daa85cf4f0161ccb435d2888b69b07a1ced78e9d
10
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
|
daa85cf4f0 |
Give every payout a bump reserve output and refuse configs that cannot pay a round (B-79, RND-21, RND-23, RND-24, RND-27, RND-38, RND-40, DAT-73, API-31, API-36, TX-11, ADR-17, ADR-29)
The pool normally holds exactly the round's bet outputs and the payout spent them all for exactly the pool amount, so it had no change output: bump_fee could never accelerate it, and a payout stuck in a mempool (never abandoned while a server knows it) kept the round in `paying_out` and the whole lottery stopped. - build_payout_transaction always has three outputs: winner, fee address, and a bump reserve of max(DUST_LIMIT_SATS, estimate_vsize(inputs, 3) * 10 sat/vB) paid to the reserve address m/84'/746'/0'/1/0. The reserve comes out of the platform's 30%, the network fee still out of the winner's 70%. Input value beyond winner share + commission (only rounds opened before the per-round pool address) is folded into the reserve output if >= dust, left to the network fee otherwise. `change_address` is replaced by `reserve_address`. - `rounds.bump_reserve_sats` (Alembic e5a91c3d7b26, plain add_column) is written with the payout intent before the broadcast; /admin/rounds returns it. - bump_fee takes the increase from the reserve output for a payout (_find_reducible_output; a payout already in flight with a change to the pool still falls back to that), never from the winner or fee-address outputs. - payout_config_problem / rounds_can_open (RND-40): a bet amount and fee rate under which a round of 1 or of MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND participants could not cover the network fee, the reserve and dust outputs opens no round (lottery_configured=false); PUT /admin/config refuses such a bet amount or fee rate with 422 config_not_payable, judged on the resulting values, since the payout reads the fee rate live. Ambiguity resolved: the reserve output and any excess input are one output (RND-23 says one output to the reserve address), and bump_reserve_sats records that output's initial value. DAT-22's "abandon clears all amounts" stays with B-96. Tests changed because the spec changed: the four test_payout_builder tests asserted the old two/three-output shape with change to the pool and the fee address receiving the whole 30%; the whitespace fee_address test now spells out the amounts rounds_can_open reads. New: reserve sizing, payout with 1 and with 400 participants (inputs = outputs + fee to the satoshi), exact commission/reserve/dust boundary, excess folded or left to the fee, a real payout bumped out of its reserve with the other outputs byte-identical and bumped five times, the old reserve-less shape still raising RbfError, the scheduler output addresses and recorded amounts, payability boundaries found independently by bisection, no round / unconfigured flag for an unpayable config, a round in progress surviving it, PUT /admin/config refusals and the migration column. Mutation-checked: dropping the reserve lookup in bump_fee and the payability check in rounds_can_open each fail tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
|
db24287ea5 |
Make the draw a commit-reveal at a fixed, confirmed, quorum-agreed height with a public proof (B-73, RND-14 … RND-20, RND-33 … RND-37, DAT-61 … DAT-66, API-25, API-45, AUD-24 … AUD-27, AUD-37, ELC-15, SEC-56, ADR-24, ADR-25)
The seed was the hash of the first block seen after the close, so a miner holding tickets
could withhold blocks until one made them win, the active Electrum server could pick which
real block was used by not announcing another (a failed corroboration even moved the draw to
the next block), and the participant order was the server-only `broadcast_at` with no
tie-break, so nobody could recompute the result.
- Open: every round gets a 32-byte `server_seed`, stored only Fernet-encrypted with the
master-xprv key (`server_seed_enc`), with its published `server_seed_hash`;
`draw_confirmations` is copied from round_config. The plaintext column is written only by
the reveal.
- Entering `drawing` (one transaction, `draw_committed` audit row): participants ordered by
bet txid, each `draw_position`, `participants_hash` (sha256 of `txid:vout:address\n`
lines; new `bet_vout`), `draw_height = tip_at_close + 1`. A tip of 0 keeps the round
`closing` (`draw_baseline_tip_unknown`, once per round). All persisted, so a resumed draw
reads rather than recomputes (the `_tick` branch itself is B-81).
