SQLite/aiosqlite returns DateTime columns as naive even though every value is written in UTC, so a bare .isoformat() dropped the offset and the frontend's new Date() parsed it as local time. Add a shared isoformat_utc() helper and use it at every call site that was missing the fix already applied ad hoc in rounds.py. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
342 lines
13 KiB
Python
342 lines
13 KiB
Python
import json
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import secrets
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Header, HTTPException, status
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from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, field_validator
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from sqlalchemy import select
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from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
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from app.api.timeutil import isoformat_utc
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from app.audit.log import write_audit_log
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from app.auth.security import hash_password
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from app.config import settings
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from app.db.models import AuditLog, PendingTransaction, Round, User
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from app.db.session import get_session
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from app.rounds.config import get_round_config
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from app.wallet.address import is_valid_plm_address
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from app.wallet.hd import derive_user_wif
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from app.wallet.psbt_builder import MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB
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router = APIRouter(prefix="/admin", tags=["admin"])
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async def require_admin(x_admin_token: str = Header(default="")) -> None:
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# An unset ADMIN_TOKEN denies everything — checked first, since compare_digest
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# on two empty strings returns True and would otherwise open the panel to
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# anyone on an instance that never configured a token.
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if not settings.admin_token:
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raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, "invalid admin token")
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if not secrets.compare_digest(x_admin_token, settings.admin_token):
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raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, "invalid admin token")
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# `paused` is deliberately NOT here: it has its own audit-logged endpoints
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# (/admin/pause, /admin/resume), and accepting it on PUT /config as well gave the
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# operator an unlogged way to stop the lottery (B-10). It stays in the response
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# model, so the dashboard still reads its current value from here.
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_CONFIG_FIELDS = (
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"fee_address",
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"bet_amount_sats",
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"round_duration_seconds",
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"round_cooldown_seconds",
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"fee_rate_sat_vb",
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"rbf_timeout_seconds",
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"draw_animation_seconds",
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)
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class RoundConfigResponse(BaseModel):
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fee_address: str
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bet_amount_sats: int
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round_duration_seconds: int
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round_cooldown_seconds: int
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fee_rate_sat_vb: int
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rbf_timeout_seconds: int
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draw_animation_seconds: int
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paused: bool
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class RoundConfigUpdate(BaseModel):
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"""Bounds are enforced here rather than trusting the operator: a value like
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fee_rate_sat_vb=0 produces transactions no node will relay (stalling every bet,
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payout and withdrawal), and round_duration_seconds=0 expires a round the instant
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it opens. `paused` is not accepted — see _CONFIG_FIELDS."""
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# An unvalidated fee_address was the worst of the lot: a malformed one wedged the
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# payout with an unhandled EmbitError, and a well-formed *foreign* one (bc1...)
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# parses fine as a witness program, so every round's 30 % commission would be
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# broadcast to a script nobody holds the key for (B-05).
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fee_address: str | None = None
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bet_amount_sats: int | None = Field(default=None, gt=0, le=100_000 * 100_000_000)
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round_duration_seconds: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=30, le=7 * 24 * 3600)
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round_cooldown_seconds: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=24 * 3600)
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fee_rate_sat_vb: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=1, le=MAX_FEE_RATE_SAT_VB)
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rbf_timeout_seconds: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=60, le=7 * 24 * 3600)
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draw_animation_seconds: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=600)
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@field_validator("fee_address")
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@classmethod
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def _validate_fee_address(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
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if value is None:
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return None
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value = value.strip()
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if not is_valid_plm_address(value):
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raise ValueError(
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"fee_address must be a valid PLM bech32 address (plm1...) — an address from "
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"another chain would send every round's commission somewhere unspendable"
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)
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return value
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def _config_response(config) -> RoundConfigResponse:
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fields = {field: getattr(config, field) for field in _CONFIG_FIELDS}
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fields["paused"] = config.paused
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return RoundConfigResponse(**fields)
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@router.get("/config", response_model=RoundConfigResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
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async def read_config(session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)) -> RoundConfigResponse:
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config = await get_round_config(session)
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await session.commit()
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return _config_response(config)
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@router.put("/config", response_model=RoundConfigResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
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async def update_config(
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body: RoundConfigUpdate, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)
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) -> RoundConfigResponse:
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config = await get_round_config(session)
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# Diff computed before assignment so the audit entry records both sides. Without
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# it, the most sensitive setting in the system (fee_address — where 30 % of every
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# pool goes) could be changed without leaving any trace at all (B-10).
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changes: dict[str, dict] = {}
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for field in _CONFIG_FIELDS:
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value = getattr(body, field)
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if value is None:
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continue
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previous = getattr(config, field)
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if previous == value:
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continue
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changes[field] = {"from": previous, "to": value}
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setattr(config, field, value)
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if changes:
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await write_audit_log(session, "config_updated", changes)
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await session.commit()
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return _config_response(config)
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@router.post("/pause", response_model=RoundConfigResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
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async def pause_lottery(session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)) -> RoundConfigResponse:
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"""Maintenance switch: the round in progress (if any) still closes, draws,
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and pays out its winner normally — only opening the *next* round is
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suppressed until /admin/resume is called (rounds/service.py)."""
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config = await get_round_config(session)
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config.paused = True
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await write_audit_log(session, "lottery_paused", {})
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await session.commit()
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return _config_response(config)
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@router.post("/resume", response_model=RoundConfigResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
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async def resume_lottery(session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)) -> RoundConfigResponse:
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config = await get_round_config(session)
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config.paused = False
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await write_audit_log(session, "lottery_resumed", {})
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await session.commit()
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return _config_response(config)
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class AdminUserResponse(BaseModel):
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id: int
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username: str
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address: str
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balance_sats: int
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created_at: str
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@router.get("/users", response_model=list[AdminUserResponse], dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
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async def list_users(session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)) -> list[AdminUserResponse]:
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users = (await session.scalars(select(User).order_by(User.id))).all()
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return [
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AdminUserResponse(
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id=u.id,
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username=u.username,
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address=u.address,
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balance_sats=u.cached_balance_sats,
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created_at=isoformat_utc(u.created_at),
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)
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for u in users
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]
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class AdminPrivkeyResponse(BaseModel):
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address: str
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wif: str
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@router.get(
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"/users/{user_id}/privkey", response_model=AdminPrivkeyResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)]
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)
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async def user_privkey(user_id: int, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)) -> AdminPrivkeyResponse:
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"""Exports a user's raw private key for manual intervention (e.g. sweeping
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funds back if something's stuck). Every access is audit-logged since this is
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the most sensitive data the platform holds."""
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user = await session.get(User, user_id)
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if user is None:
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raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, "user not found")
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wif = derive_user_wif(user.derivation_index)
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await write_audit_log(session, "admin_privkey_accessed", {"user_id": user_id}, user_id=user_id)
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await session.commit()
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return AdminPrivkeyResponse(address=user.address, wif=wif)
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class AdminPasswordResetResponse(BaseModel):
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username: str
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new_password: str
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@router.post(
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"/users/{user_id}/reset-password",
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response_model=AdminPasswordResetResponse,
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dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)],
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)
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async def reset_user_password(
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user_id: int, session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)
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) -> AdminPasswordResetResponse:
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"""Admin-only password reset for a user who's locked out: passwords are
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Argon2-hashed (one-way), so an existing password can never be recovered or
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displayed — this generates and sets a brand new one instead, shown once so
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the admin can relay it to the user. There is no user-facing self-service
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reset; only an admin (via /admin, token-gated) can trigger this."""
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user = await session.get(User, user_id)
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if user is None:
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raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, "user not found")
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new_password = secrets.token_urlsafe(12)
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user.password_hash = hash_password(new_password)
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# B-34: this endpoint exists precisely for the "account compromised" case —
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# without bumping token_version, whoever was already logged in (the
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# attacker, if that's who prompted the reset) stayed logged in on their
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# existing token until it naturally expired, unaffected by the reset.
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user.token_version += 1
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await write_audit_log(session, "admin_password_reset", {"user_id": user_id}, user_id=user_id)
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await session.commit()
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return AdminPasswordResetResponse(username=user.username, new_password=new_password)
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class AdminRoundResponse(BaseModel):
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id: int
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status: str
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opened_at: str
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closed_at: str | None
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draw_block_height: int | None
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draw_block_hash: str | None
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winner_user_id: int | None
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winner_username: str | None
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pool_amount_sats: int | None
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winner_amount_sats: int | None
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fee_amount_sats: int | None
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payout_txid: str | None
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@router.get("/rounds", response_model=list[AdminRoundResponse], dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)])
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async def list_rounds(session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session), limit: int = 50) -> list[AdminRoundResponse]:
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rounds = (await session.scalars(select(Round).order_by(Round.id.desc()).limit(limit))).all()
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winner_ids = {r.winner_user_id for r in rounds if r.winner_user_id is not None}
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winners = {}
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if winner_ids:
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users = (await session.scalars(select(User).where(User.id.in_(winner_ids)))).all()
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winners = {u.id: u.username for u in users}
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return [
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AdminRoundResponse(
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id=r.id,
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status=r.status,
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opened_at=isoformat_utc(r.opened_at),
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closed_at=isoformat_utc(r.closed_at),
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draw_block_height=r.draw_block_height,
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draw_block_hash=r.draw_block_hash,
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winner_user_id=r.winner_user_id,
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winner_username=winners.get(r.winner_user_id) if r.winner_user_id is not None else None,
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pool_amount_sats=r.pool_amount_sats,
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winner_amount_sats=r.winner_amount_sats,
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fee_amount_sats=r.fee_amount_sats,
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payout_txid=r.payout_txid,
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)
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for r in rounds
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]
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class AdminAuditLogResponse(BaseModel):
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id: int
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event_type: str
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payload: dict
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user_id: int | None
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round_id: int | None
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created_at: str
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@router.get(
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"/audit-log", response_model=list[AdminAuditLogResponse], dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)]
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)
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async def list_audit_log(
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session), limit: int = 200
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) -> list[AdminAuditLogResponse]:
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entries = (await session.scalars(select(AuditLog).order_by(AuditLog.id.desc()).limit(limit))).all()
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return [
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AdminAuditLogResponse(
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id=e.id,
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event_type=e.event_type,
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payload=json.loads(e.payload_json),
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user_id=e.user_id,
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round_id=e.round_id,
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created_at=isoformat_utc(e.created_at),
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)
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for e in entries
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]
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class AdminPendingTransactionResponse(BaseModel):
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id: int
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kind: str
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status: str
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round_id: int | None
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withdrawal_id: int | None
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user_id: int | None
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current_txid: str
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fee_rate_sat_vb: int
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attempt_count: int
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broadcast_at: str
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replaced_by_txid: str | None
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@router.get(
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"/pending-transactions",
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response_model=list[AdminPendingTransactionResponse],
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dependencies=[Depends(require_admin)],
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)
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async def list_pending_transactions(
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session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session),
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) -> list[AdminPendingTransactionResponse]:
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entries = (
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await session.scalars(select(PendingTransaction).order_by(PendingTransaction.id.desc()))
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).all()
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return [
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AdminPendingTransactionResponse(
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id=p.id,
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kind=p.kind,
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status=p.status,
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round_id=p.round_id,
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withdrawal_id=p.withdrawal_id,
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user_id=p.user_id,
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current_txid=p.current_txid,
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fee_rate_sat_vb=p.fee_rate_sat_vb,
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attempt_count=p.attempt_count,
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broadcast_at=isoformat_utc(p.broadcast_at),
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replaced_by_txid=p.replaced_by_txid,
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)
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for p in entries
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]
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