davideandClaude Sonnet 5.5
55d852fe08
The lifespan decrypts the key and compares a fixed sample (reserve/round pool addresses, the 10 lowest and highest user addresses, unrevealed round secrets) with the database, and refuses to serve on any mismatch without printing key material. The key scripts refuse a new or imported key that would not reproduce the stored addresses, and write 0600. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
176 lines
8.4 KiB
Markdown
176 lines
8.4 KiB
Markdown
# BUGS.md — open findings
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Two audits currently have open entries: 2026-08-03 (B-71, B-72, below) and the
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2026-09-28 specification review (B-73 … B-98, at the end of the file).
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## Audit of 2026-08-03
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Third full-codebase audit, opened after the 2026-07-26 (B-01 … B-24) and
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2026-07-27 (B-25 … B-49) lists were emptied. Numbering continues from the last
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fixed finding, B-51.
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The list opened at B-52 … B-72 and holds only what is still **open**: a finding is
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removed from this file once it is fixed, and is not listed here afterwards. Per
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CLAUDE.md's convention each entry gets its own commit with its own regression test,
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and the `B-nn` marker goes in a comment next to the fix, so
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`git log --all --grep 'B-nn'` is the record of how any closed finding was closed.
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State of the tree at audit time: 264 unit tests, all passing; `tests/integration/`
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still empty; withdrawal and the RBF bump path still never live-broadcast.
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Verified as *not* broken while looking for these: i18n key parity (146 identical
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keys across all 7 languages), HTML escaping of every user-controlled value in
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`admin.js`, the Alembic chain (linear, single head, matching `models.py`),
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strictly-integer satoshi arithmetic everywhere, and `.gitignore` coverage of
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secrets/DB/logs (nothing sensitive is tracked in git).
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Severity is about consequence, not likelihood:
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**critical** = money stuck or lost, or the lottery stops;
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**high** = a security control that does not hold;
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**medium** = wrong behaviour with a bounded blast radius;
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**low** = drift between documentation and code.
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---
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## Critical
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### (not new) `drawing` does not resume after a restart
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Already tracked as an accepted gap in CLAUDE.md's "Known gaps", not re-numbered
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here. Worth restating in context: with `restart: unless-stopped` on the app
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container, this is the one state that gets stuck with money in play, and it
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remains the last prerequisite for running unattended.
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---
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## Low — documentation and consistency drift
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### B-71 — `.env` points `MASTER_KEY_PATH` at a second copy of the master key
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CLAUDE.md's deployment section prescribes pointing `MASTER_KEY_PATH` at the
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host-side `./data/keys/master.xprv.enc` so the venv scripts and the container read
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one file. `.env` instead sets `./master.xprv.enc`, and both files now exist in the
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working tree (both gitignored). They were verified during this audit to decrypt to
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the *same* xprv, so nothing has diverged yet — but `scripts/decrypt_master_key.py`
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reads a different file from the one the container uses, and a future
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`generate_master_key.py --overwrite` would split them silently, with an ops
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recovery path that then reports the wrong key.
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The same duplication exists for the database (`./plm_lottery.db` next to
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`data/db/plm_lottery.db`), which is less dangerous but equally confusing.
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Fix: set `MASTER_KEY_PATH=./data/keys/master.xprv.enc` in `.env`, delete the stray
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root copy once confirmed redundant, and state the same for `DATABASE_URL`.
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### B-72 — `docs/setup.md` still frames setup as "locally or via Docker"
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`docs/setup.md:1-10` lists Python as a prerequisite "for the local/venv workflow"
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and describes the master-key step as local *or* Docker, while B-44 made Docker the
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only supported way to run the server (`docs/running-the-server.md` and README were
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updated, this file was not). The venv genuinely is needed for tests, migrations and
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the key scripts — the wording just needs to say that instead of implying a second
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way to run the server.
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---
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# Audit of 2026-09-28 — specification review (B-73 … B-98)
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Fourth audit, run against the new specification in `docs/` rather than the code
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alone: four independent reviews (coin/chain mechanics, money state machine,
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DevOps, spec cross-validation), with the critical claims re-verified in code.
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The target behaviour of every entry below is now written into `docs/` as
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requirements marked `*Stato:* da implementare (B-nn)`; the Italian overview, the
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design decisions and the implementation order are in
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[docs/piano-correzioni.md](docs/piano-correzioni.md). The code has **not** been
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changed yet. Same convention as above: one commit per entry, with its own
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regression test, spec + code + test together.
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Design decisions taken with the owner on 2026-09-28 (they change existing
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decisions, see `docs/limiti-noti.md`):
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- **Draw by commit-reveal.** The winner must not be computable by anyone who
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controls block production, since PLM's hashrate (~22 TH/s) is rentable.
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- **Never release funds on doubt.** A money-moving row is rolled back only on proof
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(an explicit rejection, or its inputs confirmed-spent elsewhere), never on a
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timeout or on one server's silence.
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- **One pool address per round**, so a round's money, history and payout are
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isolated from every other round's.
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- **Deposits need 6 confirmations** (configurable), everything else keeps 1: the
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deposit is the only input a user can double-spend.
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- **Contain reorgs instead of pretending they don't happen:** detect them, pause
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on deep ones, and pay out only what is verifiably on chain.
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## High
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### B-90 — Restoring a backup is unsafe
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A restored DB reopens rounds that were already drawn and paid, and reassigns the
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derivation indexes of users registered after the backup to new users — who then
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receive the old users' funds.
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Fix: `START_PAUSED=true` starts with the lottery paused; at startup the next 20
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indexes past the highest assigned are checked for on-chain history and, if any has
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some, registration is refused until the operator reconciles (`restore_gap_detected`);
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per-round addresses (B-80) and B-82's pre-payout check make a replayed round
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unpayable instead of payable twice.
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### B-91 — Host and supply-chain hardening
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The container runs as root, `.env` and key files are world-readable, dependencies are
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unpinned `>=` and base images float, secrets sit in env vars visible to
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`docker inspect`.
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Fix: non-root `USER`, `0600`/`0700` permissions, a hash-pinned lock file,
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digest-pinned base images, the Fernet key mounted as a file rather than an env var.
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## Medium
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### B-92 — No health, readiness or real audit browsing
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`/health` always answers ok; nothing exposes Electrum state; the audit endpoint
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returns only the latest 500 rows unfiltered; registration writes no audit row; the
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access log records Caddy's IP; app logs go only to the file.
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Fix: `GET /health/ready` (Electrum connected, tip age < 1800s, scheduler heartbeat <
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30s) used as the container healthcheck; Electrum status in `/admin`; audit filters by
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event type, round, user and time, with pagination; `user_registered` audit row with
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index and address; uvicorn proxy headers from Caddy only; logs also to stdout.
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### B-93 — Deploys and rollbacks
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A deploy with an open SSE stream never shuts down gracefully (uvicorn waits, Docker
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kills after 10s); an older image cannot start on a newer DB; images are untagged;
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`SITE_ADDRESS` passed per command reverts to `localhost` on the next plain
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`docker compose up`.
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Fix: close SSE streams on shutdown, `stop_grace_period: 30s`, await task
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cancellation; tag images per release; `SITE_ADDRESS` in `.env` with `${SITE_ADDRESS:?}`;
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documented pre-deploy backup and downgrade procedure.
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### B-94 — Account and endpoint abuse limits
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`change-password` has no rate limit, no audit and no maximum length; login fields
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have no length bounds; `POST /bug-reports` is anonymous and unlimited;
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`GET /admin/users` has no pagination; admin, SSE and framework errors are bare
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strings; static JS/CSS have no `Cache-Control`.
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Fix: throttle and audit (`password_changed`) the password change, cap every
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credential field at 256, rate-limit bug reports per IP, paginate the user list,
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structured errors everywhere, `Cache-Control: no-cache` on static files.
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### B-96 — Smaller state inconsistencies
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A reduced full-balance withdrawal is not re-checked against the minimum; an abandoned
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payout leaves `winner_amount_sats`/`fee_amount_sats` set; a promoted payout writes no
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`payout_sent` and a promoted bet no `bet_placed`; the reconciler pings SSE for every
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row it checks; concurrent refreshes of one user can collide on the unique outpoint
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and end the Electrum session; `listener.client` is read outside the per-user lock;
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a bet covered only by pending change gets `insufficient_balance` instead of
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`balance_pending_confirmation`. A round waiting in `closing` on a bet that never
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leaves the mempool gives no signal at all.
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Fix: each as described, one regression test per item; for the `closing` wait, a
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`closing_stalled` audit row every 1800s past the deadline and `closing_waiting_since`
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on `GET /rounds/current` (spec: TX-29).
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