40ac49082665ee43f1402edb995779ea3c06d369
6
Commits
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54dbffb552 |
Credit deposits at deposit_confirmations and verify the round's coins with the quorum before paying (B-82, DEP-03, DEP-04, DEP-09, DEP-12, DEP-14, ELC-17, ELC-27, RND-21, RND-22, RND-25, RND-39, DAT-10, DAT-11, DAT-24, DAT-62, DAT-67, DAT-68, AUD-12, AUD-44, AUD-45, API-30, API-31, API-36, ADR-06, ADR-52)
A user could bet and then double-spend the 1-conference deposit that funded the bet with a private chain: the bet left the chain but its participant stayed `confirmed`, and the payout failed "insufficient pool UTXOs" for ever with everyone else's money stuck. Coinbase outputs were also credited at 1 confirmation (maturity is 120). Deposits - `round_config.deposit_confirmations` (default 6, 1-100, editable from /admin) is the threshold for a deposit; an output of a platform transaction (any txid of a pending_transactions row, RBF versions included) keeps 1; a coinbase output needs 120, recognised from the raw transaction, which must hash to the txid (`is_coinbase`, cached). `read_deposit_policy` / `classify_new_deposits` run between the read and the write, so no session is open across the lookup. - The quorum must also place the coin deep enough on our own tip (ELC-17). - Confirmed outputs short of their threshold are pending deposits (memory only, replaced at every refresh): shown in `pending_balance_sats` / `has_pending` (also for DEP-13's withdrawal message), never spendable. No scripthash notification announces a maturing deposit, so each new block refreshes only the users that have one, one task per user (DEP-09 now says so). Payout - `_trigger_payout` verifies the round's confirmed participants' bet outputs with the other servers (`verify_pool_outpoints`: strict majority of >= 2 answers per outpoint, a mempool-only coin or a tie gives no verdict) and builds from exactly those outpoints (RND-22), never from whatever else sits at the address. No quorum: `payout_failed`, `pool verification unavailable`, nothing changes. Bets that are gone become `reorged_out`, one `participant_reorged_out` row each, `pool_amount_sats` rewritten (only downward) in the same transaction, and the 70/30 split is computed on what is left. - Winner's own bet gone: nothing is built; `rounds.payout_blocked_at` (Alembic f2c64a8d1e93, with `deposit_confirmations`, plain add_column) is set, `payout_blocked` and the pause with `paused_reason = 'payout_blocked'` are written in one transaction; `POST /admin/resume` clears the mark and the next attempt verifies again. /admin/rounds returns it. - Rounds opened before B-80 (pool = the shared reserve address) keep the old active-server `listunspent` choice, since that address holds no single round's bets. Ambiguities resolved: the winner's row stays `confirmed` while held (AUD-45 says every participant whose bet is gone becomes `reorged_out`, but OPS-30/DAT-68 need the verification to repeat after the resume, which only a `confirmed` row allows); `/`'s deposit hint no longer says "1 confirmation" (7 languages, same keys); guides updated. Tests changed because the spec changed: listener tests that credited height-100 coins at tip 0 now set a tip past every threshold; the payout fixtures seed confirmed participants (the new source of the inputs) instead of an active-server `listunspent`, FakeNetwork answers the verification, and test_round_pool_address asserts the quorum is asked about the round's address. New: thresholds at exactly 6/5, configured value, coinbase at 119/120 and a mismatching or missing raw tx, platform outputs at 1, dust, quorum height, waiting-deposit display and disappearance, block-triggered refresh, resume, verification verdicts, gone bets excluded with the split recomputed, winner gone held and paused, held payouts untouched until the resume, re-verification after it, no quorum, a payout with 1 and with 400 participants against reserve+fee+dust, admin config bounds and migration. Mutation-checked: threshold 1, ignored coinbase, no height bound, no verification and no winner hold each fail tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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daa85cf4f0 |
Give every payout a bump reserve output and refuse configs that cannot pay a round (B-79, RND-21, RND-23, RND-24, RND-27, RND-38, RND-40, DAT-73, API-31, API-36, TX-11, ADR-17, ADR-29)