- `_complete_draw` / `_wait_for_draw_block` replace `_wait_for_next_block`: wait for
`draw_confirmations` blocks from `draw_height`, then `ElectrumListener.agreed_block_hash`
asks every server, the active one included, for the header at that exact height (valid
work, >= 2 other answers, strict majority of all); no agreement means the same height is
asked again and `draw_header_corroboration_failed` is written once per distinct reported
hash. `draw_stalled` now counts from the last tip advance, or from when the quorum started
to fail. Seed = sha256(server_seed || block_hash || participants_hash), index = seed mod n.
- The winner, the seed and the reveal (`server_seed`, `winner_drawn` payload) are written in
one transaction; a round closing with no participants reveals too. A round opened before
this change (no commitment) is given a secret as it enters `drawing`.
- `GET /rounds/{id}/proof` (public, 404 `round_not_found`, translated in all 7 languages) and
the new fields on `GET /rounds/current`; `draw_confirmations` in `/admin/config` and the
/admin form; `server_seed_hash`/`draw_height` in `/admin/rounds`, never the secret.
- Alembic d3e8b15a7c42 (plain add_column / create_index, expression indexes untouched).
- Docs: the B-73 `*Stato:*`/`*Oggi:*` lines are gone, guides and CLAUDE.md describe the new
draw. Ambiguities resolved in api.md: the proof's participants also carry `amount_sats`
(RND-37 lists it); `seed` is decimal in the proof and hex in the audit row, as specified.
Tests changed because the spec changed: ElectrumListener.corroborate_header (asked only the
other servers about the block the active one announced) is replaced by agreed_block_hash and
its quorum tests ported; draw_winner takes the secret and the list fingerprint; the four
_wait_for_next_block scheduler tests are replaced by _wait_for_draw_block ones (fixed height,
confirmations, same-height retry, stall clock). New: test_draw_proof.py recomputes the winner
independently from the public proof, checks the plaintext secret is nowhere in the database,
the API or the log before the reveal, and that a second pass over a `drawing` round yields
the same winner. Mutation-checked: ordering by broadcast_at, an early reveal and asking the
tip instead of the draw height each fail tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
|
a4b160e240 |
Abandon a transaction only on proof, and keep watching failed rows (B-78, TX-15, TX-17, TX-23, TX-26, ELC-28, DAT-33, DAT-36, DAT-69, DAT-72, AUD-11, AUD-12, AUD-31, AUD-39, API-32)
reconcile_once abandoned a row when the *active* server's history lacked its txid:
after 120s for `building` (which a restart onto a different server makes likely),
after 6h for `pending`, and all at once after a forward clock jump. It re-checked the
status but not the txid, so it raced the bumper, and a `failed` row was never looked at
again.
- The reconciler asks every server (ElectrumListener.get_histories, active + others) for
the history of the row's address and looks for every txid of the row. Present on any
server -> promoted (adopting the version found). Absent is only "no server of the
quorum knows it" and needs the active server plus the quorum minimum of the others to
have answered; even then nothing is released without proof:
(a) an input spent in a block by a transaction that is none of the row's versions,
agreed by a strict majority of a quorum of the other servers (confirmed_spender), or
(b) a rebroadcast of the latest raw tx to every server (rebroadcast_everywhere)
refused by all of them, explicitly, for missing/spent inputs.
Accepted or "already known" by any server means alive; a fee refusal is not proof
(`building` -> `pending` for the bumper, `pending` untouched); too few answers or
anything else leaves the row alone. failure_reason names the proof.
- The write re-reads status *and* current_txid under begin_immediate (TX-26).
- pending_transactions.failed_at (set by _abandon and _release_failed_withdrawal) starts
a 14-day watch: a failed row that a majority of the other servers (at least the quorum
minimum) list in a block becomes `confirmed`, writes pending_tx_resurrected once and
pauses the lottery with paused_reason `resurrected_tx`; linked rows are not corrected.
