A user could bet and then double-spend the 1-conference deposit that funded the bet with a private chain: the bet left the chain but its participant stayed `confirmed`, and the payout failed "insufficient pool UTXOs" for ever with everyone else's money stuck. Coinbase outputs were also credited at 1 confirmation (maturity is 120). Deposits - `round_config.deposit_confirmations` (default 6, 1-100, editable from /admin) is the threshold for a deposit; an output of a platform transaction (any txid of a pending_transactions row, RBF versions included) keeps 1; a coinbase output needs 120, recognised from the raw transaction, which must hash to the txid (`is_coinbase`, cached). `read_deposit_policy` / `classify_new_deposits` run between the read and the write, so no session is open across the lookup. - The quorum must also place the coin deep enough on our own tip (ELC-17). - Confirmed outputs short of their threshold are pending deposits (memory only, replaced at every refresh): shown in `pending_balance_sats` / `has_pending` (also for DEP-13's withdrawal message), never spendable. No scripthash notification announces a maturing deposit, so each new block refreshes only the users that have one, one task per user (DEP-09 now says so). Payout - `_trigger_payout` verifies the round's confirmed participants' bet outputs with the other servers (`verify_pool_outpoints`: strict majority of >= 2 answers per outpoint, a mempool-only coin or a tie gives no verdict) and builds from exactly those outpoints (RND-22), never from whatever else sits at the address. No quorum: `payout_failed`, `pool verification unavailable`, nothing changes. Bets that are gone become `reorged_out`, one `participant_reorged_out` row each, `pool_amount_sats` rewritten (only downward) in the same transaction, and the 70/30 split is computed on what is left. - Winner's own bet gone: nothing is built; `rounds.payout_blocked_at` (Alembic f2c64a8d1e93, with `deposit_confirmations`, plain add_column) is set, `payout_blocked` and the pause with `paused_reason = 'payout_blocked'` are written in one transaction; `POST /admin/resume` clears the mark and the next attempt verifies again. /admin/rounds returns it. - Rounds opened before B-80 (pool = the shared reserve address) keep the old active-server `listunspent` choice, since that address holds no single round's bets. Ambiguities resolved: the winner's row stays `confirmed` while held (AUD-45 says every participant whose bet is gone becomes `reorged_out`, but OPS-30/DAT-68 need the verification to repeat after the resume, which only a `confirmed` row allows); `/`'s deposit hint no longer says "1 confirmation" (7 languages, same keys); guides updated. Tests changed because the spec changed: listener tests that credited height-100 coins at tip 0 now set a tip past every threshold; the payout fixtures seed confirmed participants (the new source of the inputs) instead of an active-server `listunspent`, FakeNetwork answers the verification, and test_round_pool_address asserts the quorum is asked about the round's address. New: thresholds at exactly 6/5, configured value, coinbase at 119/120 and a mismatching or missing raw tx, platform outputs at 1, dust, quorum height, waiting-deposit display and disappearance, block-triggered refresh, resume, verification verdicts, gone bets excluded with the split recomputed, winner gone held and paused, held payouts untouched until the resume, re-verification after it, no quorum, a payout with 1 and with 400 participants against reserve+fee+dust, admin config bounds and migration. Mutation-checked: threshold 1, ignored coinbase, no height bound, no verification and no winner hold each fail tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
133 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
133 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Request, status
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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from sqlalchemy import select
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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from app.api.errors import http_error
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from app.api.timeutil import isoformat_utc
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from app.auth.dependencies import get_current_user
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from app.auth.security import (
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MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH,
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create_access_token,
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hash_password_async,
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verify_password_async,
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)
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from app.db.models import Round, RoundParticipant, User
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from app.db.session import get_session
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from app.wallet.balance import compute_pending_balance
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/users", tags=["users"])
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class MeResponse(BaseModel):
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id: int
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username: str
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address: str
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balance_sats: int
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pending_balance_sats: int
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has_pending: bool
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created_at: str
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@router.get("/me", response_model=MeResponse)
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async def me(
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request: Request,
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user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
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) -> MeResponse:
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# B-82 (DEP-12 (b)): deposits confirmed but short of their threshold, kept in memory by
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# the listener (absent in an app without one, e.g. a test of this route alone).
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listener = getattr(request.app.state, "electrum_listener", None)
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waiting_sats = listener.pending_deposit_sats(user.id) if listener is not None else 0
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pending_balance_sats, has_pending = await compute_pending_balance(session, user, waiting_sats)
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return MeResponse(
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id=user.id,
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username=user.username,
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address=user.address,
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balance_sats=user.cached_balance_sats,
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pending_balance_sats=pending_balance_sats,
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has_pending=has_pending,
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created_at=isoformat_utc(user.created_at),
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)
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class ChangePasswordRequest(BaseModel):
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current_password: str
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new_password: str
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class ChangePasswordResponse(BaseModel):
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access_token: str
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@router.post("/me/change-password", response_model=ChangePasswordResponse)
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async def change_password(
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body: ChangePasswordRequest,
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user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
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) -> ChangePasswordResponse:
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"""Self-service password change — requires the current password, unlike the
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admin-only /admin/users/{id}/reset-password (which is for a user who's
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actually locked out and can't provide it)."""
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if not await verify_password_async(body.current_password, user.password_hash):
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raise http_error(
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status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, "current_password_incorrect", "current password is incorrect"
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)
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if len(body.new_password) < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH:
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raise http_error(
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status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
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"password_too_short",
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f"new password must be at least {MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters",
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minimum=MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH,
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)
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user.password_hash = await hash_password_async(body.new_password)
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# B-34: bumping token_version invalidates every token issued before this
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# point — including this very request's own bearer token, and any an
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# attacker who knew the old password might be holding. A fresh token is
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# handed back so *this* session keeps working without forcing a re-login;
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# every other open session (this user's other devices, or an attacker's)
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# gets "session_expired" on its next request.
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user.token_version += 1
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await session.commit()
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return ChangePasswordResponse(access_token=create_access_token(user.id, user.token_version))
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class LastRoundResultResponse(BaseModel):
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round_id: int | None = None
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won: bool = False
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amount_sats: int | None = None
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@router.get("/me/last-round-result", response_model=LastRoundResultResponse)
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async def last_round_result(
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user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
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) -> LastRoundResultResponse:
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"""The most recent *closed* round this user participated in, with its outcome.
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Deliberately independent of /rounds/current: that endpoint only exposes
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winner_user_id while the round is "paying_out", and drops it entirely once
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the round flips to "closed" (see rounds/service.get_active_round). A client
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that misses that narrow window (backgrounded tab, missed poll, page loaded
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late) would otherwise never learn the outcome of a round it bet in. This
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endpoint reads the durable DB record instead, so the frontend can always
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catch up regardless of polling timing."""
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row = await session.execute(
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select(Round)
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.join(RoundParticipant, RoundParticipant.round_id == Round.id)
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.where(RoundParticipant.user_id == user.id, Round.status == "closed")
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.order_by(Round.id.desc())
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.limit(1)
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)
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round_ = row.scalar_one_or_none()
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if round_ is None:
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return LastRoundResultResponse()
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won = round_.winner_user_id == user.id
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return LastRoundResultResponse(
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round_id=round_.id,
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won=won,
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amount_sats=round_.winner_amount_sats if won else None,
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)
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