ccd15807ed534a1f7f4cf4e3658f4ff903a0f6fa
10
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
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ccd15807ed |
Drop a dust-sized change into the fee on an RBF bump and audit every refused bump (B-87, TX-11, TX-24, AUD-40, AUD-09, ADR-19)
`bump_fee` only required `change > fee delta`. A change at the 294 sat minimum (a full-balance
withdrawal) shrank to ~153 sat after the very first minimum bump, relay policy refuses a
replacement with a sub-dust output, and the bumper tried again every 30 seconds for ever, with
nothing but a log line to show for it.
- When what would be left of the reducible output (the user's change, a payout's bump
reserve) is under DUST_LIMIT_SATS the output is dropped and its whole value goes to the fee:
that replacement is valid and the last one possible. If the output does not exist, or even
its whole value is below BIP125's minimum increase (vsize x 1 sat/vB), RbfError. The
recorded fee rate uses the replacement's own, smaller, size.
- RbfError now carries a `reason` (`change_too_small`, `max_fee_rate`, `replacement_rejected`);
RbfBumper._record_failure writes one `rbf_bump_failed` row {pending_transaction_id, kind,
txid, reason, message[:200]} with the row's user_id/round_id, in a transaction of its own,
once per (current txid, reason) - the audit log is the dedupe clock (AUD-09) - and the pending
row is untouched. A new txid or a new reason writes a new row.
- bump_fee's docstring no longer cites the "bet without change" case that B-62 removed.
No existing test changed (all bumps they make leave a change well above dust). New
tests/unit/test_rbf_dust.py: the 294 sat case end to end (recipient untouched, whole change to
the fee, last bump impossible), the exact boundary (leaves 294 kept / leaves 293 dropped), a
change under the minimum increase, a payout's reserve dropped with the winner and fee outputs
byte-identical, and the audit rows for each reason, once per pair, new row on a new txid or
reason, round/user attribution. Mutation-checked: the dust test of the output and the
once-per-pair check each fail tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
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54dbffb552 |
Credit deposits at deposit_confirmations and verify the round's coins with the quorum before paying (B-82, DEP-03, DEP-04, DEP-09, DEP-12, DEP-14, ELC-17, ELC-27, RND-21, RND-22, RND-25, RND-39, DAT-10, DAT-11, DAT-24, DAT-62, DAT-67, DAT-68, AUD-12, AUD-44, AUD-45, API-30, API-31, API-36, ADR-06, ADR-52)
A user could bet and then double-spend the 1-conference deposit that funded the bet with a private chain: the bet left the chain but its participant stayed `confirmed`, and the payout failed "insufficient pool UTXOs" for ever with everyone else's money stuck. Coinbase outputs were also credited at 1 confirmation (maturity is 120). Deposits - `round_config.deposit_confirmations` (default 6, 1-100, editable from /admin) is the threshold for a deposit; an output of a platform transaction (any txid of a pending_transactions row, RBF versions included) keeps 1; a coinbase output needs 120, recognised from the raw transaction, which must hash to the txid (`is_coinbase`, cached). `read_deposit_policy` / `classify_new_deposits` run between the read and the write, so no session is open across the lookup. - The quorum must also place the coin deep enough on our own tip (ELC-17). - Confirmed outputs short of their threshold are pending deposits (memory only, replaced at every refresh): shown in `pending_balance_sats` / `has_pending` (also for DEP-13's withdrawal message), never spendable. No scripthash notification announces a maturing deposit, so each new block refreshes only the users that have one, one task per user (DEP-09 now says so). Payout - `_trigger_payout` verifies the round's confirmed participants' bet outputs with the other servers (`verify_pool_outpoints`: strict majority of >= 2 answers per outpoint, a mempool-only coin or a tie gives no verdict) and builds from exactly those outpoints (RND-22), never from whatever else sits at the address. No quorum: `payout_failed`, `pool verification unavailable`, nothing changes. Bets that are gone become `reorged_out`, one `participant_reorged_out` row each, `pool_amount_sats` rewritten (only downward) in the same transaction, and the 70/30 split is computed on what is left. - Winner's own bet gone: nothing is built; `rounds.payout_blocked_at` (Alembic f2c64a8d1e93, with `deposit_confirmations`, plain add_column) is set, `payout_blocked` and the pause with `paused_reason = 'payout_blocked'` are written in one transaction; `POST /admin/resume` clears the mark and the next attempt verifies again. /admin/rounds returns it. - Rounds opened before B-80 (pool = the shared reserve address) keep the old active-server `listunspent` choice, since that address holds no single round's bets. Ambiguities resolved: the winner's row stays `confirmed` while held (AUD-45 says every participant whose bet is gone becomes `reorged_out`, but OPS-30/DAT-68 need the verification to repeat after the resume, which only a `confirmed` row allows); `/`'s deposit hint no longer says "1 confirmation" (7 languages, same keys); guides updated. Tests changed because the spec changed: listener tests that credited height-100 coins at tip 0 now set a tip past every threshold; the payout fixtures seed confirmed participants (the new source of the inputs) instead of an active-server `listunspent`, FakeNetwork answers the verification, and test_round_pool_address asserts the quorum is asked about the round's address. New: thresholds at exactly 6/5, configured value, coinbase at 119/120 and a mismatching or missing raw tx, platform outputs at 1, dust, quorum height, waiting-deposit display and disappearance, block-triggered refresh, resume, verification verdicts, gone bets excluded with the split recomputed, winner gone held and paused, held payouts untouched until the resume, re-verification after it, no quorum, a payout with 1 and with 400 participants against reserve+fee+dust, admin config bounds and migration. Mutation-checked: threshold 1, ignored coinbase, no height bound, no verification and no winner hold each fail tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
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db24287ea5 |
Make the draw a commit-reveal at a fixed, confirmed, quorum-agreed height with a public proof (B-73, RND-14 … RND-20, RND-33 … RND-37, DAT-61 … DAT-66, API-25, API-45, AUD-24 … AUD-27, AUD-37, ELC-15, SEC-56, ADR-24, ADR-25)
The seed was the hash of the first block seen after the close, so a miner holding tickets
could withhold blocks until one made them win, the active Electrum server could pick which
real block was used by not announcing another (a failed corroboration even moved the draw to
the next block), and the participant order was the server-only `broadcast_at` with no
tie-break, so nobody could recompute the result.
- Open: every round gets a 32-byte `server_seed`, stored only Fernet-encrypted with the
master-xprv key (`server_seed_enc`), with its published `server_seed_hash`;
`draw_confirmations` is copied from round_config. The plaintext column is written only by
the reveal.
- Entering `drawing` (one transaction, `draw_committed` audit row): participants ordered by
bet txid, each `draw_position`, `participants_hash` (sha256 of `txid:vout:address\n`
lines; new `bet_vout`), `draw_height = tip_at_close + 1`. A tip of 0 keeps the round
`closing` (`draw_baseline_tip_unknown`, once per round). All persisted, so a resumed draw
reads rather than recomputes (the `_tick` branch itself is B-81).
- `_complete_draw` / `_wait_for_draw_block` replace `_wait_for_next_block`: wait for
`draw_confirmations` blocks from `draw_height`, then `ElectrumListener.agreed_block_hash`
asks every server, the active one included, for the header at that exact height (valid
work, >= 2 other answers, strict majority of all); no agreement means the same height is
asked again and `draw_header_corroboration_failed` is written once per distinct reported
hash. `draw_stalled` now counts from the last tip advance, or from when the quorum started
to fail. Seed = sha256(server_seed || block_hash || participants_hash), index = seed mod n.
- The winner, the seed and the reveal (`server_seed`, `winner_drawn` payload) are written in
one transaction; a round closing with no participants reveals too. A round opened before
this change (no commitment) is given a secret as it enters `drawing`.
- `GET /rounds/{id}/proof` (public, 404 `round_not_found`, translated in all 7 languages) and
the new fields on `GET /rounds/current`; `draw_confirmations` in `/admin/config` and the
/admin form; `server_seed_hash`/`draw_height` in `/admin/rounds`, never the secret.
- Alembic d3e8b15a7c42 (plain add_column / create_index, expression indexes untouched).
- Docs: the B-73 `*Stato:*`/`*Oggi:*` lines are gone, guides and CLAUDE.md describe the new
draw. Ambiguities resolved in api.md: the proof's participants also carry `amount_sats`
(RND-37 lists it); `seed` is decimal in the proof and hex in the audit row, as specified.
