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davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 a3c51719bd Confirm transactions by merkle proof and reinstate coins only on a quorum (B-83, TX-06, TX-22, TX-23, ELC-25, ELC-26, DEP-02, DEP-08, AUD-18, ADR-07)
poll_once marked a transaction confirmed on one server's `height > 0`, and
reinstate_reappeared_utxos restored a coin written off as spent outside the platform on
the active server's word alone, so a hostile active server could report a
never-relayed payout as confirmed (winner unpaid, round closed) or put a spent coin
back into a balance.

- electrum/merkle.py: pure merkle-branch verification against a block header.
- ElectrumListener.confirmation_proven(txid, height): the *other* servers are asked for
  blockchain.transaction.get_merkle; a strict majority of at least the quorum minimum
  must return a proof that recomputes to the merkle root of that block's header (block
  height and position checked too). The header is the tip the listener holds, or for an
  older block the one a majority of the quorum agrees on and that meets its own target;
  a height above our tip cannot be proven. Quorum rules are _corroborate_majority's.
- poll_once takes the listener as `network`: the active server's history only nominates
  a candidate (txid, height); the row confirms only when the proof holds, and stays
  pending otherwise. With no network nothing confirms. ConfirmationPoller wires it.
- The reconciler's late-confirmation check of failed rows (B-78) now puts each claimed
  (txid, height) to the same proof instead of counting histories.
- refresh_user splits reinstatement like a credit: find_reinstate_candidates (read-only;
  same outpoint, recorded amount, confirmed) -> corroborate_utxo_reinstatement (same
  quorum as a credit) -> reinstate_reappeared_utxos writes only what was corroborated,
  rechecking the mark under the lock. Nothing is committed in the read phase any more.
- Broadcast fan-out, the third part of the finding, shipped with B-76.

Tests changed because the spec changed: every poll_once call now passes a network that
proves (FakeNetwork) — the confirmation tests are otherwise unchanged; the failed-row
"quorum does not confirm" test now asserts the claim goes to the proof.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-14 15:29:30 +02:00

58 lines
2.4 KiB
Python

"""Merkle proofs (B-83, TX-22, ELC-26).
`blockchain.transaction.get_merkle` answers with the branch that links a transaction to
its block's merkle root. Checking it against a header **we hold** is what turns "a server
says this tx is at height h" into something a hostile server cannot fake without mining.
"""
import hashlib
_HEADER_LENGTH_BYTES = 80
_MERKLE_ROOT_OFFSET = 36
_MERKLE_ROOT_LENGTH = 32
_MAX_BRANCH_LENGTH = 40 # 2^40 transactions in a block is already absurd
def _sha256d(data: bytes) -> bytes:
return hashlib.sha256(hashlib.sha256(data).digest()).digest()
def header_merkle_root(header_hex: str) -> bytes:
"""The merkle root committed to by a raw 80-byte header, in internal byte order."""
header = bytes.fromhex(header_hex)
if len(header) != _HEADER_LENGTH_BYTES:
raise ValueError(f"a block header is {_HEADER_LENGTH_BYTES} bytes, got {len(header)}")
return header[_MERKLE_ROOT_OFFSET : _MERKLE_ROOT_OFFSET + _MERKLE_ROOT_LENGTH]
def merkle_root_from_branch(txid: str, branch: list[str], position: int) -> bytes:
"""The merkle root (internal byte order) a transaction `txid` at index `position` of
its block reaches through `branch` — the sibling hashes, bottom-up, in the display
order Electrum uses for txids."""
if position < 0 or len(branch) > _MAX_BRANCH_LENGTH or position >> len(branch):
raise ValueError("merkle position does not fit the branch")
current = bytes.fromhex(txid)[::-1]
index = position
for sibling_hex in branch:
sibling = bytes.fromhex(sibling_hex)[::-1]
if len(sibling) != 32:
raise ValueError("merkle branch element is not 32 bytes")
current = _sha256d(sibling + current) if index & 1 else _sha256d(current + sibling)
index >>= 1
return current
def proof_matches_header(txid: str, height: int, proof: object, header_hex: str) -> bool:
"""Does `proof` — a `get_merkle` reply — put `txid` in the block at `height` whose
header is `header_hex`? Any malformed reply is simply "no"."""
try:
if not isinstance(proof, dict) or int(proof["block_height"]) != height:
return False
branch = proof["merkle"]
if not isinstance(branch, list):
return False
root = merkle_root_from_branch(txid, [str(item) for item in branch], int(proof["pos"]))
return root == header_merkle_root(header_hex)
except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
return False