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Author SHA1 Message Date
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 ca50ef62f3 Require real proof of work in headers and link every advance to the tip (B-74, ELC-11, ELC-12, ELC-22, ELC-23) 
A header only had to meet the target it declared for itself, so a fabricated one with
`bits = 0x207fffff` passed half the time, a jump of several blocks was accepted without
being linked to the tip (a fake header at a huge height locked `tip_height` and froze every
draw), and an ordinary one-block reorganisation closed the session on every server.

- draw.py: MAINNET_POW_LIMIT (00000000ffff...ffff); header_meets_its_own_target also
  refuses a claimed target easier than POW_LIMIT.
- ElectrumListener._apply_header is async and takes the active client. A single block must
  chain by prev_hash; a jump downloads the headers in between (blockchain.block.headers,
  at most 2016 per request, ElectrumClient.get_block_headers) and each must carry valid
  work and chain, otherwise HeaderValidationError ends the session.
- The listener keeps the last 10 headers (`_window`), built from the process's first header
  and its 9 predecessors (which must chain into it). A header that does not join the tip is
  walked back to its fork point inside the window and the server's branch is followed
  instead of ending the session; a fork older than the window, or a branch that does not
  end at the announced header, still ends it. The audit row and the pause for deep reorgs
  are B-85; a competing header at the tip's own height is still ignored until then.
- _header_at also serves older heights from the window.

Tests changed because the spec changed: the mainnet powLimit cannot be mined in a test, so
tests/unit/conftest.py swaps in a regtest limit at import time (the new tests put the real
one back); the _apply_header tests are async; the two _run_once tests serve the first
header's 9 predecessors; test_apply_header_skips_linkage_check_across_a_height_gap is
replaced by the jump tests, since that behaviour is exactly what the finding removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-14 15:45:34 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 a3c51719bd Confirm transactions by merkle proof and reinstate coins only on a quorum (B-83, TX-06, TX-22, TX-23, ELC-25, ELC-26, DEP-02, DEP-08, AUD-18, ADR-07) 
poll_once marked a transaction confirmed on one server's `height > 0`, and
reinstate_reappeared_utxos restored a coin written off as spent outside the platform on
the active server's word alone, so a hostile active server could report a
never-relayed payout as confirmed (winner unpaid, round closed) or put a spent coin
back into a balance.

- electrum/merkle.py: pure merkle-branch verification against a block header.
- ElectrumListener.confirmation_proven(txid, height): the *other* servers are asked for
  blockchain.transaction.get_merkle; a strict majority of at least the quorum minimum
  must return a proof that recomputes to the merkle root of that block's header (block
  height and position checked too). The header is the tip the listener holds, or for an
  older block the one a majority of the quorum agrees on and that meets its own target;
  a height above our tip cannot be proven. Quorum rules are _corroborate_majority's.
- poll_once takes the listener as `network`: the active server's history only nominates
  a candidate (txid, height); the row confirms only when the proof holds, and stays
  pending otherwise. With no network nothing confirms. ConfirmationPoller wires it.
- The reconciler's late-confirmation check of failed rows (B-78) now puts each claimed
  (txid, height) to the same proof instead of counting histories.
- refresh_user splits reinstatement like a credit: find_reinstate_candidates (read-only;
  same outpoint, recorded amount, confirmed) -> corroborate_utxo_reinstatement (same
  quorum as a credit) -> reinstate_reappeared_utxos writes only what was corroborated,
  rechecking the mark under the lock. Nothing is committed in the read phase any more.
- Broadcast fan-out, the third part of the finding, shipped with B-76.

Tests changed because the spec changed: every poll_once call now passes a network that
proves (FakeNetwork) — the confirmation tests are otherwise unchanged; the failed-row
"quorum does not confirm" test now asserts the claim goes to the proof.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-14 15:29:30 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 a4b160e240 Abandon a transaction only on proof, and keep watching failed rows (B-78, TX-15, TX-17, TX-23, TX-26, ELC-28, DAT-33, DAT-36, DAT-69, DAT-72, AUD-11, AUD-12, AUD-31, AUD-39, API-32) 
reconcile_once abandoned a row when the *active* server's history lacked its txid:
after 120s for `building` (which a restart onto a different server makes likely),
after 6h for `pending`, and all at once after a forward clock jump. It re-checked the
status but not the txid, so it raced the bumper, and a `failed` row was never looked at
again.

- The reconciler asks every server (ElectrumListener.get_histories, active + others) for
  the history of the row's address and looks for every txid of the row. Present on any
  server -> promoted (adopting the version found). Absent is only "no server of the
  quorum knows it" and needs the active server plus the quorum minimum of the others to
  have answered; even then nothing is released without proof:
  (a) an input spent in a block by a transaction that is none of the row's versions,
      agreed by a strict majority of a quorum of the other servers (confirmed_spender), or
  (b) a rebroadcast of the latest raw tx to every server (rebroadcast_everywhere)
      refused by all of them, explicitly, for missing/spent inputs.
  Accepted or "already known" by any server means alive; a fee refusal is not proof
  (`building` -> `pending` for the bumper, `pending` untouched); too few answers or
  anything else leaves the row alone. failure_reason names the proof.
- The write re-reads status *and* current_txid under begin_immediate (TX-26).
- pending_transactions.failed_at (set by _abandon and _release_failed_withdrawal) starts
  a 14-day watch: a failed row that a majority of the other servers (at least the quorum
  minimum) list in a block becomes `confirmed`, writes pending_tx_resurrected once and
  pauses the lottery with paused_reason `resurrected_tx`; linked rows are not corrected.
  The confirmation is by quorum of histories for now; merkle proofs come with B-83.
- round_config.paused_reason (migration b7d2e41c9a05, with the failed_at one): `operator`
  from POST /admin/pause (which accepts an optional `note` and never overwrites an
  automatic reason), cleared by resume, which logs the reason it lifted; exposed on
  /admin/config and GET /rounds/current. rounds/pause.py:pause_automatically is the
  system's way in.
- PendingTransactionReconciler takes the listener as `network`; with none it can promote
  but never abandon.

Tests changed because the spec changed: the three reconciler tests that expect an
abandonment (and the one in test_tx_versions) now supply a network that proves the
transaction is gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-14 15:07:09 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 f936d6660c Track every version of a bumped transaction and write the RBF replacement before broadcasting it (B-77, TX-12, TX-13, TX-19, TX-21, DAT-13, DAT-14, DAT-34, DAT-44, DAT-45, DAT-70, DAT-71) 
The poller and the reconciler matched current_txid only. If an earlier version of
a bumped transaction confirmed it was never seen, and after 6h the row was abandoned:
a confirmed bet's participant deleted, a sent withdrawal marked failed, a paid payout
rebuilt. bump_fee also broadcast in phase 2 and persisted in phase 3 unconditionally,
so a crash or a `database is locked` in between left a transaction on the network that
the DB did not know, and an abandon or a confirmation in the meantime was overwritten.

- New table pending_transaction_txids (migration a3f5c2d9b7e1; txid unique, index on
  the owning row; existing rows backfilled with current_txid + raw and the txid their
  last bump replaced, raw_hex empty). Written with the row by place_bet,
  request_withdrawal and _trigger_payout; removed with a bet row that a verified
  refusal deletes (DAT-38).
- bump_fee in four phases: read, build and sign, commit the replacement as a candidate
  version, broadcast (verdict of B-76, fanned out when accepted; an explicit refusal
  raises RbfError and leaves the row), then switch the row over with
  `UPDATE ... WHERE status='pending' AND current_txid=<replaced>`. Zero rows matched is
  a logged conflict: nothing is overwritten and the candidate stays recorded. An
  uncertain broadcast adopts the replacement. A retry rebuilds the same candidate
  without tripping the unique txid.
- poll_once and reconcile_once look for every txid of a row. When the version found is
  not the current one, broadcast.adopt_version makes it current (raw tx included) and
  retargets spent_txid, bet_txid, withdrawals.txid and payout_txid as a bump does,
  before the confirmation handler runs. _release_inputs frees inputs claimed by any
  version of the row.
- RbfBumper takes the listener as `network`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-14 14:46:43 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 2b6ddb019b Never roll back an ambiguous broadcast as if it had been refused (B-76, TX-04, TX-05, TX-20, TX-21, BET-16, BET-17, BET-23, WDR-11, WDR-12, WDR-16, API-13) 
place_bet and request_withdrawal released everything on any exception from the
broadcast, including the 15s timeout and a connection dropped after the write. The
tx may have propagated: a bet's sats landed in the pool with no participant, a
withdrawal left while its row said failed and its coins were spendable again.

- client: ElectrumRpcError (subclass of ElectrumError) is raised only for a reply
  carrying a JSON-RPC `error`; timeouts, drops and write errors stay plain
  ElectrumError.
- tx/outcome.py:broadcast_with_verdict sorts a broadcast into accepted / refused /
  uncertain. A refusal is verified first: ElectrumListener.transaction_known asks
  blockchain.transaction.get of the active server and every other one (10s each) —
  any server returning the tx means accepted; the active server plus
  MIN_QUORUM_RESPONSES others all denying it means refused (ALLOW_NO_QUORUM keeps
  the reduced rule); too few answers is uncertain. "already known" wording is only a
  shortcut that skips the check. With no network to ask, a refusal is uncertain.
- place_bet / request_withdrawal / _trigger_payout use it: only a verified refusal
  releases; uncertain leaves the rows building for the reconciler, publishes SSE and
  POST /bets and POST /withdrawals answer 202 with status building; "already known"
  promotes a payout (payout_sent) like any accepted broadcast.
- An accepted transaction is fanned out to every other server
  (ElectrumListener.fan_out_transaction, best effort, off the caller's path). The RBF
  replacement in bump_fee is left for B-77, which rewrites that function.

Tests changed because the spec changed: the existing "refused broadcast" tests raised
a bare RuntimeError (now an uncertain outcome) and are made explicit refusals
(rpc_error) with a network that denies the tx; direct route calls pass a Response;
FakePayoutListener gains the network surface.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-14 14:22:20 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 13cb66cc06 Require a real Electrum quorum and allow certificate pinning (B-84, ELC-01, ELC-03, ELC-14, ELC-19, ARC-20, OPS-12) 
An empty ELECTRUM_FALLBACK_SERVERS (the .env.example default) silently made every
corroboration pass, and with fallbacks the majority was taken over whoever
answered, so one reachable fallback decided alone. TLS certificates were never
checked.

- _corroborate_majority passes only with at least 2 answers (MIN_QUORUM_RESPONSES)
  and a strict majority of the answers; no other server configured, or fewer than
  2 answering, fails. ALLOW_NO_QUORUM=true keeps the old reduced rule.
- config.validate_quorum_servers, called from the lifespan after parse_endpoints,
  refuses to start with fewer than 2 fallback servers unless ALLOW_NO_QUORUM=true
  (which logs a warning at every start).
- Optional pinning: `host:port[:mode]:pin=<sha256>` per fallback and
  ELECTRUM_CERT_PIN for the primary; ElectrumClient compares the SHA-256 of the
  DER certificate after the TLS handshake and a mismatch fails like an unreachable
  server. A pin on a plaintext entry is a startup error.
- .env.example now ships the four bootstrap servers and documents both new
  variables; docs/setup.md, spec, storico and BUGS.md updated.
- Tests changed because the spec changed: the two "no other servers configured ->
  True" corroboration tests now assert that outcome only under allow_no_quorum.

Note: a dev .env with fewer than 2 fallback servers will now refuse to start.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-14 14:04:35 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 fd6a91e93d Give every round its own pool address (B-80, RND-35, DAT-60, DAT-11, REG-14, SEC-08, BET-12, RND-22, WDR-14, SEC-43, API-23, API-36) 
All bets of all rounds paid one address (m/84'/746'/0'/1/0), so its history
grew forever, other rounds' money and stray coins mixed with a round's own, and
the payout picked from everything it held.

- hd.py: derive_pool_key/derive_pool_address(round_id) on branch 2
  (m/84'/746'/0'/2/<round_id>); no argument is the reserve address 1/0.
  derive_round_pool_key checks the key against the address stored on the round,
  so a payout can never be signed for money its key does not control.
- rounds.pool_address (migration 477bddae1a84, existing rounds backfilled with
  the reserve address since that is where their bets went; add_column, not a
  batch alter, so the expression indexes stay): written in the transaction that
  inserts the round, once its id exists.
- place_bet pays round.pool_address; the payout reads, signs and takes change at
  the round's own address; own_address_for and bump_fee's _signing_context follow
  the round (confirmation poller and reconciler pass round_id).
- Withdrawals to any round pool address, the reserve address or fee_address are
  refused (withdrawal_to_platform_address, 400, all seven languages).
- GET /rounds/current and GET /admin/rounds expose pool_address.
- RND-22/DAT-11 stay "da implementare" for B-82: the payout still spends every
  confirmed coin at the round's address, not only the participants' outpoints
  (participants carry no bet_vout yet).
- tests/unit/conftest.py: every test now gets a throwaway master key. Opening a
  round derives an address, and tests that merely opened a round were silently
  reading the real key from the local .env.
- Existing tests changed because the spec changed: payout fixtures give their
  round a pool_address; the reconciler's address-cache test uses two payouts of
  one round (rows of different rounds no longer share an address);
  own_address_for now takes the round id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-14 13:52:32 +02:00
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 b424f670c5 Restructure docs: docs-first, SSOT, one ADR per decision 
- Add docs/README.md as the index of all documentation.
- Split the 52 DEC entries of decisioni-e-limiti.md into docs/adr/ADR-NN
  files (same numbers), add ADR-53 (audit log), TEMPLATE.md and an ADR index
  with a feature -> ADR table.
- Rename decisioni-e-limiti.md to limiti-noti.md (LIM only) and rewrite all
  DEC-nn references as links to the ADRs.
- Document the docs-first / SSOT / ADR rules in processo-di-modifica.md and
  map the docs in CLAUDE.md and README.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-14 12:05:57 +02:00