poll_once and reconcile.py's existence check both called
blockchain.transaction.get(txid, verbose=True). Several Electrum server
implementations and versions reject the verbose flag outright
("verbose transactions are currently unsupported"), which would have
meant no confirmations and no reconciliation ever running against such
a server, read as a plain transport error. reconcile.py additionally
decided whether to abandon a transaction - releasing its funds - by
substring-matching the error text ("missing", "not found", ...), which
only works against ElectrumX's specific wording.
Both now ask blockchain.scripthash.get_history for the address that
owns every input of the transaction (a user's own address for a
bet/withdrawal, the pool address for a payout) and look for the txid in
the result: present with height > 0 means confirmed, present with
height <= 0 means still in the mempool, absent means the server
doesn't know it. get_history is a plain, universally-supported Electrum
method, and "not in the list" replaces the old substring-matching
entirely - no more guessing at error wording to decide whether to
release funds. History is cached per scripthash within one pass, since
every "payout" row shares the same pool address.
New app/tx/pending_address.py factors out own_address_for (the
address derivation was previously duplicated informally inside
tx/broadcast.py's signing context) so confirmation.py and reconcile.py
share one definition instead of two that could compute different
addresses for the same row.
tests/unit/test_confirmation.py and test_reconcile.py needed real User
rows and a master-key bootstrap they didn't have before, since address
derivation is now exercised for real rather than assumed. Suite grows
from 217 to 222 tests. BUGS.md moves B-41 to Previously fixed - no
Medium-severity finding remains open.
225 lines
10 KiB
Python
225 lines
10 KiB
Python
import asyncio
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import itertools
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import json
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import ssl
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from typing import NamedTuple
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class ElectrumEndpoint(NamedTuple):
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"""One server to connect to. The listener rotates over a list of these so a
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single unreachable or misbehaving server doesn't take the platform down —
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every consumer of PLM chain data goes through this one connection."""
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host: str
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port: int
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use_ssl: bool = True
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def __str__(self) -> str:
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return f"{self.host}:{self.port}{'' if self.use_ssl else ' (plaintext)'}"
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def parse_endpoints(
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primary_host: str, primary_port: int, primary_use_ssl: bool, fallback_spec: str
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) -> list[ElectrumEndpoint]:
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"""Build the connection rotation: the primary server first, then whatever
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ELECTRUM_FALLBACK_SERVERS lists.
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`fallback_spec` is comma-separated, each entry `host:port` (TLS, the normal
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case) or `host:port:notls`. Malformed entries raise ValueError rather than
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being skipped: a typo in a fallback server is something to fix at startup,
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not to discover during an outage, when the fallback is what's needed.
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Duplicates are dropped, keeping first position.
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"""
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endpoints = [ElectrumEndpoint(primary_host, primary_port, primary_use_ssl)]
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for raw in fallback_spec.split(","):
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entry = raw.strip()
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if not entry:
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continue
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parts = entry.split(":")
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if len(parts) not in (2, 3):
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raise ValueError(f"invalid Electrum server {entry!r}: expected host:port[:notls]")
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host, port = parts[0].strip(), parts[1].strip()
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if not host or not port.isdigit():
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raise ValueError(f"invalid Electrum server {entry!r}: expected host:port[:notls]")
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use_ssl = True
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if len(parts) == 3:
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flag = parts[2].strip().lower()
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if flag not in ("ssl", "tls", "notls", "plain"):
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raise ValueError(f"invalid TLS flag {flag!r} in Electrum server {entry!r}")
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use_ssl = flag in ("ssl", "tls")
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endpoints.append(ElectrumEndpoint(host, int(port), use_ssl))
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deduped: list[ElectrumEndpoint] = []
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for endpoint in endpoints:
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if endpoint not in deduped:
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deduped.append(endpoint)
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return deduped
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# Every request is bounded: without this, a half-open socket (the peer vanished
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# without a FIN, or the read loop died — see _read_loop) leaves `await future`
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# hanging forever, and with it whatever was awaiting the call. That used to be
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# unbounded, which meant a POST /bets could hang while holding the per-user lock
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# and the confirmation poller could stop polling permanently.
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_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 15
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class ElectrumError(Exception):
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pass
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class ElectrumClient:
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"""Minimal asyncio Electrum protocol client: line-delimited JSON-RPC over TLS.
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Push notifications (blockchain.headers.subscribe, blockchain.scripthash.subscribe)
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arrive under the *same* method name as the subscribe call, multiplexed for every
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scripthash subscribed — callers read `notifications(method)` and, for scripthash
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pushes, dispatch on `params[0]` (the scripthash) themselves.
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A dead connection is observable rather than silent: `wait_closed()` resolves as
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soon as the read loop terminates for any reason, which is what lets
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ElectrumListener notice the drop and reconnect instead of waiting forever on
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notification queues nobody will ever fill again.
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"""
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def __init__(self, host: str, port: int, use_ssl: bool = True):
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self.host = host
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self.port = port
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self.use_ssl = use_ssl
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self._reader: asyncio.StreamReader | None = None
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self._writer: asyncio.StreamWriter | None = None
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self._id_counter = itertools.count(1)
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self._pending: dict[int, asyncio.Future] = {}
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self._subscriptions: dict[str, asyncio.Queue] = {}
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self._read_task: asyncio.Task | None = None
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self._closed = asyncio.Event()
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async def connect(self) -> None:
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# Electrum servers commonly present self-signed certs; the protocol's trust
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# model is server consensus, not TLS PKI, so we only use SSL for transport
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# encryption and don't verify the certificate chain/hostname.
