Files
plm-lottery/app/withdrawals/service.py
T
davide e7f844b11f Publish an SSE update from the bet/withdrawal rollback paths (B-49)
_release_failed_bet and _release_failed_withdrawal restored the balance, freed
the reserved UTXOs and (for a bet) removed the participant without calling
broadcaster.publish(), so every dashboard kept showing the phantom bet and the
reduced balance until its next poll — while the success path and the
reconciler's own abandon path both published.

The two regression tests pre-open the round before subscribing: place_bet opens
one itself, and that publish() would otherwise satisfy the assertion whether or
not the rollback published anything.
2026-07-27 23:35:10 +02:00

177 lines
6.9 KiB
Python

from embit import script
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from app.api.errors import ApiError
from app.audit.log import write_audit_log
from app.db.models import PendingTransaction, User, UtxoEvent, Withdrawal
from app.electrum.client import ElectrumClient
from app.rounds.config import get_round_config
from app.rounds.events import broadcaster
from app.wallet.address import is_valid_plm_address
from app.wallet.balance import compute_pending_balance, recompute_balance
from app.wallet.hd import derive_user_key
from app.wallet.psbt_builder import (
BuiltTransaction,
InsufficientFundsError,
Utxo,
build_signed_transaction,
)
class WithdrawalError(ApiError):
pass
async def request_withdrawal(
session: AsyncSession, client: ElectrumClient, user: User, external_address: str, amount_sats: int
) -> Withdrawal:
# Checked before anything else: an address from another chain parses fine as a
# witness program (see wallet/address.py), so without this the tx would build,
# broadcast and be irrecoverable rather than fail.
if not is_valid_plm_address(external_address):
raise WithdrawalError("invalid_address", "not a valid PLM bech32 address")
# Withdrawing to your own deposit address is a no-op that costs a network fee,
# and it breaks two things that assume the recipient and the change are
# distinguishable by address: the RBF bump would shrink the recipient output
# instead of the change (tx/broadcast.py:_find_change_output), and
# compute_pending_balance would count the amount twice (B-17).
if external_address == user.address:
raise WithdrawalError(
"withdrawal_to_own_address",
"that is your own deposit address — withdraw to an external wallet instead",
)
config = await get_round_config(session)
if amount_sats < config.bet_amount_sats:
raise WithdrawalError(
"amount_below_minimum",
f"amount below the minimum of {config.bet_amount_sats} sats",
minimum_sats=config.bet_amount_sats,
)
unspent = (
await session.scalars(
select(UtxoEvent).where(UtxoEvent.user_id == user.id, UtxoEvent.spent_txid.is_(None))
)
).all()
confirmed_sats = sum(u.amount_sats for u in unspent)
if confirmed_sats < amount_sats:
# B-37: cached_balance_sats (== confirmed_sats here) can understate the real
# balance by a whole unconfirmed change output right after a bet/withdrawal —
# the UI shows pending_balance_sats instead (compute_pending_balance), which
# can cover an amount this check would otherwise reject as flatly
# "insufficient". Distinguish "you don't have the money" from "your money
# hasn't confirmed yet" so the error doesn't contradict what the user is
# looking at on screen.
pending_inclusive_sats, has_pending = await compute_pending_balance(session, user)
if has_pending and pending_inclusive_sats >= amount_sats:
raise WithdrawalError(
"balance_pending_confirmation",
"the requested amount is covered by your pending balance, which has not confirmed yet",
pending_sats=pending_inclusive_sats - confirmed_sats,
)
raise WithdrawalError("insufficient_balance", "insufficient balance", required_sats=amount_sats)
user_key = derive_user_key(user.derivation_index)
from_script = script.p2wpkh(user_key.to_public())
utxos = [Utxo(u.txid, u.vout, u.amount_sats) for u in unspent]
try:
built = build_signed_transaction(
signing_key=user_key,
from_script=from_script,
utxos=utxos,
to_address=external_address,
amount_sats=amount_sats,
change_address=user.address,
fee_rate_sat_vb=config.fee_rate_sat_vb,
)
except InsufficientFundsError as exc:
raise WithdrawalError(exc.code, str(exc), **exc.params) from exc
# Persist the intent before broadcasting, and only promote the rows once the
# network has accepted the tx — same two-phase shape as place_bet (B-08).
spent_by_key = {(u.txid, u.vout): u for u in unspent}
for spent in built.spent_utxos:
spent_by_key[(spent.txid, spent.vout)].spent_txid = built.txid
await recompute_balance(session, user.id)
withdrawal = Withdrawal(
user_id=user.id,
external_address=external_address,
amount_requested_sats=amount_sats,
amount_sent_sats=built.recipient_sats,
txid=built.txid,
status="building",
)
session.add(withdrawal)
await session.flush()
pending = PendingTransaction(
kind="withdrawal",
withdrawal_id=withdrawal.id,
user_id=user.id,
current_txid=built.txid,
fee_rate_sat_vb=config.fee_rate_sat_vb,
raw_tx_hex=built.raw_hex,
status="building",
)
session.add(pending)
await session.commit()
try:
await client.broadcast(built.raw_hex)
except Exception as exc:
await _release_failed_withdrawal(session, withdrawal, pending, built, user.id, str(exc))
raise WithdrawalError(
"broadcast_failed", f"the network refused the transaction: {exc}"
) from exc
withdrawal.status = "broadcast"
pending.status = "pending"
await write_audit_log(
session,
"withdrawal_sent",
{"txid": built.txid, "amount_sent_sats": built.recipient_sats, "external_address": external_address},
user_id=user.id,
)
await session.commit()
await session.refresh(withdrawal)
broadcaster.publish() # balance just went "pending" — nudge the dashboard to refetch
return withdrawal
async def _release_failed_withdrawal(
session: AsyncSession,
withdrawal: Withdrawal,
pending: PendingTransaction,
built: BuiltTransaction,
user_id: int,
reason: str,
) -> None:
"""Nothing reached the chain, so free the reserved UTXOs and restore the balance.
The Withdrawal row is kept (marked "failed") rather than deleted: unlike a bet, a
withdrawal is an instruction the user gave, and they should be able to see that it
didn't go through."""
for spent in built.spent_utxos:
row = await session.scalar(
select(UtxoEvent).where(UtxoEvent.txid == spent.txid, UtxoEvent.vout == spent.vout)
)
if row is not None:
row.spent_txid = None
withdrawal.status = "failed"
withdrawal.txid = None
pending.status = "failed"
pending.failure_reason = reason[:128]
await recompute_balance(session, user_id)
await write_audit_log(
session,
"withdrawal_broadcast_failed",
{"txid": built.txid, "reason": reason[:200]},
user_id=user_id,
)
await session.commit()
broadcaster.publish() # the reserved UTXOs are spendable again — refetch the balance (B-49)