Blocks above the newest checkpoint cannot be anchored, so the header from the primary server is now compared with the one from a second server taken from the hardcoded bootstrap list. A disagreement at 3+ blocks of depth aborts the sync; a shallower one leaves the proof unverified until the next sync; with no reachable witness behaviour is unchanged. A bounded proof-of-work check was evaluated and rejected. See ADR 0042.
3.4 KiB
0042. Cross-check recent headers with a witness server; no bounded-PoW check
- Status: Accepted
- Area: SPV
- Recorded: 2026-11-03
Context
ADR 0040 anchors every header used for a Merkle proof up to a hardcoded checkpoint, but a block above the newest checkpoint has nothing to anchor to: only the header the primary server supplies and the Merkle proof against it are checked. A hostile server could show a payment that never happened in those recent blocks. ADR 0041 made the limit visible; this ADR reduces it.
Decision
- Witness cross-check. For a block above the newest checkpoint,
WalletSynchronizerasks a second server (a "witness") for the header at the same height and requires identical bytes. The witnesses come fromWalletSynchronizer.WitnessProvider, called lazily once, only when such a header is first needed. - Witness selection (
WitnessConnector): only from the hardcoded bootstrap list of the profile, never from the peers a server announces (a hostile server could announce only its own), never the primary server, each verified to be on the chain (ADR 0036). One witness by default (DefaultMax). Used by the GUI and the CLI; the GUI closes them with the primary connection. - Outcomes. Agreement: the proof verifies as before. A witness that is unreachable, errors, or does not know the block: skipped. No witness at all: unchanged behaviour (Merkle proof only). Disagreement at a depth of at least
CrossCheckMinDepth(3) blocks:SpvVerificationException("servers disagree"), the sync aborts. Disagreement at a shallower depth may be a reorganisation in progress: the proof is left unverified (not spendable, not cached) and decided again at the next sync. - Each height is asked once per synchronizer. Heights covered by a checkpoint are not cross-checked.
- The "not anchored" flag of ADR 0041 stays height-based: it is not cleared by a successful cross-check, because that result is not persisted.
Rejected: bounded proof-of-work
The idea was to require recent headers to meet a target no easier than a bound on the newest checkpoint's difficulty. The data in the shipped checkpoints argue against it: between consecutive checkpoints (20,000 blocks) the target changed by up to 8x easier and 200x harder, so a safe bound would be loose; the network is small (about tens of TH/s at the last checkpoint), so work at a fraction of a block's difficulty is cheap to rent; and a bound that is too tight would make the wallet reject honest servers whenever hash rate drops. It would add cost and a false-rejection risk for little protection. Not implemented.
Consequences
- A single lying server can no longer fabricate a recent payment on its own: it would have to control the witness too. A witness run by the same operator as the primary, or an attacker positioned in front of both, defeats it; this is a hardening, not a proof.
- One extra connection (TLS, pinned) is opened when a recent block needs checking; none for wallets whose history is all below the newest checkpoint.
- A transaction in a block 1-2 deep on which the servers briefly disagree shows as "verifying" until the next sync.
- A fresh checkpoint in every release still shrinks the window the cross-check has to cover.
References
src/Core/Spv/WalletSynchronizer.cssrc/Core/Spv/WitnessConnector.cstests/PalladiumWallet.Tests/Spv/WalletSynchronizerTests.cs- Related: 0036, 0040, 0041