plm-lottery/app/api/routes/admin.py

import json
import secrets

from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Header, HTTPException, Query, status
from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator
from sqlalchemy import select, update
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession

from app.api.errors import http_error
from app.api.timeutil import isoformat_utc
from app.audit.log import write_audit_log
from app.auth.security import hash_password_async
from app.config import settings
from app.db.models import AuditLog, BugReport, PendingTransaction, Round, User
from app.db.session import get_session
from app.rounds.config import get_round_config
from app.rounds.pause import pause_by_operator
from app.rounds.service import get_active_round, payout_config_problem
from app.wallet.address import is_valid_plm_address
from app.wallet.hd import derive_user_wif
from app.wallet.psbt_builder import MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB

router = APIRouter(prefix="/admin", tags=["admin"])


async def require_admin(x_admin_token: str = Header(default="")) -> None:
    # An unset ADMIN_TOKEN denies everything — checked first, since compare_digest
    # on two empty strings returns True and would otherwise open the panel to
    # anyone on an instance that never configured a token.
    if not settings.admin_token:
        raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, "invalid admin token")
    # compare_digest raises TypeError on a str containing non-ASCII characters
    # (B-46) -- comparing the UTF-8 bytes instead accepts any input safely.
    if not secrets.compare_digest(x_admin_token.encode(), settings.admin_token.encode()):
        raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, "invalid admin token")


# `paused` is deliberately NOT here: it has its own audit-logged endpoints
# (/admin/pause, /admin/resume), and accepting it on PUT /config as well gave the
# operator an unlogged way to stop the lottery (B-10). It stays in the response
# model, so the dashboard still reads its current value from here.
_CONFIG_FIELDS = (
    "fee_address",
    "bet_amount_sats",
    "round_duration_seconds",
    "round_cooldown_seconds",
    "fee_rate_sat_vb",
    "rbf_timeout_seconds",
    "draw_animation_seconds",
    "deposit_confirmations",  # B-82 (DAT-62)
    "draw_confirmations",  # B-73 (DAT-62)
    "max_round_pool_sats",  # B-95 (DAT-62)
)


class RoundConfigResponse(BaseModel):
    fee_address: str
    bet_amount_sats: int
    round_duration_seconds: int
    round_cooldown_seconds: int
    fee_rate_sat_vb: int
    rbf_timeout_seconds: int
    draw_animation_seconds: int
    deposit_confirmations: int  # B-82 (DAT-62)
    draw_confirmations: int  # B-73 (DAT-62)
    max_round_pool_sats: int  # B-95 (DAT-62)
    paused: bool
    paused_reason: str | None = None  # B-78 (DAT-69): why, or None when not paused


class RoundConfigUpdate(BaseModel):
    """Bounds are enforced here rather than trusting the operator: a value like
    fee_rate_sat_vb=0 produces transactions no node will relay (stalling every bet,
    payout and withdrawal), and round_duration_seconds=0 expires a round the instant
    it opens. `paused` is not accepted — see _CONFIG_FIELDS."""

    # An unvalidated fee_address was the worst of the lot: a malformed one wedged the
    # payout with an unhandled EmbitError, and a well-formed *foreign* one (bc1...)
    # parses fine as a witness program, so every round's 30 % commission would be
    # broadcast to a script nobody holds the key for (B-05).
    fee_address: str | None = None
    bet_amount_sats: int | None = Field(default=None, gt=0, le=100_000 * 100_000_000)
    round_duration_seconds: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=30, le=7 * 24 * 3600)
    round_cooldown_seconds: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=24 * 3600)
    fee_rate_sat_vb: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=1, le=MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB)
    rbf_timeout_seconds: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=60, le=7 * 24 * 3600)
    draw_animation_seconds: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=600)
    deposit_confirmations: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=1, le=100)  # B-82 (DAT-62)
    draw_confirmations: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=1, le=20)  # B-73 (DAT-62)
    max_round_pool_sats: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=4_000_000_000_000_000)  # B-95 (DAT-62)

    @field_validator("fee_address")
    @classmethod
    def _validate_fee_address(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
        if value is None:
            return None
        value = value.strip()
        if not is_valid_plm_address(value):
            raise ValueError(
                "fee_address must be a valid PLM bech32 address (plm1...) — an address from "
                "another chain would send every round's commission somewhere unspendable"
            )
        return value


def _config_response(config) -> RoundConfigResponse:
    fields = {field: getattr(config, field) for field in _CONFIG_FIELDS}
    fields["paused"] = config.paused
    fields["paused_reason"] = config.paused_reason
    return RoundConfigResponse(**fields)


@router.get("/config", response_model=RoundConfigResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
async def read_config(session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)) -> RoundConfigResponse:
    config = await get_round_config(session)
    await session.commit()
    return _config_response(config)


@router.put("/config", response_model=RoundConfigResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
async def update_config(
    body: RoundConfigUpdate, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)
) -> RoundConfigResponse:
    config = await get_round_config(session)
    # Diff computed before assignment so the audit entry records both sides. Without
    # it, the most sensitive setting in the system (fee_address — where 30 % of every
    # pool goes) could be changed without leaving any trace at all (B-10).
    changes: dict[str, dict] = {}
    for field in _CONFIG_FIELDS:
        value = getattr(body, field)
        if value is None:
            continue
        previous = getattr(config, field)
        if previous == value:
            continue
        changes[field] = {"from": previous, "to": value}
        setattr(config, field, value)

    # B-79 (RND-40): a bet amount or fee rate under which a round could not be paid out is
    # refused before anything is written — the payout reads fee_rate_sat_vb at build time, so
    # a rate raised mid-round could otherwise make the round in progress unpayable.
    if "bet_amount_sats" in changes or "fee_rate_sat_vb" in changes:
        amounts = {config.bet_amount_sats}
        if "fee_rate_sat_vb" in changes:
            # B-95: the round in progress is paid with the bet amount it opened with, which may
            # differ from the one configured now — a higher fee rate has to leave *it* payable too.
            active = await get_active_round(session)
            if active is not None:
                amounts.add(active.bet_amount_sats)
        problem = next(
            (p for p in (payout_config_problem(a, config.fee_rate_sat_vb) for a in sorted(amounts)) if p), None
        )
        if problem is not None:
            await session.rollback()
            raise http_error(
                422,
                "config_not_payable",
                "this bet amount and fee rate would make a round impossible to pay out "
                f"({problem}); a larger bet amount or a lower fee rate is needed",
                reason=problem,
            )

    # B-95 (DAT-62): a cap below the price of one bet would refuse every bet of every round.
    if (
        ("max_round_pool_sats" in changes or "bet_amount_sats" in changes)
        and config.max_round_pool_sats
        and config.max_round_pool_sats < config.bet_amount_sats
    ):
        offending = {"max_round_pool_sats": config.max_round_pool_sats, "bet_amount_sats": config.bet_amount_sats}
        await session.rollback()
        raise http_error(
            422,
            "max_round_pool_below_bet_amount",
            "max_round_pool_sats must be 0 (no cap) or at least the bet amount",
            **offending,
        )

    if changes:
        await write_audit_log(session, "config_updated", changes)
    await session.commit()
    return _config_response(config)


class PauseRequest(BaseModel):
    note: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=256)


@router.post("/pause", response_model=RoundConfigResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
async def pause_lottery(
    body: PauseRequest | None = None, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)
) -> RoundConfigResponse:
    """Maintenance switch: the round in progress (if any) still closes, draws,
    and pays out its winner normally — only opening the *next* round is
    suppressed until /admin/resume is called (rounds/service.py).

    B-78 (DAT-69, API-32): the reason is "operator", except that an automatic reason
    already in force stays — it is the one that needs a look. The audit row always
    says `operator` for this call."""
    config = await pause_by_operator(session, body.note if body is not None else None)
    await session.commit()
    return _config_response(config)


@router.post("/resume", response_model=RoundConfigResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
async def resume_lottery(session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)) -> RoundConfigResponse:
    config = await get_round_config(session)
    # B-78 (AUD-12): the reason the resume took away, so the log says what the operator
    # agreed to resume (None when the lottery was not paused).
    lifted = config.paused_reason if config.paused else None
    config.paused = False
    config.paused_reason = None
    # B-82 (DAT-68, API-32): a payout held because the winner's bet left the chain is released
    # for a new attempt, which verifies the coins again, in the same transaction as the resume.
    await session.execute(update(Round).where(Round.payout_blocked_at.is_not(None)).values(payout_blocked_at=None))
    await write_audit_log(session, "lottery_resumed", {"reason": lifted})
    await session.commit()
    return _config_response(config)


class AdminUserResponse(BaseModel):
    id: int
    username: str
    address: str
    balance_sats: int
    created_at: str


@router.get("/users", response_model=list[AdminUserResponse], dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
async def list_users(session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)) -> list[AdminUserResponse]:
    users = (await session.scalars(select(User).order_by(User.id))).all()
    return [
        AdminUserResponse(
            id=u.id,
            username=u.username,
            address=u.address,
            balance_sats=u.cached_balance_sats,
            created_at=isoformat_utc(u.created_at),
        )
        for u in users
    ]


class AdminPrivkeyResponse(BaseModel):
    address: str
    wif: str


@router.get(
    "/users/{user_id}/privkey", response_model=AdminPrivkeyResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)]
)
async def user_privkey(user_id: int, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)) -> AdminPrivkeyResponse:
    """Exports a user's raw private key for manual intervention (e.g. sweeping
    funds back if something's stuck). Every access is audit-logged since this is
    the most sensitive data the platform holds."""
    user = await session.get(User, user_id)
    if user is None:
        raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, "user not found")

    wif = derive_user_wif(user.derivation_index)
    await write_audit_log(session, "admin_privkey_accessed", {"user_id": user_id}, user_id=user_id)
    await session.commit()
    return AdminPrivkeyResponse(address=user.address, wif=wif)


class AdminPasswordResetResponse(BaseModel):
    username: str
    new_password: str


@router.post(
    "/users/{user_id}/reset-password",
    response_model=AdminPasswordResetResponse,
    dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)],
)
async def reset_user_password(
    user_id: int, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)
) -> AdminPasswordResetResponse:
    """Admin-only password reset for a user who's locked out: passwords are
    Argon2-hashed (one-way), so an existing password can never be recovered or
    displayed — this generates and sets a brand new one instead, shown once so
    the admin can relay it to the user. There is no user-facing self-service
    reset; only an admin (via /admin, token-gated) can trigger this."""
    user = await session.get(User, user_id)
    if user is None:
        raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, "user not found")

    new_password = secrets.token_urlsafe(12)
    user.password_hash = await hash_password_async(new_password)
    # B-34: this endpoint exists precisely for the "account compromised" case —
    # without bumping token_version, whoever was already logged in (the
    # attacker, if that's who prompted the reset) stayed logged in on their
    # existing token until it naturally expired, unaffected by the reset.
    user.token_version += 1
    await write_audit_log(session, "admin_password_reset", {"user_id": user_id}, user_id=user_id)
    await session.commit()
    return AdminPasswordResetResponse(username=user.username, new_password=new_password)


class AdminRoundResponse(BaseModel):
    id: int
    status: str
    opened_at: str
    closed_at: str | None
    draw_block_height: int | None
    draw_block_hash: str | None
    winner_user_id: int | None
    winner_username: str | None
    pool_amount_sats: int | None
    winner_amount_sats: int | None
    fee_amount_sats: int | None
    payout_txid: str | None
    pool_address: str | None  # B-80
    server_seed_hash: str | None  # B-73 (API-36): the commitment only — never the secret
    draw_height: int | None  # B-73
    bump_reserve_sats: int | None  # B-79 (API-36)
    payout_blocked_at: str | None  # B-82 (API-36, DAT-68)


@router.get("/rounds", response_model=list[AdminRoundResponse], dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
async def list_rounds(
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session), limit: int = Query(default=50, ge=1, le=500)
) -> list[AdminRoundResponse]:
    rounds = (await session.scalars(select(Round).order_by(Round.id.desc()).limit(limit))).all()
    winner_ids = {r.winner_user_id for r in rounds if r.winner_user_id is not None}
    winners = {}
    if winner_ids:
        users = (await session.scalars(select(User).where(User.id.in_(winner_ids)))).all()
        winners = {u.id: u.username for u in users}

    return [
        AdminRoundResponse(
            id=r.id,
            status=r.status,
            opened_at=isoformat_utc(r.opened_at),
            closed_at=isoformat_utc(r.closed_at),
            draw_block_height=r.draw_block_height,
            draw_block_hash=r.draw_block_hash,
            winner_user_id=r.winner_user_id,
            winner_username=winners.get(r.winner_user_id) if r.winner_user_id is not None else None,
            pool_amount_sats=r.pool_amount_sats,
            winner_amount_sats=r.winner_amount_sats,
            fee_amount_sats=r.fee_amount_sats,
            payout_txid=r.payout_txid,
            pool_address=r.pool_address or None,
            server_seed_hash=r.server_seed_hash,
            draw_height=r.draw_height,
            bump_reserve_sats=r.bump_reserve_sats,
            payout_blocked_at=isoformat_utc(r.payout_blocked_at),
        )
        for r in rounds
    ]


class AdminAuditLogResponse(BaseModel):
    id: int
    event_type: str
    payload: dict
    user_id: int | None
    round_id: int | None
    created_at: str