Tests changed because the spec changed: ElectrumListener.corroborate_header (asked only the
other servers about the block the active one announced) is replaced by agreed_block_hash and
its quorum tests ported; draw_winner takes the secret and the list fingerprint; the four
_wait_for_next_block scheduler tests are replaced by _wait_for_draw_block ones (fixed height,
confirmations, same-height retry, stall clock). New: test_draw_proof.py recomputes the winner
independently from the public proof, checks the plaintext secret is nowhere in the database,
the API or the log before the reveal, and that a second pass over a `drawing` round yields
the same winner. Mutation-checked: ordering by broadcast_at, an early reveal and asking the
tip instead of the draw height each fail tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
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50b68d2957 |
Follow and record chain reorganisations, pausing on deep ones (B-85, ELC-09, ELC-22, ELC-23, ELC-24, AUD-38, DAT-69)
A reorganisation was neither recorded nor acted upon, and a competing header at the tip's own height was ignored for as long as the tip stood, leaving the listener on an orphan. - A header at the height we hold with a different hash is followed through the same fork-point search as any other reorg (ELC-09) instead of being ignored; it still has to bring valid work and a connected chain. - ElectrumListener._record_reorg writes `chain_reorg_detected` (depth, fork height, old and new tip height and hash) before the window moves, so a failed write ends the session and the next server's announcement of the same fork is recorded then. Depth 1 is a transaction of its own; depth >= 2 also pauses the lottery with paused_reason 'reorg' and writes `lottery_paused` in the same transaction (begin_immediate first). - Docs: ELC-09/22/23/24, AUD-03/11/38, DAT-30/69, OPS-30, RND-04, ADR-26/52 lose their B-85 "da implementare" lines. Tests changed because the spec changed: test_apply_header_ignores_a_competing_header_at_ the_current_tip_height encoded the B-64 behaviour that ELC-09 now reverses; it is replaced by test_a_competing_header_at_the_tip_height_is_a_reorg_to_follow and the depth tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
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a3c51719bd |
Confirm transactions by merkle proof and reinstate coins only on a quorum (B-83, TX-06, TX-22, TX-23, ELC-25, ELC-26, DEP-02, DEP-08, AUD-18, ADR-07)
poll_once marked a transaction confirmed on one server's `height > 0`, and reinstate_reappeared_utxos restored a coin written off as spent outside the platform on the active server's word alone, so a hostile active server could report a never-relayed payout as confirmed (winner unpaid, round closed) or put a spent coin back into a balance. - electrum/merkle.py: pure merkle-branch verification against a block header. - ElectrumListener.confirmation_proven(txid, height): the *other* servers are asked for blockchain.transaction.get_merkle; a strict majority of at least the quorum minimum must return a proof that recomputes to the merkle root of that block's header (block height and position checked too). The header is the tip the listener holds, or for an older block the one a majority of the quorum agrees on and that meets its own target; a height above our tip cannot be proven. Quorum rules are _corroborate_majority's. - poll_once takes the listener as `network`: the active server's history only nominates a candidate (txid, height); the row confirms only when the proof holds, and stays pending otherwise. With no network nothing confirms. ConfirmationPoller wires it. - The reconciler's late-confirmation check of failed rows (B-78) now puts each claimed (txid, height) to the same proof instead of counting histories. - refresh_user splits reinstatement like a credit: find_reinstate_candidates (read-only; same outpoint, recorded amount, confirmed) -> corroborate_utxo_reinstatement (same quorum as a credit) -> reinstate_reappeared_utxos writes only what was corroborated, rechecking the mark under the lock. Nothing is committed in the read phase any more. - Broadcast fan-out, the third part of the finding, shipped with B-76. Tests changed because the spec changed: every poll_once call now passes a network that proves (FakeNetwork) — the confirmation tests are otherwise unchanged; the failed-row "quorum does not confirm" test now asserts the claim goes to the proof. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
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a4b160e240 |
Abandon a transaction only on proof, and keep watching failed rows (B-78, TX-15, TX-17, TX-23, TX-26, ELC-28, DAT-33, DAT-36, DAT-69, DAT-72, AUD-11, AUD-12, AUD-31, AUD-39, API-32)
reconcile_once abandoned a row when the *active* server's history lacked its txid:
after 120s for `building` (which a restart onto a different server makes likely),
after 6h for `pending`, and all at once after a forward clock jump. It re-checked the
status but not the txid, so it raced the bumper, and a `failed` row was never looked at
again.
- The reconciler asks every server (ElectrumListener.get_histories, active + others) for
the history of the row's address and looks for every txid of the row. Present on any
server -> promoted (adopting the version found). Absent is only "no server of the
quorum knows it" and needs the active server plus the quorum minimum of the others to
have answered; even then nothing is released without proof:
(a) an input spent in a block by a transaction that is none of the row's versions,
agreed by a strict majority of a quorum of the other servers (confirmed_spender), or
(b) a rebroadcast of the latest raw tx to every server (rebroadcast_everywhere)
refused by all of them, explicitly, for missing/spent inputs.
Accepted or "already known" by any server means alive; a fee refusal is not proof
(`building` -> `pending` for the bumper, `pending` untouched); too few answers or
anything else leaves the row alone. failure_reason names the proof.
- The write re-reads status *and* current_txid under begin_immediate (TX-26).
- pending_transactions.failed_at (set by _abandon and _release_failed_withdrawal) starts
a 14-day watch: a failed row that a majority of the other servers (at least the quorum
minimum) list in a block becomes `confirmed`, writes pending_tx_resurrected once and
pauses the lottery with paused_reason `resurrected_tx`; linked rows are not corrected.
The confirmation is by quorum of histories for now; merkle proofs come with B-83.
- round_config.paused_reason (migration b7d2e41c9a05, with the failed_at one): `operator`
from POST /admin/pause (which accepts an optional `note` and never overwrites an
automatic reason), cleared by resume, which logs the reason it lifted; exposed on
/admin/config and GET /rounds/current. rounds/pause.py:pause_automatically is the
system's way in.
- PendingTransactionReconciler takes the listener as `network`; with none it can promote
but never abandon.
Tests changed because the spec changed: the three reconciler tests that expect an
abandonment (and the one in test_tx_versions) now supply a network that proves the
transaction is gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
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2b6ddb019b |
Never roll back an ambiguous broadcast as if it had been refused (B-76, TX-04, TX-05, TX-20, TX-21, BET-16, BET-17, BET-23, WDR-11, WDR-12, WDR-16, API-13)
place_bet and request_withdrawal released everything on any exception from the broadcast, including the 15s timeout and a connection dropped after the write. The tx may have propagated: a bet's sats landed in the pool with no participant, a withdrawal left while its row said failed and its coins were spendable again. - client: ElectrumRpcError (subclass of ElectrumError) is raised only for a reply carrying a JSON-RPC `error`; timeouts, drops and write errors stay plain ElectrumError. - tx/outcome.py:broadcast_with_verdict sorts a broadcast into accepted / refused / uncertain. A refusal is verified first: ElectrumListener.transaction_known asks blockchain.transaction.get of the active server and every other one (10s each) — any server returning the tx means accepted; the active server plus MIN_QUORUM_RESPONSES others all denying it means refused (ALLOW_NO_QUORUM keeps the reduced rule); too few answers is uncertain. "already known" wording is only a shortcut that skips the check. With no network to ask, a refusal is uncertain. - place_bet / request_withdrawal / _trigger_payout use it: only a verified refusal releases; uncertain leaves the rows building for the reconciler, publishes SSE and POST /bets and POST /withdrawals answer 202 with status building; "already known" promotes a payout (payout_sent) like any accepted broadcast. - An accepted transaction is fanned out to every other server (ElectrumListener.fan_out_transaction, best effort, off the caller's path). The RBF replacement in bump_fee is left for B-77, which rewrites that function. Tests changed because the spec changed: the existing "refused broadcast" tests raised a bare RuntimeError (now an uncertain outcome) and are made explicit refusals (rpc_error) with a network that denies the tx; direct route calls pass a Response; FakePayoutListener gains the network surface. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
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b424f670c5 |
Restructure docs: docs-first, SSOT, one ADR per decision
- Add docs/README.md as the index of all documentation. - Split the 52 DEC entries of decisioni-e-limiti.md into docs/adr/ADR-NN files (same numbers), add ADR-53 (audit log), TEMPLATE.md and an ADR index with a feature -> ADR table. - Rename decisioni-e-limiti.md to limiti-noti.md (LIM only) and rewrite all DEC-nn references as links to the ADRs. - Document the docs-first / SSOT / ADR rules in processo-di-modifica.md and map the docs in CLAUDE.md and README.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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davideandClaude Opus 5.5
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4be58709d1 |
Complete the target spec for the 2026-09-28 review (B-73..B-98)
Finishes what
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davideandClaude Opus 5.5
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61efbb0e37 |
Replace flowchart/ with a traceable specification in docs/
The two Mermaid diagrams under flowchart/ described the intended flow but had drifted from the code and carried no link back to it. docs/ now holds the specification instead: 15 Italian documents (flows, architecture, data model, API, security, audit log, operations, decisions and limits, bug history) with 472 numbered requirements, each pointing at the function that implements it and the test that covers it. docs/processo-di-modifica.md defines the ID convention and the spec -> code -> test change workflow, and CLAUDE.md now names docs/ as authoritative. Writing the spec from the code also corrected stale claims in CLAUDE.md (B-41's get_history check, BUGS.md still tracking B-71/B-72, Cache-Control scope, the error contract's bare-string exceptions) and in the operator guides (payouts do retry, only `drawing` fails to resume, rounds do not open without fee_address). The B-70 doc test now pins the prose in docs/scommesse-e-prelievi.md instead of the deleted diagram. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |