c1b192f6d1e2ab29051bb6f10a45ff1a39df1a7d
5
Commits
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54dbffb552 |
Credit deposits at deposit_confirmations and verify the round's coins with the quorum before paying (B-82, DEP-03, DEP-04, DEP-09, DEP-12, DEP-14, ELC-17, ELC-27, RND-21, RND-22, RND-25, RND-39, DAT-10, DAT-11, DAT-24, DAT-62, DAT-67, DAT-68, AUD-12, AUD-44, AUD-45, API-30, API-31, API-36, ADR-06, ADR-52)
A user could bet and then double-spend the 1-conference deposit that funded the bet with a private chain: the bet left the chain but its participant stayed `confirmed`, and the payout failed "insufficient pool UTXOs" for ever with everyone else's money stuck. Coinbase outputs were also credited at 1 confirmation (maturity is 120). Deposits - `round_config.deposit_confirmations` (default 6, 1-100, editable from /admin) is the threshold for a deposit; an output of a platform transaction (any txid of a pending_transactions row, RBF versions included) keeps 1; a coinbase output needs 120, recognised from the raw transaction, which must hash to the txid (`is_coinbase`, cached). `read_deposit_policy` / `classify_new_deposits` run between the read and the write, so no session is open across the lookup. - The quorum must also place the coin deep enough on our own tip (ELC-17). - Confirmed outputs short of their threshold are pending deposits (memory only, replaced at every refresh): shown in `pending_balance_sats` / `has_pending` (also for DEP-13's withdrawal message), never spendable. No scripthash notification announces a maturing deposit, so each new block refreshes only the users that have one, one task per user (DEP-09 now says so). Payout - `_trigger_payout` verifies the round's confirmed participants' bet outputs with the other servers (`verify_pool_outpoints`: strict majority of >= 2 answers per outpoint, a mempool-only coin or a tie gives no verdict) and builds from exactly those outpoints (RND-22), never from whatever else sits at the address. No quorum: `payout_failed`, `pool verification unavailable`, nothing changes. Bets that are gone become `reorged_out`, one `participant_reorged_out` row each, `pool_amount_sats` rewritten (only downward) in the same transaction, and the 70/30 split is computed on what is left. - Winner's own bet gone: nothing is built; `rounds.payout_blocked_at` (Alembic f2c64a8d1e93, with `deposit_confirmations`, plain add_column) is set, `payout_blocked` and the pause with `paused_reason = 'payout_blocked'` are written in one transaction; `POST /admin/resume` clears the mark and the next attempt verifies again. /admin/rounds returns it. - Rounds opened before B-80 (pool = the shared reserve address) keep the old active-server `listunspent` choice, since that address holds no single round's bets. Ambiguities resolved: the winner's row stays `confirmed` while held (AUD-45 says every participant whose bet is gone becomes `reorged_out`, but OPS-30/DAT-68 need the verification to repeat after the resume, which only a `confirmed` row allows); `/`'s deposit hint no longer says "1 confirmation" (7 languages, same keys); guides updated. Tests changed because the spec changed: listener tests that credited height-100 coins at tip 0 now set a tip past every threshold; the payout fixtures seed confirmed participants (the new source of the inputs) instead of an active-server `listunspent`, FakeNetwork answers the verification, and test_round_pool_address asserts the quorum is asked about the round's address. New: thresholds at exactly 6/5, configured value, coinbase at 119/120 and a mismatching or missing raw tx, platform outputs at 1, dust, quorum height, waiting-deposit display and disappearance, block-triggered refresh, resume, verification verdicts, gone bets excluded with the split recomputed, winner gone held and paused, held payouts untouched until the resume, re-verification after it, no quorum, a payout with 1 and with 400 participants against reserve+fee+dust, admin config bounds and migration. Mutation-checked: threshold 1, ignored coinbase, no height bound, no verification and no winner hold each fail tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fe909bedcf |
Don't double-count a bet/withdrawal's own change in pending balance (B-51)
A change output's confirmation is credited by two independent, unordered paths: the Electrum listener (event-driven, near-instant — credits it as a UtxoEvent and folds it into cached_balance_sats via recompute_balance) and this module's PendingTransaction.status flip (tx/confirmation.py, polled every 10s). The listener normally wins that race, so for the gap until the poller catches up, compute_pending_balance kept adding the same change on top of a cached_balance_sats that already included it — observed live as a user's displayed balance briefly jumping by exactly the change amount before self-correcting a few seconds later. Fix: skip any change output whose (txid, vout) already has a UtxoEvent for this user before summing pending_change_sats. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d528c5b475 |
Let the system recover from a broadcast that never confirms
The code treated a broadcast as final: money moved on-chain and the DB was updated on the assumption it would either confirm or be fee-bumped until it did. Neither is guaranteed, and every way that assumption broke was permanent (BUGS.md B-02, B-03, B-04, B-07, B-08, B-20, B-21). Persist before broadcasting. place_bet and request_withdrawal now write their rows in a "building" state and commit, then broadcast, then promote to broadcast/pending in a second commit. Before, a failure or crash between the broadcast and the commit left the coins irreversibly spent with no trace: no participant (so no entry in the draw), no pending row (so no RBF and no confirmation tracking), and the UTXOs not even marked spent, so the next bet would try to double-spend them. A refused broadcast now releases the reserved UTXOs, restores the balance, removes the participant (or marks the withdrawal failed), audit-logs it, and answers a translatable broadcast_failed — as 502, since the network refused it, not the caller, where it used to be an opaque 500. Reconcile what's in flight against the chain. New PendingTransactionReconciler (app/tx/reconcile.py, every 120s and once at startup) asks whether each non-terminal tx exists: present -> promote, gone -> mark failed with a reason, release the inputs, roll the domain row back, audit-log it. Grace periods differ by state (120s for "building", 6h for "pending", so the RBF bumper gets its attempts first). It is deliberately biased to inaction: only a server that positively doesn't know the tx counts as absent, and a transport failure never abandons anything, because releasing a UTXO whose tx is actually alive would invite a double-spend. Verified against the live server, which answers "No such mempool or blockchain transaction" for an unknown txid. Stop keying on a value that changes. An RBF bump changes the txid, and _on_bet_confirmed looked the participant up by bet_txid — so a bumped bet confirmed under a txid no participant carried, the row stayed "broadcast" forever, and the scheduler waited on it forever: the round could never close and the lottery stopped. Handlers now resolve by immutable ids (round_id/user_id, withdrawal_id), and bump_fee retargets every stored txid — bet_txid, Withdrawal.txid, Round.payout_txid and UtxoEvent.spent_txid — plus records the previous one in replaced_by_txid, which was never written at all. One bad row no longer blocks the rest. The confirmation poller's per-tx lookup is guarded: a txid the server can't resolve used to abort the whole pass, so nothing confirmed again until an operator intervened. It also selects plain columns instead of hydrating entities that outlive their session. Tests: 6 reconciler cases including "a broken connection must not release coins"; the bet-ordering test probes committed state from an independent session during the broadcast, and caught a real mistake in the first draft of this change (the _pending_transaction helper still hardcoded status="pending", so rows were born already-broadcast and would have got the 6-hour grace instead of 120s). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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6a857f0e07 |
Show pending-inclusive balance and per-player round outcome reliably
Balance display: place_bet/request_withdrawal spend whole UTXOs and mark them spent at broadcast time, well before confirmation, so the confirmed-only balance could drop by far more than the amount actually moving. Add compute_pending_balance() (app/wallet/balance.py) to fold the unconfirmed change from in-flight bet/withdrawal PendingTransactions back in; GET /users/me now returns pending_balance_sats + has_pending, and the frontend shows it colored green (settled) or amber (still pending) instead of the confirmed-only figure. Round outcome display: the win/lose reveal and the "pagamento al vincitore in corso" status were fighting over the same UI slot, and the reveal broke across a page refresh. Now: - The round-status box (generic phase progress) and the personal win/lose box are independent and can both be visible at once. - The win/lose box only renders for users who actually played in that round (new user_played field on GET /rounds/current, via a new optional-auth dependency so the endpoint stays usable logged-out). - The reveal delay is anchored to the round's server-provided closes_at instead of a client-side "first seen" timestamp, so repeated reloads can't reset it, and the revealed result is persisted in localStorage so it survives a refresh even after the round has fully closed. - GET /users/me/last-round-result is a durable DB-backed backstop for players who miss the live window entirely (backgrounded tab, offline). Also hardens the frontend polling loop: call() now times out instead of hanging forever, and a session-epoch counter stops an in-flight request from a previous login from resurrecting a duplicate poll loop after logout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f1261584ff |
Add wallet key derivation and PSBT building
BIP84 derivation of per-user P2WPKH addresses and the pool address from the encrypted master xprv (app/wallet/hd.py, keystore.py), the PLM mainnet chain params (plm_network.py), and PSBT construction for bets/ payouts/withdrawals with change-output and fee-estimation logic (psbt_builder.py). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |