select_utxos had no ceiling on input count, so an address fragmented into many
small deposits built an ever-larger transaction whose fee — deducted from the
amount being moved — eroded the bet's share of the pool or the withdrawn amount,
and past a few hundred inputs stopped being standard at all.
MAX_TX_INPUTS (50) now bounds the selection. Reaching the cap without covering
the target is reported as its own "too_many_inputs" code, distinct from having
no funds, with the cap carried in the error params for the 7 translations. The
payout path records the same distinction in its payout_failed audit reason.
bump_fee computed fee_delta as new_fee - old_fee, falling back to a
flat 1-satoshi bump whenever that came out zero or negative - which
happened whenever old_fee (the actual fee paid, from real prevout
amounts) already exceeded the naive target, e.g. because dust change
had been folded into the original fee (psbt_builder.py's
DUST_LIMIT_SATS handling). A 1-satoshi total increase is nowhere near
BIP125 rule 4's minimum (the replacement must pay at least the
incremental relay fee rate times its own vsize more than what it
replaces), so the node rejected it every time - and since bump_fee
raised before touching `pending`, the next tick retried with identical
parameters every 30 seconds, forever. Separately, the fee rate climbed
by 1 sat/vB every bump with no ceiling.
fee_delta is now max(target_fee - old_fee, vsize * the incremental
relay rate) - always at least the relay-mandated minimum regardless of
what the naive arithmetic produces. pending.fee_rate_sat_vb is set to
the actual resulting rate rather than the naive target, so a later
bump's arithmetic starts from what's really being paid instead of
drifting from it. Once a transaction reaches MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB (a
new constant, 10,000 sat/vB, shared with RoundConfig.fee_rate_sat_vb's
existing admin-facing bound so the two can't drift apart - the same
reason MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH is shared elsewhere) bump_fee refuses to
bump further; the reconciler abandons it if it never confirms (B-27)
instead of this retrying forever.
Suite grows from 185 to 187 tests. BUGS.md moves B-32 to Previously
fixed.
`if change > 0` created a change output for any leftover at all. Below the
P2WPKH dust threshold (294 sat: the output's 31 vbytes plus the 67 needed to
spend it, at the 3000 sat/kvB dust relay fee) relaying nodes reject the whole
transaction, so the bet or withdrawal failed at broadcast with an error the user
could do nothing about — and which arrived as a 500 (BUGS.md B-06).
Sub-dust change now goes to the fee in both builders, and a sub-dust
recipient/winner/commission amount is refused up front with its own error code.
The fee estimate already assumed two outputs, so dropping one never underpays.
Cross-checked against PalladiumWallet, the source of truth for PLM parameters:
it delegates to NBitcoin's TransactionBuilder (same 294 sat threshold) and has
an explicit test — Un_resto_sotto_la_soglia_dust_viene_assorbito_nella_fee —
asserting the same behaviour, so both the value and the semantics match the
reference implementation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The code treated a broadcast as final: money moved on-chain and the DB was
updated on the assumption it would either confirm or be fee-bumped until it
did. Neither is guaranteed, and every way that assumption broke was permanent
(BUGS.md B-02, B-03, B-04, B-07, B-08, B-20, B-21).
Persist before broadcasting. place_bet and request_withdrawal now write their
rows in a "building" state and commit, then broadcast, then promote to
broadcast/pending in a second commit. Before, a failure or crash between the
broadcast and the commit left the coins irreversibly spent with no trace: no
participant (so no entry in the draw), no pending row (so no RBF and no
confirmation tracking), and the UTXOs not even marked spent, so the next bet
would try to double-spend them. A refused broadcast now releases the reserved
UTXOs, restores the balance, removes the participant (or marks the withdrawal
failed), audit-logs it, and answers a translatable broadcast_failed — as 502,
since the network refused it, not the caller, where it used to be an opaque 500.
Reconcile what's in flight against the chain. New PendingTransactionReconciler
(app/tx/reconcile.py, every 120s and once at startup) asks whether each
non-terminal tx exists: present -> promote, gone -> mark failed with a reason,
release the inputs, roll the domain row back, audit-log it. Grace periods differ
by state (120s for "building", 6h for "pending", so the RBF bumper gets its
attempts first). It is deliberately biased to inaction: only a server that
positively doesn't know the tx counts as absent, and a transport failure never
abandons anything, because releasing a UTXO whose tx is actually alive would
invite a double-spend. Verified against the live server, which answers "No such
mempool or blockchain transaction" for an unknown txid.
Stop keying on a value that changes. An RBF bump changes the txid, and
_on_bet_confirmed looked the participant up by bet_txid — so a bumped bet
confirmed under a txid no participant carried, the row stayed "broadcast"
forever, and the scheduler waited on it forever: the round could never close and
the lottery stopped. Handlers now resolve by immutable ids (round_id/user_id,
withdrawal_id), and bump_fee retargets every stored txid — bet_txid,
Withdrawal.txid, Round.payout_txid and UtxoEvent.spent_txid — plus records the
previous one in replaced_by_txid, which was never written at all.
