Files
plm-lottery/app/wallet/psbt_builder.py
T
davide 17c557b8a3 Meet BIP125's relay minimum on every RBF bump, and cap the fee rate (B-32)
bump_fee computed fee_delta as new_fee - old_fee, falling back to a
flat 1-satoshi bump whenever that came out zero or negative - which
happened whenever old_fee (the actual fee paid, from real prevout
amounts) already exceeded the naive target, e.g. because dust change
had been folded into the original fee (psbt_builder.py's
DUST_LIMIT_SATS handling). A 1-satoshi total increase is nowhere near
BIP125 rule 4's minimum (the replacement must pay at least the
incremental relay fee rate times its own vsize more than what it
replaces), so the node rejected it every time - and since bump_fee
raised before touching `pending`, the next tick retried with identical
parameters every 30 seconds, forever. Separately, the fee rate climbed
by 1 sat/vB every bump with no ceiling.

fee_delta is now max(target_fee - old_fee, vsize * the incremental
relay rate) - always at least the relay-mandated minimum regardless of
what the naive arithmetic produces. pending.fee_rate_sat_vb is set to
the actual resulting rate rather than the naive target, so a later
bump's arithmetic starts from what's really being paid instead of
drifting from it. Once a transaction reaches MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB (a
new constant, 10,000 sat/vB, shared with RoundConfig.fee_rate_sat_vb's
existing admin-facing bound so the two can't drift apart - the same
reason MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH is shared elsewhere) bump_fee refuses to
bump further; the reconciler abandons it if it never confirms (B-27)
instead of this retrying forever.

Suite grows from 185 to 187 tests. BUGS.md moves B-32 to Previously
fixed.
2026-07-27 11:16:20 +02:00