@router.get(
    "/audit-log", response_model=list[AdminAuditLogResponse], dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)]
)
async def list_audit_log(
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session), limit: int = Query(default=200, ge=1, le=500)
) -> list[AdminAuditLogResponse]:
    entries = (await session.scalars(select(AuditLog).order_by(AuditLog.id.desc()).limit(limit))).all()
    return [
        AdminAuditLogResponse(
            id=e.id,
            event_type=e.event_type,
            payload=json.loads(e.payload_json),
            user_id=e.user_id,
            round_id=e.round_id,
            created_at=isoformat_utc(e.created_at),
        )
        for e in entries
    ]


class AdminPendingTransactionResponse(BaseModel):
    id: int
    kind: str
    status: str
    round_id: int | None
    withdrawal_id: int | None
    user_id: int | None
    current_txid: str
    fee_rate_sat_vb: int
    attempt_count: int
    broadcast_at: str
    replaced_by_txid: str | None


@router.get(
    "/pending-transactions",
    response_model=list[AdminPendingTransactionResponse],
    dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)],
)
async def list_pending_transactions(
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
    limit: int = Query(default=50, ge=1, le=500),
    status_filter: str | None = Query(default=None, alias="status"),
) -> list[AdminPendingTransactionResponse]:
    query = select(PendingTransaction).order_by(PendingTransaction.id.desc())
    if status_filter is not None:
        query = query.where(PendingTransaction.status == status_filter)
    entries = (await session.scalars(query.limit(limit))).all()
    return [
        AdminPendingTransactionResponse(
            id=p.id,
            kind=p.kind,
            status=p.status,
            round_id=p.round_id,
            withdrawal_id=p.withdrawal_id,
            user_id=p.user_id,
            current_txid=p.current_txid,
            fee_rate_sat_vb=p.fee_rate_sat_vb,
            attempt_count=p.attempt_count,
            broadcast_at=isoformat_utc(p.broadcast_at),
            replaced_by_txid=p.replaced_by_txid,
        )
        for p in entries
    ]


_BUG_REPORT_STATUSES = ("open", "read", "resolved")


class AdminBugReportResponse(BaseModel):
    id: int
    description: str
    contact: str | None
    user_id: int | None
    username: str | None
    status: str
    created_at: str


def _bug_report_response(report: BugReport, username: str | None) -> AdminBugReportResponse:
    return AdminBugReportResponse(
        id=report.id,
        description=report.description,
        contact=report.contact,
        user_id=report.user_id,
        username=username,
        status=report.status,
        created_at=isoformat_utc(report.created_at),
    )


@router.get(
    "/bug-reports", response_model=list[AdminBugReportResponse], dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)]
)
async def list_bug_reports(
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session), limit: int = Query(default=200, ge=1, le=500)
) -> list[AdminBugReportResponse]:
    reports = (await session.scalars(select(BugReport).order_by(BugReport.id.desc()).limit(limit))).all()
    user_ids = {r.user_id for r in reports if r.user_id is not None}
    usernames = {}
    if user_ids:
        users = (await session.scalars(select(User).where(User.id.in_(user_ids)))).all()
        usernames = {u.id: u.username for u in users}

    return [
        _bug_report_response(r, usernames.get(r.user_id) if r.user_id is not None else None)
        for r in reports
    ]


class BugReportStatusUpdate(BaseModel):
    status: str = Field(pattern="^(open|read|resolved)$")


@router.post(
    "/bug-reports/{report_id}/status",
    response_model=AdminBugReportResponse,
    dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)],
)
async def update_bug_report_status(
    report_id: int, body: BugReportStatusUpdate, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)
) -> AdminBugReportResponse:
    report = await session.get(BugReport, report_id)
    if report is None:
        raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, "bug report not found")

    # B-60: every other admin mutation (config edit, pause/resume, privkey export,
    # password reset) leaves a trace; this one silently marked a report `resolved`.
    # With one shared ADMIN_TOKEN and no per-admin identity, the audit log is the
    # only accountability there is. Before/after like config_updated, and nothing
    # written when the status doesn't actually change — re-clicking the status a
    # report already has isn't an event.
    if report.status != body.status:
        await write_audit_log(
            session,
            "bug_report_status_changed",
            {"report_id": report_id, "from": report.status, "to": body.status},
            user_id=report.user_id,
        )
        report.status = body.status
    await session.commit()

    username = None
    if report.user_id is not None:
        user = await session.get(User, report.user_id)
        username = user.username if user is not None else None

    return _bug_report_response(report, username)