The confirmation is by quorum of histories for now; merkle proofs come with B-83.
- round_config.paused_reason (migration b7d2e41c9a05, with the failed_at one): `operator`
from POST /admin/pause (which accepts an optional `note` and never overwrites an
automatic reason), cleared by resume, which logs the reason it lifted; exposed on
/admin/config and GET /rounds/current. rounds/pause.py:pause_automatically is the
system's way in.
- PendingTransactionReconciler takes the listener as `network`; with none it can promote
but never abandon.
Tests changed because the spec changed: the three reconciler tests that expect an
abandonment (and the one in test_tx_versions) now supply a network that proves the
transaction is gone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
|
2b6ddb019b |
Never roll back an ambiguous broadcast as if it had been refused (B-76, TX-04, TX-05, TX-20, TX-21, BET-16, BET-17, BET-23, WDR-11, WDR-12, WDR-16, API-13)
place_bet and request_withdrawal released everything on any exception from the broadcast, including the 15s timeout and a connection dropped after the write. The tx may have propagated: a bet's sats landed in the pool with no participant, a withdrawal left while its row said failed and its coins were spendable again. - client: ElectrumRpcError (subclass of ElectrumError) is raised only for a reply carrying a JSON-RPC `error`; timeouts, drops and write errors stay plain ElectrumError. - tx/outcome.py:broadcast_with_verdict sorts a broadcast into accepted / refused / uncertain. A refusal is verified first: ElectrumListener.transaction_known asks blockchain.transaction.get of the active server and every other one (10s each) — any server returning the tx means accepted; the active server plus MIN_QUORUM_RESPONSES others all denying it means refused (ALLOW_NO_QUORUM keeps the reduced rule); too few answers is uncertain. "already known" wording is only a shortcut that skips the check. With no network to ask, a refusal is uncertain. - place_bet / request_withdrawal / _trigger_payout use it: only a verified refusal releases; uncertain leaves the rows building for the reconciler, publishes SSE and POST /bets and POST /withdrawals answer 202 with status building; "already known" promotes a payout (payout_sent) like any accepted broadcast. - An accepted transaction is fanned out to every other server (ElectrumListener.fan_out_transaction, best effort, off the caller's path). The RBF replacement in bump_fee is left for B-77, which rewrites that function. Tests changed because the spec changed: the existing "refused broadcast" tests raised a bare RuntimeError (now an uncertain outcome) and are made explicit refusals (rpc_error) with a network that denies the tx; direct route calls pass a Response; FakePayoutListener gains the network surface. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
|
fd6a91e93d |
Give every round its own pool address (B-80, RND-35, DAT-60, DAT-11, REG-14, SEC-08, BET-12, RND-22, WDR-14, SEC-43, API-23, API-36)
All bets of all rounds paid one address (m/84'/746'/0'/1/0), so its history grew forever, other rounds' money and stray coins mixed with a round's own, and the payout picked from everything it held. - hd.py: derive_pool_key/derive_pool_address(round_id) on branch 2 (m/84'/746'/0'/2/<round_id>); no argument is the reserve address 1/0. derive_round_pool_key checks the key against the address stored on the round, so a payout can never be signed for money its key does not control. - rounds.pool_address (migration 477bddae1a84, existing rounds backfilled with the reserve address since that is where their bets went; add_column, not a batch alter, so the expression indexes stay): written in the transaction that inserts the round, once its id exists. - place_bet pays round.pool_address; the payout reads, signs and takes change at the round's own address; own_address_for and bump_fee's _signing_context follow the round (confirmation poller and reconciler pass round_id). - Withdrawals to any round pool address, the reserve address or fee_address are refused (withdrawal_to_platform_address, 400, all seven languages). - GET /rounds/current and GET /admin/rounds expose pool_address. - RND-22/DAT-11 stay "da implementare" for B-82: the payout still spends every confirmed coin at the round's address, not only the participants' outpoints (participants carry no bet_vout yet). - tests/unit/conftest.py: every test now gets a throwaway master key. Opening a round derives an address, and tests that merely opened a round were silently reading the real key from the local .env. - Existing tests changed because the spec changed: payout fixtures give their round a pool_address; the reconciler's address-cache test uses two payouts of one round (rows of different rounds no longer share an address); own_address_for now takes the round id. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
|
b424f670c5 |
Restructure docs: docs-first, SSOT, one ADR per decision
- Add docs/README.md as the index of all documentation. - Split the 52 DEC entries of decisioni-e-limiti.md into docs/adr/ADR-NN files (same numbers), add ADR-53 (audit log), TEMPLATE.md and an ADR index with a feature -> ADR table. - Rename decisioni-e-limiti.md to limiti-noti.md (LIM only) and rewrite all DEC-nn references as links to the ADRs. - Document the docs-first / SSOT / ADR rules in processo-di-modifica.md and map the docs in CLAUDE.md and README.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
|
7ba8e22bb4 |
Real SQLite transactions: BEGIN IMMEDIATE and synchronous=FULL (B-88, DAT-74, DAT-52, ARC-07, TX-28, BET-11, DAT-16)
pysqlite's legacy mode emitted BEGIN only at the first DML, so every read before it ran outside any transaction and a lock wait surfaced as "database is locked" at an arbitrary later statement; place_bet also mistook that error for a write-snapshot conflict, which SQLite cannot produce. - _register_sqlite_pragmas: synchronous=FULL, isolation_level=None and a `begin` event that emits BEGIN / BEGIN IMMEDIATE. - begin_immediate(session): takes the write lock before the first read; called first thing in place_bet, request_withdrawal, the scheduler transitions, _trigger_payout, the confirmation poller, the reconciler, bump_fee's persist phase, deposit crediting / external-spend marking / reinstating, and the derivation-index allocation at registration. - A lock not granted before a broadcast answers service_busy (503, all seven languages), nothing built or sent; after a broadcast nothing is undone, the rows stay `building` for the reconciler. - Spec, storico, BUGS.md and CLAUDE.md updated; 37 new tests on a real file DB. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
davideandClaude Opus 5.5
|
4be58709d1 |
Complete the target spec for the 2026-09-28 review (B-73..B-98)
Finishes what
|
||
|
davideandClaude Sonnet 5
|
88221b0dbd |
Document the 2026-09-28 specification review and its fixes (B-73..B-97)
Fourth full audit, run against the docs/ specification instead of the code alone, found logical flaws rooted in PLM's small hashrate (~22 TH/s): a minable draw, no distinction between "never broadcast" and "unknown if broadcast", an Electrum client that degrades as the pool address's history grows, and 1-confirmation deposits on a chain where a reorg is rentable. The spec now describes the target behaviour for every finding, marked *Stato:* da implementare (B-nn) with an *Oggi:* line for what the code does now; docs/piano-correzioni.md records the design decisions and the implementation order. No code changed — this is spec-only, per B-nn convention when a bug reveals the spec itself was incomplete. Also documents, as an accepted-but-open risk (LIM-24), that the optional jackpot cap (max_round_pool_sats) isn't tied to the cost of a 51% attack — deferred, not decided. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
davideandClaude Opus 5.5
|
61efbb0e37 |
Replace flowchart/ with a traceable specification in docs/
The two Mermaid diagrams under flowchart/ described the intended flow but had drifted from the code and carried no link back to it. docs/ now holds the specification instead: 15 Italian documents (flows, architecture, data model, API, security, audit log, operations, decisions and limits, bug history) with 472 numbered requirements, each pointing at the function that implements it and the test that covers it. docs/processo-di-modifica.md defines the ID convention and the spec -> code -> test change workflow, and CLAUDE.md now names docs/ as authoritative. Writing the spec from the code also corrected stale claims in CLAUDE.md (B-41's get_history check, BUGS.md still tracking B-71/B-72, Cache-Control scope, the error contract's bare-string exceptions) and in the operator guides (payouts do retry, only `drawing` fails to resume, rounds do not open without fee_address). The B-70 doc test now pins the prose in docs/scommesse-e-prelievi.md instead of the deleted diagram. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |