from dataclasses import dataclass

from embit import script
from embit.bip32 import HDKey
from embit.finalizer import finalize_psbt
from embit.psbt import PSBT
from embit.transaction import Transaction, TransactionInput, TransactionOutput

# Standard P2WPKH size estimates (vbytes): 10.5-byte overhead (version+counts+locktime+
# segwit marker/flag), ~68 vbytes per input, ~31 vbytes per output. Used to size the fee
# before signing (fee only needs to be "minimized ~1 sat/vB", not maximally precise).
_TX_OVERHEAD_VBYTES = 11
_P2WPKH_INPUT_VBYTES = 68
_P2WPKH_OUTPUT_VBYTES = 31

# BIP125 opt-in RBF: any sequence < 0xfffffffe signals replaceability. Set on every
# input we create so a stuck tx can later be fee-bumped (tx/broadcast.py, stage 9).
RBF_SEQUENCE = 0xFFFFFFFD

# Below this, an output costs more to spend than it's worth and relay policy rejects
# the whole transaction as "dust" — so a small change amount must be left to the fee
# instead of being paid back to ourselves. 294 sat is the standard P2WPKH threshold
# (the output's own 31 vbytes plus the 67-vbyte input needed to spend it, at the
# 3000 sat/kvB dust relay fee). Creating such an output used to make the bet or
# withdrawal fail at broadcast with an opaque error (B-06).
DUST_LIMIT_SATS = 294

# Sanity ceiling on any transaction's fee rate — shared by RoundConfig.fee_rate_sat_vb's
# admin-facing bound (app/api/routes/admin.py, so the two can't drift apart, the same
# reason MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH is shared in auth/security.py) and tx/broadcast.py's RBF
# bump escalation, which refuses to bump a pending_transaction past this rate (B-32) —
# without a ceiling, a stuck transaction's fee climbed by 1 sat/vB every bump forever,
# eating further and further into the sender's change with no limit.
MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB = 10_000

# Ceiling on how many UTXOs one *user* transaction (bet, withdrawal) may spend (B-48).
# Every extra input costs ~68 vbytes of fee, and that fee comes out of the amount being
# moved — so an address fragmented into hundreds of small deposits would silently erode
# its own bet (shrinking the user's share of the pool) or withdrawal. Failing the build
# with a translatable error is the honest outcome; consolidating the address is the way
# out. This is a *user-protection* limit, which is why the payout gets its own, far
# higher one below.
MAX_TX_INPUTS = 50

# Ceiling on the payout's inputs (B-52). The payout is not a user spending their own
# fragmented balance: it drains the pool, whose UTXO count is simply the number of bets
# in the round, and its fee comes out of a 70% share of that whole pool. So the erosion
# argument behind MAX_TX_INPUTS doesn't apply here — 400 inputs at 1 sat/vB cost ~27_300
# sat, i.e. ~0.00027 PLM out of the winner's share — and reusing that limit was what made
# any round past ~50 participants unpayable: select_utxos raised too_many_inputs, the
# round stayed "paying_out" retrying forever, and since no new round may open while one
# is active, the whole lottery stopped with the pool stuck (B-52).
#
# What actually bounds this is relay policy: a non-standard transaction is refused at
# broadcast past 100 kvB, which at ~68 vbytes per input is ~1470 inputs. 500 stays at
# roughly a third of that budget, and signing that many inputs costs ~0.4s of event loop
# (measured), once per round, inside a background task.
MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS = 500

# The most participants one round may hold (B-52). Enforced where the money is not yet
# committed — app/bets/service.py refuses the bet — instead of being discovered at payout
# time, when the bets are already in the pool and there is no way back. Deliberately below
# MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS: the payout also has to be able to spend whatever change UTXOs
# earlier rounds left in the pool, so the gap is the headroom for those.
MAX_PARTICIPANTS_PER_ROUND = 400


class InsufficientFundsError(Exception):
    """`code` is the machine-readable identifier the API layer forwards to the
    client so it can translate the failure (see app/api/errors.py); the message
    itself stays English, and `params` carries the values it interpolates so the
    translation can place them wherever its own grammar needs them."""