One bad row no longer blocks the rest. The confirmation poller's per-tx lookup
is guarded: a txid the server can't resolve used to abort the whole pass, so
nothing confirmed again until an operator intervened. It also selects plain
columns instead of hydrating entities that outlive their session.
Tests: 6 reconciler cases including "a broken connection must not release coins";
the bet-ordering test probes committed state from an independent session during
the broadcast, and caught a real mistake in the first draft of this change (the
_pending_transaction helper still hardcoded status="pending", so rows were born
already-broadcast and would have got the 6-hour grace instead of 120s).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
embit's Script.from_address accepts a well-formed bech32 address from any
chain: a Bitcoin bc1... parses into a perfectly valid witness program. So a
withdrawal to a BTC address built, signed and broadcast normally on PLM, and
the funds landed on a script nobody holds the key for — silently, with no
error anywhere. A malformed address fared slightly better only in that it
crashed the request with an unhandled 500.
is_valid_plm_address checks the HRP as well as the parse, and runs first in
request_withdrawal, before a single UTXO is touched. It matches what the
withdrawal form already told the user (bech32 plm1q... only).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dashboard now speaks seven languages but every failure path still showed
the API's raw English text ("insufficient balance", "current password is
incorrect"), which is the most frequent and least forgiving part of the UI to
leave untranslated.
Rather than teach the API about locales, it keeps answering in one language
and hands the client something to translate: `detail` becomes
{code, message, params}, where message stays English for non-dashboard
consumers (curl, tests) and code maps onto `error.<code>` in i18n.js. An
unknown code falls back to message, so a client older or newer than the server
degrades to English instead of a blank toast.
Domain exceptions (BetError, WithdrawalError) subclass the new ApiError and
carry the code from where the failure actually happens; str(exc) is still the
English message, so existing tests keep matching on it. Interpolated values
travel in params rather than baked into the English sentence — amounts as
*_sats, from which the frontend derives a *_plm sibling, so each language can
place them wherever its grammar wants.
admin.js reads detail.message defensively: the admin endpoints still return a
bare string, but the shared auth dependencies now return the structured form.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Balance display: place_bet/request_withdrawal spend whole UTXOs and mark
them spent at broadcast time, well before confirmation, so the confirmed-only
balance could drop by far more than the amount actually moving. Add
compute_pending_balance() (app/wallet/balance.py) to fold the unconfirmed
change from in-flight bet/withdrawal PendingTransactions back in; GET
/users/me now returns pending_balance_sats + has_pending, and the frontend
shows it colored green (settled) or amber (still pending) instead of the
confirmed-only figure.
Round outcome display: the win/lose reveal and the "pagamento al vincitore
in corso" status were fighting over the same UI slot, and the reveal broke
across a page refresh. Now:
- The round-status box (generic phase progress) and the personal win/lose
box are independent and can both be visible at once.
- The win/lose box only renders for users who actually played in that round
(new user_played field on GET /rounds/current, via a new optional-auth
dependency so the endpoint stays usable logged-out).
- The reveal delay is anchored to the round's server-provided closes_at
instead of a client-side "first seen" timestamp, so repeated reloads can't
reset it, and the revealed result is persisted in localStorage so it
survives a refresh even after the round has fully closed.
- GET /users/me/last-round-result is a durable DB-backed backstop for
players who miss the live window entirely (backgrounded tab, offline).
Also hardens the frontend polling loop: call() now times out instead of
hanging forever, and a session-epoch counter stops an in-flight request from
a previous login from resurrecting a duplicate poll loop after logout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GET /admin/users lists id/username/address/balance_sats/created_at.
GET /admin/users/{id}/privkey derives and returns that user's raw WIF
private key, for manual intervention (e.g. sweeping funds back if
something's stuck) — this is already a custodial system, the server
holds the master key everything is derived from, so this doesn't grant
a new capability, just exposes an existing one through the API. Every
access is audit-logged (admin_privkey_accessed).
Also fixes a pre-existing test-isolation bug in test_admin.py's client
fixture: app.db.session.get_session had `from app.db.base import
AsyncSessionLocal`, a one-time reference copy at first import — later
tests reassigning db_base.AsyncSessionLocal never reached it, so any
test mixing direct DB writes with router calls silently read/wrote
against a stale, possibly-disposed engine from whichever test ran
first. Fixed by also rebinding app.db.session.AsyncSessionLocal in the
fixture on every run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
BIP84 derivation of per-user P2WPKH addresses and the pool address from
the encrypted master xprv (app/wallet/hd.py, keystore.py), the PLM
mainnet chain params (plm_network.py), and PSBT construction for bets/
payouts/withdrawals with change-output and fee-estimation logic
(psbt_builder.py).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
davide
