davide
702b37b319
GET /rounds/stream capped concurrent subscribers with one global counter (MAX_SUBSCRIBERS=500): anyone opening 500 connections degraded every other user to polling. The comment called it a defensive cap; it was actually the vector, since nothing stopped a single source from exhausting it alone. RoundEventBroadcaster now also tracks subscribers per client IP, capped much lower (MAX_SUBSCRIBERS_PER_IP=5). Past that cap, opening one more stream evicts that same IP's own oldest connection (woken via a new EVICTED sentinel so the SSE generator closes it promptly) rather than refusing the new one or letting one abusive IP crowd out unrelated clients under the old global-only cap. The global cap stays as a backstop against overall resource exhaustion regardless of source. Extracted client_ip() (X-Forwarded-For, since Caddy reverse-proxies every request) out of auth/routes.py into app/api/client_ip.py so the login/registration throttles (B-33) and this new per-IP cap share one definition instead of two that could drift apart. Not implemented: enforcing the connection cap at the Caddy layer itself, which the proposed fix also suggested - the standard Caddy image this project uses has no such directive without a third-party module, and building a custom image felt like a bigger, separate change than this fix warranted. Suite grows from 201 to 211 tests. BUGS.md moves B-38 to Previously fixed.
160 lines
9.2 KiB
Markdown
160 lines
9.2 KiB
Markdown
# Known bugs
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A second full-codebase audit on 2026-07-27 found **25 further issues** (4 critical, 6 high,
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7 medium, 8 low), listed below as B-39 … B-49. B-25 through B-38 are fixed (see "Previously
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fixed" below) — no Critical-severity finding remains open; the other 11 are Medium/Low.
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The 139-test suite was green at the time of the audit, so none of these were caught by existing
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coverage — every fix lands with a regression test (the fourteen fixes so far brought the suite
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from 139 to 211).
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The recurring pattern across the open findings is worth stating once: the code is rigorous
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about the failure modes that have actually been hit, and silent about the ones that have not.
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The payout phase is now fully recoverable; the "drawing" phase (waiting on a block) is now
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observable (B-36) but still has no equivalent resume-after-restart — see "Known gaps / TODO"
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in [CLAUDE.md](CLAUDE.md), which is also where other by-design limitations (single-shared-token
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admin auth, single-process assumptions, no user-facing history, etc.) are documented.
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---
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## Medium
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### B-39 — SQLite with no WAL, no `busy_timeout`, and five concurrent writer tasks
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`db/base.py:6` calls `create_async_engine(settings.database_url)` with no `connect_args`, and
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there is no `PRAGMA` anywhere in the repo (verified by grep). Without `journal_mode=WAL`
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readers block writers, and the concurrent writers are five background tasks plus every HTTP
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handler. `database is locked` under load is realistic, and nothing handles it.
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**Proposed fix.** Set `journal_mode=WAL`, `synchronous=NORMAL` and a `busy_timeout` of a few
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seconds on connect (a `connect` event listener on the engine, applied only for the SQLite
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dialect), and retry `OperationalError: database is locked` in the background loops. Longer
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term this is an argument for PostgreSQL, which the single-process constraints in CLAUDE.md
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also point at.
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### B-40 — `bump_fee` holds a DB session open across N network calls
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`tx/broadcast.py:80` issues one `get_transaction` **per input** (up to 15s each) and then a
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`broadcast`, all with the session open. This is precisely the pattern B-18 removed from
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`_trigger_payout` via its three-phase structure; it survives here.
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Side note in the same function: `_prevout_amount` does `round(value_coins * 100_000_000)` on a
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float from the server — acceptable at these magnitudes, but it is floating-point money
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arithmetic in a codebase that is otherwise strictly integer-satoshi.
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**Proposed fix.** Restructure into the same three phases: read what is needed and close the
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session, do the chain work, then reopen to persist. For the float: prefer the raw (non-verbose)
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transaction and parse the output value as an integer with `embit`, which is what
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`reconcile.py:_release_inputs` already does for inputs.
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### B-41 — All confirmation logic depends on `verbose=True`, which is not universally supported
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`poll_once`, `reconcile._tx_exists_on_chain` and `bump_fee` all call
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`blockchain.transaction.get(txid, True)`. Several Electrum server implementations and versions
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reject the verbose flag ("verbose transactions are currently unsupported"). Falling back onto
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such a server means **no confirmations, no reconciliation, no bumps** — and the code would read
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that as a transport error and stay silent.
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Related: `reconcile.py:83` decides whether to **abandon a transaction** by substring-matching
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the error text (`"missing"`, `"not found"`, `"no such"`, `"unknown"`). It works against
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ElectrumX; it is fragile as the basis for a decision that releases funds.
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**Proposed fix.** Use `blockchain.transaction.get_merkle` (or the scripthash history) for
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confirmation and existence checks — both are portable and give the confirming height directly.
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Probe verbose support once at connect time and record it on the client, so an unsupported
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server is detected loudly at session start rather than silently mid-operation.
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---
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## Low / hygiene
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### B-42 — `/docs` exposed in production
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FastAPI mounts Swagger by default, so the entire API surface — `/admin` included — is publicly
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enumerable. The README advertises it.