The pool normally holds exactly the round's bet outputs and the payout spent them all for exactly the pool amount, so it had no change output: bump_fee could never accelerate it, and a payout stuck in a mempool (never abandoned while a server knows it) kept the round in `paying_out` and the whole lottery stopped. - build_payout_transaction always has three outputs: winner, fee address, and a bump reserve of max(DUST_LIMIT_SATS, estimate_vsize(inputs, 3) * 10 sat/vB) paid to the reserve address m/84'/746'/0'/1/0. The reserve comes out of the platform's 30%, the network fee still out of the winner's 70%. Input value beyond winner share + commission (only rounds opened before the per-round pool address) is folded into the reserve output if >= dust, left to the network fee otherwise. `change_address` is replaced by `reserve_address`. - `rounds.bump_reserve_sats` (Alembic e5a91c3d7b26, plain add_column) is written with the payout intent before the broadcast; /admin/rounds returns it. - bump_fee takes the increase from the reserve output for a payout (_find_reducible_output; a payout already in flight with a change to the pool still falls back to that), never from the winner or fee-address outputs. - payout_config_problem / rounds_can_open (RND-40): a bet amount and fee rate under which a round of 1 or of MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND participants could not cover the network fee, the reserve and dust outputs opens no round (lottery_configured=false); PUT /admin/config refuses such a bet amount or fee rate with 422 config_not_payable, judged on the resulting values, since the payout reads the fee rate live. Ambiguity resolved: the reserve output and any excess input are one output (RND-23 says one output to the reserve address), and bump_reserve_sats records that output's initial value. DAT-22's "abandon clears all amounts" stays with B-96. Tests changed because the spec changed: the four test_payout_builder tests asserted the old two/three-output shape with change to the pool and the fee address receiving the whole 30%; the whitespace fee_address test now spells out the amounts rounds_can_open reads. New: reserve sizing, payout with 1 and with 400 participants (inputs = outputs + fee to the satoshi), exact commission/reserve/dust boundary, excess folded or left to the fee, a real payout bumped out of its reserve with the other outputs byte-identical and bumped five times, the old reserve-less shape still raising RbfError, the scheduler output addresses and recorded amounts, payability boundaries found independently by bisection, no round / unconfigured flag for an unpayable config, a round in progress surviving it, PUT /admin/config refusals and the migration column. Mutation-checked: dropping the reserve lookup in bump_fee and the payability check in rounds_can_open each fail tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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db24287ea5 |
Make the draw a commit-reveal at a fixed, confirmed, quorum-agreed height with a public proof (B-73, RND-14 … RND-20, RND-33 … RND-37, DAT-61 … DAT-66, API-25, API-45, AUD-24 … AUD-27, AUD-37, ELC-15, SEC-56, ADR-24, ADR-25)
The seed was the hash of the first block seen after the close, so a miner holding tickets
could withhold blocks until one made them win, the active Electrum server could pick which
real block was used by not announcing another (a failed corroboration even moved the draw to
the next block), and the participant order was the server-only `broadcast_at` with no
tie-break, so nobody could recompute the result.
- Open: every round gets a 32-byte `server_seed`, stored only Fernet-encrypted with the
master-xprv key (`server_seed_enc`), with its published `server_seed_hash`;
`draw_confirmations` is copied from round_config. The plaintext column is written only by
the reveal.
- Entering `drawing` (one transaction, `draw_committed` audit row): participants ordered by
bet txid, each `draw_position`, `participants_hash` (sha256 of `txid:vout:address\n`
lines; new `bet_vout`), `draw_height = tip_at_close + 1`. A tip of 0 keeps the round
`closing` (`draw_baseline_tip_unknown`, once per round). All persisted, so a resumed draw
reads rather than recomputes (the `_tick` branch itself is B-81).
- `_complete_draw` / `_wait_for_draw_block` replace `_wait_for_next_block`: wait for
`draw_confirmations` blocks from `draw_height`, then `ElectrumListener.agreed_block_hash`
asks every server, the active one included, for the header at that exact height (valid
work, >= 2 other answers, strict majority of all); no agreement means the same height is
asked again and `draw_header_corroboration_failed` is written once per distinct reported
hash. `draw_stalled` now counts from the last tip advance, or from when the quorum started
to fail. Seed = sha256(server_seed || block_hash || participants_hash), index = seed mod n.
- The winner, the seed and the reveal (`server_seed`, `winner_drawn` payload) are written in
one transaction; a round closing with no participants reveals too. A round opened before
this change (no commitment) is given a secret as it enters `drawing`.
- `GET /rounds/{id}/proof` (public, 404 `round_not_found`, translated in all 7 languages) and
the new fields on `GET /rounds/current`; `draw_confirmations` in `/admin/config` and the
/admin form; `server_seed_hash`/`draw_height` in `/admin/rounds`, never the secret.
- Alembic d3e8b15a7c42 (plain add_column / create_index, expression indexes untouched).
- Docs: the B-73 `*Stato:*`/`*Oggi:*` lines are gone, guides and CLAUDE.md describe the new
draw. Ambiguities resolved in api.md: the proof's participants also carry `amount_sats`
(RND-37 lists it); `seed` is decimal in the proof and hex in the audit row, as specified.