    def __init__(
        self,
        message: str,
        code: str = "insufficient_balance",
        **params: int | str,
    ) -> None:
        super().__init__(message)
        self.code = code
        self.params = params


@dataclass
class Utxo:
    txid: str
    vout: int
    amount_sats: int


@dataclass
class BuiltTransaction:
    raw_hex: str
    txid: str
    fee_sats: int
    recipient_sats: int
    change_sats: int
    spent_utxos: list[Utxo]


def estimate_vsize(n_inputs: int, n_outputs: int) -> int:
    return _TX_OVERHEAD_VBYTES + n_inputs * _P2WPKH_INPUT_VBYTES + n_outputs * _P2WPKH_OUTPUT_VBYTES


def select_utxos(
    utxos: list[Utxo], target_sats: int, max_inputs: int = MAX_TX_INPUTS
) -> tuple[list[Utxo], int]:
    """Greedily select UTXOs (largest first, to minimize input count) covering
    target_sats — the amount deducted from the sender's balance. The fee is paid
    out of target_sats (see build_signed_transaction), not added on top of it.

    At most `max_inputs` are ever selected (B-48): if the largest `max_inputs`
    UTXOs don't cover the target, the balance is there but too fragmented to spend
    in one transaction, which is a different failure from having no funds at all
    and gets its own code.

    The cap is a parameter, not the constant it used to be, because the two callers
    want different ones (B-52): MAX_TX_INPUTS protects a user from a fee that would
    eat into their own bet/withdrawal, while the payout drains a pool holding one
    UTXO per bet and needs MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS to be able to pay a full round at
    all."""
    ordered = sorted(utxos, key=lambda u: u.amount_sats, reverse=True)
    selected: list[Utxo] = []
    total = 0
    for utxo in ordered:
        if len(selected) == max_inputs:
            raise InsufficientFundsError(
                f"balance too fragmented: more than {max_inputs} inputs would be needed",
                code="too_many_inputs",
                max_inputs=max_inputs,
            )
        selected.append(utxo)
        total += utxo.amount_sats
        if total >= target_sats:
            return selected, total
    raise InsufficientFundsError("not enough confirmed balance to cover amount")


def build_signed_transaction(
    *,
    signing_key: HDKey,
    from_script: script.Script,
    utxos: list[Utxo],
    to_address: str,
    amount_sats: int,
    change_address: str,
    fee_rate_sat_vb: int,
) -> BuiltTransaction:
    """Build, sign and finalize a single-recipient P2WPKH transaction with change
    back to change_address.

    `amount_sats` is deducted from the sender's balance in full: the recipient
    receives `amount_sats - fee`, change = total_in - amount_sats. This matches the
    spec everywhere a single-recipient tx is used (bet, withdrawal): "fee deducted
    from the amount being moved", not paid on top by the sender.

    A change amount below DUST_LIMIT_SATS is dropped and left to the fee — paying it
    back to ourselves would produce an unrelayable transaction. The fee estimate
    already assumes two outputs, so dropping one never underpays.
    """
    selected, total_in = select_utxos(utxos, amount_sats)
    fee = estimate_vsize(len(selected), 2) * fee_rate_sat_vb
    recipient_amount = amount_sats - fee
    if recipient_amount <= 0:
        raise InsufficientFundsError(
            "amount too small to cover the network fee", code="amount_below_network_fee"
        )
    change = total_in - amount_sats
    if change < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
        fee += change  # dust change is unspendable and unrelayable — miners get it
        change = 0
    if recipient_amount < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
        raise InsufficientFundsError(
            "amount too small to be sent (dust)", code="amount_below_dust_limit"
        )

