Files
plm-lottery/docs/adr/ADR-06-depositi-richiedono-deposit-confirmations-conferme-6.md
davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5 54dbffb552 Credit deposits at deposit_confirmations and verify the round's coins with the quorum before paying (B-82, DEP-03, DEP-04, DEP-09, DEP-12, DEP-14, ELC-17, ELC-27, RND-21, RND-22, RND-25, RND-39, DAT-10, DAT-11, DAT-24, DAT-62, DAT-67, DAT-68, AUD-12, AUD-44, AUD-45, API-30, API-31, API-36, ADR-06, ADR-52)
A user could bet and then double-spend the 1-conference deposit that funded the bet with a
private chain: the bet left the chain but its participant stayed `confirmed`, and the payout
failed "insufficient pool UTXOs" for ever with everyone else's money stuck. Coinbase outputs
were also credited at 1 confirmation (maturity is 120).

Deposits
- `round_config.deposit_confirmations` (default 6, 1-100, editable from /admin) is the
  threshold for a deposit; an output of a platform transaction (any txid of a
  pending_transactions row, RBF versions included) keeps 1; a coinbase output needs 120,
  recognised from the raw transaction, which must hash to the txid (`is_coinbase`, cached).
  `read_deposit_policy` / `classify_new_deposits` run between the read and the write, so no
  session is open across the lookup.
- The quorum must also place the coin deep enough on our own tip (ELC-17).
- Confirmed outputs short of their threshold are pending deposits (memory only, replaced at
  every refresh): shown in `pending_balance_sats` / `has_pending` (also for DEP-13's withdrawal
  message), never spendable. No scripthash notification announces a maturing deposit, so each
  new block refreshes only the users that have one, one task per user (DEP-09 now says so).

Payout
- `_trigger_payout` verifies the round's confirmed participants' bet outputs with the other
  servers (`verify_pool_outpoints`: strict majority of >= 2 answers per outpoint, a
  mempool-only coin or a tie gives no verdict) and builds from exactly those outpoints
  (RND-22), never from whatever else sits at the address. No quorum: `payout_failed`, `pool
  verification unavailable`, nothing changes. Bets that are gone become `reorged_out`, one
  `participant_reorged_out` row each, `pool_amount_sats` rewritten (only downward) in the same
  transaction, and the 70/30 split is computed on what is left.
- Winner's own bet gone: nothing is built; `rounds.payout_blocked_at` (Alembic f2c64a8d1e93,
  with `deposit_confirmations`, plain add_column) is set, `payout_blocked` and the pause with
  `paused_reason = 'payout_blocked'` are written in one transaction; `POST /admin/resume` clears
  the mark and the next attempt verifies again. /admin/rounds returns it.
- Rounds opened before B-80 (pool = the shared reserve address) keep the old active-server
  `listunspent` choice, since that address holds no single round's bets.

Ambiguities resolved: the winner's row stays `confirmed` while held (AUD-45 says every
participant whose bet is gone becomes `reorged_out`, but OPS-30/DAT-68 need the verification to
repeat after the resume, which only a `confirmed` row allows); `/`'s deposit hint no longer says
"1 confirmation" (7 languages, same keys); guides updated.

Tests changed because the spec changed: listener tests that credited height-100 coins at tip 0
now set a tip past every threshold; the payout fixtures seed confirmed participants (the new
source of the inputs) instead of an active-server `listunspent`, FakeNetwork answers the
verification, and test_round_pool_address asserts the quorum is asked about the round's
address. New: thresholds at exactly 6/5, configured value, coinbase at 119/120 and a mismatching
or missing raw tx, platform outputs at 1, dust, quorum height, waiting-deposit display and
disappearance, block-triggered refresh, resume, verification verdicts, gone bets excluded with
the split recomputed, winner gone held and paused, held payouts untouched until the resume,
re-verification after it, no quorum, a payout with 1 and with 400 participants against
reserve+fee+dust, admin config bounds and migration. Mutation-checked: threshold 1, ignored
coinbase, no height bound, no verification and no winner hold each fail tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 14:25:41 +02:00

39 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
Raw Permalink Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
# ADR-06 — I depositi richiedono `deposit_confirmations` conferme (6 per default, configurabile in `round_config`), le uscite coinbase 120; ogni altra transazione ne richiede 1
- **Stato:** Accettata
- **Area:** Conferme e fiducia nella rete
- **Fonte di verità per:** la scelta di progetto descritta qui sotto; i requisiti (`PREFISSO-NN`) che la attuano stanno nei documenti di dominio, indicati nelle *Conseguenze*.
## Decisione
**I depositi richiedono `deposit_confirmations` conferme (6
per default, configurabile in `round_config`), le uscite coinbase 120; ogni
altra transazione ne richiede 1** (decisione del 2026-09-28). «Deposito» è
una moneta arrivata all'indirizzo di un utente da una transazione che la
piattaforma non ha costruito; le uscite delle transazioni della piattaforma
(resto di scommesse e prelievi, vincite) si accreditano a 1 conferma come
le transazioni che le hanno prodotte. Le soglie si cambiano solo con una
decisione esplicita.
- *Motivazione:* il deposito è **l'unico ingresso che un utente può spendere
due volte**: tutto il resto lo firma solo il server. Un utente che
scommette con un deposito a 1 conferma e poi, se perde, lo sostituisce con
una catena privata fa sparire la propria scommessa dal montepremi mentre il
partecipante resta contato, e il round diventa impagabile per tutti
(B-82). La potenza di calcolo di PLM (~22 TH/s) si può affittare, quindi
una riorganizzazione di 1–2 blocchi è alla portata di un singolo
attaccante; 6 conferme la rendono costosa quanto sei blocchi di tutta la
rete. È anche la soglia di spendibilità del portafoglio di riferimento
([LIM-27]).
- *Alternative scartate:* 1 conferma per tutto (la regola precedente,
esposta al doppio speso del deposito); 6 conferme per tutto (allunga ogni
round di cinque blocchi per coprire transazioni che l'utente non può
sostituire); scommesse ammesse solo da monete a 6 conferme ma depositi
mostrati prima (due saldi da spiegare all'utente per lo stesso rischio).
- *Conseguenze:* un deposito diventa spendibile dopo 6 blocchi (12 minuti
in media, con blocchi da 120s) invece di 1; il rischio residuo (una riorganizzazione più profonda di 6 blocchi)
è contenuto da [ADR-52](ADR-52-riorganizzazioni-catena-contengono-invece-ignorarle.md) e accettato in [LIM-24]. Regole in
[registrazione-e-depositi.md](../registrazione-e-depositi.md#deposito) (B-82).
*Codice:* `app/tx/confirmation.py:poll_once` · `app/deposits/service.py:find_new_credit_candidates` · `app/deposits/service.py:classify_new_deposits` ·
*Test:* `tests/unit/test_confirmation.py::test_unconfirmed_tx_is_left_pending`, `tests/unit/test_deposits.py::test_unconfirmed_entry_is_ignored`, `tests/unit/test_deposit_confirmations.py::test_a_deposit_is_credited_exactly_at_six_confirmations`, `tests/unit/test_deposit_confirmations.py::test_an_immature_coinbase_is_not_credited_until_it_has_120_confirmations`, `tests/unit/test_deposit_confirmations.py::test_an_output_of_a_platform_transaction_is_credited_at_one_confirmation`