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ssl_context = None
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if self.use_ssl:
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ssl_context = ssl.create_default_context()
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ssl_context.check_hostname = False
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ssl_context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
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self._reader, self._writer = await asyncio.open_connection(self.host, self.port, ssl=ssl_context)
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self._read_task = asyncio.create_task(self._read_loop())
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await self.request("server.version", ["plm-lottery", "1.4"])
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async def close(self) -> None:
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self._closed.set()
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if self._read_task is not None:
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self._read_task.cancel()
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if self._writer is not None:
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self._writer.close()
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try:
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await asyncio.wait_for(self._writer.wait_closed(), timeout=2)
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except (ssl.SSLError, TimeoutError, asyncio.TimeoutError, ConnectionError):
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pass # some Electrum servers don't send a clean TLS close_notify
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async def wait_closed(self) -> None:
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"""Resolves once this connection is gone — read loop finished (peer closed,
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protocol error, TLS failure) or close() was called. ElectrumListener races
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this against its notification consumers so a drop triggers a reconnect."""
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await self._closed.wait()
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async def request(self, method: str, params: list | None = None) -> object:
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if self._writer is None or self._closed.is_set():
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raise ElectrumError("not connected")
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request_id = next(self._id_counter)
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future: asyncio.Future = asyncio.get_running_loop().create_future()
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self._pending[request_id] = future
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payload = json.dumps({"id": request_id, "method": method, "params": params or []}) + "\n"
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try:
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self._writer.write(payload.encode())
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await self._writer.drain()
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except (ConnectionError, ssl.SSLError, OSError) as exc:
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self._pending.pop(request_id, None)
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self._closed.set()
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raise ElectrumError(f"write failed: {exc}") from exc
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try:
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return await asyncio.wait_for(future, timeout=_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
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except (TimeoutError, asyncio.TimeoutError) as exc:
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self._pending.pop(request_id, None)
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# A server that owes us a reply and never sends one is indistinguishable
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# from a dead socket, and retrying on the same connection would keep
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# hitting it — tear it down so the listener reconnects.
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self._closed.set()
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raise ElectrumError(f"{method} timed out after {_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_SECONDS}s") from exc
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async def ping(self) -> None:
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"""Keepalive: Electrum servers drop idle connections (commonly after ~10
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minutes), which on a quiet instance would otherwise be the normal way this
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connection dies. Called periodically by ElectrumListener."""
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await self.request("server.ping")
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def notifications(self, method: str) -> asyncio.Queue:
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return self._subscriptions.setdefault(method, asyncio.Queue())
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async def subscribe_headers(self) -> dict:
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self.notifications("blockchain.headers.subscribe")
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return await self.request("blockchain.headers.subscribe")
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async def subscribe_scripthash(self, scripthash: str) -> str | None:
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self.notifications("blockchain.scripthash.subscribe")
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return await self.request("blockchain.scripthash.subscribe", [scripthash])
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async def listunspent(self, scripthash: str) -> list[dict]:
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return await self.request("blockchain.scripthash.listunspent", [scripthash])
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async def get_history(self, scripthash: str) -> list[dict]:
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"""Every transaction touching `scripthash`, each as {"tx_hash", "height"} —
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height > 0 means confirmed at that height, height <= 0 means still in the
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mempool. Used instead of blockchain.transaction.get's verbose=True mode
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for confirmation/existence checks (B-41): several Electrum server
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implementations and versions reject the verbose flag outright ("verbose
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transactions are currently unsupported"), while get_history is a plain,
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universally-supported method every server must implement.
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"""
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return await self.request("blockchain.scripthash.get_history", [scripthash])
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async def broadcast(self, raw_tx_hex: str) -> str:
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return await self.request("blockchain.transaction.broadcast", [raw_tx_hex])
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async def get_transaction(self, txid: str, verbose: bool = False) -> object:
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return await self.request("blockchain.transaction.get", [txid, verbose])
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async def _read_loop(self) -> None:
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assert self._reader is not None
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try:
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while True:
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line = await self._reader.readline()
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if not line:
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break
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message = json.loads(line)
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self._dispatch(message)
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finally:
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# Whatever ended this loop — clean EOF, protocol error, TLS failure — the
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# connection is unusable from here on. Setting this is what makes the
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# death observable to wait_closed(), and so to the listener's reconnect
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# logic; without it the listener waited on notification queues nobody
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# would ever fill again, forever (B-01).
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self._closed.set()
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error = ElectrumError("connection closed")
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for future in self._pending.values():
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if not future.done():
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future.set_exception(error)
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self._pending.clear()
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def _dispatch(self, message: dict) -> None:
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message_id = message.get("id")
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if message_id is not None and message_id in self._pending:
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future = self._pending.pop(message_id)
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if future.done():
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return
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if message.get("error"):
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future.set_exception(ElectrumError(message["error"]))
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else:
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future.set_result(message.get("result"))
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elif "method" in message:
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queue = self._subscriptions.get(message["method"])
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if queue is not None:
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queue.put_nowait(message.get("params"))
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