    # TransactionInput.txid is natural/display byte order (as in tx_hash from Electrum);
    # embit reverses it internally when serializing to wire format.
    vin = [TransactionInput(bytes.fromhex(u.txid), u.vout, sequence=RBF_SEQUENCE) for u in selected]
    vout = [TransactionOutput(recipient_amount, script.Script.from_address(to_address))]
    if change > 0:
        vout.append(TransactionOutput(change, script.Script.from_address(change_address)))

    tx = Transaction(vin=vin, vout=vout)
    psbt = PSBT(tx)
    for i, utxo in enumerate(selected):
        psbt.inputs[i].witness_utxo = TransactionOutput(utxo.amount_sats, from_script)

    signed_count = psbt.sign_with(signing_key)
    if signed_count != len(selected):
        raise RuntimeError(f"expected {len(selected)} signatures, got {signed_count}")

    final_tx = finalize_psbt(psbt)
    if final_tx is None:
        raise RuntimeError("failed to finalize PSBT")

    raw = final_tx.serialize()
    return BuiltTransaction(
        raw_hex=raw.hex(),
        txid=final_tx.txid().hex(),
        fee_sats=fee,
        recipient_sats=recipient_amount,
        change_sats=change,
        spent_utxos=selected,
    )


@dataclass
class PayoutTransaction:
    raw_hex: str
    txid: str
    fee_sats: int
    winner_sats: int
    commission_sats: int
    change_sats: int
    spent_utxos: list[Utxo]


def build_payout_transaction(
    *,
    signing_key: HDKey,
    from_script: script.Script,
    utxos: list[Utxo],
    winner_address: str,
    winner_share_sats: int,
    fee_address: str,
    commission_sats: int,
    change_address: str,
    fee_rate_sat_vb: int,
) -> PayoutTransaction:
    """Build, sign and finalize the round payout: pool -> winner + fee address,
    with change back to the pool itself. Per spec, only the winner's share
    absorbs the tx fee — the commission (fee_address) output is untouched.

    As in build_signed_transaction, dust-sized pool change is left to the fee
    rather than creating an unrelayable output (B-06).

    Selection uses MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS, not the much stricter user-facing
    MAX_TX_INPUTS (B-52) — the pool holds one UTXO per bet, so the user-protection
    cap made every round past ~50 participants impossible to pay."""
    target = winner_share_sats + commission_sats
    selected, total_in = select_utxos(utxos, target, max_inputs=MAX_PAYOUT_TX_INPUTS)
    fee = estimate_vsize(len(selected), 3) * fee_rate_sat_vb  # winner + commission + pool change
    winner_amount = winner_share_sats - fee
    if winner_amount < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
        raise InsufficientFundsError(
            "winner share too small to cover the network fee", code="winner_share_below_network_fee"
        )
    if commission_sats < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
        raise InsufficientFundsError(
            "commission share too small to be paid out (dust)", code="commission_below_dust_limit"
        )
    change = total_in - target
    if change < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
        fee += change
        change = 0

    vin = [TransactionInput(bytes.fromhex(u.txid), u.vout, sequence=RBF_SEQUENCE) for u in selected]
    vout = [
        TransactionOutput(winner_amount, script.Script.from_address(winner_address)),
        TransactionOutput(commission_sats, script.Script.from_address(fee_address)),
    ]
    if change > 0:
        vout.append(TransactionOutput(change, script.Script.from_address(change_address)))

    tx = Transaction(vin=vin, vout=vout)
    psbt = PSBT(tx)
    for i, utxo in enumerate(selected):
        psbt.inputs[i].witness_utxo = TransactionOutput(utxo.amount_sats, from_script)

    signed_count = psbt.sign_with(signing_key)
    if signed_count != len(selected):
        raise RuntimeError(f"expected {len(selected)} signatures, got {signed_count}")

    final_tx = finalize_psbt(psbt)
    if final_tx is None:
        raise RuntimeError("failed to finalize PSBT")

    raw = final_tx.serialize()
    return PayoutTransaction(
        raw_hex=raw.hex(),
        txid=final_tx.txid().hex(),
        fee_sats=fee,
        winner_sats=winner_amount,
        commission_sats=commission_sats,
        change_sats=change,
        spent_utxos=selected,
    )