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**Fix:** `docs_url=None, redoc_url=None, openapi_url=None` in production (env-gated), or place
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them behind `require_admin`.
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### B-43 — No HTTP security headers
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The [Caddyfile](Caddyfile) sets no CSP, no `X-Frame-Options`/`frame-ancestors`, and no HSTS
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(Caddy does not add it on its own). The JWT lives in `localStorage`, so any XSS exfiltrates
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it, and the page is iframeable.
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**Fix:** a `header` block in the Caddyfile with `Strict-Transport-Security`,
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`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `Referrer-Policy` and a CSP tight enough for two static
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pages with no external assets (`default-src 'self'`).
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### B-44 — README and CLAUDE.md contradict each other
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The README says to run `uvicorn --reload` directly and
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`docker compose run --rm app python scripts/generate_master_key.py`; CLAUDE.md says explicitly
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that neither is supported. Whoever opens the repo reads the README first.
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**Fix:** align the README's Quick start with the Docker-only workflow documented in
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CLAUDE.md and `docs/setup.md`.
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### B-45 — Unvalidated and unpaginated admin list endpoints
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`limit: int = 50` on `/admin/rounds` and `/admin/audit-log` has no bounds (`-1` means
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"everything" on SQLite), and `/admin/pending-transactions` has no limit at all — it grows
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without end.
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**Fix:** `Query(default=50, ge=1, le=500)` on both, and the same treatment plus a status filter
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on the pending-transaction list.
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### B-46 — `secrets.compare_digest` on a `str` raises on non-ASCII input
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`api/routes/admin.py:27` raises `TypeError` — a 500 instead of a 403 — when the header contains
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non-ASCII characters.
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**Fix:** compare the UTF-8 encoded bytes of both sides.
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### B-47 — Unbounded `String` columns for large text
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`raw_tx_hex` (`db/models.py:146`) and `payload_json` (`:178`) should be `Text`. It works on
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SQLite and PostgreSQL and breaks elsewhere.
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**Fix:** switch both to `Text` in a migration.
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### B-48 — No cap on input count in `select_utxos`
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A user with hundreds of small UTXOs builds a huge transaction whose fee — deducted from the bet
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amount — materially erodes their contribution to the pool, and it can exceed standardness
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limits.
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**Fix:** cap the selected inputs (e.g. 50) and fail with a translatable error suggesting a
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consolidation, or consolidate the address automatically when the count crosses a threshold.
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### B-49 — Rollback paths do not publish an SSE update
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`bets/service.py:_release_failed_bet` and `withdrawals/service.py:_release_failed_withdrawal`
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restore the balance without calling `broadcaster.publish()`, so dashboards only find out on
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their next poll.
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**Fix:** one `broadcaster.publish()` at the end of each, as every other state-changing path
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already does.
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---
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## Previously fixed
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- **B-25** — the payout had no two-phase write, unlike bets and withdrawals
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- **B-26** — a payout failure or a process restart could wedge a round in `paying_out` forever
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- **B-27** — an RBF bump reset the reconciler's own abandon clock, so a repeatedly-bumped tx was never abandoned
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- **B-28** — a hostile Electrum server (or a MITM) could single-handedly pick the round's winner
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- **B-29** — a UTXO absent from one server's `listunspent` was marked spent immediately, irreversibly, on a single unauthenticated reply
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- **B-30** — a lost scripthash subscription meant a user's deposits were never credited, with no periodic safety net
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- **B-31** — resubscribing on reconnect ran serially before anything else started, freezing the chain tip (and so an in-flight draw) for the whole sweep
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- **B-32** — an RBF bump could retry forever below BIP125's relay-mandated minimum fee delta, with no ceiling on the fee rate either
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- **B-33** — `POST /auth/login` had no rate limiting, so a password could be brute-forced against an enumerable username list
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- **B-34** — password change/reset didn't invalidate already-issued JWTs, so a stolen token survived a change meant to lock it out
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- **B-35** — API timestamps round-tripped as naive datetimes, so the frontend parsed them as local time instead of UTC
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- **B-36** — a stalled draw wait had no timeout, no log, and no audit trail, so a frozen round showed nothing in `/admin`
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- **B-37** — a withdrawal covered by unconfirmed change answered "insufficient balance" instead of distinguishing it from actually having no funds
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- **B-38** — the SSE subscriber cap was global, so one client opening enough connections degraded every other user to polling
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See git history for the fix-by-fix breakdown (commits `f13f685`, `50a43ae`, `933760e`, and the
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B-28/B-29/B-30/B-31/B-32/B-33/B-34/B-35/B-36/B-37/B-38 fixes). Suite grew from 139 to 211 tests over the fourteen.
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A full-codebase audit on 2026-07-26 (commit `d4e0974`) found 24 bugs across every Python
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module under `app/`, both static frontends, and the Docker/Caddy deployment — 5 critical,
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7 high, 7 medium, 5 low. All 24 were fixed and verified against the current code on
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2026-07-27; the fixes are covered by the regression suite (grew from 79 to 139 tests) and
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five of them were additionally confirmed against a real mainnet deployment (see git history
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between `fb734bb` (documenting the findings) and `845ba98` (recording the audit outcome) for
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the fix-by-fix breakdown — each commit message names the bugs it closes and where their
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tests live).
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