# SITE_ADDRESS is the domain to serve (e.g. lottery.example.com) — Caddy # automatically requests a Let's Encrypt certificate for it. # # Left at the default "localhost" (dev mode, no domain), Caddy detects it's # not a public hostname and issues a locally-trusted self-signed certificate # instead, via its internal CA. Browsers will still warn on first visit # unless that CA is explicitly trusted — expected for local/dev use. {$SITE_ADDRESS:localhost} { encode gzip # B-43: Caddy adds none of these on its own. The session cookie is HttpOnly, but a CSP is # still the main mitigation against injected script. 'unsafe-inline' stays for now because # Django Admin uses inline scripts and styles; the pages of the new site (roadmap A5-A8) # are written without them so the policy can be tightened for them later. header { Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" X-Frame-Options "DENY" Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; object-src 'none'" } # B-54: Caddy *appends* the real peer address to whatever X-Forwarded-For the # client sent, so without this the header arrives as ", " and every IP-keyed control in the app (the login and # registration throttles of B-33, the SSE per-IP subscriber cap of B-38) is # defeated by simply rotating a fake value per request. Overwriting the header # with the actual peer makes the app's assumption true at the source; it also # reads the last hop rather than the first, so the two defences hold independently. reverse_proxy web:8000 { header_up X-Forwarded-For {remote_host} } }