Tests changed because the spec changed: ElectrumListener.corroborate_header (asked only the
other servers about the block the active one announced) is replaced by agreed_block_hash and
its quorum tests ported; draw_winner takes the secret and the list fingerprint; the four
_wait_for_next_block scheduler tests are replaced by _wait_for_draw_block ones (fixed height,
confirmations, same-height retry, stall clock). New: test_draw_proof.py recomputes the winner
independently from the public proof, checks the plaintext secret is nowhere in the database,
the API or the log before the reveal, and that a second pass over a `drawing` round yields
the same winner. Mutation-checked: ordering by broadcast_at, an early reveal and asking the
tip instead of the draw height each fail tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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a4b160e240 |
Abandon a transaction only on proof, and keep watching failed rows (B-78, TX-15, TX-17, TX-23, TX-26, ELC-28, DAT-33, DAT-36, DAT-69, DAT-72, AUD-11, AUD-12, AUD-31, AUD-39, API-32)
reconcile_once abandoned a row when the *active* server's history lacked its txid:
after 120s for `building` (which a restart onto a different server makes likely),
after 6h for `pending`, and all at once after a forward clock jump. It re-checked the
status but not the txid, so it raced the bumper, and a `failed` row was never looked at
again.
- The reconciler asks every server (ElectrumListener.get_histories, active + others) for
the history of the row's address and looks for every txid of the row. Present on any
server -> promoted (adopting the version found). Absent is only "no server of the
quorum knows it" and needs the active server plus the quorum minimum of the others to
have answered; even then nothing is released without proof:
(a) an input spent in a block by a transaction that is none of the row's versions,
agreed by a strict majority of a quorum of the other servers (confirmed_spender), or
(b) a rebroadcast of the latest raw tx to every server (rebroadcast_everywhere)
refused by all of them, explicitly, for missing/spent inputs.
Accepted or "already known" by any server means alive; a fee refusal is not proof
(`building` -> `pending` for the bumper, `pending` untouched); too few answers or
anything else leaves the row alone. failure_reason names the proof.
- The write re-reads status *and* current_txid under begin_immediate (TX-26).
- pending_transactions.failed_at (set by _abandon and _release_failed_withdrawal) starts
a 14-day watch: a failed row that a majority of the other servers (at least the quorum
minimum) list in a block becomes `confirmed`, writes pending_tx_resurrected once and
pauses the lottery with paused_reason `resurrected_tx`; linked rows are not corrected.
The confirmation is by quorum of histories for now; merkle proofs come with B-83.
- round_config.paused_reason (migration b7d2e41c9a05, with the failed_at one): `operator`
from POST /admin/pause (which accepts an optional `note` and never overwrites an
automatic reason), cleared by resume, which logs the reason it lifted; exposed on
/admin/config and GET /rounds/current. rounds/pause.py:pause_automatically is the
system's way in.
- PendingTransactionReconciler takes the listener as `network`; with none it can promote
but never abandon.
Tests changed because the spec changed: the three reconciler tests that expect an
abandonment (and the one in test_tx_versions) now supply a network that proves the
transaction is gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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f936d6660c |
Track every version of a bumped transaction and write the RBF replacement before broadcasting it (B-77, TX-12, TX-13, TX-19, TX-21, DAT-13, DAT-14, DAT-34, DAT-44, DAT-45, DAT-70, DAT-71)
The poller and the reconciler matched current_txid only. If an earlier version of a bumped transaction confirmed it was never seen, and after 6h the row was abandoned: a confirmed bet's participant deleted, a sent withdrawal marked failed, a paid payout rebuilt. bump_fee also broadcast in phase 2 and persisted in phase 3 unconditionally, so a crash or a `database is locked` in between left a transaction on the network that the DB did not know, and an abandon or a confirmation in the meantime was overwritten. - New table pending_transaction_txids (migration a3f5c2d9b7e1; txid unique, index on the owning row; existing rows backfilled with current_txid + raw and the txid their last bump replaced, raw_hex empty). Written with the row by place_bet, request_withdrawal and _trigger_payout; removed with a bet row that a verified refusal deletes (DAT-38). - bump_fee in four phases: read, build and sign, commit the replacement as a candidate version, broadcast (verdict of B-76, fanned out when accepted; an explicit refusal raises RbfError and leaves the row), then switch the row over with `UPDATE ... WHERE status='pending' AND current_txid=<replaced>`. Zero rows matched is a logged conflict: nothing is overwritten and the candidate stays recorded. An uncertain broadcast adopts the replacement. A retry rebuilds the same candidate without tripping the unique txid. - poll_once and reconcile_once look for every txid of a row. When the version found is not the current one, broadcast.adopt_version makes it current (raw tx included) and retargets spent_txid, bet_txid, withdrawals.txid and payout_txid as a bump does, before the confirmation handler runs. _release_inputs frees inputs claimed by any version of the row. - RbfBumper takes the listener as `network`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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cc63753439 |
Test that the migration chain keeps the expression indexes (B-97, DAT-75, DAT-56, ARC-62)
batch_alter_table on SQLite rebuilds the table and silently drops ix_rounds_single_active and ix_users_username_lower, autogenerate never sees them, and no test ran the migrations (the others build the schema with create_all). tests/unit/test_migrations.py runs `alembic upgrade head` on an empty file DB in a subprocess and asserts both indexes exist with their definition (read from sqlite_master) and that a second active round and a case-variant username are refused. Verified to fail when a batch_alter_table on rounds is added to the last migration. The current chain already preserves both indexes, so no migration changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |