Compare commits
12
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
025754c860 | ||
|
|
99d7a1ee00 | ||
|
|
e5af15087c | ||
|
|
a384b08044 | ||
|
|
ee4e845c89 | ||
|
|
977bb762c7 | ||
|
|
fe909bedcf | ||
|
|
9207bbcb8f | ||
|
|
5cfe2d6f95 | ||
|
|
0d2fef6502 | ||
|
|
e7f844b11f | ||
|
|
4c80c1c5bf |
No files matched your search
@@ -1,75 +1,368 @@
|
||||
# Known bugs
|
||||
# BUGS.md — audit of 2026-08-03
|
||||
|
||||
A second full-codebase audit on 2026-07-27 found **25 further issues** (4 critical, 6 high,
|
||||
7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-48 … B-49. B-25 through B-47 are fixed (see "Previously
|
||||
fixed" below) — no Critical-, High- or Medium-severity finding remains open; the remaining 2 are
|
||||
Low/hygiene. The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so none of these were caught
|
||||
by existing coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the twenty-three fixes so far
|
||||
brought the suite from 139 to 248).
|
||||
Third full-codebase audit, opened after the 2026-07-26 (B-01 … B-24) and
|
||||
2026-07-27 (B-25 … B-49) lists were emptied. Numbering continues from the last
|
||||
fixed finding, B-51.
|
||||
|
||||
The recurring pattern across the open findings is worth stating once: the code is rigorous
|
||||
about the failure modes that have actually been hit, and silent about the ones that have not.
|
||||
The payout phase is now fully recoverable; the "drawing" phase (waiting on a block) is now
|
||||
observable (B-36) but still has no equivalent resume-after-restart — see "Known gaps / TODO"
|
||||
in [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md), which is also where other by-design limitations (single-shared-token
|
||||
admin auth, single-process assumptions, no user-facing history, etc.) are documented.
|
||||
Nothing in this list is fixed yet — it is the analysis pass only. Per CLAUDE.md's
|
||||
convention each entry gets its own commit with its own regression test, and the
|
||||
`B-nn` marker goes in a comment next to the fix so `git log --all --grep 'B-nn'`
|
||||
finds it later.
|
||||
|
||||
State of the tree at audit time: 264 unit tests, all passing; `tests/integration/`
|
||||
still empty; withdrawal and the RBF bump path still never live-broadcast.
|
||||
|
||||
Verified as *not* broken while looking for these: i18n key parity (146 identical
|
||||
keys across all 7 languages), HTML escaping of every user-controlled value in
|
||||
`admin.js`, the Alembic chain (linear, single head, matching `models.py`),
|
||||
strictly-integer satoshi arithmetic everywhere, and `.gitignore` coverage of
|
||||
secrets/DB/logs (nothing sensitive is tracked in git).
|
||||
|
||||
Severity is about consequence, not likelihood:
|
||||
**critical** = money stuck or lost, or the lottery stops;
|
||||
**high** = a security control that does not hold;
|
||||
**medium** = wrong behaviour with a bounded blast radius;
|
||||
**low** = drift between documentation and code.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Low / hygiene
|
||||
## Critical
|
||||
|
||||
### B-48 — No cap on input count in `select_utxos`
|
||||
### B-52 — a round with more than ~50 participants deadlocks the platform permanently — **FIXED**
|
||||
|
||||
A user with hundreds of small UTXOs builds a huge transaction whose fee — deducted from the bet
|
||||
amount — materially erodes their contribution to the pool, and it can exceed standardness
|
||||
limits.
|
||||
**Fix:** cap the selected inputs (e.g. 50) and fail with a translatable error suggesting a
|
||||
consolidation, or consolidate the address automatically when the count crosses a threshold.
|
||||
`app/wallet/psbt_builder.py:42` (`MAX_TX_INPUTS = 50`),
|
||||
`app/rounds/scheduler.py:349-373`.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-49 — Rollback paths do not publish an SSE update
|
||||
Every confirmed bet leaves exactly one UTXO on the pool address, and the payout's
|
||||
selection target is `winner_share + commission`, i.e. the whole pool — so it needs
|
||||
*all* n bet UTXOs as inputs. At n ≥ 51 `select_utxos` raises `too_many_inputs`,
|
||||
`_trigger_payout` records `payout_failed`, and `_retry_payout_if_due` re-attempts
|
||||
every 60 s forever. The round stays `paying_out`, so `open_new_round_if_needed`
|
||||
never opens another round: the lottery halts, the pool is unspendable through the
|
||||
normal path, and the only way out is a manual consolidation with the pool key.
|
||||
|
||||
`bets/service.py:_release_failed_bet` and `withdrawals/service.py:_release_failed_withdrawal`
|
||||
restore the balance without calling `broadcaster.publish()`, so dashboards only find out on
|
||||
their next poll.
|
||||
**Fix:** one `broadcaster.publish()` at the end of each, as every other state-changing path
|
||||
already does.
|
||||
CLAUDE.md presents B-48's input cap purely as a fragmented *user* address problem.
|
||||
The pool case is structural rather than an edge case: participant count alone
|
||||
causes it, with the default bet amount and no unusual deposit pattern.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fixed** by moving the limit from where it was *discovered* to where it can still be
|
||||
*enforced*:
|
||||
|
||||
- `select_utxos` takes the cap as a parameter. Bets and withdrawals keep
|
||||
`MAX_TX_INPUTS = 50` (a user-protection limit: the fee comes out of the amount
|
||||
they are moving); the payout uses the new `MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS = 500`, since the
|
||||
pool's UTXO count is just the number of bets and the fee comes out of a 70% share
|
||||
of the whole pool. 500 inputs is ~34 kvB, about a third of the 100 kvB relay
|
||||
standardness budget; signing that many costs ~0.4 s of event loop, once per round,
|
||||
in a background task.
|
||||
- `place_bet` refuses the bet past `MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND = 400` with a new
|
||||
`round_full` error (400, translated into all 7 languages), counting every
|
||||
participant row rather than only the confirmed ones. The cap sits below the input
|
||||
cap so the payout keeps headroom for pool change accumulated by earlier rounds.
|
||||
|
||||
The invariant is now "a round can always be paid out", enforced before any of the
|
||||
401st player's money moves. A round already wedged with 51–499 participants pays out
|
||||
by itself on the next `_retry_payout_if_due` tick.
|
||||
|
||||
Not addressed, and deliberately so: periodic pool consolidation, which is what would
|
||||
be needed to go beyond this order of magnitude (see the audit discussion — it needs a
|
||||
new PendingTransaction kind, must not run mid-round, and would force the payout math
|
||||
to tolerate a pool short of its exact target). Raising these two constants covers
|
||||
anything up to ~1400 participants first.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-53 — a bet can pay into the pool and still be left out of the draw
|
||||
|
||||
`app/bets/service.py:80-92`, `app/rounds/scheduler.py:101-129`.
|
||||
|
||||
`place_bet` commits its participant row as `building` *before* broadcasting
|
||||
(the deliberate two-phase write of B-08). The scheduler counts in-flight
|
||||
participants in one session and then reads the `confirmed` participants in a
|
||||
second, separate session. A bet that passed `round_accepts_bets` just before the
|
||||
deadline can commit its phase-1 row *between* those two queries: the count saw
|
||||
zero, so the round draws and pays out, while the new row — not yet `confirmed` —
|
||||
is excluded from `participants`. The bet then confirms normally and its sats land
|
||||
in the pool address, credited to no round and to no participant. There is no
|
||||
refund path, and the money silently improves the *next* round's payout change.
|
||||
|
||||
The window is one task switch wide, but both queries do real DB I/O, so it is
|
||||
reachable rather than theoretical.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix directions: re-check the in-flight count inside the same transaction that
|
||||
snapshots the participants (and abort the close if it is non-zero), or make the
|
||||
deadline authoritative at the row level so a bet cannot commit against a round
|
||||
whose timer has expired.
|
||||
|
||||
### (not new) `drawing` does not resume after a restart
|
||||
|
||||
Already tracked as an accepted gap in CLAUDE.md's "Known gaps", not re-numbered
|
||||
here. Worth restating in context: with `restart: unless-stopped` on the app
|
||||
container, this is the one state that gets stuck with money in play, and it
|
||||
remains the last prerequisite for running unattended.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Previously fixed
|
||||
## High — security
|
||||
|
||||
- **B-25** — the payout had no two-phase write, unlike bets and withdrawals
|
||||
- **B-26** — a payout failure or a process restart could wedge a round in `paying_out` forever
|
||||
- **B-27** — an RBF bump reset the reconciler's own abandon clock, so a repeatedly-bumped tx was never abandoned
|
||||
- **B-28** — a hostile Electrum server (or a MITM) could single-handedly pick the round's winner
|
||||
- **B-29** — a UTXO absent from one server's `listunspent` was marked spent immediately, irreversibly, on a single unauthenticated reply
|
||||
- **B-30** — a lost scripthash subscription meant a user's deposits were never credited, with no periodic safety net
|
||||
- **B-31** — resubscribing on reconnect ran serially before anything else started, freezing the chain tip (and so an in-flight draw) for the whole sweep
|
||||
- **B-42** — Swagger/ReDoc/the raw OpenAPI JSON enumerated the entire API surface, admin endpoints included, to anyone who requested them; now off by default and gated behind `ENABLE_API_DOCS`
|
||||
- **B-43** — the Caddyfile sent no CSP, no `X-Frame-Options`/`frame-ancestors`, and no HSTS, on a page whose JWT lives in `localStorage`
|
||||
- **B-44** — README's Quick start documented a bare `uvicorn --reload` workflow, and `docs/running-the-server.md` still had a matching "Locale / venv" section, both contradicting CLAUDE.md's Docker-only policy
|
||||
- **B-45** — `/admin/rounds`/`/admin/audit-log`'s `limit` had no bounds (`-1` means "everything" on SQLite), and `/admin/pending-transactions` had no limit or status filter at all
|
||||
- **B-46** — `secrets.compare_digest` on a `str` raises `TypeError` on non-ASCII input, turning an invalid admin token with non-ASCII characters into a 500 instead of a 403
|
||||
- **B-47** — `raw_tx_hex` and `payload_json` were unbounded `String` columns (`VARCHAR` with no length) — fine on SQLite/PostgreSQL, rejected by backends like MySQL that require a length
|
||||
- **B-32** — an RBF bump could retry forever below BIP125's relay-mandated minimum fee delta, with no ceiling on the fee rate either
|
||||
- **B-33** — `POST /auth/login` had no rate limiting, so a password could be brute-forced against an enumerable username list
|
||||
- **B-34** — password change/reset didn't invalidate already-issued JWTs, so a stolen token survived a change meant to lock it out
|
||||
- **B-35** — API timestamps round-tripped as naive datetimes, so the frontend parsed them as local time instead of UTC
|
||||
- **B-36** — a stalled draw wait had no timeout, no log, and no audit trail, so a frozen round showed nothing in `/admin`
|
||||
- **B-37** — a withdrawal covered by unconfirmed change answered "insufficient balance" instead of distinguishing it from actually having no funds
|
||||
- **B-38** — the SSE subscriber cap was global, so one client opening enough connections degraded every other user to polling
|
||||
- **B-39** — SQLite ran without WAL or a `busy_timeout`, so a writer could block every reader and a second writer failed immediately instead of waiting
|
||||
- **B-40** — `bump_fee` held a DB session open across N slow network calls, and computed a prevout's value from a server-reported float instead of an exact integer
|
||||
- **B-41** — confirmation/reconciliation depended on a verbose `blockchain.transaction.get` reply many Electrum servers reject, and abandonment relied on fragile substring-matching of an error message
|
||||
### B-54 — `X-Forwarded-For` is trusted blindly, so every IP-keyed control is bypassable
|
||||
|
||||
See git history for the fix-by-fix breakdown (commits `f13f685`, `50a43ae`, `933760e`, and the
|
||||
B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33/B-34/B-35/B-36/B-37/B-38/B-39/B-40/B-41/B-42/B-43/B-44/B-45/B-46/B-47 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 248 tests over the twenty-three.
|
||||
`app/api/client_ip.py:14-17`, `Caddyfile`.
|
||||
|
||||
A full-codebase audit on 2026-07-26 (commit `d4e0974`) found 24 bugs across every Python
|
||||
module under `app/`, both static frontends, and the Docker/Caddy deployment — 5 critical,
|
||||
7 high, 7 medium, 5 low. All 24 were fixed and verified against the current code on
|
||||
2026-07-27; the fixes are covered by the regression suite (grew from 79 to 139 tests) and
|
||||
five of them were additionally confirmed against a real mainnet deployment (see git history
|
||||
between `fb734bb` (documenting the findings) and `845ba98` (recording the audit outcome) for
|
||||
the fix-by-fix breakdown — each commit message names the bugs it closes and where their
|
||||
tests live).
|
||||
`client_ip()` returns `xff.split(",")[0]`. Caddy's `reverse_proxy` *appends* the
|
||||
real peer address to an incoming `X-Forwarded-For` rather than replacing it, so
|
||||
the first element is whatever the client sent. Rotating a fake value per request
|
||||
defeats `login_ip`, `register_ip` (B-33) and the per-IP SSE subscriber cap
|
||||
(B-38) outright; only the per-username login bucket still bites.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: take the *last* element of the header, or force it at the proxy with
|
||||
`header_up X-Forwarded-For {remote_host}` and keep reading element 0. The proxy-side
|
||||
fix is the more robust of the two, since it makes the app's assumption true.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-55 — Argon2 hashing runs on the event loop
|
||||
|
||||
`app/auth/security.py:20-39`, called from `app/auth/routes.py` and
|
||||
`app/api/routes/users.py`.
|
||||
|
||||
`hash_password`/`verify_password` are synchronous and cost tens of milliseconds
|
||||
each, so every login, registration and password change blocks the whole process —
|
||||
including all six background tasks (scheduler, confirmation poller, RBF bumper,
|
||||
listener, both reconcilers). A burst of unauthenticated login attempts (which,
|
||||
per B-54, is not effectively throttled) is a cheap denial of service that also
|
||||
delays draws and confirmations.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: run both through `starlette.concurrency.run_in_threadpool`.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-56 — `RateLimiter._buckets` is never pruned
|
||||
|
||||
`app/auth/rate_limit.py:37`.
|
||||
|
||||
The dict grows without bound, keyed by attacker-chosen strings (arbitrary
|
||||
usernames, and — via B-54 — arbitrary IPs). `decay_seconds` ages a bucket's
|
||||
*counter* but never removes the entry.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: evict entries whose last failure is older than `decay_seconds` (opportunistically
|
||||
on `record_failure`, or on a periodic sweep), and cap the dict size.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-57 — username matching is case-sensitive while the login throttle key is not
|
||||
|
||||
`app/auth/routes.py:126` (`body.username.lower()`) vs `:132`
|
||||
(`User.username == body.username`).
|
||||
|
||||
Two consequences: `Bob` and `bob` are separate accounts sharing a single rate-limit
|
||||
bucket (one locks the other out), and registration happily accepts near-duplicate
|
||||
usernames, which is an impersonation vector on a custodial system.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: make username uniqueness case-insensitive (store a normalized form, or a
|
||||
functional unique index) and key the throttle on the same normalized value.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-58 — the registration throttle counts successes as failures and is IP-only
|
||||
|
||||
`app/auth/routes.py:66-71`.
|
||||
|
||||
`record_failure` is called on every registration attempt, successful ones
|
||||
included. Five legitimate signups from one shared/NAT address lock the sixth real
|
||||
user out with exponential backoff up to 600 s — while an attacker skips the limiter
|
||||
entirely through B-54. The intent (bounding accounts per source) is reasonable;
|
||||
the current shape punishes only honest users. The inline comment also cites B-31
|
||||
(the resubscribe finding) where it means B-33.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: keep an accounts-per-IP quota if that is the goal, but express it as a quota
|
||||
rather than as failure backoff, and fix the B-nn reference.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-59 — deposit crediting is not corroborated, unlike external-spend detection
|
||||
|
||||
`app/deposits/service.py:31-45`, `app/electrum/listener.py:401-433`.
|
||||
|
||||
A candidate external spend is corroborated across the other configured servers
|
||||
before it can reduce a balance (B-29), but `value` and `height` for a *credit*
|
||||
are taken from the single active connection with no cross-check. A hostile or
|
||||
broken server can inflate a user's displayed balance with outpoints that do not
|
||||
exist. The blast radius is bounded — a bet or withdrawal built on a phantom UTXO
|
||||
is refused at broadcast and the rollback releases it — but it wedges the user's
|
||||
balance display and burns build attempts.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: either corroborate credits the same way (symmetry with B-29), or record the
|
||||
asymmetry explicitly as an accepted risk in CLAUDE.md with its bound stated.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-60 — `POST /admin/bug-reports/{id}/status` writes no audit entry
|
||||
|
||||
`app/api/routes/admin.py:404-419`.
|
||||
|
||||
Every other admin mutation (config edit, pause/resume, privkey export, password
|
||||
reset) is audit-logged. This one is not, so a report can be silently marked
|
||||
`resolved` with no trace — and with one shared `ADMIN_TOKEN` and no per-admin
|
||||
identity, the audit log is the only accountability there is.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Medium — correctness and robustness
|
||||
|
||||
### B-61 — config edits apply retroactively to the round already in progress
|
||||
|
||||
`app/rounds/scheduler.py:71`, `app/rounds/service.py:51-61`,
|
||||
`app/api/routes/admin.py:106-128`.
|
||||
|
||||
`round_duration_seconds` is read live on every tick and on every bet check, and the
|
||||
deadline is computed as `opened_at + duration`. Lowering it from 600 to 60 while a
|
||||
round is 300 s in closes that round instantly; raising it moves the `closes_at`
|
||||
clients are already counting down to. `round_cooldown_seconds` has the same
|
||||
property for the gap after a close.
|
||||
|
||||
B-11 fixed exactly this class of problem for `bet_amount_sats` (an in-progress
|
||||
round's advertised jackpot must not move when an operator edits the bet amount);
|
||||
the timing fields were left live.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: snapshot the duration (and cooldown) onto the `Round` row when it opens and
|
||||
read them from there, leaving the config row as the value for the *next* round.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-62 — "withdraw the full amount" reliably produces an unbumpable transaction
|
||||
|
||||
`app/static/app.js:798-807`, `app/wallet/psbt_builder.py:138-141`,
|
||||
`app/tx/broadcast.py:150-152`.
|
||||
|
||||
The max-amount checkbox sends `amount_sats == myBalanceSats == total_in`, so
|
||||
`change == 0`, the change output is dropped, and the tx has a single output. `bump_fee`
|
||||
then finds no change output to absorb the increase and raises `RbfError` every 30 s
|
||||
until the reconciler abandons the row six hours later. The RBF single-change-output
|
||||
limitation is a documented gap, but the UI makes it the *default* withdrawal path
|
||||
rather than a corner case (the same applies to an exact-amount bet).
|
||||
|
||||
Fix directions: leave a change output above `DUST_LIMIT_SATS` when the requested
|
||||
amount would consume the whole input total (i.e. reserve a little), or warn in the
|
||||
UI that a full-balance withdrawal cannot be fee-bumped, or implement the
|
||||
extra-input RBF fallback.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-63 — `tip_height == 0` window right after connecting can seed a draw from a pre-close block
|
||||
|
||||
`app/electrum/listener.py:160-167`, `app/rounds/scheduler.py:153`.
|
||||
|
||||
`_run_once` assigns `self.client` *before* `subscribe_headers()` returns, so there
|
||||
is a window in which the client looks alive while `tip_height` is still 0 and
|
||||
`tip_header_hex` is `None`. A `_close_and_draw` entering that window records
|
||||
`tip_at_close = 0`, and the first header applied — the current tip, a block mined
|
||||
*before* the round closed — satisfies `tip_height > tip_at_close` and becomes the
|
||||
draw's entropy. The draw must use a block that did not exist at close time; a block
|
||||
whose hash was already public before betting closed is not the guarantee the
|
||||
flowchart describes.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: publish `self.client` only after the first header has been applied, or refuse
|
||||
to draw while `tip_header_hex is None` / `tip_height == 0`.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-64 — `_apply_header` accepts a same-height header without the chaining check
|
||||
|
||||
`app/electrum/listener.py:271-296`.
|
||||
|
||||
The chain check only runs for `height == self.tip_height + 1`. A header at exactly
|
||||
the current tip height replaces `tip_header_hex` after passing only the
|
||||
self-target check — which, as the docstring of `header_meets_its_own_target`
|
||||
already notes, a server can satisfy with a self-declared easy target. Separately,
|
||||
a header with no `hex` field sets `tip_header_hex = None`, discarding a tip we
|
||||
otherwise accepted.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: treat a same-height header as either ignorable or as a reorg signal rather
|
||||
than silently replacing the entropy source, and don't clear `tip_header_hex` on a
|
||||
hex-less notification.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-65 — `/rounds/current` counts unconfirmed participants; the draw and payout do not
|
||||
|
||||
`app/api/routes/rounds.py:131-143` vs `app/rounds/scheduler.py:126`.
|
||||
|
||||
`participant_count` and `jackpot_sats` are computed over *all* `round_participants`
|
||||
rows, while the draw and the payout only use `status == "confirmed"`. So the
|
||||
advertised jackpot can exceed what is actually paid out, and a participant whose
|
||||
bet is later abandoned appears in the count and then vanishes from it.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: either count only `confirmed` (and accept that a fresh bet takes a block to
|
||||
show up), or expose the two figures separately (confirmed vs in-flight) so the
|
||||
number on screen and the number that gets paid agree by construction.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-66 — nothing stops rounds from opening with no `fee_address` configured
|
||||
|
||||
`app/rounds/config.py:12-17`, `app/rounds/scheduler.py:330-335`.
|
||||
|
||||
A fresh instance starts with `fee_address = ""`. Rounds open, bets are accepted and
|
||||
confirm, and only then does the payout refuse to build — leaving the round in
|
||||
`paying_out`, retrying every 60 s, with the audit log as the only signal.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: refuse to open a round while `fee_address` is unset (and surface it on
|
||||
`/admin` and as a maintenance-style banner), so the failure happens before anyone's
|
||||
money is committed.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-67 — `/qr/{address}` is unauthenticated, synchronous and only shape-validated
|
||||
|
||||
`app/api/routes/qr.py:11-21`.
|
||||
|
||||
`qrcode.make` runs on the event loop, so the endpoint is a cheap CPU amplifier for
|
||||
an unauthenticated caller, and the regex accepts any `plm1[a-z0-9]{10,90}` string
|
||||
without validating the bech32 checksum — so it happily renders a QR for a
|
||||
non-address.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: validate with `is_valid_plm_address` (already used by withdrawals and by the
|
||||
admin `fee_address` validator), and either offload the render or cache it per
|
||||
address.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Low — documentation and consistency drift
|
||||
|
||||
### B-68 — CLAUDE.md and README describe a state the code has moved past
|
||||
|
||||
- CLAUDE.md's tech-stack line still says JWT has **no revocation (B-34)**; `token_version`
|
||||
implements exactly that revocation (`app/db/models.py:29`, `app/auth/dependencies.py:26`).
|
||||
- "Known gaps" still says **no rate limiting anywhere (B-33)**; login and registration
|
||||
are throttled (`app/auth/rate_limit.py`). What is genuinely still unthrottled is
|
||||
bets, withdrawals and the admin endpoints — that is the claim worth keeping.
|
||||
- "Known gaps" still says **`/report-bug` is a placeholder**; it is fully implemented
|
||||
and translated, with admin triage. Only `/guida` is still a stub.
|
||||
- Test counts are stale in three places: 264 actual, CLAUDE.md says 253 twice,
|
||||
README says 232.
|
||||
- The code map omits `app/auth/rate_limit.py`, `app/api/client_ip.py` and
|
||||
`app/api/routes/bug_reports.py`.
|
||||
- README links `flowchart.mmd`, which does not exist (the diagrams live in
|
||||
`flowchart/`), describes `docs/running-the-server.md` as covering "local venv vs.
|
||||
Docker" (that workflow was removed in B-44), and links the anchor
|
||||
`CLAUDE.md#tech-stack-mvp`, which no longer exists.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-69 — stale in-code comments
|
||||
|
||||
- `app/tx/reconcile.py:206` calls the payout retry "a future payout-retry routine —
|
||||
still an open gap"; it exists (B-26).
|
||||
- `app/db/base.py:9` says "five concurrent background tasks"; there are six.
|
||||
- `app/auth/routes.py:31` cites B-31 where it means B-33 (see B-58).
|
||||
|
||||
### B-70 — the flowchart's WITHDRAW precondition is not implemented as written
|
||||
|
||||
`flowchart/platform-overview.mmd:39` (node E1) states a withdrawal cannot happen
|
||||
together with a bet in progress. The code only serializes the *builds* through the
|
||||
per-user lock (`app/tx/locks.py`): a withdrawal is accepted while a bet is still
|
||||
unconfirmed, as long as confirmed UTXOs cover it.
|
||||
|
||||
CLAUDE.md declares every node and edge label of the diagrams a behaviour that must
|
||||
be implemented as described, so one of the two has to move — most likely the
|
||||
diagram, since the lock already prevents the actual double-spend hazard, but that
|
||||
is a decision, not a cleanup.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-71 — `.env` points `MASTER_KEY_PATH` at a second copy of the master key
|
||||
|
||||
CLAUDE.md's deployment section prescribes pointing `MASTER_KEY_PATH` at the
|
||||
host-side `./data/keys/master.xprv.enc` so the venv scripts and the container read
|
||||
one file. `.env` instead sets `./master.xprv.enc`, and both files now exist in the
|
||||
working tree (both gitignored). They were verified during this audit to decrypt to
|
||||
the *same* xprv, so nothing has diverged yet — but `scripts/decrypt_master_key.py`
|
||||
reads a different file from the one the container uses, and a future
|
||||
`generate_master_key.py --overwrite` would split them silently, with an ops
|
||||
recovery path that then reports the wrong key.
|
||||
|
||||
The same duplication exists for the database (`./plm_lottery.db` next to
|
||||
`data/db/plm_lottery.db`), which is less dangerous but equally confusing.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix: set `MASTER_KEY_PATH=./data/keys/master.xprv.enc` in `.env`, delete the stray
|
||||
root copy once confirmed redundant, and state the same for `DATABASE_URL`.
|
||||
|
||||
### B-72 — `docs/setup.md` still frames setup as "locally or via Docker"
|
||||
|
||||
`docs/setup.md:1-10` lists Python as a prerequisite "for the local/venv workflow"
|
||||
and describes the master-key step as local *or* Docker, while B-44 made Docker the
|
||||
only supported way to run the server (`docs/running-the-server.md` and README were
|
||||
updated, this file was not). The venv genuinely is needed for tests, migrations and
|
||||
the key scripts — the wording just needs to say that instead of implying a second
|
||||
way to run the server.
|
||||
@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@ The user communicates in Italian in chat — reply to them in Italian. Everythin
|
||||
|
||||
## Project status
|
||||
|
||||
All 10 stages of the original build order are code-complete and unit-tested — 185 tests, all under `tests/unit/` (`tests/integration/` is an empty package). Beyond them: Docker + Caddy deployment, admin dashboard (`/admin`), static test UI (`/`), pending-inclusive balance display, an SSE push channel layered over the original polling, self-service password change + admin password reset, and the reconciliation/corroboration machinery below.
|
||||
All 10 stages of the original build order are code-complete and unit-tested — 253 tests, all under `tests/unit/` (`tests/integration/` is an empty package). Beyond them: Docker + Caddy deployment, admin dashboard (`/admin`), static test UI (`/`), pending-inclusive balance display, an SSE push channel layered over the original polling, self-service password change + admin password reset, and the reconciliation/corroboration machinery below.
|
||||
|
||||
Verified on mainnet with real money: registration + address derivation, deposit crediting (1-conf), a real 10 PLM bet (broadcast → confirmed → change credited back), and one full round cycle (close → draw on a real block hash → 70/30 payout with sat math checked against the broadcast tx → confirmation → close → next round auto-opened). **Withdrawal and the RBF bump path have never been exercised against a live broadcast** — unit-tested only.
|
||||
|
||||
**Read [BUGS.md](BUGS.md) before trusting any behaviour here.** Two audits: 2026-07-26 found 24 bugs (5 critical), all fixed; 2026-07-27 found 25 more (B-25 … B-49), of which **2 are still open** — no Critical, High or Medium remains, only Low/hygiene: no cap on input count in `select_utxos` (B-48) and rollback paths not publishing an SSE update (B-49). BUGS.md is the live open list with a proposed fix per finding; "Known gaps" at the end of this file is for limitations accepted **by design** instead. Don't fix a BUGS.md item silently as a side effect of other work — each fix lands with its own regression test.
|
||||
Two full-codebase audits — 2026-07-26 (24 findings, 5 critical) and 2026-07-27 (25 more, B-25 … B-49) — are **all fixed** as of 2026-07-27, each with its own regression test. They were tracked in a `BUGS.md` that was deleted once the list emptied, so the ~276 `B-nn` markers left in comments across the code are pointers into git history (`git log --all --grep 'B-nn'` finds the commit that fixed one, and `git show f1a1145:BUGS.md`-style the file as it stood). A closed list is not the same as no bugs: the suite is unit-only (`tests/integration/` is empty), and withdrawal and the RBF bump have never been live-broadcast. "Known gaps" at the end of this file is for limitations accepted **by design** instead. A new finding gets the next B-nn, in its own commit with its own regression test.
|
||||
|
||||
Before writing code, read the "Architecture" section below in full plus the diagrams in [flowchart/](flowchart/): [platform-overview.mmd](flowchart/platform-overview.mmd) (the 5-phase flow) and [round-lifecycle.mmd](flowchart/round-lifecycle.mmd) (the round/draw lifecycle). Every node **and edge label** (conditions, retries, loops) is a behaviour that must be implemented as described. Regenerate the companion PDFs with `flowchart/render-pdf.sh <file>.mmd` after editing either.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ PYTHONPATH=. python scripts/decrypt_master_key.py # ops recovery: decrypt+pr
|
||||
PYTHONPATH=. python scripts/encrypt_master_key.py # ops bootstrap: import an externally-generated xprv (--overwrite to replace)
|
||||
PYTHONPATH=. python scripts/electrum_smoke_test.py # manual check: connect, handshake, subscribe to headers, print the tip
|
||||
|
||||
python -m pytest # all 185 tests
|
||||
python -m pytest # all 253 tests
|
||||
python -m pytest tests/unit/test_hd.py # one file
|
||||
python -m pytest tests/unit/test_hd.py::test_derivation_is_deterministic # one test
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ Source of truth: the `PalladiumWallet` repo — [ChainProfiles.cs](../PalladiumW
|
||||
| Min deposit | none | — |
|
||||
| Min password length | 8 | `auth/security.py:MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH` |
|
||||
| Confirmations, every tx kind | **1** | hardcoded in `tx/confirmation.py` |
|
||||
| Max inputs per *user* tx (bet, withdrawal) | 50 (`MAX_TX_INPUTS`, B-48) — over it the build fails with `too_many_inputs`, it never spends more | hardcoded in `wallet/psbt_builder.py` |
|
||||
| Max inputs per *payout* | 500 (`MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS`, B-52) — the pool holds one UTXO per bet, so reusing the user cap made any round past ~50 players unpayable | hardcoded in `wallet/psbt_builder.py` |
|
||||
| Max participants per round | 400 (`MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND`, B-52) — the 401st bet is refused with `round_full` *before* any money moves, so "a round can always be paid out" is an invariant rather than something discovered at payout time | hardcoded in `wallet/psbt_builder.py`, enforced in `bets/service.py` |
|
||||
|
||||
`GET /rounds/current`'s `jackpot_sats` is the winner's 70% share, not the whole pool, and the pool is summed from the participants' actual `bet_amount_sats` (each already net of its own bet fee) rather than `count × current bet amount` — editing the bet amount mid-round must not move an in-progress round's advertised jackpot (B-11).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -149,7 +152,7 @@ Diagrams: [platform-overview.mmd](flowchart/platform-overview.mmd), [round-lifec
|
||||
|
||||
**DEP** — the listener subscribes to the user's scripthash; balance is credited after **1 confirmation**, with the 1-conf reorg risk knowingly accepted and no rollback logic. `deposits/service.py` also detects UTXOs that vanished (spent outside the platform — corroborated per B-29 first) and *reinstates* ones that reappear.
|
||||
|
||||
**PLAY** — fixed cost, **at most one active bet per user**. PSBT user-address → pool-address, always with a **change output back to the same user address** (a user's balance must never exactly equal the bet). Fee ~1 sat/vB, **deducted from the bet amount**. No confirmation within the timeout → RBF bump and rebroadcast.
|
||||
**PLAY** — fixed cost, **at most one active bet per user**, and **at most `MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND` (400) players per round** — past that the bet is refused with `round_full` and the player waits for the next round (B-52: the payout must spend one pool UTXO per bet, so a round is only ever allowed to grow to what a single payout tx can drain). PSBT user-address → pool-address, always with a **change output back to the same user address** (a user's balance must never exactly equal the bet). Fee ~1 sat/vB, **deducted from the bet amount**. No confirmation within the timeout → RBF bump and rebroadcast.
|
||||
|
||||
**DRAW** — configurable timer (default 600s):
|
||||
- *Bet cutoff is the round's own deadline* (`opened_at + round_duration_seconds`), **not** the DB status: `place_bet` calls `rounds/service.round_accepts_bets`, which rejects once the deadline passes even while `status` is still `"open"` (the 5s scheduler tick can lag behind it). Once a round leaves `open`, no new bets either, and no new round opens until this one is fully `closed`.
|
||||
@@ -180,7 +183,7 @@ At 120s blocks that's ~4–6 min worst case (last bet confirms right at the dead
|
||||
|
||||
`GET /rounds/stream` is **additive to** the polling loops in the two SPAs, not a replacement — a blocked or dropped stream just degrades to the old behaviour. No payload, no auth: it's a "something changed, go refetch" ping, with all personalization (e.g. `user_played`) staying in the authenticated REST endpoints. The generator re-checks `request.is_disconnected()` every 5s and sends a keep-alive comment every 20s, so neither a client that vanished without a clean close nor a proxy idle timeout breaks it silently.
|
||||
|
||||
`rounds/events.py`'s `RoundEventBroadcaster` (singleton `broadcaster`) is in-process pub/sub, one `asyncio.Queue(maxsize=1)` per client so redundant notifications coalesce. `publish()` is called on: a round opening (`rounds/service.py`), every status transition (`scheduler.py`), a bet or withdrawal broadcast, any pending tx confirming (`tx/confirmation.py`), a deposit credited (`deposits/service.py`), and a new tip arriving (`electrum/listener.py` — exactly what the drawing phase waits on). Rollback paths are the known exception (B-49).
|
||||
`rounds/events.py`'s `RoundEventBroadcaster` (singleton `broadcaster`) is in-process pub/sub, one `asyncio.Queue(maxsize=1)` per client so redundant notifications coalesce. `publish()` is called on: a round opening (`rounds/service.py`), every status transition (`scheduler.py`), a bet or withdrawal broadcast, any pending tx confirming (`tx/confirmation.py`), a deposit credited (`deposits/service.py`), and a new tip arriving (`electrum/listener.py` — exactly what the drawing phase waits on). The rollback paths (`_release_failed_bet`, `_release_failed_withdrawal`, the reconciler's abandon) publish too — a rollback moves as much state as the success path, so it must ping the dashboards the same way (B-49).
|
||||
|
||||
Deliberate scope limits, not oversights: **single-process only** (fine for one uvicorn process; a multi-worker deployment needs e.g. Redis pub/sub — don't add it speculatively); **generic broadcast, not per-user** (everyone refetches on every event; acceptable at ~100 concurrent users, and a targeted channel would need auth on the stream plus server-side knowledge of who each event affects); `MAX_SUBSCRIBERS` (500) is defensive only — past it the endpoint returns 503 and `EventSource` falls back to polling, which being global and unauthenticated makes the cap itself a cheap DoS of the realtime feature (B-38).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -209,12 +212,13 @@ Two static SPAs served directly by FastAPI (`main.py` mounts `app/static/` and a
|
||||
|
||||
Both talk to the same JSON API; there's no admin/user API split beyond `require_admin`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Internationalization (`/` only)
|
||||
## Internationalization (`/` and `/report-bug`)
|
||||
|
||||
`app/static/i18n.js` holds every user-facing string of `/` in 7 languages (en, it, es, fr, de, ru, zh) as one flat `TRANSLATIONS` table — no build step, no fetch, loaded before `app.js` so `t()` is always available. Language: `localStorage.plm_lang` → `navigator.language` → `en`. The switcher sits in the **chain-bar, not the navbar**, deliberately: the navbar is hidden until login, which would leave the landing page and login form untranslatable for exactly the users who need it.
|
||||
`app/static/i18n.js` holds every user-facing string of `/` and `/report-bug` in 7 languages (en, it, es, fr, de, ru, zh) as one flat `TRANSLATIONS` table — no build step, no fetch. `/` loads it before `app.js`; `/report-bug` loads it before its own inline script — either way `t()` is always available by the time it's called. Language: `localStorage.plm_lang` → `navigator.language` → `en`, shared across both pages since they read/write the same `localStorage` key. On `/` the switcher sits in the **chain-bar, not the navbar**, deliberately: the navbar is hidden until login, which would leave the landing page and login form untranslatable for exactly the users who need it. `/report-bug` has no navbar at all, so its switcher is just a top-right bar of its own.
|
||||
|
||||
- Static markup is translated by attribute (`data-i18n`, plus `-html`, `-placeholder`, `-title`, `-aria-label`, `-alt`) via `applyStaticTranslations(root?)`; anything rendered from server data uses `t()` in `app.js` and is re-rendered by `onLanguageChange()`. An element belongs to one camp or the other, **never both**, or the two mechanisms overwrite each other — that's why `#bet-btn` has no `data-i18n`: its label carries the configurable bet amount, so `renderBetButton()` owns it.
|
||||
- Static markup is translated by attribute (`data-i18n`, plus `-html`, `-placeholder`, `-title`, `-aria-label`, `-alt`) via `applyStaticTranslations(root?)`; anything rendered from server data uses `t()` directly (`app.js`'s `onLanguageChange()`, `report-bug.html`'s own inline equivalent) and is re-rendered on a language switch. An element belongs to one camp or the other, **never both**, or the two mechanisms overwrite each other — that's why `#bet-btn` has no `data-i18n`: its label carries the configurable bet amount, so `renderBetButton()` owns it.
|
||||
- **Every language must have exactly the same key set.** There is no fallback beyond `en`; a missing key renders as the raw key string.
|
||||
- `/report-bug`'s `bugReport.englishNotice` string is itself translated into all 7 languages — it just always *says*, in whichever language the visitor reads, to write the actual bug description in English (so the admin panel, which is Italian-operator-facing and untranslated, doesn't end up with reports in 7 different languages).
|
||||
- `/admin` is intentionally untranslated (operator-facing, Italian), as is `/guida`.
|
||||
|
||||
**API error contract** (`app/api/errors.py`) — the API is single-language by design. Failures answer with a structured `detail`: `{"code", "message", "params"}`, where `message` is English for non-dashboard consumers and `code` is what the frontend maps to `error.<code>` in `i18n.js` (falling back to `message` for an unknown code). `BetError`/`WithdrawalError` subclass `ApiError` and carry the code from where the failure happens. Even the catch-all 500 handler answers in that shape (`internal_error`), so clients never special-case unexpected errors, and the exception text stays in `logs/app.log`. Adding a user-facing error: give it a code, add `error.<code>` to all 7 languages, and pass values through `params` (amounts as `*_sats` — the frontend derives a `*_plm` sibling) instead of baking them into English text.
|
||||
@@ -233,7 +237,7 @@ Explicit design choices, not derivable from any single file — respect them:
|
||||
|
||||
## Known gaps / TODO
|
||||
|
||||
Accepted **by design**. For actual bugs see [BUGS.md](BUGS.md) (2 open) — not duplicated here.
|
||||
Accepted **by design** — distinct from the audit findings above (all fixed), which are not duplicated here.
|
||||
|
||||
- **`drawing` doesn't resume after a restart.** `_tick()` handles `open`, `closing` and `paying_out` (the last via `_retry_payout_if_due`); nothing re-enters `_wait_for_next_block` after a crash. That wait is unbounded by design (the draw's entropy genuinely depends on a future block) but no longer silent — past `_DRAW_STALL_THRESHOLD_SECONDS` it logs progress and writes a `draw_stalled` audit entry, and `GET /rounds/current`'s `draw_waiting_since` surfaces it live (B-36). Restart-resumption itself remains the last prerequisite for running unattended.
|
||||
- **RBF handles one shape only**: a single change output, back to the tx's own sender, big enough to absorb the increase. No extra-input fallback — an exact-amount tx or too-small change raises `RbfError`. Not permanent, though: an unbumpable tx that never confirms is eventually abandoned and its UTXOs released.
|
||||
|
||||
+72
-1
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ from app.api.timeutil import isoformat_utc
|
||||
from app.audit.log import write_audit_log
|
||||
from app.auth.security import hash_password
|
||||
from app.config import settings
|
||||
from app.db.models import AuditLog, PendingTransaction, Round, User
|
||||
from app.db.models import AuditLog, BugReport, PendingTransaction, Round, User
|
||||
from app.db.session import get_session
|
||||
from app.rounds.config import get_round_config
|
||||
from app.wallet.address import is_valid_plm_address
|
||||
@@ -346,3 +346,74 @@ async def list_pending_transactions(
|
||||
)
|
||||
for p in entries
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_BUG_REPORT_STATUSES = ("open", "read", "resolved")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AdminBugReportResponse(BaseModel):
|
||||
id: int
|
||||
description: str
|
||||
contact: str | None
|
||||
user_id: int | None
|
||||
username: str | None
|
||||
status: str
|
||||
created_at: str
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _bug_report_response(report: BugReport, username: str | None) -> AdminBugReportResponse:
|
||||
return AdminBugReportResponse(
|
||||
id=report.id,
|
||||
description=report.description,
|
||||
contact=report.contact,
|
||||
user_id=report.user_id,
|
||||
username=username,
|
||||
status=report.status,
|
||||
created_at=isoformat_utc(report.created_at),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get(
|
||||
"/bug-reports", response_model=list[AdminBugReportResponse], dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)]
|
||||
)
|
||||
async def list_bug_reports(
|
||||
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session), limit: int = Query(default=200, ge=1, le=500)
|
||||
) -> list[AdminBugReportResponse]:
|
||||
reports = (await session.scalars(select(BugReport).order_by(BugReport.id.desc()).limit(limit))).all()
|
||||
user_ids = {r.user_id for r in reports if r.user_id is not None}
|
||||
usernames = {}
|
||||
if user_ids:
|
||||
users = (await session.scalars(select(User).where(User.id.in_(user_ids)))).all()
|
||||
usernames = {u.id: u.username for u in users}
|
||||
|
||||
return [
|
||||
_bug_report_response(r, usernames.get(r.user_id) if r.user_id is not None else None)
|
||||
for r in reports
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class BugReportStatusUpdate(BaseModel):
|
||||
status: str = Field(pattern="^(open|read|resolved)$")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post(
|
||||
"/bug-reports/{report_id}/status",
|
||||
response_model=AdminBugReportResponse,
|
||||
dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)],
|
||||
)
|
||||
async def update_bug_report_status(
|
||||
report_id: int, body: BugReportStatusUpdate, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)
|
||||
) -> AdminBugReportResponse:
|
||||
report = await session.get(BugReport, report_id)
|
||||
if report is None:
|
||||
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, "bug report not found")
|
||||
|
||||
report.status = body.status
|
||||
await session.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
username = None
|
||||
if report.user_id is not None:
|
||||
user = await session.get(User, report.user_id)
|
||||
username = user.username if user is not None else None
|
||||
|
||||
return _bug_report_response(report, username)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
|
||||
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, status
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import select
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
|
||||
|
||||
from app.api.timeutil import isoformat_utc
|
||||
from app.auth.dependencies import get_current_user, get_optional_user
|
||||
from app.db.models import BugReport, User
|
||||
from app.db.session import get_session
|
||||
|
||||
router = APIRouter(prefix="/bug-reports", tags=["bug-reports"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class BugReportCreate(BaseModel):
|
||||
description: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=2000)
|
||||
contact: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=256)
|
||||
|
||||
@field_validator("description")
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def _description_not_blank(cls, value: str) -> str:
|
||||
value = value.strip()
|
||||
if not value:
|
||||
raise ValueError("description must not be blank")
|
||||
return value
|
||||
|
||||
@field_validator("contact")
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def _contact_stripped(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
if value is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
value = value.strip()
|
||||
return value or None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class BugReportResponse(BaseModel):
|
||||
id: int
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.post("", response_model=BugReportResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
|
||||
async def create_bug_report(
|
||||
body: BugReportCreate,
|
||||
user: User | None = Depends(get_optional_user),
|
||||
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
|
||||
) -> BugReportResponse:
|
||||
report = BugReport(
|
||||
description=body.description,
|
||||
contact=body.contact,
|
||||
user_id=user.id if user is not None else None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
session.add(report)
|
||||
await session.commit()
|
||||
return BugReportResponse(id=report.id)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class MyBugReportResponse(BaseModel):
|
||||
id: int
|
||||
description: str
|
||||
status: str
|
||||
created_at: str
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@router.get("/mine", response_model=list[MyBugReportResponse])
|
||||
async def list_my_bug_reports(
|
||||
user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
|
||||
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
|
||||
) -> list[MyBugReportResponse]:
|
||||
"""The one user-facing history view for bug reports (anonymous submissions have
|
||||
no user to attribute this to, so this only ever covers ones filed while logged in)."""
|
||||
reports = (
|
||||
await session.scalars(
|
||||
select(BugReport).where(BugReport.user_id == user.id).order_by(BugReport.id.desc())
|
||||
)
|
||||
).all()
|
||||
return [
|
||||
MyBugReportResponse(
|
||||
id=r.id, description=r.description, status=r.status, created_at=isoformat_utc(r.created_at)
|
||||
)
|
||||
for r in reports
|
||||
]
|
||||
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from app.db.models import RoundParticipant, User
|
||||
from app.db.session import get_session
|
||||
from app.rounds.config import get_round_config
|
||||
from app.rounds.events import EVICTED, RoundEventCapacityError, broadcaster
|
||||
from app.rounds.service import get_active_round
|
||||
from app.rounds.service import get_active_round, winner_share
|
||||
|
||||
router = APIRouter(prefix="/rounds", tags=["rounds"])
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ async def current_round(
|
||||
# upper bound by the payout tx's own fee, which is deducted from the winner's
|
||||
# share and isn't knowable until the payout is built — a few hundred sat on a
|
||||
# 1 sat/vB payout, i.e. invisible at PLM amounts, but it is not exact.
|
||||
jackpot_sats = pool_amount_sats * 70 // 100
|
||||
jackpot_sats = winner_share(pool_amount_sats)
|
||||
|
||||
return CurrentRoundResponse(
|
||||
server_time=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
|
||||
|
||||
+34
-3
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
||||
|
||||
from embit import script
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import select
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import func, select
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
|
||||
|
||||
from app.api.errors import ApiError
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +13,13 @@ from app.rounds.events import broadcaster
|
||||
from app.rounds.service import open_new_round_if_needed, round_accepts_bets
|
||||
from app.wallet.balance import recompute_balance
|
||||
from app.wallet.hd import derive_pool_address, derive_user_key
|
||||
from app.wallet.psbt_builder import BuiltTransaction, InsufficientFundsError, Utxo, build_signed_transaction
|
||||
from app.wallet.psbt_builder import (
|
||||
MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND,
|
||||
BuiltTransaction,
|
||||
InsufficientFundsError,
|
||||
Utxo,
|
||||
build_signed_transaction,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class BetError(ApiError):
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +43,26 @@ async def place_bet(session: AsyncSession, client: ElectrumClient, user: User) -
|
||||
if already_playing is not None:
|
||||
raise BetError("already_betting", "you already have an active bet in the current round")
|
||||
|
||||
# B-52: "this round can always be paid out" is an invariant, and this is where it
|
||||
# gets enforced — before any of this user's money moves. The payout has to spend
|
||||
# one pool UTXO per bet, so a round that grew past what a single payout
|
||||
# transaction may spend was unpayable: it stayed "paying_out" retrying forever,
|
||||
# and because no new round may open while one is active, the whole lottery
|
||||
# stopped. Refusing the bet costs the player one round of waiting; accepting it
|
||||
# cost everyone the platform. Counted over every participant row, not just the
|
||||
# confirmed ones: a bet that later fails frees a slot, so counting them all is
|
||||
# the conservative direction.
|
||||
participant_count = await session.scalar(
|
||||
select(func.count()).select_from(RoundParticipant).where(RoundParticipant.round_id == round_.id)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if participant_count >= MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND:
|
||||
raise BetError(
|
||||
"round_full",
|
||||
f"this round already has its maximum of {MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND} players, "
|
||||
"wait for the next one",
|
||||
max_participants=MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
bet_amount = config.bet_amount_sats
|
||||
|
||||
unspent = (
|
||||
@@ -62,7 +88,7 @@ async def place_bet(session: AsyncSession, client: ElectrumClient, user: User) -
|
||||
fee_rate_sat_vb=config.fee_rate_sat_vb,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except InsufficientFundsError as exc:
|
||||
raise BetError(exc.code, str(exc)) from exc
|
||||
raise BetError(exc.code, str(exc), **exc.params) from exc
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Phase 1: record the intent, *then* broadcast (B-08) --------------------
|
||||
# Broadcasting first meant a failure (or a crash) between the broadcast and the
|
||||
@@ -144,6 +170,11 @@ async def _release_failed_bet(
|
||||
user_id=user_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
await session.commit()
|
||||
# The rollback moved as much state as the successful path did — the balance is
|
||||
# back, the participant is gone, so participant_count and jackpot shrank again.
|
||||
# Without this the dashboards kept showing the phantom bet until their next poll
|
||||
# (B-49); the reconciler's own abandon path has always published here.
|
||||
broadcaster.publish()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _pending_transaction(
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -188,6 +188,24 @@ class Withdrawal(Base):
|
||||
confirmed_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(default=None)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class BugReport(Base):
|
||||
__tablename__ = "bug_reports"
|
||||
|
||||
id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(primary_key=True)
|
||||
description: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text)
|
||||
contact: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(256), default=None)
|
||||
# Set when the reporter was logged in at submission time; the report page is
|
||||
# reachable both logged-in and logged-out (like GET /rounds/current), so this
|
||||
# stays nullable rather than requiring auth just to file a report.
|
||||
user_id: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(ForeignKey("users.id"), default=None)
|
||||
# open -> read -> resolved, admin-driven (app/api/routes/admin.py). "read" is a
|
||||
# distinct step from "resolved" so a reporter checking their own status (only
|
||||
# possible when logged in — see GET /bug-reports/mine) can tell "an admin has
|
||||
# seen this" apart from "this has actually been fixed".
|
||||
status: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(16), default="open")
|
||||
created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(default=utcnow)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuditLog(Base):
|
||||
__tablename__ = "audit_log"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+3
-1
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import app.rounds.confirmation # noqa: F401 (registers the "payout" confirmati
|
||||
import app.withdrawals.confirmation # noqa: F401 (registers the "withdrawal" confirmation handler)
|
||||
from app.api.routes.admin import router as admin_router
|
||||
from app.api.routes.bets import router as bets_router
|
||||
from app.api.routes.bug_reports import router as bug_reports_router
|
||||
from app.api.routes.qr import router as qr_router
|
||||
from app.api.routes.rounds import router as rounds_router
|
||||
from app.api.routes.users import router as users_router
|
||||
@@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ def _make_electrum_client(endpoint: ElectrumEndpoint) -> ElectrumClient:
|
||||
|
||||
@asynccontextmanager
|
||||
async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
|
||||
# Refuses to serve rather than starting up half-configured — see B-15 in BUGS.md.
|
||||
# Refuses to serve rather than starting up half-configured (B-15).
|
||||
validate_runtime_secrets()
|
||||
|
||||
endpoints = parse_endpoints(
|
||||
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ app.include_router(users_router)
|
||||
app.include_router(bets_router)
|
||||
app.include_router(withdrawals_router)
|
||||
app.include_router(admin_router)
|
||||
app.include_router(bug_reports_router)
|
||||
app.include_router(qr_router)
|
||||
app.include_router(rounds_router)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+14
-7
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ from app.electrum.scripthash import address_to_scripthash
|
||||
from app.rounds.config import get_round_config
|
||||
from app.rounds.draw import draw_winner, header_hex_to_block_hash
|
||||
from app.rounds.events import broadcaster
|
||||
from app.rounds.service import open_new_round_if_needed
|
||||
from app.rounds.service import open_new_round_if_needed, winner_share
|
||||
from app.wallet.hd import derive_pool_key
|
||||
from app.wallet.plm_network import PLM_MAINNET
|
||||
from app.wallet.psbt_builder import InsufficientFundsError, Utxo, build_payout_transaction
|
||||
@@ -338,8 +338,8 @@ class RoundScheduler:
|
||||
await self._log_payout_failure(round_id, winner_user_id, "winner user not found")
|
||||
return
|
||||
|
||||
winner_share = pool_amount_sats * 70 // 100
|
||||
commission_share = pool_amount_sats - winner_share # remainder from rounding goes to fees
|
||||
winner_sats = winner_share(pool_amount_sats)
|
||||
commission_share = pool_amount_sats - winner_sats # remainder from rounding goes to fees
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Phase 2: build (network read only, no DB write yet) -----------------
|
||||
try:
|
||||
@@ -358,15 +358,22 @@ class RoundScheduler:
|
||||
from_script=pool_script_obj,
|
||||
utxos=utxos,
|
||||
winner_address=winner_address,
|
||||
winner_share_sats=winner_share,
|
||||
winner_share_sats=winner_sats,
|
||||
fee_address=fee_address,
|
||||
commission_sats=commission_share,
|
||||
change_address=pool_address,
|
||||
fee_rate_sat_vb=fee_rate,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except InsufficientFundsError:
|
||||
logger.exception("round %s payout failed: insufficient pool UTXOs", round_id)
|
||||
await self._log_payout_failure(round_id, winner_user_id, "insufficient pool UTXOs")
|
||||
except InsufficientFundsError as exc:
|
||||
# Includes the "too_many_inputs" case: the pool holds enough, but spread over
|
||||
# more UTXOs than one transaction may spend, so /admin has to say which. Since
|
||||
# B-52 that means MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS, and participants are capped below it at
|
||||
# bet time (bets/service.py), so reaching it now takes pool change accumulated
|
||||
# over many rounds rather than one busy round — an operator consolidation job,
|
||||
# not a dead end for the bets of the round in progress.
|
||||
reason = "insufficient pool UTXOs" if exc.code == "insufficient_balance" else exc.code
|
||||
logger.exception("round %s payout failed: %s", round_id, reason)
|
||||
await self._log_payout_failure(round_id, winner_user_id, reason)
|
||||
return
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Anything else — a malformed fee_address (EmbitError) or similar. This
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,6 +18,14 @@ _ACTIVE_STATUSES = ("open", "closing", "drawing", "paying_out")
|
||||
# broken in a way we don't anticipate.
|
||||
_OPEN_ROUND_ATTEMPTS = 3
|
||||
|
||||
# 70% winner / 30% fees. Hardcoded by design (see CLAUDE.md) — changing the split
|
||||
# is a code change, not an admin-editable setting. Single source of truth so the
|
||||
# advertised jackpot (rounds.py) and the actual payout (scheduler.py) can't diverge.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def winner_share(pool_amount_sats: int) -> int:
|
||||
return pool_amount_sats * 70 // 100
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def get_active_round(session: AsyncSession) -> Round | None:
|
||||
"""The round currently in progress (in any non-closed state), if any. Rounds
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ table { width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; font-size: 0.85rem; }
|
||||
th, td { text-align: left; padding: 8px 6px; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--color-border); vertical-align: top; }
|
||||
th { color: var(--color-muted-foreground); font-weight: 500; }
|
||||
td.addr, td.txid { font-family: 'Fira Code', monospace; word-break: break-all; max-width: 200px; }
|
||||
td.payload-cell { max-width: 360px; white-space: pre-wrap; word-break: break-word; }
|
||||
.table-wrap { overflow-x: auto; }
|
||||
|
||||
.badge {
|
||||
@@ -144,6 +145,13 @@ td.addr, td.txid { font-family: 'Fira Code', monospace; word-break: break-all; m
|
||||
background: #FEF3C7; color: #92400E; border-color: #F59E0B;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.badge.bug-status-open { background: #FEF3C7; color: #92400E; border-color: #F59E0B; }
|
||||
.badge.bug-status-read { background: var(--color-background); color: var(--color-muted-foreground); }
|
||||
.badge.bug-status-resolved { background: var(--color-success-bg); color: var(--color-success); border-color: var(--color-success); }
|
||||
|
||||
.bug-actions { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 6px; margin-top: 6px; }
|
||||
.bug-actions button { width: auto; margin-top: 0; min-height: 30px; padding: 4px 10px; font-size: 0.78rem; }
|
||||
|
||||
button.reveal {
|
||||
width: auto; margin-top: 0; padding: 4px 10px; min-height: 30px; font-size: 0.78rem;
|
||||
background: var(--color-destructive-bg); color: var(--color-destructive); border: 1px solid var(--color-destructive);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
|
||||
<span class="nav-tab" id="nav-round" onclick="switchView('round')">Round</span>
|
||||
<span class="nav-tab" id="nav-pending" onclick="switchView('pending')">Transazioni pendenti</span>
|
||||
<span class="nav-tab" id="nav-audit" onclick="switchView('audit')">Audit log</span>
|
||||
<span class="nav-tab" id="nav-bugreports" onclick="switchView('bugreports')">Segnalazioni bug</span>
|
||||
<span class="spacer"></span>
|
||||
<span class="chain-status-pill">
|
||||
<span class="status-dot" id="chain-status-dot"></span>
|
||||
@@ -153,6 +154,22 @@
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="view" id="view-bugreports">
|
||||
<h2 class="section-title">Segnalazioni bug</h2>
|
||||
<p class="hint">Segnalazioni inviate dagli utenti tramite la pagina "Segnala un bug".</p>
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="card">
|
||||
<div class="table-wrap">
|
||||
<table>
|
||||
<thead>
|
||||
<tr><th>ID</th><th>Descrizione</th><th>Contatto</th><th>Utente</th><th>Quando</th><th>Stato</th></tr>
|
||||
</thead>
|
||||
<tbody id="bugreports-tbody"></tbody>
|
||||
</table>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
</main>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+46
-3
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ function stopChainStatusPolling() {
|
||||
chainStatusInterval = null;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const VIEWS = ['parametri', 'utenti', 'round', 'pending', 'audit'];
|
||||
const VIEW_LOADERS = { utenti: loadUsers, round: loadRounds, pending: loadPending, audit: loadAuditLog };
|
||||
const VIEWS = ['parametri', 'utenti', 'round', 'pending', 'audit', 'bugreports'];
|
||||
const VIEW_LOADERS = { utenti: loadUsers, round: loadRounds, pending: loadPending, audit: loadAuditLog, bugreports: loadBugReports };
|
||||
let currentAdminView = 'parametri';
|
||||
|
||||
function switchView(name) {
|
||||
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ function showDashboard() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function loadDashboard() {
|
||||
await Promise.all([adminLoadConfig(), loadUsers(), loadRounds(), loadPending(), loadAuditLog()]);
|
||||
await Promise.all([adminLoadConfig(), loadUsers(), loadRounds(), loadPending(), loadAuditLog(), loadBugReports()]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function adminLogin() {
|
||||
@@ -346,6 +346,49 @@ async function loadAuditLog() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const BUG_REPORT_STATUS_LABELS = { open: 'Da leggere', read: 'Presa in carico', resolved: 'Risolta' };
|
||||
|
||||
function bugReportBadge(status) {
|
||||
return `<span class="badge bug-status-${escapeHtml(status)}">${escapeHtml(BUG_REPORT_STATUS_LABELS[status] || status)}</span>`;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function loadBugReports() {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const reports = await callAdmin('GET', '/admin/bug-reports');
|
||||
const tbody = document.getElementById('bugreports-tbody');
|
||||
tbody.innerHTML = reports.map((r) => `
|
||||
<tr>
|
||||
<td>${r.id}</td>
|
||||
<td class="payload-cell">${escapeHtml(r.description)}</td>
|
||||
<td>${r.contact ? escapeHtml(r.contact) : '—'}</td>
|
||||
<td>${r.username ? escapeHtml(r.username) : '—'}</td>
|
||||
<td>${fmtDate(r.created_at)}</td>
|
||||
<td>
|
||||
${bugReportBadge(r.status)}
|
||||
<div class="bug-actions">
|
||||
${r.status === 'open' ? `<button class="secondary" onclick="setBugReportStatus(${r.id}, 'read', this)">Segna come presa in carico</button>` : ''}
|
||||
${r.status !== 'resolved' ? `<button class="secondary" onclick="setBugReportStatus(${r.id}, 'resolved', this)">Segna come risolta</button>` : ''}
|
||||
${r.status !== 'open' ? `<button class="secondary" onclick="setBugReportStatus(${r.id}, 'open', this)">Riapri</button>` : ''}
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</td>
|
||||
</tr>
|
||||
`).join('') || '<tr><td colspan="6" class="hint">Nessuna segnalazione ricevuta.</td></tr>';
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
toast('Errore nel caricamento segnalazioni: ' + e.message, 'error');
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function setBugReportStatus(reportId, newStatus, button) {
|
||||
await withLoading(button, '…', async () => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await callAdmin('POST', '/admin/bug-reports/' + reportId + '/status', { status: newStatus });
|
||||
await loadBugReports();
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
toast('Errore: ' + e.message, 'error');
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
document.getElementById('admin-token').addEventListener('keydown', (e) => {
|
||||
if (e.key === 'Enter') adminLogin();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
+12
-2
@@ -488,11 +488,21 @@ async function refreshRound() {
|
||||
// myUserId may not be loaded yet on the very first tick after a reload
|
||||
// (refreshMe() and refreshRound() run concurrently) — fall back to the
|
||||
// persisted result rather than risk showing nothing or the wrong side.
|
||||
// winner_user_id is committed as soon as the draw picks a winner, but
|
||||
// winner_amount_sats isn't set until the payout tx is built afterwards
|
||||
// (a real Electrum round-trip later) — revealing a win before then would
|
||||
// show "+— PLM". Only the winner's own reveal needs to wait for it.
|
||||
const iWon = myUserId != null && data.winner_user_id === myUserId;
|
||||
const amountReady = !iWon || data.winner_amount_sats != null;
|
||||
const canReveal =
|
||||
data.user_played && data.winner_user_id != null && (alreadyKnown || elapsedMs >= minMs) && myUserId != null;
|
||||
data.user_played &&
|
||||
data.winner_user_id != null &&
|
||||
(alreadyKnown || elapsedMs >= minMs) &&
|
||||
myUserId != null &&
|
||||
amountReady;
|
||||
|
||||
if (canReveal) {
|
||||
const won = data.winner_user_id === myUserId;
|
||||
const won = iWon;
|
||||
if (!alreadyKnown) {
|
||||
persistResult(data.round_id, won, data.winner_amount_sats);
|
||||
if (won) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,6 +10,26 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'nav.guideTitle': 'Guide',
|
||||
'nav.guideAria': 'Open the user guide',
|
||||
'nav.bugReport': 'Report a bug',
|
||||
'bugReport.pageTitle': 'Report a bug',
|
||||
'bugReport.heading': 'Report a bug',
|
||||
'bugReport.intro': 'Found a problem? Describe it below — your report goes straight to the admin panel.',
|
||||
'bugReport.englishNotice': "Please write your bug report in English, regardless of the language you're browsing in — this helps us handle it faster.",
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionLabel': 'What happened?',
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionPlaceholder': 'Describe the bug: what you were doing, what you expected, and what happened instead.',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactLabel': 'Contact (optional)',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactPlaceholder': "Email or other contact, if you'd like a reply",
|
||||
'bugReport.submitBtn': 'Send report',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitting': 'Sending…',
|
||||
'bugReport.blankError': 'Describe the bug before sending.',
|
||||
'bugReport.successToast': 'Thanks! Report sent.',
|
||||
'bugReport.errorPrefix': 'Error sending: ',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsTitle': 'Your reports',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsHint': 'Only reports sent from this account, with the status set by the admin team.',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsEmpty': "You haven't sent any reports yet.",
|
||||
'bugReport.statusOpen': 'Not read yet',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusRead': 'Acknowledged',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusResolved': 'Resolved',
|
||||
'bugReport.backLink': 'Back to home',
|
||||
'nav.logoutTitle': 'Log out',
|
||||
'nav.logoutAria': 'Log out of your account',
|
||||
'nav.deposit': 'Deposit',
|
||||
@@ -119,6 +139,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.network_unavailable': 'Not connected to the network, please try again shortly.',
|
||||
'error.no_round_open': 'No round is open right now, please try again shortly.',
|
||||
'error.round_closing': 'The current round is closing, please try again shortly.',
|
||||
'error.round_full': 'This round has reached its maximum of {max_participants} players — wait for the next one, it opens shortly.',
|
||||
'error.already_betting': 'You already have an active bet in the current round.',
|
||||
'error.insufficient_balance': 'Insufficient balance.',
|
||||
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': 'You have {pending_plm} PLM pending confirmation — it is not spendable yet.',
|
||||
@@ -135,6 +156,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.invalid_amount': 'Enter an amount greater than zero.',
|
||||
'error.broadcast_failed': 'The network refused the transaction. Please try again shortly.',
|
||||
'error.amount_below_dust_limit': 'The amount is too small to be sent.',
|
||||
'error.too_many_inputs': 'Your balance is split across too many small deposits to be spent in a single transaction (max {max_inputs}). Please contact support to consolidate it.',
|
||||
'error.withdrawal_to_own_address': 'That is your own deposit address — withdraw to an external wallet.',
|
||||
'error.internal_error': 'Unexpected server error. Please try again shortly.',
|
||||
'error.guide_unavailable': 'The guide is not available right now.',
|
||||
@@ -152,6 +174,26 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'nav.guideTitle': 'Guida',
|
||||
'nav.guideAria': 'Apri la guida utente',
|
||||
'nav.bugReport': 'Segnala un bug',
|
||||
'bugReport.pageTitle': 'Segnala un bug',
|
||||
'bugReport.heading': 'Segnala un bug',
|
||||
'bugReport.intro': 'Hai trovato un problema? Descrivilo qui sotto: la segnalazione arriva direttamente al pannello di amministrazione.',
|
||||
'bugReport.englishNotice': "Scrivi la segnalazione in inglese, indipendentemente dalla lingua che stai usando per navigare: questo ci aiuta a gestirla più velocemente.",
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionLabel': 'Cosa è successo?',
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionPlaceholder': 'Descrivi il bug: cosa stavi facendo, cosa ti aspettavi e cosa è successo invece.',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactLabel': 'Contatto (opzionale)',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactPlaceholder': 'Email o altro recapito, se vuoi essere ricontattato',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitBtn': 'Invia segnalazione',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitting': 'Invio…',
|
||||
'bugReport.blankError': 'Descrivi il bug prima di inviare.',
|
||||
'bugReport.successToast': 'Grazie! Segnalazione inviata.',
|
||||
'bugReport.errorPrefix': "Errore nell'invio: ",
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsTitle': 'Le tue segnalazioni',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsHint': "Solo le segnalazioni inviate da questo account, con lo stato aggiornato dall'amministrazione.",
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsEmpty': 'Non hai ancora inviato segnalazioni.',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusOpen': 'Da leggere',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusRead': 'Presa in carico',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusResolved': 'Risolta',
|
||||
'bugReport.backLink': 'Torna alla home',
|
||||
'nav.logoutTitle': 'Esci',
|
||||
'nav.logoutAria': "Esci dall'account",
|
||||
'nav.deposit': 'Deposito',
|
||||
@@ -258,6 +300,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.network_unavailable': 'Nessuna connessione alla rete, riprova tra poco.',
|
||||
'error.no_round_open': 'Nessun round aperto in questo momento, riprova tra poco.',
|
||||
'error.round_closing': 'Il round corrente si sta chiudendo, riprova tra poco.',
|
||||
'error.round_full': 'Questo round ha raggiunto il massimo di {max_participants} giocatori — aspetta il prossimo, si apre tra poco.',
|
||||
'error.already_betting': 'Hai già una bet attiva nel round corrente.',
|
||||
'error.insufficient_balance': 'Saldo insufficiente.',
|
||||
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': 'Hai {pending_plm} PLM in attesa di conferma — non ancora disponibili per la spesa.',
|
||||
@@ -274,6 +317,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.invalid_amount': 'Inserisci un importo maggiore di zero.',
|
||||
'error.broadcast_failed': 'La rete ha rifiutato la transazione. Riprova tra poco.',
|
||||
'error.amount_below_dust_limit': "L'importo è troppo basso per essere inviato.",
|
||||
'error.too_many_inputs': 'Il tuo saldo è suddiviso in troppi piccoli depositi per essere speso in una sola transazione (max {max_inputs}). Contatta l\'assistenza per consolidarlo.',
|
||||
'error.withdrawal_to_own_address': 'Questo è il tuo indirizzo di deposito — preleva verso un wallet esterno.',
|
||||
'error.internal_error': 'Errore inatteso del server. Riprova tra poco.',
|
||||
'error.guide_unavailable': 'La guida non è disponibile in questo momento.',
|
||||
@@ -291,6 +335,26 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'nav.guideTitle': 'Guía',
|
||||
'nav.guideAria': 'Abrir la guía del usuario',
|
||||
'nav.bugReport': 'Reportar un error',
|
||||
'bugReport.pageTitle': 'Reportar un error',
|
||||
'bugReport.heading': 'Reportar un error',
|
||||
'bugReport.intro': '¿Encontraste un problema? Descríbelo a continuación: el informe llega directamente al panel de administración.',
|
||||
'bugReport.englishNotice': 'Escribe el informe en inglés, independientemente del idioma que estés usando para navegar: esto nos ayuda a gestionarlo más rápido.',
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionLabel': '¿Qué pasó?',
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionPlaceholder': 'Describe el error: qué estabas haciendo, qué esperabas y qué sucedió en su lugar.',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactLabel': 'Contacto (opcional)',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactPlaceholder': 'Correo u otro contacto, si quieres que te respondamos',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitBtn': 'Enviar informe',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitting': 'Enviando…',
|
||||
'bugReport.blankError': 'Describe el error antes de enviarlo.',
|
||||
'bugReport.successToast': '¡Gracias! Informe enviado.',
|
||||
'bugReport.errorPrefix': 'Error al enviar: ',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsTitle': 'Tus informes',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsHint': 'Solo los informes enviados desde esta cuenta, con el estado actualizado por el equipo de administración.',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsEmpty': 'Todavía no has enviado ningún informe.',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusOpen': 'Sin leer',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusRead': 'En curso',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusResolved': 'Resuelto',
|
||||
'bugReport.backLink': 'Volver al inicio',
|
||||
'nav.logoutTitle': 'Salir',
|
||||
'nav.logoutAria': 'Cerrar sesión',
|
||||
'nav.deposit': 'Depósito',
|
||||
@@ -397,6 +461,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.network_unavailable': 'Sin conexión con la red, inténtalo de nuevo en un momento.',
|
||||
'error.no_round_open': 'No hay ninguna ronda abierta ahora mismo, inténtalo de nuevo en un momento.',
|
||||
'error.round_closing': 'La ronda actual se está cerrando, inténtalo de nuevo en un momento.',
|
||||
'error.round_full': 'Esta ronda ha alcanzado su máximo de {max_participants} jugadores: espera la siguiente, se abre en breve.',
|
||||
'error.already_betting': 'Ya tienes una apuesta activa en la ronda actual.',
|
||||
'error.insufficient_balance': 'Saldo insuficiente.',
|
||||
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': 'Tienes {pending_plm} PLM pendientes de confirmación — todavía no se pueden gastar.',
|
||||
@@ -413,6 +478,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.invalid_amount': 'Introduce un importe mayor que cero.',
|
||||
'error.broadcast_failed': 'La red rechazó la transacción. Inténtalo de nuevo en un momento.',
|
||||
'error.amount_below_dust_limit': 'El importe es demasiado pequeño para enviarse.',
|
||||
'error.too_many_inputs': 'Tu saldo está repartido en demasiados depósitos pequeños para gastarse en una sola transacción (máx. {max_inputs}). Contacta con soporte para consolidarlo.',
|
||||
'error.withdrawal_to_own_address': 'Esa es tu propia dirección de depósito — retira a una cartera externa.',
|
||||
'error.internal_error': 'Error inesperado del servidor. Inténtalo de nuevo en un momento.',
|
||||
'error.guide_unavailable': 'La guía no está disponible en este momento.',
|
||||
@@ -430,6 +496,26 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'nav.guideTitle': 'Guide',
|
||||
'nav.guideAria': "Ouvrir le guide de l'utilisateur",
|
||||
'nav.bugReport': 'Signaler un bug',
|
||||
'bugReport.pageTitle': 'Signaler un bug',
|
||||
'bugReport.heading': 'Signaler un bug',
|
||||
'bugReport.intro': "Vous avez trouvé un problème ? Décrivez-le ci-dessous : le signalement arrive directement dans le panneau d'administration.",
|
||||
'bugReport.englishNotice': "Rédigez votre signalement en anglais, quelle que soit la langue que vous utilisez pour naviguer : cela nous aide à le traiter plus rapidement.",
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionLabel': "Que s'est-il passé ?",
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionPlaceholder': "Décrivez le bug : ce que vous faisiez, ce que vous attendiez et ce qui s'est passé à la place.",
|
||||
'bugReport.contactLabel': 'Contact (facultatif)',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactPlaceholder': 'Email ou autre contact, si vous souhaitez une réponse',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitBtn': 'Envoyer le signalement',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitting': 'Envoi…',
|
||||
'bugReport.blankError': "Décrivez le bug avant d'envoyer.",
|
||||
'bugReport.successToast': 'Merci ! Signalement envoyé.',
|
||||
'bugReport.errorPrefix': "Erreur lors de l'envoi : ",
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsTitle': 'Vos signalements',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsHint': "Seulement les signalements envoyés depuis ce compte, avec le statut mis à jour par l'équipe d'administration.",
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsEmpty': "Vous n'avez encore envoyé aucun signalement.",
|
||||
'bugReport.statusOpen': 'Non lu',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusRead': 'Prise en charge',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusResolved': 'Résolu',
|
||||
'bugReport.backLink': "Retour à l'accueil",
|
||||
'nav.logoutTitle': 'Se déconnecter',
|
||||
'nav.logoutAria': 'Se déconnecter du compte',
|
||||
'nav.deposit': 'Dépôt',
|
||||
@@ -536,6 +622,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.network_unavailable': 'Pas de connexion au réseau, réessayez dans un instant.',
|
||||
'error.no_round_open': "Aucun round n'est ouvert pour le moment, réessayez dans un instant.",
|
||||
'error.round_closing': 'Le round en cours est en train de se fermer, réessayez dans un instant.',
|
||||
'error.round_full': 'Ce tour a atteint son maximum de {max_participants} joueurs — attendez le prochain, il ouvre dans un instant.',
|
||||
'error.already_betting': 'Vous avez déjà une mise active dans le round en cours.',
|
||||
'error.insufficient_balance': 'Solde insuffisant.',
|
||||
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': 'Vous avez {pending_plm} PLM en attente de confirmation — pas encore disponibles.',
|
||||
@@ -552,6 +639,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.invalid_amount': 'Saisissez un montant supérieur à zéro.',
|
||||
'error.broadcast_failed': 'Le réseau a refusé la transaction. Veuillez réessayer dans un instant.',
|
||||
'error.amount_below_dust_limit': "Le montant est trop faible pour être envoyé.",
|
||||
'error.too_many_inputs': 'Votre solde est réparti sur trop de petits dépôts pour être dépensé en une seule transaction (max {max_inputs}). Contactez le support pour le consolider.',
|
||||
'error.withdrawal_to_own_address': "C'est votre propre adresse de dépôt — retirez vers un portefeuille externe.",
|
||||
'error.internal_error': 'Erreur inattendue du serveur. Veuillez réessayer dans un instant.',
|
||||
'error.guide_unavailable': "Le guide n'est pas disponible pour le moment.",
|
||||
@@ -569,6 +657,26 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'nav.guideTitle': 'Anleitung',
|
||||
'nav.guideAria': 'Benutzerhandbuch öffnen',
|
||||
'nav.bugReport': 'Fehler melden',
|
||||
'bugReport.pageTitle': 'Fehler melden',
|
||||
'bugReport.heading': 'Fehler melden',
|
||||
'bugReport.intro': 'Ein Problem gefunden? Beschreibe es unten — die Meldung geht direkt an das Admin-Panel.',
|
||||
'bugReport.englishNotice': 'Bitte schreibe die Fehlermeldung auf Englisch, unabhängig von der Sprache, die du gerade verwendest — das hilft uns, sie schneller zu bearbeiten.',
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionLabel': 'Was ist passiert?',
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionPlaceholder': 'Beschreibe den Fehler: was du getan hast, was du erwartet hast und was stattdessen passiert ist.',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactLabel': 'Kontakt (optional)',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactPlaceholder': 'E-Mail oder anderer Kontakt, falls du eine Antwort möchtest',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitBtn': 'Meldung senden',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitting': 'Senden…',
|
||||
'bugReport.blankError': 'Beschreibe den Fehler, bevor du sendest.',
|
||||
'bugReport.successToast': 'Danke! Meldung gesendet.',
|
||||
'bugReport.errorPrefix': 'Fehler beim Senden: ',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsTitle': 'Deine Meldungen',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsHint': 'Nur Meldungen, die von diesem Konto gesendet wurden, mit dem vom Admin-Team aktualisierten Status.',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsEmpty': 'Du hast noch keine Meldungen gesendet.',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusOpen': 'Ungelesen',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusRead': 'In Bearbeitung',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusResolved': 'Gelöst',
|
||||
'bugReport.backLink': 'Zurück zur Startseite',
|
||||
'nav.logoutTitle': 'Abmelden',
|
||||
'nav.logoutAria': 'Vom Konto abmelden',
|
||||
'nav.deposit': 'Einzahlung',
|
||||
@@ -675,6 +783,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.network_unavailable': 'Keine Verbindung zum Netzwerk, bitte versuche es gleich erneut.',
|
||||
'error.no_round_open': 'Derzeit ist keine Runde offen, bitte versuche es gleich erneut.',
|
||||
'error.round_closing': 'Die laufende Runde wird gerade geschlossen, bitte versuche es gleich erneut.',
|
||||
'error.round_full': 'Diese Runde hat ihr Maximum von {max_participants} Spielern erreicht — warten Sie auf die nächste, sie beginnt in Kürze.',
|
||||
'error.already_betting': 'Du hast bereits eine aktive Wette in der laufenden Runde.',
|
||||
'error.insufficient_balance': 'Nicht genügend Guthaben.',
|
||||
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': 'Sie haben {pending_plm} PLM, die noch auf Bestätigung warten — noch nicht verfügbar.',
|
||||
@@ -691,6 +800,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.invalid_amount': 'Gib einen Betrag größer als null ein.',
|
||||
'error.broadcast_failed': 'Das Netzwerk hat die Transaktion abgelehnt. Bitte versuche es in Kürze erneut.',
|
||||
'error.amount_below_dust_limit': 'Der Betrag ist zu klein, um gesendet zu werden.',
|
||||
'error.too_many_inputs': 'Ihr Guthaben ist auf zu viele kleine Einzahlungen verteilt, um in einer einzigen Transaktion ausgegeben zu werden (max. {max_inputs}). Bitte wenden Sie sich an den Support, um es zusammenzufassen.',
|
||||
'error.withdrawal_to_own_address': 'Das ist deine eigene Einzahlungsadresse — zahle auf eine externe Wallet aus.',
|
||||
'error.internal_error': 'Unerwarteter Serverfehler. Bitte versuche es in Kürze erneut.',
|
||||
'error.guide_unavailable': 'Die Anleitung ist derzeit nicht verfügbar.',
|
||||
@@ -708,6 +818,26 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'nav.guideTitle': 'Инструкция',
|
||||
'nav.guideAria': 'Открыть руководство пользователя',
|
||||
'nav.bugReport': 'Сообщить об ошибке',
|
||||
'bugReport.pageTitle': 'Сообщить об ошибке',
|
||||
'bugReport.heading': 'Сообщить об ошибке',
|
||||
'bugReport.intro': 'Нашли проблему? Опишите её ниже — сообщение сразу попадёт в панель администратора.',
|
||||
'bugReport.englishNotice': 'Пожалуйста, опишите ошибку на английском языке, независимо от языка интерфейса — это поможет нам обработать её быстрее.',
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionLabel': 'Что произошло?',
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionPlaceholder': 'Опишите ошибку: что вы делали, что ожидали и что произошло вместо этого.',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactLabel': 'Контакт (необязательно)',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactPlaceholder': 'Email или другой контакт, если хотите получить ответ',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitBtn': 'Отправить сообщение',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitting': 'Отправка…',
|
||||
'bugReport.blankError': 'Опишите ошибку перед отправкой.',
|
||||
'bugReport.successToast': 'Спасибо! Сообщение отправлено.',
|
||||
'bugReport.errorPrefix': 'Ошибка отправки: ',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsTitle': 'Ваши сообщения',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsHint': 'Только сообщения, отправленные с этого аккаунта, со статусом, обновлённым администрацией.',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsEmpty': 'Вы ещё не отправляли сообщений.',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusOpen': 'Не прочитано',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusRead': 'В обработке',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusResolved': 'Решено',
|
||||
'bugReport.backLink': 'Назад на главную',
|
||||
'nav.logoutTitle': 'Выйти',
|
||||
'nav.logoutAria': 'Выйти из аккаунта',
|
||||
'nav.deposit': 'Депозит',
|
||||
@@ -814,6 +944,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.network_unavailable': 'Нет соединения с сетью, повторите попытку чуть позже.',
|
||||
'error.no_round_open': 'Сейчас нет открытого раунда, повторите попытку чуть позже.',
|
||||
'error.round_closing': 'Текущий раунд закрывается, повторите попытку чуть позже.',
|
||||
'error.round_full': 'В этом раунде достигнут максимум участников ({max_participants}) — дождитесь следующего, он начнётся совсем скоро.',
|
||||
'error.already_betting': 'У вас уже есть активная ставка в текущем раунде.',
|
||||
'error.insufficient_balance': 'Недостаточно средств.',
|
||||
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': 'У вас есть {pending_plm} PLM, ожидающих подтверждения — они пока недоступны для расходования.',
|
||||
@@ -830,6 +961,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.invalid_amount': 'Введите сумму больше нуля.',
|
||||
'error.broadcast_failed': 'Сеть отклонила транзакцию. Попробуйте ещё раз через минуту.',
|
||||
'error.amount_below_dust_limit': 'Сумма слишком мала для отправки.',
|
||||
'error.too_many_inputs': 'Ваш баланс разбит на слишком много мелких депозитов, чтобы потратить его одной транзакцией (максимум {max_inputs}). Обратитесь в поддержку для консолидации.',
|
||||
'error.withdrawal_to_own_address': 'Это ваш собственный адрес для депозита — выводите на внешний кошелёк.',
|
||||
'error.internal_error': 'Непредвиденная ошибка сервера. Попробуйте ещё раз через минуту.',
|
||||
'error.guide_unavailable': 'Руководство сейчас недоступно.',
|
||||
@@ -847,6 +979,26 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'nav.guideTitle': '指南',
|
||||
'nav.guideAria': '打开用户指南',
|
||||
'nav.bugReport': '报告问题',
|
||||
'bugReport.pageTitle': '报告问题',
|
||||
'bugReport.heading': '报告问题',
|
||||
'bugReport.intro': '发现问题了吗?请在下面描述——您的反馈会直接发送到管理员面板。',
|
||||
'bugReport.englishNotice': '请用英文描述问题,无论您当前使用的是哪种语言界面——这有助于我们更快处理。',
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionLabel': '发生了什么?',
|
||||
'bugReport.descriptionPlaceholder': '描述问题:您当时在做什么、期望的结果是什么,以及实际发生了什么。',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactLabel': '联系方式(可选)',
|
||||
'bugReport.contactPlaceholder': '如果希望得到回复,请留下邮箱或其他联系方式',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitBtn': '发送反馈',
|
||||
'bugReport.submitting': '发送中…',
|
||||
'bugReport.blankError': '请先描述问题再发送。',
|
||||
'bugReport.successToast': '谢谢!反馈已发送。',
|
||||
'bugReport.errorPrefix': '发送出错:',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsTitle': '您的反馈',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsHint': '仅显示此账户发送的反馈,状态由管理团队更新。',
|
||||
'bugReport.myReportsEmpty': '您还没有发送过反馈。',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusOpen': '待处理',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusRead': '处理中',
|
||||
'bugReport.statusResolved': '已解决',
|
||||
'bugReport.backLink': '返回首页',
|
||||
'nav.logoutTitle': '退出登录',
|
||||
'nav.logoutAria': '退出账户',
|
||||
'nav.deposit': '存款',
|
||||
@@ -953,6 +1105,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.network_unavailable': '未连接到网络,请稍后重试。',
|
||||
'error.no_round_open': '当前没有开放的回合,请稍后重试。',
|
||||
'error.round_closing': '当前回合正在结束,请稍后重试。',
|
||||
'error.round_full': '本轮已达到 {max_participants} 名玩家的上限 —— 请等待下一轮,很快就会开始。',
|
||||
'error.already_betting': '你在当前回合已有一笔有效下注。',
|
||||
'error.insufficient_balance': '余额不足。',
|
||||
'error.balance_pending_confirmation': '您有 {pending_plm} PLM 待确认 —— 尚不可用于支出。',
|
||||
@@ -969,6 +1122,7 @@ const TRANSLATIONS = {
|
||||
'error.invalid_amount': '请输入大于零的金额。',
|
||||
'error.broadcast_failed': '网络拒绝了该交易,请稍后重试。',
|
||||
'error.amount_below_dust_limit': '金额过小,无法发送。',
|
||||
'error.too_many_inputs': '您的余额分散在过多的小额存款中,无法在一笔交易中花费(最多 {max_inputs} 笔)。请联系客服进行归集。',
|
||||
'error.withdrawal_to_own_address': '这是你自己的充值地址 — 请提现到外部钱包。',
|
||||
'error.internal_error': '服务器发生意外错误,请稍后重试。',
|
||||
'error.guide_unavailable': '指南当前不可用。',
|
||||
|
||||
+159
-6
@@ -1,16 +1,169 @@
|
||||
<!DOCTYPE html>
|
||||
<html lang="it">
|
||||
<html lang="en">
|
||||
<head>
|
||||
<meta charset="UTF-8">
|
||||
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
|
||||
<title>Segnala un bug — PLM Lottery</title>
|
||||
<title data-i18n="bugReport.pageTitle">Report a bug</title>
|
||||
<link rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/logo.svg">
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="/style.css">
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<div class="app-shell">
|
||||
<h1>Segnala un bug</h1>
|
||||
<p>Questa pagina è un placeholder. Il modulo per la segnalazione dei bug sarà disponibile qui a breve.</p>
|
||||
<p><a class="link" href="/">← Torna alla home</a></p>
|
||||
<div class="app-shell app-shell-bugreport">
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="bugreport-topbar">
|
||||
<a class="brand" href="/">
|
||||
<img class="brand-mark" src="/logo.svg" alt="">
|
||||
PLM Lottery
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
<div class="bugreport-topbar-right">
|
||||
<a class="back-home-btn" href="/">
|
||||
<svg class="icon" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><line x1="19" y1="12" x2="5" y2="12"/><polyline points="12 19 5 12 12 5"/></svg>
|
||||
<span data-i18n="bugReport.backLink">Back to home</span>
|
||||
</a>
|
||||
<select id="lang-switcher" class="lang-switcher" onchange="setLanguage(this.value)" aria-label="Language">
|
||||
<option value="en">English</option>
|
||||
<option value="it">Italiano</option>
|
||||
<option value="es">Español</option>
|
||||
<option value="fr">Français</option>
|
||||
<option value="de">Deutsch</option>
|
||||
<option value="ru">Русский</option>
|
||||
<option value="zh">中文</option>
|
||||
</select>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="bugreport-hero">
|
||||
<div class="bugreport-hero-icon">
|
||||
<svg class="icon" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><circle cx="12" cy="12" r="10"/><path d="M12 8v5"/><path d="M12 16h.01"/></svg>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<div>
|
||||
<h1 data-i18n="bugReport.heading">Report a bug</h1>
|
||||
<p data-i18n="bugReport.intro">Found a problem? Describe it below — your report goes straight to the admin panel.</p>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="card" id="report-form">
|
||||
<div class="field-note" id="english-notice">
|
||||
<svg class="icon" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"><circle cx="12" cy="12" r="10"/><line x1="2" y1="12" x2="22" y2="12"/><path d="M12 2a15.3 15.3 0 0 1 4 10 15.3 15.3 0 0 1-4 10 15.3 15.3 0 0 1-4-10 15.3 15.3 0 0 1 4-10z"/></svg>
|
||||
<span data-i18n="bugReport.englishNotice">Please write your bug report in English, regardless of the language you're browsing in — this helps us handle it faster.</span>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<label for="bug-description" data-i18n="bugReport.descriptionLabel">What happened?</label>
|
||||
<textarea id="bug-description" rows="6" maxlength="2000" data-i18n-placeholder="bugReport.descriptionPlaceholder" oninput="updateCharCount()"></textarea>
|
||||
<div class="char-count" id="char-count">0 / 2000</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<label for="bug-contact" data-i18n="bugReport.contactLabel">Contact (optional)</label>
|
||||
<input id="bug-contact" type="text" maxlength="256" data-i18n-placeholder="bugReport.contactPlaceholder">
|
||||
|
||||
<button onclick="submitBugReport()" id="bug-submit-btn" data-i18n="bugReport.submitBtn">Send report</button>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div class="hidden" id="my-reports-section">
|
||||
<p class="section-label" data-i18n="bugReport.myReportsTitle">Your reports</p>
|
||||
<div class="card">
|
||||
<p class="hint" data-i18n="bugReport.myReportsHint">Only reports sent from this account, with the status set by the admin team.</p>
|
||||
<div id="my-reports-list"></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
<div id="toast-container" aria-live="polite"></div>
|
||||
|
||||
<script src="/i18n.js"></script>
|
||||
<script>
|
||||
function toast(message, type) {
|
||||
const container = document.getElementById('toast-container');
|
||||
const el = document.createElement('div');
|
||||
el.className = 'toast ' + type;
|
||||
el.textContent = message;
|
||||
container.appendChild(el);
|
||||
setTimeout(() => el.remove(), 4000);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function escapeHtml(s) {
|
||||
return String(s).replace(/[&<>"']/g, (c) => ({ '&': '&', '<': '<', '>': '>', '"': '"', "'": ''' }[c]));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function updateCharCount() {
|
||||
const field = document.getElementById('bug-description');
|
||||
document.getElementById('char-count').textContent = field.value.length + ' / ' + field.maxLength;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function submitBugReport() {
|
||||
const btn = document.getElementById('bug-submit-btn');
|
||||
const description = document.getElementById('bug-description').value.trim();
|
||||
const contact = document.getElementById('bug-contact').value.trim();
|
||||
if (!description) {
|
||||
toast(t('bugReport.blankError'), 'error');
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const headers = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };
|
||||
const token = localStorage.getItem('plm_token');
|
||||
if (token) headers['Authorization'] = 'Bearer ' + token;
|
||||
|
||||
btn.disabled = true;
|
||||
const original = btn.textContent;
|
||||
btn.textContent = t('bugReport.submitting');
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const res = await fetch('/bug-reports', {
|
||||
method: 'POST',
|
||||
headers,
|
||||
body: JSON.stringify({ description, contact: contact || null }),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const data = await res.json().catch(() => ({}));
|
||||
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(data.detail?.message || data.detail || res.statusText);
|
||||
document.getElementById('bug-description').value = '';
|
||||
document.getElementById('bug-contact').value = '';
|
||||
updateCharCount();
|
||||
toast(t('bugReport.successToast'), 'success');
|
||||
loadMyBugReports();
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
toast(t('bugReport.errorPrefix') + e.message, 'error');
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
btn.disabled = false;
|
||||
btn.textContent = original;
|
||||
applyStaticTranslations(btn);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function loadMyBugReports() {
|
||||
const token = localStorage.getItem('plm_token');
|
||||
const section = document.getElementById('my-reports-section');
|
||||
if (!token) {
|
||||
section.classList.add('hidden');
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const res = await fetch('/bug-reports/mine', { headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer ' + token } });
|
||||
if (!res.ok) {
|
||||
section.classList.add('hidden');
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
const reports = await res.json();
|
||||
section.classList.remove('hidden');
|
||||
const list = document.getElementById('my-reports-list');
|
||||
list.innerHTML = reports.map((r) => `
|
||||
<div class="report-row">
|
||||
<span class="badge bug-status-${escapeHtml(r.status)}">${escapeHtml(t('bugReport.status' + r.status.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + r.status.slice(1)))}</span>
|
||||
<span class="report-row-desc" title="${escapeHtml(r.description)}">${escapeHtml(r.description)}</span>
|
||||
<span class="report-row-date">${new Date(r.created_at).toLocaleDateString(currentDateLocale(), { day: 'numeric', month: 'short', year: 'numeric' })}</span>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
`).join('') || `<p class="hint report-empty">${escapeHtml(t('bugReport.myReportsEmpty'))}</p>`;
|
||||
} catch (e) {
|
||||
section.classList.add('hidden');
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Re-renders server-rendered content (my reports list) on a language switch,
|
||||
// the same split app.js uses between data-i18n (static markup) and t() (data).
|
||||
function onLanguageChange() {
|
||||
loadMyBugReports();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
updateCharCount();
|
||||
loadMyBugReports();
|
||||
</script>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
+91
-3
@@ -74,16 +74,17 @@ h1, h2, h3 { font-family: inherit; letter-spacing: -0.01em; }
|
||||
label { display: block; font-size: 0.85rem; font-weight: 500; color: var(--color-muted-foreground); margin-top: 14px; margin-bottom: 6px; }
|
||||
label:first-child { margin-top: 0; }
|
||||
|
||||
input {
|
||||
input, textarea {
|
||||
width: 100%; min-height: 44px; padding: 10px 12px; font-size: 0.95rem; font-family: inherit;
|
||||
border: 1px solid var(--color-border); border-radius: var(--radius-sm); background: var(--color-surface);
|
||||
color: var(--color-foreground); transition: border-color 150ms, box-shadow 150ms;
|
||||
}
|
||||
input:focus {
|
||||
textarea { resize: vertical; }
|
||||
input:focus, textarea:focus {
|
||||
outline: none; border-color: var(--color-ring);
|
||||
box-shadow: 0 0 0 3px color-mix(in srgb, var(--color-ring) 25%, transparent);
|
||||
}
|
||||
input:disabled { background: var(--color-surface-inset); color: var(--color-muted-foreground); }
|
||||
input:disabled, textarea:disabled { background: var(--color-surface-inset); color: var(--color-muted-foreground); }
|
||||
|
||||
button {
|
||||
display: inline-flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; gap: 6px;
|
||||
@@ -253,6 +254,93 @@ button.link:hover, a.link:hover { filter: none; color: var(--color-foreground);
|
||||
.toast.error { background: var(--color-destructive-bg); color: var(--color-destructive); }
|
||||
@keyframes toast-in { from { opacity: 0; transform: translateY(8px); } to { opacity: 1; transform: translateY(0); } }
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- /report-bug: a standalone page (no logged-in navbar), so it gets its
|
||||
own slim top bar rather than the app's bottom tab bar / sticky header. --- */
|
||||
.app-shell-bugreport { padding-bottom: 32px; }
|
||||
|
||||
.bugreport-topbar {
|
||||
display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: space-between; gap: 12px;
|
||||
padding: 4px 0 20px; margin-bottom: 20px; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--color-border);
|
||||
}
|
||||
.bugreport-topbar .brand {
|
||||
display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 8px; font-weight: 700; font-size: 1rem;
|
||||
letter-spacing: -0.01em; color: var(--color-foreground); text-decoration: none;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.bugreport-topbar .brand-mark { width: 26px; height: 26px; border-radius: 50%; flex-shrink: 0; display: block; }
|
||||
.bugreport-topbar-right { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 12px; }
|
||||
|
||||
/* Pill button, same idiom as .trust-pill / .chain-status-pill elsewhere on the
|
||||
site: a bordered chip rather than a bare text link, so "go back" reads as an
|
||||
actual control instead of fading into the surrounding copy. */
|
||||
.back-home-btn {
|
||||
display: inline-flex; align-items: center; gap: 6px;
|
||||
font-size: 0.8rem; font-weight: 500; color: var(--color-muted-foreground);
|
||||
background: var(--color-surface); border: 1px solid var(--color-border);
|
||||
padding: 6px 12px 6px 10px; border-radius: 999px; text-decoration: none;
|
||||
transition: color 150ms, border-color 150ms, background 150ms;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.back-home-btn .icon { width: 15px; height: 15px; }
|
||||
.back-home-btn:hover {
|
||||
color: var(--color-foreground); background: var(--color-surface-inset);
|
||||
border-color: color-mix(in srgb, var(--color-ring) 40%, var(--color-border));
|
||||
}
|
||||
.back-home-btn:focus-visible { outline: 2px solid var(--color-ring); outline-offset: 2px; }
|
||||
|
||||
.bugreport-hero { display: flex; align-items: flex-start; gap: 14px; margin-bottom: 20px; }
|
||||
.bugreport-hero-icon {
|
||||
width: 44px; height: 44px; flex-shrink: 0; border-radius: 999px;
|
||||
background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--color-primary) 14%, transparent);
|
||||
color: var(--color-primary);
|
||||
display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.bugreport-hero-icon .icon { width: 22px; height: 22px; }
|
||||
.bugreport-hero h1 { font-size: 1.3rem; font-weight: 700; margin: 2px 0 4px; text-wrap: balance; }
|
||||
.bugreport-hero p { color: var(--color-muted-foreground); font-size: 0.9rem; margin: 0; max-width: 46ch; }
|
||||
|
||||
/* Info callout, anchored inside the form card right above the field it
|
||||
applies to — not a warning (that's what the amber status badges below are
|
||||
for), so it gets the accent hue instead, keeping the two meanings visually
|
||||
distinct. */
|
||||
.field-note {
|
||||
display: flex; align-items: flex-start; gap: 10px;
|
||||
background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--color-accent) 10%, transparent);
|
||||
border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--color-accent) 28%, transparent);
|
||||
color: color-mix(in srgb, var(--color-accent) 75%, var(--color-foreground));
|
||||
border-radius: var(--radius-sm); padding: 10px 12px; font-size: 0.82rem; line-height: 1.4;
|
||||
margin-bottom: 16px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.field-note .icon { width: 16px; height: 16px; margin-top: 1px; flex-shrink: 0; }
|
||||
|
||||
.char-count {
|
||||
font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums; text-align: right;
|
||||
font-size: 0.75rem; color: var(--color-muted-foreground); margin-top: 4px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.badge {
|
||||
display: inline-block; font-size: 0.72rem; font-weight: 600; padding: 2px 8px;
|
||||
border-radius: 999px; background: var(--color-background); border: 1px solid var(--color-border);
|
||||
flex-shrink: 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.badge.bug-status-open { background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--color-primary) 16%, transparent); color: #92400E; border-color: color-mix(in srgb, var(--color-primary) 55%, transparent); }
|
||||
.badge.bug-status-read { background: var(--color-background); color: var(--color-muted-foreground); }
|
||||
.badge.bug-status-resolved { background: var(--color-success-bg); color: var(--color-success); border-color: var(--color-success); }
|
||||
|
||||
.report-row {
|
||||
display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; align-items: center; gap: 10px;
|
||||
padding: 12px 0; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--color-border);
|
||||
}
|
||||
.report-row:first-child { padding-top: 0; }
|
||||
.report-row:last-child { padding-bottom: 0; border-bottom: none; }
|
||||
.report-row-desc {
|
||||
flex: 1 1 200px; font-size: 0.88rem;
|
||||
overflow: hidden; text-overflow: ellipsis; white-space: nowrap;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.report-row-date {
|
||||
font-size: 0.78rem; color: var(--color-muted-foreground); white-space: nowrap;
|
||||
font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums;
|
||||
}
|
||||
.report-empty { margin: 0; }
|
||||
|
||||
/* --- landing hero (shown only when logged out) --- */
|
||||
body {
|
||||
position: relative;
|
||||
|
||||
+19
-1
@@ -38,6 +38,15 @@ async def compute_pending_balance(session: AsyncSession, user: User) -> tuple[in
|
||||
user's own address. Adding that to cached_balance_sats gives the balance the
|
||||
user will end up with once everything currently in flight confirms.
|
||||
|
||||
The change output's own confirmation is credited by two independent, unordered
|
||||
paths: the Electrum listener (event-driven, near-instant — app/deposits/service.py
|
||||
turns it into a UtxoEvent and folds it into cached_balance_sats via
|
||||
recompute_balance) and this module's PendingTransaction.status flip
|
||||
(app/tx/confirmation.py, polled every 10s). The listener usually wins that race,
|
||||
so for the gap until the poller catches up the row is still "pending" here while
|
||||
the same sats are already inside cached_balance_sats — double-counting the
|
||||
change unless excluded below.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns (pending_inclusive_balance_sats, has_pending) — has_pending tells the
|
||||
caller whether this differs from the confirmed-only balance at all.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
@@ -54,10 +63,19 @@ async def compute_pending_balance(session: AsyncSession, user: User) -> tuple[in
|
||||
)
|
||||
).all()
|
||||
|
||||
already_credited = {
|
||||
(txid, vout)
|
||||
for txid, vout in (
|
||||
await session.execute(select(UtxoEvent.txid, UtxoEvent.vout).where(UtxoEvent.user_id == user.id))
|
||||
).all()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pending_change_sats = 0
|
||||
for row in pending:
|
||||
tx = Transaction.parse(bytes.fromhex(row.raw_tx_hex))
|
||||
for out in tx.vout:
|
||||
for vout, out in enumerate(tx.vout):
|
||||
if (row.current_txid, vout) in already_credited:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if out.script_pubkey.address(network=PLM_MAINNET) == user.address:
|
||||
pending_change_sats += out.value
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,15 +33,53 @@ DUST_LIMIT_SATS = 294
|
||||
# eating further and further into the sender's change with no limit.
|
||||
MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB = 10_000
|
||||
|
||||
# Ceiling on how many UTXOs one *user* transaction (bet, withdrawal) may spend (B-48).
|
||||
# Every extra input costs ~68 vbytes of fee, and that fee comes out of the amount being
|
||||
# moved — so an address fragmented into hundreds of small deposits would silently erode
|
||||
# its own bet (shrinking the user's share of the pool) or withdrawal. Failing the build
|
||||
# with a translatable error is the honest outcome; consolidating the address is the way
|
||||
# out. This is a *user-protection* limit, which is why the payout gets its own, far
|
||||
# higher one below.
|
||||
MAX_TX_INPUTS = 50
|
||||
|
||||
# Ceiling on the payout's inputs (B-52). The payout is not a user spending their own
|
||||
# fragmented balance: it drains the pool, whose UTXO count is simply the number of bets
|
||||
# in the round, and its fee comes out of a 70% share of that whole pool. So the erosion
|
||||
# argument behind MAX_TX_INPUTS doesn't apply here — 400 inputs at 1 sat/vB cost ~27_300
|
||||
# sat, i.e. ~0.00027 PLM out of the winner's share — and reusing that limit was what made
|
||||
# any round past ~50 participants unpayable: select_utxos raised too_many_inputs, the
|
||||
# round stayed "paying_out" retrying forever, and since no new round may open while one
|
||||
# is active, the whole lottery stopped with the pool stuck (B-52).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# What actually bounds this is relay policy: a non-standard transaction is refused at
|
||||
# broadcast past 100 kvB, which at ~68 vbytes per input is ~1470 inputs. 500 stays at
|
||||
# roughly a third of that budget, and signing that many inputs costs ~0.4s of event loop
|
||||
# (measured), once per round, inside a background task.
|
||||
MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS = 500
|
||||
|
||||
# The most participants one round may hold (B-52). Enforced where the money is not yet
|
||||
# committed — app/bets/service.py refuses the bet — instead of being discovered at payout
|
||||
# time, when the bets are already in the pool and there is no way back. Deliberately below
|
||||
# MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS: the payout also has to be able to spend whatever change UTXOs
|
||||
# earlier rounds left in the pool, so the gap is the headroom for those.
|
||||
MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND = 400
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class InsufficientFundsError(Exception):
|
||||
"""`code` is the machine-readable identifier the API layer forwards to the
|
||||
client so it can translate the failure (see app/api/errors.py); the message
|
||||
itself stays English."""
|
||||
itself stays English, and `params` carries the values it interpolates so the
|
||||
translation can place them wherever its own grammar needs them."""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message: str, code: str = "insufficient_balance") -> None:
|
||||
def __init__(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
message: str,
|
||||
code: str = "insufficient_balance",
|
||||
**params: int | str,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
super().__init__(message)
|
||||
self.code = code
|
||||
self.params = params
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass
|
||||
@@ -65,14 +103,33 @@ def estimate_vsize(n_inputs: int, n_outputs: int) -> int:
|
||||
return _TX_OVERHEAD_VBYTES + n_inputs * _P2WPKH_INPUT_VBYTES + n_outputs * _P2WPKH_OUTPUT_VBYTES
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def select_utxos(utxos: list[Utxo], target_sats: int) -> tuple[list[Utxo], int]:
|
||||
def select_utxos(
|
||||
utxos: list[Utxo], target_sats: int, max_inputs: int = MAX_TX_INPUTS
|
||||
) -> tuple[list[Utxo], int]:
|
||||
"""Greedily select UTXOs (largest first, to minimize input count) covering
|
||||
target_sats — the amount deducted from the sender's balance. The fee is paid
|
||||
out of target_sats (see build_signed_transaction), not added on top of it."""
|
||||
out of target_sats (see build_signed_transaction), not added on top of it.
|
||||
|
||||
At most `max_inputs` are ever selected (B-48): if the largest `max_inputs`
|
||||
UTXOs don't cover the target, the balance is there but too fragmented to spend
|
||||
in one transaction, which is a different failure from having no funds at all
|
||||
and gets its own code.
|
||||
|
||||
The cap is a parameter, not the constant it used to be, because the two callers
|
||||
want different ones (B-52): MAX_TX_INPUTS protects a user from a fee that would
|
||||
eat into their own bet/withdrawal, while the payout drains a pool holding one
|
||||
UTXO per bet and needs MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS to be able to pay a full round at
|
||||
all."""
|
||||
ordered = sorted(utxos, key=lambda u: u.amount_sats, reverse=True)
|
||||
selected: list[Utxo] = []
|
||||
total = 0
|
||||
for utxo in ordered:
|
||||
if len(selected) == max_inputs:
|
||||
raise InsufficientFundsError(
|
||||
f"balance too fragmented: more than {max_inputs} inputs would be needed",
|
||||
code="too_many_inputs",
|
||||
max_inputs=max_inputs,
|
||||
)
|
||||
selected.append(utxo)
|
||||
total += utxo.amount_sats
|
||||
if total >= target_sats:
|
||||
@@ -177,9 +234,13 @@ def build_payout_transaction(
|
||||
absorbs the tx fee — the commission (fee_address) output is untouched.
|
||||
|
||||
As in build_signed_transaction, dust-sized pool change is left to the fee
|
||||
rather than creating an unrelayable output (B-06)."""
|
||||
rather than creating an unrelayable output (B-06).
|
||||
|
||||
Selection uses MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS, not the much stricter user-facing
|
||||
MAX_TX_INPUTS (B-52) — the pool holds one UTXO per bet, so the user-protection
|
||||
cap made every round past ~50 participants impossible to pay."""
|
||||
target = winner_share_sats + commission_sats
|
||||
selected, total_in = select_utxos(utxos, target)
|
||||
selected, total_in = select_utxos(utxos, target, max_inputs=MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS)
|
||||
fee = estimate_vsize(len(selected), 3) * fee_rate_sat_vb # winner + commission + pool change
|
||||
winner_amount = winner_share_sats - fee
|
||||
if winner_amount < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ async def request_withdrawal(
|
||||
fee_rate_sat_vb=config.fee_rate_sat_vb,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except InsufficientFundsError as exc:
|
||||
raise WithdrawalError(exc.code, str(exc)) from exc
|
||||
raise WithdrawalError(exc.code, str(exc), **exc.params) from exc
|
||||
|
||||
# Persist the intent before broadcasting, and only promote the rows once the
|
||||
# network has accepted the tx — same two-phase shape as place_bet (B-08).
|
||||
@@ -173,3 +173,4 @@ async def _release_failed_withdrawal(
|
||||
user_id=user_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
await session.commit()
|
||||
broadcaster.publish() # the reserved UTXOs are spendable again — refetch the balance (B-49)
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
"""replace bug_reports.resolved with a three-state status
|
||||
|
||||
Revision ID: be71fdac734e
|
||||
Revises: ee8508d98d34
|
||||
Create Date: 2026-07-31 15:33:51.780062
|
||||
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from typing import Sequence, Union
|
||||
|
||||
from alembic import op
|
||||
import sqlalchemy as sa
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
|
||||
revision: str = 'be71fdac734e'
|
||||
down_revision: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = 'ee8508d98d34'
|
||||
branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
|
||||
depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def upgrade() -> None:
|
||||
"""Upgrade schema, preserving existing rows: resolved=True -> 'resolved', else 'open'.
|
||||
|
||||
'read' has no equivalent in the old boolean, so nothing backfills into it —
|
||||
every previously-open report starts the new lifecycle at 'open', which is
|
||||
correct (nobody had acknowledged it yet)."""
|
||||
op.add_column('bug_reports', sa.Column('status', sa.String(length=16), nullable=True))
|
||||
op.execute("UPDATE bug_reports SET status = CASE WHEN resolved THEN 'resolved' ELSE 'open' END")
|
||||
with op.batch_alter_table('bug_reports') as batch_op:
|
||||
batch_op.alter_column('status', nullable=False)
|
||||
batch_op.drop_column('resolved')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def downgrade() -> None:
|
||||
"""Downgrade schema. 'read' collapses back into resolved=False — the same loss
|
||||
of information any boolean-from-enum downgrade has."""
|
||||
op.add_column('bug_reports', sa.Column('resolved', sa.BOOLEAN(), nullable=True))
|
||||
op.execute("UPDATE bug_reports SET resolved = (status = 'resolved')")
|
||||
with op.batch_alter_table('bug_reports') as batch_op:
|
||||
batch_op.alter_column('resolved', nullable=False)
|
||||
batch_op.drop_column('status')
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
"""add bug_reports table
|
||||
|
||||
Revision ID: ee8508d98d34
|
||||
Revises: 87a0c640355c
|
||||
Create Date: 2026-07-31 15:14:14.288552
|
||||
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from typing import Sequence, Union
|
||||
|
||||
from alembic import op
|
||||
import sqlalchemy as sa
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# revision identifiers, used by Alembic.
|
||||
revision: str = 'ee8508d98d34'
|
||||
down_revision: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = '87a0c640355c'
|
||||
branch_labels: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
|
||||
depends_on: Union[str, Sequence[str], None] = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def upgrade() -> None:
|
||||
"""Upgrade schema."""
|
||||
# ### commands auto generated by Alembic - please adjust! ###
|
||||
op.create_table('bug_reports',
|
||||
sa.Column('id', sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
|
||||
sa.Column('description', sa.Text(), nullable=False),
|
||||
sa.Column('contact', sa.String(length=256), nullable=True),
|
||||
sa.Column('user_id', sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
|
||||
sa.Column('resolved', sa.Boolean(), nullable=False),
|
||||
sa.Column('created_at', sa.DateTime(), nullable=False),
|
||||
sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(['user_id'], ['users.id'], ),
|
||||
sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint('id')
|
||||
)
|
||||
# ### end Alembic commands ###
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def downgrade() -> None:
|
||||
"""Downgrade schema."""
|
||||
# ### commands auto generated by Alembic - please adjust! ###
|
||||
op.drop_table('bug_reports')
|
||||
# ### end Alembic commands ###
|
||||
@@ -91,6 +91,54 @@ async def test_pending_balance_matches_confirmed_when_nothing_in_flight(session_
|
||||
assert pending_balance == 2_000_000_000
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_pending_balance_does_not_double_count_change_already_credited(session_factory):
|
||||
"""The Electrum listener (event-driven) and the confirmation poller (10s
|
||||
cadence) independently react to the same change output confirming. When the
|
||||
listener wins that race — the common case — the change is already a
|
||||
UtxoEvent inside cached_balance_sats while the PendingTransaction row is
|
||||
still "pending". compute_pending_balance must not add the change a second
|
||||
time in that window."""
|
||||
user_id = await _make_funded_user(session_factory, 4, 1_500_000_000)
|
||||
client = FakeElectrumClient()
|
||||
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
user = await session.get(User, user_id)
|
||||
await place_bet(session, client, user)
|
||||
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
pending = (await session.scalars(select(PendingTransaction))).one()
|
||||
from embit.transaction import Transaction
|
||||
|
||||
from app.wallet.plm_network import PLM_MAINNET
|
||||
|
||||
tx = Transaction.parse(bytes.fromhex(pending.raw_tx_hex))
|
||||
change_vout, change_out = next(
|
||||
(i, out) for i, out in enumerate(tx.vout) if out.script_pubkey.address(network=PLM_MAINNET) == user.address
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
user = await session.get(User, user_id)
|
||||
# Simulate the listener having already credited the change output as
|
||||
# confirmed, before the poller has flipped `pending.status`.
|
||||
session.add(
|
||||
UtxoEvent(
|
||||
user_id=user_id,
|
||||
txid=pending.current_txid,
|
||||
vout=change_vout,
|
||||
amount_sats=change_out.value,
|
||||
confirmed_height=101,
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
await recompute_balance(session, user_id)
|
||||
await session.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
user = await session.get(User, user_id)
|
||||
pending_balance, has_pending = await compute_pending_balance(session, user)
|
||||
|
||||
assert has_pending is True # the PendingTransaction row is still "pending"
|
||||
assert pending_balance == user.cached_balance_sats # already-credited change isn't added again
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_pending_balance_ignores_other_users_pending_transactions(session_factory):
|
||||
user_id = await _make_funded_user(session_factory, 2, 2_000_000_000)
|
||||
other_user_id = await _make_funded_user(session_factory, 3, 1_500_000_000)
|
||||
|
||||
+127
-1
@@ -1,15 +1,17 @@
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
|
||||
|
||||
import pytest
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import select
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import func, select
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker, create_async_engine
|
||||
|
||||
from app.bets.service import BetError, place_bet
|
||||
from app.config import settings
|
||||
from app.db.base import Base
|
||||
from app.db.models import AuditLog, PendingTransaction, Round, RoundConfig, RoundParticipant, User, UtxoEvent
|
||||
from app.rounds.events import broadcaster
|
||||
from app.rounds.service import open_new_round_if_needed
|
||||
from app.wallet.hd import derive_user_address
|
||||
from app.wallet.psbt_builder import MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND, MAX_TX_INPUTS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class FakeElectrumClient:
|
||||
@@ -91,6 +93,103 @@ async def test_place_bet_rejects_insufficient_balance(session_factory):
|
||||
await place_bet(session, client, user)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_place_bet_reports_a_too_fragmented_balance_distinctly(session_factory): # B-48
|
||||
# 100 x 0.15 PLM = 15 PLM, plenty for a 10 PLM bet, but the 50 largest inputs
|
||||
# only add up to 7.5 PLM — so the build must fail with its own code, not with
|
||||
# the "you have no funds" one, and must carry the cap for the translation.
|
||||
user_id = await _make_funded_user(session_factory, 20, 15_000_000)
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
for i in range(99):
|
||||
session.add(
|
||||
UtxoEvent(
|
||||
user_id=user_id,
|
||||
txid=f"{i:064x}",
|
||||
vout=0,
|
||||
amount_sats=15_000_000,
|
||||
confirmed_height=100,
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
await session.commit()
|
||||
client = FakeElectrumClient()
|
||||
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
user = await session.get(User, user_id)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(BetError) as excinfo:
|
||||
await place_bet(session, client, user)
|
||||
|
||||
assert excinfo.value.code == "too_many_inputs"
|
||||
assert excinfo.value.params == {"max_inputs": MAX_TX_INPUTS}
|
||||
assert not client.broadcasted
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _fill_round_with_participants(session_factory, round_id: int, count: int) -> None:
|
||||
"""Participant rows only, no real bets: what the cap counts is rows, and building
|
||||
`count` genuine transactions would just make the test slow without exercising
|
||||
anything the other tests don't already cover."""
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
for i in range(count):
|
||||
session.add(
|
||||
RoundParticipant(
|
||||
round_id=round_id,
|
||||
user_id=10_000 + i, # placeholder ids; the cap check never joins users
|
||||
bet_amount_sats=1_000_000_000,
|
||||
bet_txid=f"{i:064x}",
|
||||
status="confirmed",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
await session.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_place_bet_rejects_the_bet_past_the_participant_cap(session_factory): # B-52
|
||||
"""The payout has to spend one pool UTXO per bet, so a round is only ever allowed
|
||||
to grow to what a single payout transaction can drain. Enforced here, before the
|
||||
player's money moves — not discovered at payout time, when the bets are already in
|
||||
the pool and the round can no longer be paid at all."""
|
||||
user_id = await _make_funded_user(session_factory, 30, 3_000_000_000)
|
||||
client = FakeElectrumClient()
|
||||
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
round_ = await open_new_round_if_needed(session)
|
||||
await session.commit()
|
||||
round_id = round_.id
|
||||
await _fill_round_with_participants(session_factory, round_id, MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND)
|
||||
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
user = await session.get(User, user_id)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(BetError) as excinfo:
|
||||
await place_bet(session, client, user)
|
||||
|
||||
assert excinfo.value.code == "round_full"
|
||||
assert excinfo.value.params == {"max_participants": MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND}
|
||||
assert not client.broadcasted
|
||||
|
||||
# Refused cleanly: no participant row, and the user's UTXO is still spendable.
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
assert await session.scalar(
|
||||
select(func.count()).select_from(RoundParticipant).where(RoundParticipant.round_id == round_id)
|
||||
) == MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND
|
||||
utxo = (await session.scalars(select(UtxoEvent).where(UtxoEvent.user_id == user_id))).one()
|
||||
assert utxo.spent_txid is None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_place_bet_still_accepts_the_last_slot_under_the_cap(session_factory): # B-52
|
||||
user_id = await _make_funded_user(session_factory, 31, 3_000_000_000)
|
||||
client = FakeElectrumClient()
|
||||
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
round_ = await open_new_round_if_needed(session)
|
||||
await session.commit()
|
||||
round_id = round_.id
|
||||
await _fill_round_with_participants(session_factory, round_id, MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND - 1)
|
||||
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
user = await session.get(User, user_id)
|
||||
participant = await place_bet(session, client, user)
|
||||
|
||||
assert participant.status == "broadcast"
|
||||
assert client.broadcasted
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_place_bet_rejects_second_bet_same_round(session_factory):
|
||||
user_id = await _make_funded_user(session_factory, 2, 3_000_000_000)
|
||||
client = FakeElectrumClient()
|
||||
@@ -166,6 +265,33 @@ async def test_failed_broadcast_leaves_nothing_behind(session_factory):
|
||||
assert "bet_placed" not in events
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_failed_broadcast_publishes_an_sse_update(session_factory): # B-49
|
||||
"""The rollback moves as much state as the successful path does, so it must ping
|
||||
the dashboards the same way — otherwise the phantom bet stays on screen until the
|
||||
next poll."""
|
||||
user_id = await _make_funded_user(session_factory, 21, 3_000_000_000)
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
# Open the round up front: place_bet would otherwise open it itself, and that
|
||||
# publish() would satisfy the assertion below whether or not the rollback ever
|
||||
# published one of its own.
|
||||
await open_new_round_if_needed(session)
|
||||
await session.commit()
|
||||
|
||||
queue = broadcaster.subscribe()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
while not queue.empty():
|
||||
queue.get_nowait()
|
||||
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
user = await session.get(User, user_id)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(BetError, match="refused"):
|
||||
await place_bet(session, RejectingElectrumClient(), user)
|
||||
|
||||
assert not queue.empty()
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
broadcaster.unsubscribe(queue)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_failed_broadcast_reports_the_broadcast_failed_code(session_factory):
|
||||
user_id = await _make_funded_user(session_factory, 5, 3_000_000_000)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
|
||||
import pytest
|
||||
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
|
||||
from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient
|
||||
|
||||
from app.config import settings
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.fixture
|
||||
async def client(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "database_url", f"sqlite+aiosqlite:///{tmp_path}/test.db")
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "admin_token", "test-admin-token")
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "jwt_secret", "test-jwt-secret")
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "xprv_encryption_key", Fernet.generate_key().decode())
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "master_key_path", str(tmp_path / "master.xprv.enc"))
|
||||
|
||||
import app.wallet.hd as hd
|
||||
|
||||
hd._account_key = None
|
||||
hd.generate_master_key()
|
||||
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker, create_async_engine
|
||||
|
||||
from app.db import base as db_base
|
||||
|
||||
import app.db.models # noqa: F401
|
||||
|
||||
db_base.engine = create_async_engine(settings.database_url)
|
||||
db_base.AsyncSessionLocal = async_sessionmaker(db_base.engine, expire_on_commit=False)
|
||||
|
||||
from app.db import session as db_session
|
||||
|
||||
db_session.AsyncSessionLocal = db_base.AsyncSessionLocal
|
||||
|
||||
async with db_base.engine.begin() as conn:
|
||||
await conn.run_sync(db_base.Base.metadata.create_all)
|
||||
|
||||
from fastapi import FastAPI
|
||||
|
||||
from app.api.routes.admin import router as admin_router
|
||||
from app.api.routes.bug_reports import router as bug_reports_router
|
||||
from app.auth.routes import router as auth_router
|
||||
from app.electrum.listener import ElectrumListener
|
||||
|
||||
app = FastAPI()
|
||||
app.include_router(auth_router)
|
||||
app.include_router(bug_reports_router)
|
||||
app.include_router(admin_router)
|
||||
app.state.electrum_listener = ElectrumListener(lambda endpoint: None, db_base.AsyncSessionLocal)
|
||||
|
||||
transport = ASGITransport(app=app)
|
||||
async with AsyncClient(transport=transport, base_url="http://test") as ac:
|
||||
yield ac
|
||||
|
||||
await db_base.engine.dispose()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_ADMIN_HEADERS = {"X-Admin-Token": "test-admin-token"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _register(client, username="alice", password="original-password"):
|
||||
resp = await client.post("/auth/register", json={"username": username, "password": password})
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 201
|
||||
return resp.json()["access_token"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_anonymous_bug_report_has_no_user(client):
|
||||
resp = await client.post("/bug-reports", json={"description": "the bet button does nothing"})
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 201
|
||||
|
||||
resp = await client.get("/admin/bug-reports", headers=_ADMIN_HEADERS)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 200
|
||||
reports = resp.json()
|
||||
assert len(reports) == 1
|
||||
assert reports[0]["description"] == "the bet button does nothing"
|
||||
assert reports[0]["user_id"] is None
|
||||
assert reports[0]["username"] is None
|
||||
assert reports[0]["status"] == "open"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_logged_in_bug_report_is_attributed_to_the_user(client):
|
||||
token = await _register(client)
|
||||
|
||||
resp = await client.post(
|
||||
"/bug-reports",
|
||||
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
|
||||
json={"description": "withdrawal amount looks wrong", "contact": "alice@example.com"},
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 201
|
||||
|
||||
resp = await client.get("/admin/bug-reports", headers=_ADMIN_HEADERS)
|
||||
reports = resp.json()
|
||||
assert reports[0]["username"] == "alice"
|
||||
assert reports[0]["contact"] == "alice@example.com"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_user_can_see_own_report_status(client):
|
||||
token = await _register(client)
|
||||
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
|
||||
|
||||
resp = await client.post("/bug-reports", headers=headers, json={"description": "some bug"})
|
||||
report_id = resp.json()["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
resp = await client.get("/bug-reports/mine", headers=headers)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 200
|
||||
reports = resp.json()
|
||||
assert len(reports) == 1
|
||||
assert reports[0]["id"] == report_id
|
||||
assert reports[0]["status"] == "open"
|
||||
|
||||
await client.post(
|
||||
f"/admin/bug-reports/{report_id}/status", headers=_ADMIN_HEADERS, json={"status": "read"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
resp = await client.get("/bug-reports/mine", headers=headers)
|
||||
assert resp.json()[0]["status"] == "read"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_bug_reports_mine_requires_auth(client):
|
||||
resp = await client.get("/bug-reports/mine")
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 401
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_bug_reports_mine_only_returns_own_reports(client):
|
||||
alice_token = await _register(client, username="alice")
|
||||
bob_token = await _register(client, username="bob", password="bob-password")
|
||||
|
||||
await client.post(
|
||||
"/bug-reports", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {alice_token}"}, json={"description": "alice's bug"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
resp = await client.get("/bug-reports/mine", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {bob_token}"})
|
||||
assert resp.json() == []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_blank_description_is_rejected(client):
|
||||
resp = await client.post("/bug-reports", json={"description": " "})
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 422
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_admin_bug_reports_requires_token(client):
|
||||
resp = await client.get("/admin/bug-reports")
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 403
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_admin_can_move_through_open_read_resolved(client):
|
||||
resp = await client.post("/bug-reports", json={"description": "some bug"})
|
||||
report_id = resp.json()["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
resp = await client.post(
|
||||
f"/admin/bug-reports/{report_id}/status", headers=_ADMIN_HEADERS, json={"status": "read"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 200
|
||||
assert resp.json()["status"] == "read"
|
||||
|
||||
resp = await client.post(
|
||||
f"/admin/bug-reports/{report_id}/status", headers=_ADMIN_HEADERS, json={"status": "resolved"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 200
|
||||
assert resp.json()["status"] == "resolved"
|
||||
|
||||
resp = await client.post(
|
||||
f"/admin/bug-reports/{report_id}/status", headers=_ADMIN_HEADERS, json={"status": "open"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 200
|
||||
assert resp.json()["status"] == "open"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_update_status_rejects_unknown_value(client):
|
||||
resp = await client.post("/bug-reports", json={"description": "some bug"})
|
||||
report_id = resp.json()["id"]
|
||||
|
||||
resp = await client.post(
|
||||
f"/admin/bug-reports/{report_id}/status", headers=_ADMIN_HEADERS, json={"status": "bogus"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 422
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_update_status_unknown_report_is_404(client):
|
||||
resp = await client.post(
|
||||
"/admin/bug-reports/999/status", headers=_ADMIN_HEADERS, json={"status": "read"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert resp.status_code == 404
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,15 @@ from embit.bip32 import HDKey
|
||||
from embit.transaction import Transaction
|
||||
|
||||
from app.wallet.plm_network import PLM_MAINNET
|
||||
from app.wallet.psbt_builder import InsufficientFundsError, Utxo, build_payout_transaction, estimate_vsize
|
||||
from app.wallet.psbt_builder import (
|
||||
MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND,
|
||||
MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS,
|
||||
MAX_TX_INPUTS,
|
||||
InsufficientFundsError,
|
||||
Utxo,
|
||||
build_payout_transaction,
|
||||
estimate_vsize,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _key(seed_byte: int) -> HDKey:
|
||||
@@ -75,6 +83,55 @@ def test_payout_adds_change_output_when_pool_utxos_exceed_target():
|
||||
assert len(parsed.vout) == 3
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_payout_spends_more_utxos_than_a_user_transaction_may(): # B-52
|
||||
"""The pool holds one UTXO per bet, so a round with more participants than
|
||||
MAX_TX_INPUTS used to be impossible to pay out: select_utxos raised
|
||||
too_many_inputs, the round stayed "paying_out" retrying every 60s forever, and
|
||||
since no new round may open while one is active, the lottery stopped for good.
|
||||
The payout gets its own, far higher cap for exactly this reason."""
|
||||
pool_key = _key(40)
|
||||
pool_script = script.p2wpkh(pool_key.to_public())
|
||||
pool_address = pool_script.address(network=PLM_MAINNET)
|
||||
winner_address = script.p2wpkh(_key(41).to_public()).address(network=PLM_MAINNET)
|
||||
fee_address = script.p2wpkh(_key(42).to_public()).address(network=PLM_MAINNET)
|
||||
|
||||
# One 10 PLM bet per participant, one UTXO each, just past the user-facing cap.
|
||||
participants = MAX_TX_INPUTS + 1
|
||||
bet_sats = 1_000_000_000
|
||||
pool_amount = bet_sats * participants
|
||||
winner_share = pool_amount * 70 // 100
|
||||
commission = pool_amount - winner_share
|
||||
utxos = [Utxo(f"{i:064x}", 0, bet_sats) for i in range(participants)]
|
||||
|
||||
built = build_payout_transaction(
|
||||
signing_key=pool_key,
|
||||
from_script=pool_script,
|
||||
utxos=utxos,
|
||||
winner_address=winner_address,
|
||||
winner_share_sats=winner_share,
|
||||
fee_address=fee_address,
|
||||
commission_sats=commission,
|
||||
change_address=pool_address,
|
||||
fee_rate_sat_vb=1,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
assert len(built.spent_utxos) == participants # every bet had to be spent
|
||||
parsed = Transaction.parse(bytes.fromhex(built.raw_hex))
|
||||
assert len(parsed.vin) == participants
|
||||
assert built.fee_sats == estimate_vsize(participants, 3)
|
||||
assert built.winner_sats == winner_share - built.fee_sats
|
||||
assert built.commission_sats == commission # still untouched by the fee
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_payout_at_the_participant_cap_stays_well_inside_relay_limits(): # B-52
|
||||
"""MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND is only safe if the payout it implies is still a
|
||||
standard transaction. A full round is one input per bet plus the pool's own
|
||||
change, and relay policy refuses anything past 100 kvB."""
|
||||
inputs_needed = MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND + 1 # + one accumulated pool change UTXO
|
||||
assert inputs_needed <= MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS # headroom for pool change exists
|
||||
assert estimate_vsize(MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS, 3) < 100_000
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_payout_raises_when_winner_share_too_small():
|
||||
pool_key = _key(30)
|
||||
pool_script = script.p2wpkh(pool_key.to_public())
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ from embit.transaction import Transaction
|
||||
|
||||
from app.wallet.plm_network import PLM_MAINNET
|
||||
from app.wallet.psbt_builder import (
|
||||
MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS,
|
||||
MAX_TX_INPUTS,
|
||||
InsufficientFundsError,
|
||||
Utxo,
|
||||
build_signed_transaction,
|
||||
@@ -36,6 +38,49 @@ def test_select_utxos_raises_when_insufficient():
|
||||
select_utxos(utxos, target_sats=10_000_000)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_select_utxos_never_exceeds_the_input_cap(): # B-48
|
||||
# 200 dust-ish UTXOs that together cover the target, but only past the cap.
|
||||
utxos = [Utxo(f"{i:064x}", 0, 100_000) for i in range(200)]
|
||||
with pytest.raises(InsufficientFundsError) as excinfo:
|
||||
select_utxos(utxos, target_sats=100_000 * MAX_TX_INPUTS + 1)
|
||||
assert excinfo.value.code == "too_many_inputs"
|
||||
assert excinfo.value.params == {"max_inputs": MAX_TX_INPUTS}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_select_utxos_allows_exactly_the_input_cap():
|
||||
utxos = [Utxo(f"{i:064x}", 0, 100_000) for i in range(200)]
|
||||
selected, total = select_utxos(utxos, target_sats=100_000 * MAX_TX_INPUTS)
|
||||
assert len(selected) == MAX_TX_INPUTS
|
||||
assert total == 100_000 * MAX_TX_INPUTS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_select_utxos_honours_a_caller_supplied_cap(): # B-52
|
||||
"""The cap is per-caller: MAX_TX_INPUTS protects a user from a fee eating into
|
||||
their own bet/withdrawal, while the payout needs MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS to be able
|
||||
to drain a pool holding one UTXO per bet at all."""
|
||||
utxos = [Utxo(f"{i:064x}", 0, 100_000) for i in range(MAX_TX_INPUTS + 10)]
|
||||
target = 100_000 * (MAX_TX_INPUTS + 10)
|
||||
|
||||
with pytest.raises(InsufficientFundsError):
|
||||
select_utxos(utxos, target_sats=target) # default cap: too fragmented
|
||||
|
||||
selected, total = select_utxos(utxos, target_sats=target, max_inputs=MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS)
|
||||
assert len(selected) == MAX_TX_INPUTS + 10
|
||||
assert total == target
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_select_utxos_still_caps_at_the_payout_limit(): # B-52
|
||||
utxos = [Utxo(f"{i:064x}", 0, 100_000) for i in range(MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS + 5)]
|
||||
with pytest.raises(InsufficientFundsError) as excinfo:
|
||||
select_utxos(
|
||||
utxos,
|
||||
target_sats=100_000 * (MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS + 1),
|
||||
max_inputs=MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS,
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert excinfo.value.code == "too_many_inputs"
|
||||
assert excinfo.value.params == {"max_inputs": MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def test_build_signed_transaction_deducts_fee_from_amount_not_change():
|
||||
signer = _key(1)
|
||||
from_script = script.p2wpkh(signer.to_public())
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
|
||||
|
||||
import pytest
|
||||
from embit.transaction import Transaction
|
||||
from sqlalchemy import select
|
||||
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker, create_async_engine
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,6 +9,7 @@ from app.config import settings
|
||||
from app.db.base import Base
|
||||
from app.db.models import AuditLog, PendingTransaction, Round, RoundConfig, User
|
||||
from app.rounds.scheduler import RoundScheduler, _reserved_payout_outpoints
|
||||
from app.wallet.psbt_builder import MAX_TX_INPUTS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class FakeListener:
|
||||
@@ -155,6 +157,40 @@ async def test_trigger_payout_persists_before_broadcasting(payout_session_factor
|
||||
assert "payout_sent" in events
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_trigger_payout_pays_a_round_with_more_participants_than_max_tx_inputs(
|
||||
payout_session_factory,
|
||||
): # B-52
|
||||
"""End-to-end shape of the deadlock this fixes: the pool holds one UTXO per bet,
|
||||
so a round past MAX_TX_INPUTS participants could not be paid at all — the build
|
||||
failed with too_many_inputs, the round stayed "paying_out" retrying every 60s,
|
||||
and no new round could ever open behind it. It must now broadcast normally."""
|
||||
await _seed_paying_out_round(payout_session_factory)
|
||||
|
||||
participants = MAX_TX_INPUTS + 1
|
||||
bet_sats = _POOL_AMOUNT_SATS // participants
|
||||
entries = [
|
||||
{"tx_hash": f"{i:064x}", "tx_pos": 0, "height": 10, "value": bet_sats}
|
||||
for i in range(participants)
|
||||
]
|
||||
# The pool's total must cover the round's recorded pool_amount_sats, exactly as
|
||||
# on-chain: integer division above leaves a remainder, so top the last one up.
|
||||
entries[-1]["value"] += _POOL_AMOUNT_SATS - bet_sats * participants
|
||||
client = FakePayoutClient(entries)
|
||||
scheduler = RoundScheduler(payout_session_factory, FakePayoutListener(client))
|
||||
|
||||
await scheduler._trigger_payout(1)
|
||||
|
||||
assert client.broadcasted
|
||||
async with payout_session_factory() as session:
|
||||
pending = (await session.scalars(select(PendingTransaction))).one()
|
||||
assert pending.status == "pending"
|
||||
assert len(Transaction.parse(bytes.fromhex(pending.raw_tx_hex)).vin) == participants
|
||||
|
||||
events = [e.event_type for e in (await session.scalars(select(AuditLog))).all()]
|
||||
assert "payout_sent" in events
|
||||
assert "payout_failed" not in events
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_trigger_payout_broadcast_failure_leaves_a_recoverable_row(payout_session_factory):
|
||||
"""Before B-25, a broadcast rejection here left nothing behind — no payout_txid,
|
||||
no PendingTransaction — because everything was persisted only after the
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from app.bets.service import place_bet
|
||||
from app.config import settings
|
||||
from app.db.base import Base
|
||||
from app.db.models import PendingTransaction, User, UtxoEvent, Withdrawal
|
||||
from app.rounds.events import broadcaster
|
||||
from app.wallet.hd import derive_user_address
|
||||
from app.withdrawals.service import WithdrawalError, request_withdrawal
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -171,6 +172,31 @@ async def test_withdrawal_to_own_address_is_rejected(session_factory):
|
||||
assert (await session.scalars(select(UtxoEvent).where(UtxoEvent.user_id == user_id))).one().spent_txid is None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_failed_broadcast_publishes_an_sse_update(session_factory): # B-49
|
||||
"""The released UTXOs are spendable again and the balance changed back, so the
|
||||
rollback must nudge the dashboard to refetch instead of leaving it stale until
|
||||
its next poll."""
|
||||
user_id = await _make_funded_user(session_factory, 10, 3_000_000_000)
|
||||
|
||||
class RejectingClient:
|
||||
async def broadcast(self, raw_tx_hex: str) -> str:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("min relay fee not met")
|
||||
|
||||
queue = broadcaster.subscribe()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
while not queue.empty():
|
||||
queue.get_nowait()
|
||||
|
||||
async with session_factory() as session:
|
||||
user = await session.get(User, user_id)
|
||||
with pytest.raises(WithdrawalError, match="refused"):
|
||||
await request_withdrawal(session, RejectingClient(), user, derive_user_address(98), 1_000_000_000)
|
||||
|
||||
assert not queue.empty()
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
broadcaster.unsubscribe(queue)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def test_failed_broadcast_marks_the_withdrawal_failed_and_frees_the_coins(session_factory):
|
||||
"""B-07/B-08: the Withdrawal row is kept (unlike a bet) so the user can see the
|
||||
instruction didn't go through, but the coins must come back."""
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user