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plm-lottery/docs/adr/ADR-06-depositi-richiedono-deposit-confirmations-conferme-6.md
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davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 54dbffb552 Credit deposits at deposit_confirmations and verify the round's coins with the quorum before paying (B-82, DEP-03, DEP-04, DEP-09, DEP-12, DEP-14, ELC-17, ELC-27, RND-21, RND-22, RND-25, RND-39, DAT-10, DAT-11, DAT-24, DAT-62, DAT-67, DAT-68, AUD-12, AUD-44, AUD-45, API-30, API-31, API-36, ADR-06, ADR-52)
A user could bet and then double-spend the 1-conference deposit that funded the bet with a
private chain: the bet left the chain but its participant stayed `confirmed`, and the payout
failed "insufficient pool UTXOs" for ever with everyone else's money stuck. Coinbase outputs
were also credited at 1 confirmation (maturity is 120).

Deposits
- `round_config.deposit_confirmations` (default 6, 1-100, editable from /admin) is the
  threshold for a deposit; an output of a platform transaction (any txid of a
  pending_transactions row, RBF versions included) keeps 1; a coinbase output needs 120,
  recognised from the raw transaction, which must hash to the txid (`is_coinbase`, cached).
  `read_deposit_policy` / `classify_new_deposits` run between the read and the write, so no
  session is open across the lookup.
- The quorum must also place the coin deep enough on our own tip (ELC-17).
- Confirmed outputs short of their threshold are pending deposits (memory only, replaced at
  every refresh): shown in `pending_balance_sats` / `has_pending` (also for DEP-13's withdrawal
  message), never spendable. No scripthash notification announces a maturing deposit, so each
  new block refreshes only the users that have one, one task per user (DEP-09 now says so).

Payout
- `_trigger_payout` verifies the round's confirmed participants' bet outputs with the other
  servers (`verify_pool_outpoints`: strict majority of >= 2 answers per outpoint, a
  mempool-only coin or a tie gives no verdict) and builds from exactly those outpoints
  (RND-22), never from whatever else sits at the address. No quorum: `payout_failed`, `pool
  verification unavailable`, nothing changes. Bets that are gone become `reorged_out`, one
  `participant_reorged_out` row each, `pool_amount_sats` rewritten (only downward) in the same
  transaction, and the 70/30 split is computed on what is left.
- Winner's own bet gone: nothing is built; `rounds.payout_blocked_at` (Alembic f2c64a8d1e93,
  with `deposit_confirmations`, plain add_column) is set, `payout_blocked` and the pause with
  `paused_reason = 'payout_blocked'` are written in one transaction; `POST /admin/resume` clears
  the mark and the next attempt verifies again. /admin/rounds returns it.
- Rounds opened before B-80 (pool = the shared reserve address) keep the old active-server
  `listunspent` choice, since that address holds no single round's bets.

Ambiguities resolved: the winner's row stays `confirmed` while held (AUD-45 says every
participant whose bet is gone becomes `reorged_out`, but OPS-30/DAT-68 need the verification to
repeat after the resume, which only a `confirmed` row allows); `/`'s deposit hint no longer says
"1 confirmation" (7 languages, same keys); guides updated.

Tests changed because the spec changed: listener tests that credited height-100 coins at tip 0
now set a tip past every threshold; the payout fixtures seed confirmed participants (the new
source of the inputs) instead of an active-server `listunspent`, FakeNetwork answers the
verification, and test_round_pool_address asserts the quorum is asked about the round's
address. New: thresholds at exactly 6/5, configured value, coinbase at 119/120 and a mismatching
or missing raw tx, platform outputs at 1, dust, quorum height, waiting-deposit display and
disappearance, block-triggered refresh, resume, verification verdicts, gone bets excluded with
the split recomputed, winner gone held and paused, held payouts untouched until the resume,
re-verification after it, no quorum, a payout with 1 and with 400 participants against
reserve+fee+dust, admin config bounds and migration. Mutation-checked: threshold 1, ignored
coinbase, no height bound, no verification and no winner hold each fail tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 14:25:41 +02:00

3.0 KiB
Raw Blame History

ADR-06 — I depositi richiedono deposit_confirmations conferme (6 per default, configurabile in round_config), le uscite coinbase 120; ogni altra transazione ne richiede 1

  • Stato: Accettata
  • Area: Conferme e fiducia nella rete
  • Fonte di verità per: la scelta di progetto descritta qui sotto; i requisiti (PREFISSO-NN) che la attuano stanno nei documenti di dominio, indicati nelle Conseguenze.

Decisione

I depositi richiedono deposit_confirmations conferme (6 per default, configurabile in round_config), le uscite coinbase 120; ogni altra transazione ne richiede 1 (decisione del 2026-09-28). «Deposito» è una moneta arrivata all'indirizzo di un utente da una transazione che la piattaforma non ha costruito; le uscite delle transazioni della piattaforma (resto di scommesse e prelievi, vincite) si accreditano a 1 conferma come le transazioni che le hanno prodotte. Le soglie si cambiano solo con una decisione esplicita.

  • Motivazione: il deposito è l'unico ingresso che un utente può spendere due volte: tutto il resto lo firma solo il server. Un utente che scommette con un deposito a 1 conferma e poi, se perde, lo sostituisce con una catena privata fa sparire la propria scommessa dal montepremi mentre il partecipante resta contato, e il round diventa impagabile per tutti (B-82). La potenza di calcolo di PLM (~22 TH/s) si può affittare, quindi una riorganizzazione di 1–2 blocchi è alla portata di un singolo attaccante; 6 conferme la rendono costosa quanto sei blocchi di tutta la rete. È anche la soglia di spendibilità del portafoglio di riferimento ([LIM-27]).
  • Alternative scartate: 1 conferma per tutto (la regola precedente, esposta al doppio speso del deposito); 6 conferme per tutto (allunga ogni round di cinque blocchi per coprire transazioni che l'utente non può sostituire); scommesse ammesse solo da monete a 6 conferme ma depositi mostrati prima (due saldi da spiegare all'utente per lo stesso rischio).
  • Conseguenze: un deposito diventa spendibile dopo 6 blocchi (12 minuti in media, con blocchi da 120s) invece di 1; il rischio residuo (una riorganizzazione più profonda di 6 blocchi) è contenuto da ADR-52 e accettato in [LIM-24]. Regole in registrazione-e-depositi.md (B-82).

Codice: app/tx/confirmation.py:poll_once · app/deposits/service.py:find_new_credit_candidates · app/deposits/service.py:classify_new_deposits · Test: tests/unit/test_confirmation.py::test_unconfirmed_tx_is_left_pending, tests/unit/test_deposits.py::test_unconfirmed_entry_is_ignored, tests/unit/test_deposit_confirmations.py::test_a_deposit_is_credited_exactly_at_six_confirmations, tests/unit/test_deposit_confirmations.py::test_an_immature_coinbase_is_not_credited_until_it_has_120_confirmations, tests/unit/test_deposit_confirmations.py::test_an_output_of_a_platform_transaction_is_credited_at_one_confirmation