Files
plm-lottery/app/tx/broadcast.py
T
davide 17c557b8a3 Meet BIP125's relay minimum on every RBF bump, and cap the fee rate (B-32)
bump_fee computed fee_delta as new_fee - old_fee, falling back to a
flat 1-satoshi bump whenever that came out zero or negative - which
happened whenever old_fee (the actual fee paid, from real prevout
amounts) already exceeded the naive target, e.g. because dust change
had been folded into the original fee (psbt_builder.py's
DUST_LIMIT_SATS handling). A 1-satoshi total increase is nowhere near
BIP125 rule 4's minimum (the replacement must pay at least the
incremental relay fee rate times its own vsize more than what it
replaces), so the node rejected it every time - and since bump_fee
raised before touching `pending`, the next tick retried with identical
parameters every 30 seconds, forever. Separately, the fee rate climbed
by 1 sat/vB every bump with no ceiling.

fee_delta is now max(target_fee - old_fee, vsize * the incremental
relay rate) - always at least the relay-mandated minimum regardless of
what the naive arithmetic produces. pending.fee_rate_sat_vb is set to
the actual resulting rate rather than the naive target, so a later
bump's arithmetic starts from what's really being paid instead of
drifting from it. Once a transaction reaches MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB (a
new constant, 10,000 sat/vB, shared with RoundConfig.fee_rate_sat_vb's
existing admin-facing bound so the two can't drift apart - the same
reason MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH is shared elsewhere) bump_fee refuses to
bump further; the reconciler abandons it if it never confirms (B-27)
instead of this retrying forever.

Suite grows from 185 to 187 tests. BUGS.md moves B-32 to Previously
fixed.
2026-07-27 11:16:20 +02:00

246 lines
12 KiB
Python

import asyncio
import logging
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from embit import script
from embit.psbt import PSBT
from embit.transaction import Transaction, TransactionInput, TransactionOutput
from embit.finalizer import finalize_psbt
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession, async_sessionmaker
from app.db.models import PendingTransaction, Round, RoundParticipant, User, UtxoEvent, Withdrawal
from app.electrum.client import ElectrumClient
from app.rounds.config import get_round_config
from app.wallet.hd import derive_pool_key, derive_user_key
from app.wallet.plm_network import PLM_MAINNET
from app.wallet.psbt_builder import MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB, RBF_SEQUENCE, estimate_vsize
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 30
_FEE_RATE_INCREMENT = 1 # how much pending.fee_rate_sat_vb's *target* rises by per bump
# BIP125 rule 4: a replacement transaction must pay at least this much more, in
# total, per vbyte of its own size, than the transaction it replaces — Bitcoin
# Core's default incremental relay fee. bump_fee's delta must never fall below
# this regardless of what the target-rate arithmetic comes out to (B-32).
_INCREMENTAL_RELAY_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB = 1
class RbfError(Exception):
pass
def should_bump(pending: PendingTransaction, now: datetime, timeout_seconds: int) -> bool:
"""Pure decision: has this pending tx gone unconfirmed for longer than the
configured timeout (RoundConfig.rbf_timeout_seconds) *since it was last
broadcast*? Kept separate from the I/O-heavy bump_fee() so it's trivially
unit-testable.
Deliberately measured from last_broadcast_at, not broadcast_at: this decides
whether *another* bump is due, which should reset after every bump (a tx just
rebroadcast at a higher fee deserves the same grace period again) — unlike
reconcile.py's abandon check, which must measure from the *first* broadcast so
repeated bumping can't indefinitely postpone ever giving up on a tx (B-27)."""
if pending.status != "pending":
return False
return now >= pending.last_broadcast_at.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc) + timedelta(seconds=timeout_seconds)
async def _signing_context(session: AsyncSession, pending: PendingTransaction) -> tuple:
"""Returns (signing_key, own_script, own_address) for the single sender that
controls every input of this tx — a user for bet/withdrawal, the pool for
payout. All our builders only ever spend one address's UTXOs per tx."""
if pending.kind == "payout":
key = derive_pool_key()
else:
user = await session.get(User, pending.user_id)
key = derive_user_key(user.derivation_index)
own_script = script.p2wpkh(key.to_public())
own_address = own_script.address(network=PLM_MAINNET)
return key, own_script, own_address
async def _prevout_amount(client: ElectrumClient, vin: TransactionInput) -> int:
txid_hex = vin.txid.hex()
tx = await client.get_transaction(txid_hex, verbose=True)
value_coins = tx["vout"][vin.vout]["value"]
return round(value_coins * 100_000_000)
def _find_change_output(tx: Transaction, change_address: str) -> int | None:
for i, out in enumerate(tx.vout):
if out.script_pubkey.address(network=PLM_MAINNET) == change_address:
return i
return None
async def bump_fee(session: AsyncSession, client: ElectrumClient, pending: PendingTransaction) -> str:
"""Rebuild `pending`'s transaction with a higher fee (same inputs, same
recipient outputs, the extra fee taken from the change output) and
rebroadcast. Returns the new txid.
Only handles the common case: exactly one change output paying back to the
tx's own sender address, large enough to absorb the increase. If there's no
such output (e.g. an exact-amount bet with no change), this raises RbfError —
bumping such a tx would require selecting additional inputs, which isn't
implemented for the MVP; it needs manual operator intervention. Also raises
RbfError, rather than bumping, once `pending` is already at MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB
(B-32) — the reconciler abandons it if it never confirms (B-27), instead of
this retrying an ever-higher fee forever.
"""
if pending.fee_rate_sat_vb >= MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB:
raise RbfError(
f"pending_transaction {pending.id}: already at the maximum fee rate "
f"({MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB} sat/vB) — refusing to bump further"
)
old_tx = Transaction.parse(bytes.fromhex(pending.raw_tx_hex))
signing_key, own_script, own_address = await _signing_context(session, pending)
input_amounts = [await _prevout_amount(client, vin) for vin in old_tx.vin]
total_in = sum(input_amounts)
old_fee = total_in - sum(o.value for o in old_tx.vout)
vsize = estimate_vsize(len(old_tx.vin), len(old_tx.vout))
target_fee_rate = min(pending.fee_rate_sat_vb + _FEE_RATE_INCREMENT, MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB)
target_fee = vsize * target_fee_rate
# BIP125 rule 4's minimum, in absolute sats for this tx's size — the floor
# `fee_delta` must never go below, no matter what `target_fee - old_fee` comes
# out to. That naive difference used to go to zero or negative whenever
# old_fee already exceeded target_fee (e.g. a dust change amount folded into
# the original fee — wallet/psbt_builder.py's DUST_LIMIT_SATS handling), and
# the previous fallback — a flat 1-satoshi total bump — was nowhere near this
# relay-mandated minimum, so the node rejected it every time. Because bump_fee
# raised before touching `pending`, the next tick retried with identical
# parameters every 30 seconds, forever (B-32).
min_valid_delta = vsize * _INCREMENTAL_RELAY_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB
fee_delta = max(target_fee - old_fee, min_valid_delta)
change_index = _find_change_output(old_tx, own_address)
if change_index is None or old_tx.vout[change_index].value <= fee_delta:
raise RbfError(f"pending_transaction {pending.id}: no change output large enough to absorb a fee bump")
new_vout = list(old_tx.vout)
bumped_change = new_vout[change_index].value - fee_delta
new_vout[change_index] = TransactionOutput(bumped_change, new_vout[change_index].script_pubkey)
new_vin = [TransactionInput(v.txid, v.vout, sequence=RBF_SEQUENCE) for v in old_tx.vin]
new_tx = Transaction(vin=new_vin, vout=new_vout)
psbt = PSBT(new_tx)
for i, amount in enumerate(input_amounts):
psbt.inputs[i].witness_utxo = TransactionOutput(amount, own_script)
signed = psbt.sign_with(signing_key)
if signed != len(new_vin):
raise RuntimeError(f"expected {len(new_vin)} signatures, got {signed}")
final_tx = finalize_psbt(psbt)
if final_tx is None:
raise RuntimeError("failed to finalize bumped PSBT")
raw_hex = final_tx.serialize().hex()
new_txid = final_tx.txid().hex()
await client.broadcast(raw_hex)
old_txid = pending.current_txid
pending.replaced_by_txid = old_txid # points backwards: what current_txid replaced
