md
defines the ID convention and the spec -> code -> test change workflow, and
CLAUDE.md now names docs/ as authoritative.

Writing the spec from the code also corrected stale claims in CLAUDE.md
(B-41's get_history check, BUGS.md still tracking B-71/B-72, Cache-Control
scope, the error contract's bare-string exceptions) and in the operator
guides (payouts do retry, only `drawing` fails to resume, rounds do not
open without fee_address). The B-70 doc test now pins the prose in
docs/scommesse-e-prelievi.md instead of the deleted diagram.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 12:16:01 +02:00