229 lines
8.6 KiB
Python

from dataclasses import dataclass
from embit import script
from embit.bip32 import HDKey
from embit.finalizer import finalize_psbt
from embit.psbt import PSBT
from embit.transaction import Transaction, TransactionInput, TransactionOutput
# Standard P2WPKH size estimates (vbytes): 10.5-byte overhead (version+counts+locktime+
# segwit marker/flag), ~68 vbytes per input, ~31 vbytes per output. Used to size the fee
# before signing (fee only needs to be "minimized ~1 sat/vB", not maximally precise).
_TX_OVERHEAD_VBYTES = 11
_P2WPKH_INPUT_VBYTES = 68
_P2WPKH_OUTPUT_VBYTES = 31
# BIP125 opt-in RBF: any sequence < 0xfffffffe signals replaceability. Set on every
# input we create so a stuck tx can later be fee-bumped (tx/broadcast.py, stage 9).
RBF_SEQUENCE = 0xFFFFFFFD
# Below this, an output costs more to spend than it's worth and relay policy rejects
# the whole transaction as "dust" — so a small change amount must be left to the fee
# instead of being paid back to ourselves. 294 sat is the standard P2WPKH threshold
# (the output's own 31 vbytes plus the 67-vbyte input needed to spend it, at the
# 3000 sat/kvB dust relay fee). Creating such an output used to make the bet or
# withdrawal fail at broadcast with an opaque error (B-06).
DUST_LIMIT_SATS = 294
# Sanity ceiling on any transaction's fee rate — shared by RoundConfig.fee_rate_sat_vb's
# admin-facing bound (app/api/routes/admin.py, so the two can't drift apart, the same
# reason MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH is shared in auth/security.py) and tx/broadcast.py's RBF
# bump escalation, which refuses to bump a pending_transaction past this rate (B-32) —
# without a ceiling, a stuck transaction's fee climbed by 1 sat/vB every bump forever,
# eating further and further into the sender's change with no limit.
MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB = 10_000
class InsufficientFundsError(Exception):
"""`code` is the machine-readable identifier the API layer forwards to the
client so it can translate the failure (see app/api/errors.py); the message
itself stays English."""
def __init__(self, message: str, code: str = "insufficient_balance") -> None:
super().__init__(message)
self.code = code
@dataclass
class Utxo:
txid: str
vout: int
amount_sats: int
@dataclass
class BuiltTransaction:
raw_hex: str
txid: str
fee_sats: int
recipient_sats: int
change_sats: int
spent_utxos: list[Utxo]
def estimate_vsize(n_inputs: int, n_outputs: int) -> int:
return _TX_OVERHEAD_VBYTES + n_inputs * _P2WPKH_INPUT_VBYTES + n_outputs * _P2WPKH_OUTPUT_VBYTES
def select_utxos(utxos: list[Utxo], target_sats: int) -> tuple[list[Utxo], int]:
"""Greedily select UTXOs (largest first, to minimize input count) covering
target_sats — the amount deducted from the sender's balance. The fee is paid
out of target_sats (see build_signed_transaction), not added on top of it."""
ordered = sorted(utxos, key=lambda u: u.amount_sats, reverse=True)
selected: list[Utxo] = []
total = 0
for utxo in ordered:
selected.append(utxo)
total += utxo.amount_sats
if total >= target_sats:
return selected, total
raise InsufficientFundsError("not enough confirmed balance to cover amount")
def build_signed_transaction(
*,
signing_key: HDKey,
from_script: script.Script,
utxos: list[Utxo],
to_address: str,
amount_sats: int,
change_address: str,
fee_rate_sat_vb: int,
) -> BuiltTransaction:
"""Build, sign and finalize a single-recipient P2WPKH transaction with change
back to change_address.
`amount_sats` is deducted from the sender's balance in full: the recipient
receives `amount_sats - fee`, change = total_in - amount_sats. This matches the
spec everywhere a single-recipient tx is used (bet, withdrawal): "fee deducted
from the amount being moved", not paid on top by the sender.
A change amount below DUST_LIMIT_SATS is dropped and left to the fee — paying it
back to ourselves would produce an unrelayable transaction. The fee estimate
already assumes two outputs, so dropping one never underpays.
"""
selected, total_in = select_utxos(utxos, amount_sats)
fee = estimate_vsize(len(selected), 2) * fee_rate_sat_vb
recipient_amount = amount_sats - fee
if recipient_amount <= 0:
raise InsufficientFundsError(
"amount too small to cover the network fee", code="amount_below_network_fee"
)
change = total_in - amount_sats
if change < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
fee += change # dust change is unspendable and unrelayable — miners get it
change = 0
if recipient_amount < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
raise InsufficientFundsError(
"amount too small to be sent (dust)", code="amount_below_dust_limit"
)
# TransactionInput.txid is natural/display byte order (as in tx_hash from Electrum);
# embit reverses it internally when serializing to wire format.
vin = [TransactionInput(bytes.fromhex(u.txid), u.vout, sequence=RBF_SEQUENCE) for u in selected]
vout = [TransactionOutput(recipient_amount, script.Script.from_address(to_address))]
if change > 0:
vout.append(TransactionOutput(change, script.Script.from_address(change_address)))
tx = Transaction(vin=vin, vout=vout)
psbt = PSBT(tx)
for i, utxo in enumerate(selected):
psbt.inputs[i].witness_utxo = TransactionOutput(utxo.amount_sats, from_script)
signed_count = psbt.sign_with(signing_key)
if signed_count != len(selected):
raise RuntimeError(f"expected {len(selected)} signatures, got {signed_count}")
final_tx = finalize_psbt(psbt)
if final_tx is None:
raise RuntimeError("failed to finalize PSBT")
raw = final_tx.serialize()
return BuiltTransaction(
raw_hex=raw.hex(),
txid=final_tx.txid().hex(),
fee_sats=fee,
recipient_sats=recipient_amount,
change_sats=change,
spent_utxos=selected,
)
@dataclass
class PayoutTransaction:
raw_hex: str
txid: str
fee_sats: int
winner_sats: int
commission_sats: int
change_sats: int
spent_utxos: list[Utxo]
def build_payout_transaction(
*,
signing_key: HDKey,
from_script: script.Script,
utxos: list[Utxo],
winner_address: str,
winner_share_sats: int,
fee_address: str,
commission_sats: int,
change_address: str,
fee_rate_sat_vb: int,
) -> PayoutTransaction:
"""Build, sign and finalize the round payout: pool -> winner + fee address,
with change back to the pool itself. Per spec, only the winner's share
absorbs the tx fee — the commission (fee_address) output is untouched.
As in build_signed_transaction, dust-sized pool change is left to the fee
rather than creating an unrelayable output (B-06)."""
target = winner_share_sats + commission_sats
selected, total_in = select_utxos(utxos, target)
fee = estimate_vsize(len(selected), 3) * fee_rate_sat_vb # winner + commission + pool change
winner_amount = winner_share_sats - fee
if winner_amount < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
raise InsufficientFundsError(
"winner share too small to cover the network fee", code="winner_share_below_network_fee"
)
if commission_sats < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
raise InsufficientFundsError(
"commission share too small to be paid out (dust)", code="commission_below_dust_limit"
)
change = total_in - target
if change < DUST_LIMIT_SATS:
fee += change
change = 0
vin = [TransactionInput(bytes.fromhex(u.txid), u.vout, sequence=RBF_SEQUENCE) for u in selected]
vout = [
TransactionOutput(winner_amount, script.Script.from_address(winner_address)),
TransactionOutput(commission_sats, script.Script.from_address(fee_address)),
]
if change > 0:
vout.append(TransactionOutput(change, script.Script.from_address(change_address)))
tx = Transaction(vin=vin, vout=vout)
psbt = PSBT(tx)
for i, utxo in enumerate(selected):
psbt.inputs[i].witness_utxo = TransactionOutput(utxo.amount_sats, from_script)
signed_count = psbt.sign_with(signing_key)
if signed_count != len(selected):
raise RuntimeError(f"expected {len(selected)} signatures, got {signed_count}")
final_tx = finalize_psbt(psbt)
if final_tx is None:
raise RuntimeError("failed to finalize PSBT")
raw = final_tx.serialize()
return PayoutTransaction(
raw_hex=raw.hex(),
txid=final_tx.txid().hex(),
fee_sats=fee,
winner_sats=winner_amount,
commission_sats=commission_sats,
change_sats=change,
spent_utxos=selected,
)