pending.current_txid = new_txid
pending.raw_tx_hex = raw_hex
# The *actual* resulting rate, not target_fee_rate: when the BIP125-minimum
# floor above raised fee_delta past the naive target, the tx now pays more
# than target_fee_rate implied. Recording the true rate keeps the next bump's
# arithmetic honest instead of drifting from what's really being paid.
pending.fee_rate_sat_vb = (old_fee + fee_delta) // vsize
pending.attempt_count += 1
# last_broadcast_at, not broadcast_at (B-27): broadcast_at must stay the *first*
# broadcast, since reconcile.py's abandon-after-N-hours grace period is measured
# from it — overwriting it here used to reset that clock on every bump, so a
# repeatedly-bumped-but-never-mined tx was never abandoned.
pending.last_broadcast_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
await _retarget_txid_references(session, pending, old_txid, new_txid)
await session.commit()
logger.info("bumped %s pending_transaction %s: %s -> %s", pending.kind, pending.id, old_txid, new_txid)
return new_txid
async def _retarget_txid_references(
session: AsyncSession, pending: PendingTransaction, old_txid: str, new_txid: str
) -> None:
"""A bump changes the txid, and everything that recorded the old one has to
follow — otherwise the bumped tx confirms and nothing recognizes it (B-02).
The worst case was the bet path: _on_bet_confirmed used to look the participant
up by bet_txid, so after a bump it found nothing, the participant stayed
"broadcast" forever, and the scheduler waited on it forever — the round could
never close and the lottery stopped. The handlers now key off immutable ids
(round_id/user_id, withdrawal_id) as well, so this update is about keeping the
stored txids *true* — for the admin UI, for the audit trail, and for
reconcile.py, which matches UtxoEvent.spent_txid against current_txid.
"""
if pending.kind == "bet":
participant = await session.scalar(
select(RoundParticipant).where(
RoundParticipant.round_id == pending.round_id,
RoundParticipant.user_id == pending.user_id,
)
)
if participant is not None:
participant.bet_txid = new_txid
elif pending.kind == "withdrawal" and pending.withdrawal_id is not None:
withdrawal = await session.get(Withdrawal, pending.withdrawal_id)
if withdrawal is not None:
withdrawal.txid = new_txid
elif pending.kind == "payout" and pending.round_id is not None:
round_ = await session.get(Round, pending.round_id)
if round_ is not None and round_.payout_txid == old_txid:
round_.payout_txid = new_txid
# The UTXOs this tx spends are still the same UTXOs — only the id of the tx
# spending them changed. Keeping this in step is what lets reconcile.py tell
# "reserved by this pending tx" from "spent by something else".
spent = (await session.scalars(select(UtxoEvent).where(UtxoEvent.spent_txid == old_txid))).all()
for utxo in spent:
utxo.spent_txid = new_txid
class RbfBumper:
def __init__(self, session_factory: async_sessionmaker, get_client):
self._session_factory = session_factory
self._get_client = get_client
async def run(self) -> None:
while True:
client = self._get_client()
if client is not None:
try:
await self._tick(client)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
raise
except Exception:
logger.exception("RBF bump tick failed")
await asyncio.sleep(_POLL_INTERVAL_SECONDS)
async def _tick(self, client: ElectrumClient) -> None:
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
async with self._session_factory() as session:
timeout_seconds = (await get_round_config(session)).rbf_timeout_seconds
candidates = (
await session.scalars(select(PendingTransaction).where(PendingTransaction.status == "pending"))
).all()
due = [p for p in candidates if should_bump(p, now, timeout_seconds=timeout_seconds)]
for pending in due:
async with self._session_factory() as session:
row = await session.get(PendingTransaction, pending.id)
if row is None or row.status != "pending":
continue
try:
await bump_fee(session, client, row)
except RbfError:
logger.exception("could not bump pending_transaction %s", row.id)
except Exception:
logger.exception("unexpected error bumping pending_transaction %s", row.id)