Files
plm-lottery/app/api/routes/users.py
T
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 54dbffb552 Credit deposits at deposit_confirmations and verify the round's coins with the quorum before paying (B-82, DEP-03, DEP-04, DEP-09, DEP-12, DEP-14, ELC-17, ELC-27, RND-21, RND-22, RND-25, RND-39, DAT-10, DAT-11, DAT-24, DAT-62, DAT-67, DAT-68, AUD-12, AUD-44, AUD-45, API-30, API-31, API-36, ADR-06, ADR-52)
A user could bet and then double-spend the 1-conference deposit that funded the bet with a
private chain: the bet left the chain but its participant stayed `confirmed`, and the payout
failed "insufficient pool UTXOs" for ever with everyone else's money stuck. Coinbase outputs
were also credited at 1 confirmation (maturity is 120).

Deposits
- `round_config.deposit_confirmations` (default 6, 1-100, editable from /admin) is the
  threshold for a deposit; an output of a platform transaction (any txid of a
  pending_transactions row, RBF versions included) keeps 1; a coinbase output needs 120,
  recognised from the raw transaction, which must hash to the txid (`is_coinbase`, cached).
  `read_deposit_policy` / `classify_new_deposits` run between the read and the write, so no
  session is open across the lookup.
- The quorum must also place the coin deep enough on our own tip (ELC-17).
- Confirmed outputs short of their threshold are pending deposits (memory only, replaced at
  every refresh): shown in `pending_balance_sats` / `has_pending` (also for DEP-13's withdrawal
  message), never spendable. No scripthash notification announces a maturing deposit, so each
  new block refreshes only the users that have one, one task per user (DEP-09 now says so).

Payout
- `_trigger_payout` verifies the round's confirmed participants' bet outputs with the other
  servers (`verify_pool_outpoints`: strict majority of >= 2 answers per outpoint, a
  mempool-only coin or a tie gives no verdict) and builds from exactly those outpoints
  (RND-22), never from whatever else sits at the address. No quorum: `payout_failed`, `pool
  verification unavailable`, nothing changes. Bets that are gone become `reorged_out`, one
  `participant_reorged_out` row each, `pool_amount_sats` rewritten (only downward) in the same
  transaction, and the 70/30 split is computed on what is left.
- Winner's own bet gone: nothing is built; `rounds.payout_blocked_at` (Alembic f2c64a8d1e93,
  with `deposit_confirmations`, plain add_column) is set, `payout_blocked` and the pause with
  `paused_reason = 'payout_blocked'` are written in one transaction; `POST /admin/resume` clears
  the mark and the next attempt verifies again. /admin/rounds returns it.
- Rounds opened before B-80 (pool = the shared reserve address) keep the old active-server
  `listunspent` choice, since that address holds no single round's bets.

Ambiguities resolved: the winner's row stays `confirmed` while held (AUD-45 says every
participant whose bet is gone becomes `reorged_out`, but OPS-30/DAT-68 need the verification to
repeat after the resume, which only a `confirmed` row allows); `/`'s deposit hint no longer says
"1 confirmation" (7 languages, same keys); guides updated.

Tests changed because the spec changed: listener tests that credited height-100 coins at tip 0
now set a tip past every threshold; the payout fixtures seed confirmed participants (the new
source of the inputs) instead of an active-server `listunspent`, FakeNetwork answers the
verification, and test_round_pool_address asserts the quorum is asked about the round's
address. New: thresholds at exactly 6/5, configured value, coinbase at 119/120 and a mismatching
or missing raw tx, platform outputs at 1, dust, quorum height, waiting-deposit display and
disappearance, block-triggered refresh, resume, verification verdicts, gone bets excluded with
the split recomputed, winner gone held and paused, held payouts untouched until the resume,
re-verification after it, no quorum, a payout with 1 and with 400 participants against
reserve+fee+dust, admin config bounds and migration. Mutation-checked: threshold 1, ignored
coinbase, no height bound, no verification and no winner hold each fail tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 14:25:41 +02:00

133 lines
4.9 KiB
Python

from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Request, status
from pydantic import BaseModel
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
from app.api.errors import http_error
from app.api.timeutil import isoformat_utc
from app.auth.dependencies import get_current_user
from app.auth.security import (
MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH,
create_access_token,
hash_password_async,
verify_password_async,
)
from app.db.models import Round, RoundParticipant, User
from app.db.session import get_session
from app.wallet.balance import compute_pending_balance
router = APIRouter(prefix="/users", tags=["users"])
class MeResponse(BaseModel):
id: int
username: str
address: str
balance_sats: int
pending_balance_sats: int
has_pending: bool
created_at: str
@router.get("/me", response_model=MeResponse)
async def me(
request: Request,
user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
) -> MeResponse:
# B-82 (DEP-12 (b)): deposits confirmed but short of their threshold, kept in memory by
# the listener (absent in an app without one, e.g. a test of this route alone).
listener = getattr(request.app.state, "electrum_listener", None)
waiting_sats = listener.pending_deposit_sats(user.id) if listener is not None else 0
pending_balance_sats, has_pending = await compute_pending_balance(session, user, waiting_sats)
return MeResponse(
id=user.id,
username=user.username,
address=user.address,
balance_sats=user.cached_balance_sats,
pending_balance_sats=pending_balance_sats,
has_pending=has_pending,
created_at=isoformat_utc(user.created_at),
)
class ChangePasswordRequest(BaseModel):
current_password: str
new_password: str
class ChangePasswordResponse(BaseModel):
access_token: str
@router.post("/me/change-password", response_model=ChangePasswordResponse)
async def change_password(
body: ChangePasswordRequest,
user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
) -> ChangePasswordResponse:
"""Self-service password change — requires the current password, unlike the
admin-only /admin/users/{id}/reset-password (which is for a user who's
actually locked out and can't provide it)."""
if not await verify_password_async(body.current_password, user.password_hash):
raise http_error(
status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, "current_password_incorrect", "current password is incorrect"
)
if len(body.new_password) < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH:
raise http_error(
status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
"password_too_short",
f"new password must be at least {MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters",
minimum=MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH,
)
user.password_hash = await hash_password_async(body.new_password)
# B-34: bumping token_version invalidates every token issued before this
# point — including this very request's own bearer token, and any an
# attacker who knew the old password might be holding. A fresh token is
# handed back so *this* session keeps working without forcing a re-login;
# every other open session (this user's other devices, or an attacker's)
# gets "session_expired" on its next request.
user.token_version += 1
await session.commit()
return ChangePasswordResponse(access_token=create_access_token(user.id, user.token_version))
class LastRoundResultResponse(BaseModel):
round_id: int | None = None
won: bool = False
amount_sats: int | None = None
@router.get("/me/last-round-result", response_model=LastRoundResultResponse)
async def last_round_result(
user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
) -> LastRoundResultResponse:
"""The most recent *closed* round this user participated in, with its outcome.
Deliberately independent of /rounds/current: that endpoint only exposes
winner_user_id while the round is "paying_out", and drops it entirely once
the round flips to "closed" (see rounds/service.get_active_round). A client
that misses that narrow window (backgrounded tab, missed poll, page loaded
late) would otherwise never learn the outcome of a round it bet in. This
endpoint reads the durable DB record instead, so the frontend can always
catch up regardless of polling timing."""
row = await session.execute(
select(Round)
.join(RoundParticipant, RoundParticipant.round_id == Round.id)
.where(RoundParticipant.user_id == user.id, Round.status == "closed")
.order_by(Round.id.desc())
.limit(1)
)
round_ = row.scalar_one_or_none()
if round_ is None:
return LastRoundResultResponse()
won = round_.winner_user_id == user.id
return LastRoundResultResponse(
round_id=round_.id,
won=won,
amount_sats=round_.winner_amount_sats if won else None,
)