release.sh expects signed apks. if a non-releasemanager uses
release.sh to build it will build the apks unsigned and then
rename them to the same name as the signed apks. However
if the apks have already been built separately and are still named
*-unsigned.apk it will not detect them and instead try to build them
again. Instead it should just rename them to *-release.apk as if built
directly through release.sh.
Don't include first hop of the path,
this is the hop from us to the first node and we don't
need a payload for ourselves.
Also adds unittest checking this.
Factor out code from `send_onion_message_to` into a separate
function `_create_route_to_introduction_point` to make it
easier to reason about it and more testable.
This allows restricting blinded paths to channels that have sufficient receive
capacity for payment.
NOTE: this might have privacy issues, as this can be used to probe channel capacity.
Maybe randomize leeway?
@f321x: changed to use scid alias in create_blinded_path
- I noticed we were creating the RPC server unix domain socket with 0o775.
Instead of hunting down each individual line we create files/dirs, we should
just set a restrictive umask by default. We can still use chmod to relax this
for individual files. -- but we should try to be secure by default
- note: bitcoin core does the same
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blame/2fe76ed8324af44c985b96455a05c3e8bec0a03e/src/common/system.cpp#L92
- the umask is set in run_electrum as opposed to __init__.py so that we don't side-effect use-cases where electrum is imported as a library
Adds a CI step to the Cirrus CI which will run claude code on the diff
of a Pull Request and fail if it finds critical security vulnerabilities
or serious code issues. Optinally it can be given a GitHub api key to
create a comment in the pull request.
Followup #10541.
Fixes tests.regtest.TestLightningSwapserver.test_swapserver_forceclose.
In the regtest bob would now signal trampoline support due to #10541 and
include Alice into the invoice trampoline as he is connected to Alice.
Alice would then try to add herself onto the trampoline route, causing
the payment to fail.
Check if self.network before trying to access it. This would trigger an
exception when toggling the trampoline checkbox in offline mode:
```
29.13 | E | gui.qt.exception_window.Exception_Hook | exception caught by crash reporter
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/user/Documents/electrum/electrum/gui/qt/settings_dialog.py", line 133, in on_trampoline_checked
self.network.run_from_another_thread(
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'run_from_another_thread'
31.00 | E | gui.qt.exception_window.Exception_Hook | exception caught by crash reporter
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/home/user/Documents/electrum/electrum/gui/qt/settings_dialog.py", line 131, in on_trampoline_checked
self.network.start_gossip()
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'start_gossip'
```
Even though the NIP-47 specification kind of defines that requests should
always pass a params dict in their request i witnessed way too often
that clients don't include it in some requests where it is technically
not neccessary and we fail on it.
Handling this gracefully improves compatibility without obvious
downsides.
The ReceiveTab gets updated regularly (e.g. when syncing headers).
Every time it updates we would first show the invoice and then the
zeroconf confirmation overlay. This caused the overly to appear
flickering when there are updates in higher frequency.
Also we need to keep state if the user has already confirmed the
zeroconf message for this request, otherwise the question
will re-appear each time the user clicked "Accept" and the
ReceiveTab updates again.
Only signal `OPTION_ZEROCONF_OPT` to peers if we either:
1. Have no trusted peer configured (assuming that we are LSP)
2. Have a trusted peer configured, and the peer we are connecting
to is this trusted peer.
Otherwise peers that are LSPs but are not the clients trusted LSP
might try to open a channel to the client but it would get rejected.
Make the just in time channel fees and channel size
configvars, as in practice not every provider would
use the same hardcoded fees or channel sizes.
Add the mining fees required for the funding transaction on top of the
opening fees to prevent opening channels at a loss in a higher
fee environment.
Adds unittests for `LNWallet.open_channel_just_in_time()`,
`LNWallet._cleanup_failed_jit_channel()`,
`LNWallet.can_get_zeroconf_channel()` and
`LNWallet.receive_requires_jit_channel()`.
Adds cleanup logic to `LNWallet.open_channel_just_in_time` so
that the channel provider removes unfunded channels again, e.g. if
the client didn't release the preimage or the provider failed
to broadcast the funding transaction.
Also adds more robust transaction broadcast logic so we retry to
broadcast if it failed and check against adb to see if any previous
broadcast was successful.
...so we can have multiple just in time channels with the same lsp.
We already save a remote scid alias in `on_channel_ready` which we
already have received after the new zeroconf channel is in open state.
So setting the alias to the static node id hash is counterproductive
because it doesn't allow to differentiate between channels.
Also extends the regtest (`just_in_time`) to do a second channel
opening, to cover this scenario. This doesn't add much runtime to
the test, so the cost seems reasonable.
On LSP side we were only checking if ACCEPT_ZEROCONF_CHANNELS
is enabled while forwarding a non-trampoline htlc.
During trampoline forwarding the config was ignored.
The ACCEPT_* prefix implied this was only for accepting inbound
zeroconf channels, but it also controls whether we open them when
forwarding HTLCs.
Renames the config var to OPEN_ZEROCONF_CHANNELS
to clarify it enables zeroconf channel opens in both directions,
and add the missing check when forwarding trampoline HTLCs.
Fixes AbstractChannel.update_unfunded_state to stop calling a
non-existent method (unwatch_channel).
Adds unittest to execute the zeroconf path of update_unfunded_state.
Add unittest that verifies we only include r_tags for trampoline nodes
if we signal trampoline support in the invoice_features and only signal
trampoline support if we use trampoline or have only open trampoline
channels.
Make the trampoline signaling in bolt11 invoices dependent upon all
unfrozen channels being with trampoline peers instead of the trampoline
config.
Stops automatically freezing non-trampoline channels for receiving if
trampoline is enabled.
One effect of this change is that now we don't signal trampoline support
anymore in the invoice even if trampoline is enabled, if one of the
channels is with a non trampoline peer.
To limit attack surface.
Context:
- both in daemon mode and in GUI mode, we start an RPC server
- the RPC server uses HTTP basic auth, with a random password that is saved in the config file
- read access to the config file implies access to the RPC server
- the traffic is unencrypted
- by default the server listens
- on Windows, on localhost TCP
- all other platform, via unix domain sockets
- if an attacker can listen to localhost TCP traffic, and there was traffic
- they could see the plaintext RPC password and issue their own commands
- e.g. if wireshark was already installed on the system, this might not require root access
- the "ping" and "gui" commands are used by everyday operations that affect most users:
- "ping" is used when trying to launch a second instance of electrum, to contact the first instance and enforce "singleton" behaviour
- "gui" is used for URI handling (`$ xdg-open bitcoin:asdasd`)
- many other sensitive commands, that operate on wallets, require *also* the wallet password
- but note that wallet.unlock can be used by the user to bypass this and store the wallet password in memory (exposed in GUI)
I propose locking down the RPC server when running in GUI mode:
- we still start it, as it is used for "ping" and "gui" RPCs, however we disable all other RPCs
- we could opt-in enable it, using a config var, except that ofc would not help against an attacker that has filesystem write access to the config file
- so I think it's even safer to just "hardcode" disable it: however the functionality is useful for development
- I propose we branch based on `constants.net.TESTNET`
- an alternative we could branch on that is hard to fake is `is_git_clone` in run_electrum
rm the `assert fee >= 0, f"{fee=!r} must be non-negative satoshis"`
from `Abstract_Wallet.get_tx_fee_warning()` to prevent an exception when
users load a psbt with negative tx fee.
f321x